THE WAR AGAINST THE WEST
by
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with Preface by
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PREFACE

The contents of this striking book bear out its title: "The War Against The West". What its author means by "the West" readers will discover. Unless I misread him he would define the "War against the West"—as I should—in terms of a conscious, deliberate revolt of Germanism against the freedom of the human personality alike in its religious, social and political forms. It is the onslaught of a reborn pagan barbarism upon the spirit and the ethics of liberal Christendom.

Readers will do well to glance through the 14 pages of bibliography at the end of M. Kolnai's volume before they plunge into it. They will notice that the great majority of the works cited and analysed have been published since 1980. The names of most of these works and of their authors will be unknown to them. Even to me, despite a bowing acquaintance with contemporary German literature, M. Kolnai's book has come, if not as a revelation in itself, at least as cumulative proof (overwhelming in its completeness) of the tendencies of such German thought as can now be printed in Germany. Few of us have the time or the patience to scale all the mountains of portentous trash or to wade through the morasses of mental and moral degradation that must be traversed by any seeker after the "truth" of National Socialist ideology. M. Kolnai has had the patience and has found the time. He has climbed, plodded and waded his way through all this forbidding country. Now and again he pauses to take breath and to reflect awhile. Rarely, if ever, are his reflections wide of the mark. If they have a quaint flavour of their own, his readers will soon learn to appreciate it. His publishers have, I think, done well not to iron out all the wrinkles in his English style or to sand-paper its little knots and knobs until the surface should seem uniformly smooth. He is dealing with very knotty material; and it is sometimes well that the style of a writer should suit his subject.
My own researches into German ways of thought go back to the autumn of 1892. Then, as a student of philosophy at Berlin University, I learned something of the working of German minds, something that those who read German philosophy in translations can hardly grasp. A wise and experienced English friend who had been through the German mill gave me at that time a piece of advice of which I afterwards saw the value. "Be careful", he wrote, "not to get into the way of using German terms and expressions as counters in your thought when you turn over in your mind what you have learned. Force yourself to put them into English; and if they won't go into English be sure that there is a catch in them somewhere". Friedrich Paulsen, who was one of my professors of philosophy at Berlin, put the same idea into other words. "I can't imagine", he said, "why you English people come here to study German philosophy. You have got it all at home, and much more clearly, in David Hume". But it was not until I read Schopenhauer's devastating criticism of his predecessors that I understood what my English friend and Paulsen had really meant.

Chief among the German terms that will not go into English or, for that matter, into any Western tongue, is the concept of Kultur. The "catch" in it is not obvious, for Kultur is usually rendered into English as "culture" or "civilization". Both renderings are thoroughly misleading. For a clear and comprehensive definition of Kultur I have searched German literature in vain, and have as vainly applied to German friends. The only satisfactory definition I know of is that which the leading Germanist of Paris University, Professor Edmond Vermeil, supplied in an article contributed to The International Mind of April, 1986. It helps to show what M. Kolnai understands by "The War against the West". Professor Vermeil asked why modern German thought has been systematically hostile to Western ideas of international co-operation and has obstinately supported historical realism against the constructive idealism of the West. By way of answer he drew attention to the geographical boundaries of Germany which, in course of time, became more or less stabilized on the West but on the East were fretted out, in flat country, by constant conflict between Germans and Slavs. To the South the Italians and the Magyars
oppose barriers to German expansiveness; and in order to triumph German expansion needs to overcome all these barriers so as to escape from territorial limitations. Professor Vermeil went on:

"This explains the meaning which German thought gives to Kultur. Here, Kultur means mastery, effort ceaselessly renewed, constant struggle without final satisfaction in principle. By 'civilization' the West understands the sum total of the institutions which came at once out of Antiquity and Christianity, the acknowledged sources of Western thought and of Western universalism. But Germany only learned late, and indirectly, the thought of Antiquity. Nor was she so strongly impregnated by Christianity as were the other peoples of Western and Southern Europe; and, perhaps for this reason, she has preserved her original traits. It is, above all, this double tardiness which leads her to set up the concept of Kultur against the concept of 'civilization' and, not without disdain, to throw back the latter concept on to the West."

If Western Europe, international in mind and tendency, looks upon "civilization" as a system of ways of behaviour and spiritual ideals that are humane and susceptible of universal application, the Germans understand by Kultur an intimate union between themselves and the natural forces of the Universe, whose action they alone are capable of apprehending, and as a tribal discipline designed to turn those forces to account. As Fichte insisted in his "Fourteen Speeches to the German Nation", delivered in 1808, only the Germans know the method of realizing this intimate union since that method is the outcome of their temperament and of their history. They, Fichte reminded them, are the "primeval people" (Urvolk) who speak the primeval, aboriginal tongue (Ursprache) which gives them contact with the forces of Nature. Therefore German minds return more easily than those of other nations to the instincts and concepts of the primitive world from which "the West", under the joint influences of Classical thought and of Christianity, has sought to escape.

From Fichte to Hitler, as Professor F. W. Foerster has observed, the line runs straight. It can be traced through Hegel and Schlegel, Paul de Lagarde (whose real name was von Bötticher), List and Lange to Treitschke, Nietzsche, Houston
Stewart Chamberlain and a number of minor writers. But the line did not begin with Fichte. One of his predecessors, Herder, had maintained that the German people alone are initiated into the secrets of philosophical thought and are able to give those secrets reality. The whole sense of history and of the world, he affirmed, would be lost without the triumph of the German people. Even Schiller, in an unfinished poem on “German Greatness” which he wrote in 1801, denounced English force and French brilliance as aspects of a materialist outlook, whereas Germany derived moral dignity from her Kultur and from the character of her people which are independent of her political position. To the German spirit alone, Schiller claimed, is it given to apprehend sacred things, since it alone communes with the spirit of the Universe which has chosen it to work at the timeless task of human Kultur. So when Fichte proclaimed that only in and through the German language, the primeval tongue of the aboriginal German race that gives access to the forces of Nature, can progress be achieved and true freedom be attained he was but carrying one step farther notions already current.

Still farther did Fichte go in claiming that the German people and their Fatherland bear in themselves a pledge of eternity, and that true patriotism must lie in the conception of the German people as eternal and supreme. Indeed, their fundamental character gave Germans the right to call themselves simply “The People”. Such a people would take whatever soil it might need, driving out earlier inhabitants, or raiding and enslaving them. The empty idea of a “balance of power” in Europe could only be made a real thing by having in the centre of Europe an overwhelmingly powerful German nation, pure and uncontaminated, animated by a common will and united in a common strength. German peace must be imposed upon Europe. Force alone must be its guarantee, a guarantee more valid than any plighted word, treaty, or “honourable peace”. No prince, as a prince, is entitled to observe the laws of private morals, humaneness, probity or good faith; and a people whom their prince might ruin by observing these laws would be warranted in taking him to task. “Between States”, Fichte wrote, “there is neither law nor right save the law of the strongest”. And the German people,
among whom alone individuals live metaphysically, is "the people, metaphysically predestined, which has the moral right to fulfil its destiny by every means of cunning and force".

These doctrines, which Hegel developed and transmitted to Treitschke and others, lead naturally to Hegel's affirmation that war is a necessary method of asserting the rights of a State, and that the (Prussian) State would be criminal not to employ it. War prevents stagnation and crystallization and restores internal order with the real balance of powers indispensable to the proper working of human societies. It is a great boon which mankind cannot dispense with.

From Clausewitz, the classical German writer "On War", to Ludendorff, whose book "Total War" once more extolled war as the supreme object of a nation's existence, the course of German military thought runs parallel with German political philosophy. Though Clausewitz defined war as the "handmaid of policy" he also said that in the service of a splendid policy war might become almost an end in itself. Ludendorff chides him for ever thinking of war as merely the handmaid of policy instead of declaring it to be the highest form of national activity in preparation for which all energies of heart and mind and body must be enlisted, the whole enterprise being guided and inspired by German knowledge of a German God.

However fantastic Ludendorff's military religiosity may seem, it is a consistent development of the line which German metaphysical thought has followed, and has clothed with political aspirations, since the end of the eighteenth, throughout the nineteenth and during the first few decades of the twentieth centuries. All the greater, therefore, is the significance of M. Aurel Kolnai's summary and analysis of German writings since 1930. He shows what flowers are now blossoming on the branches of the Nazi tree whose "metaphysical roots" Hitler has urged foreigners to try to find. Among these flowers few are fairer than the utterance of Dr. Frank, the Nazi Minister of Justice, in October, 1935: "We are under the great obligation of recognizing, as a holy work of the spirit of our folk, the laws signed with Adolf Hitler's name. Hitler has received his authority from God. Therefore he is a champion, sent by God, of German Right in the world".

It is this "German Right" that is essentially hostile to the
spirit of the West; and the circumstance that Mussolini, who claims to represent the traditions of Rome, should have allied himself with Adolf Hitler to promote the triumph of this “German Right”, is one of the ironies of the present hour. As Professor F. W. Foerster—a Prussian of the Prussians yet a philosopher imbued with the spirit of the West—has pointed out: “Rome created the first universal order of the West not by arms and commerce but by language, law, customs, the art of living, as a fundamental order and logic of speech, thought and co-operation”. Or as another non-Nazi German writer, Georg Moenius, puts it: “In this country (Germany), tardily and laboriously Christianized, a latent enmity against Rome has survived, an outburst of which characterizes every new epoch of German history. Germany’s adherence to the Greco-Roman world of culture would by itself bring about a pacification of Europe”. Mr. Edgar Ansell Mowrer, whose first-hand knowledge of post-war Germany is second to none, recognizes that the adepts of German National doctrine fundamentally hate the lucid Mediterranean civilization without which Germans might still be living in the forests of their Germanic-Slavic ancestors. To free Germans from this civilization, to turn their backs on Western culture is their aim. “Nationalism”, he adds, “became with them a particularist substitute for religion. Their entire attitude strengthens the suspicion that Germany—Prussia, at least—was hardly part of the Western world at all”. Or again, in the words of a pro-Nazi writer, Hans Blüher, in 1932: “Unlike the Teutons, the Gauls have fully adopted the culture of victorious Rome. . . . France always bears the same mission, be it under the symbol of the Cross or of the Rights of Man. . . . Germany is always essentially The Other Side. Even to-day, at bottom, she lives in a state of prorogated truce with official Christianity, nor can it ever be known if the pagan cult-fires are truly and really extinct”.

M. Kolnai rightly recognizes that “Rome” and the “West”, in so far as they mean definable and palpable things, do not mean the same thing, though the Roman and the Western world are united on a basis which can aptly be described as Christian, rational, juridical, and equalitarian from the racial point of view. They are united, too, he argues, in their adherence to the pursuits of civilization and of equipoise in life, in the ideal
of moving towards the goal of happiness. German Nazism
declaims against Russian Bolshevism; but Russian Bolshevism
is no more a proper rival to Nazi Germany than Abyssinia was
to Italy. Criticism of Western tenets of faith and codes of
morals, not of Bolshevist ideas and methods, is the core round
which the Nazi state of mind has developed. While it is the
intention of National Socialist Germany to bring the Slavs and
semi-Slavs of Eastern Europe under German domination and
exploitation, it is alike the Catholic and the Liberal South
and West of Europe that must be overthrown, refuted in theory
and in practice, forced into an inferior position and rooted out
from among the Germanic peoples themselves. Were Nazi
Germany to march against Moscow or Prague or Warsaw or
Kiev or Bucharest, with the toleration or even partial assistance
of the West, Germany would still in essence be waging the
War against the West, and leading Teutonic Paganism on to
victory over the Christian God of justice, mercy and humanity,
and over the universalism of Rome.

Since M. Kolnai reached these conclusions they have been
emphatically confirmed by the Nazi leader, Field-Marshal
Goering, in a speech delivered after Hitler’s annexation of
Austria. Extolling the “Rome-Berlin axis” as the bridge
between Central Europe and “the riches of Africa” he declared
that the axis serves also to cover the rear and the flanks of
Germanic Central Europe “which is directed against the
West”. Those who, like me, have been at some pains to follow
Herr Hitler’s advice and “to try to find the metaphysical
roots of the Nazi movement” can feel no surprise at Field-
Marshal Goering’s categorical statement. It is true; and in
its truth lies at once a warning to the British peoples and
abundant warrant, if warrant were needed, for the title and the
substance of M. Kolnai’s remarkable book.

WICKHAM STEED
Neither a detailed analysis of the "roots" and "causes" of National Socialism, nor a systematic survey of its relationship to analogous or contiguous movements and processes can find a place within the scope of this book in spite of the fact that on several occasions we have referred to those powerful influences which have gone to the making of that strange and terrible creed. Thus, I have referred to the Teutonic religious opposition to the Roman and Western world; to the Germanic tradition of Power and of Thought; to the driving force of the class struggle; and finally to the vices, blunders and insufficiencies of Western Christendom, of Liberalism, Socialism and Pacifism.

Yet I would not have it supposed that I am attempting to "explain" National Socialism by any of these causes. My attitude is more objective. I simply recognize that whether we have adequate explanations or not. "These little things do happen" in this strange world of ours.

Especially when a thing is more than a "little" thing, when it is a grand and powerful thing, it is foolish to treat it as "nothing but" something else, to reduce it to its component parts, and, as it were, explain it away. Moreover a thing so evil as National Socialism cannot be attributed to this or that "mistake." We have no right to assume that "had it not been for . . ." all would have been well.

Even if only for the purpose of fighting it more effectively we had better begin by accepting it as a real, massive, well-founded fact. Only such an attitude will save us from self-deception and from spurious remedies.

The thing has happened. There it is. The fact cannot be altered by optimism on the one hand or by self-reproaches on the other, either by wit or by magic.

But if such things do happen, so also do they pass. They are not invincible. They are only inevitable in a very general sense. It is possible, when we see this grim reality for what it is, and not before, to deal with it very thoroughly in every sense.
Such things do happen.
Such things are destroyed.

Having forewarned my readers against "the perils of a full and false explanation" I may be permitted a few remarks on the spiritual ancestry of the Nazi Philosophy.

Of all those who have contributed to the rise of National Socialism as a creed the two outstanding figures are Friedrich Nietzsche, perhaps the greatest Satanist of all times, and Stefan George, less great but, perhaps because of his homosexuality, more directly instrumental in creating the Third Reich. To be sure both reveal non-Nazi traits. They are hostile both to commonplace German Nationalism and to biological racialism. They even had Jewish and Latin sympathies. Still, all Nazis rightly stress their descent from Nietzsche, and few lack a Georgian determinant in their mental system. For these two men are truly the Augustines of the new paganism, the Aristotles of subjective absolutism, the Kants of immoralism, and the Rousseaus of inequalitarian domination.

How far is this National Socialism identical with Italian Fascism? Fülöp-Miller, Böhm, Spann, and of course Goebbels (always fawning on Mussolini) believe that it is, since it is anti-democratic, hostile to Western Constitutionalism, the French Revolution, and Socialism, since it is nationalistic, totalitarian, and accepts the principle of leadership.

On the other hand, there are both Italian Fascists who are proud of their Latinity and dislike Nazi racialism, and Nazis eager to dissociate themselves from the worship of the State as such, from capitalism, from the acceptance of the urban as opposed to the rural ideal, from anything savouring of Westernism or the Latin culture. Schramm has criticized the national egotism of Italian Fascism and remarked its complete failure to apprehend the German conception of the Reich. Marr argues that Mussolini has created a pagan "order", not a "bund" and that his brand of Fascism has no biological or racial principle behind it.

Sometimes these supposed differences are even more obviously fictitious, as when the Italian protests that he is less servile to capitalism than the Nazi, or the Nazi that he is doing more for labour; or vice versa!

But surely it is clear that not only are these systems really
identical in method and spirit (compare for instance Catholic Fascism in Austria and Portugal), but even beyond ideological identity is the inheritance from the Middle Ages of a Central European Imperialism—a conception which lives again in Fascism and is highly dangerous.

Finally, it may be surprising to some if I trace a correlation, though definitely subconscious, between Naziism and certain degenerate forms of “Liberalism”. In its cult of “relativism”, “tolerance” and “indifferentism”, in its explanation of social phenomena by “psychology”, or by a succession of different “modes of general outlook” or world attitudes of mind, the Liberal Spirit has definitely over-reached itself.

Here is a mood of meek generosity and arbitrary irresponsibility, which throws the door wide open to the wildest subjectivism on the one hand and arbitrary despotism on the other; subjectivism in those who delight in the pose of comfortable inertia and aesthetic passivity; despotism in those who are unable or unwilling to accept that pose.

Mincing criticism ends in shameless irrationalism; overrefined scientific scepticism in brutal pragmatism; distrust of the mind, in a return to fetishistic tribalism; “breadth of mind” in the cowardly acceptance of tyranny and class or national exclusiveness.

Another aspect of the self-destruction of Liberal idealism is the glorification of urges and instincts, of complexes and natural desires which attributes overwhelming power to sensual lust and unconscious impulse. Klages is not far from Freud. Nazi racialism with its false biology and fussy eugenics is very much akin to widely prevalent “progressive” ideas well known to us all.

Mannheim is right when he says that “the self-same sociological causes which lead to the cultural disintegration of liberal society, pave the way for dictatorial forms. Unless a rational control of man, and of self, keeps pace with technological evolution, our present social order is bound to collapse”.

In Germany it has collapsed.
INTRODUCTION

THE CHALLENGE TO EUROPE

“Hitler urged foreigners to try to find the metaphysical roots of the Nazi movement.”

WICKHAM STEED.

1. PURPOSE AND METHOD OF THIS ENQUIRY

The purpose of this book is to illustrate the following ten theses; as a summary a further ten theses will be found at the end of the book.

I. FACTS

1. The outstanding form of Fascism known as National Socialism, and the Germany known as the Third Reich, controlled by, and imbued with National Socialist thought in its more or less official varieties, constitute a reality, spiritual and historical, of supreme individuality and importance.

2. Absolute and conscious antagonism to Western Liberal civilization is the central impulse of that intellectual and political reality.

3. The National Socialist and affiliated doctrines are fundamentally opposed to Liberal democracy, as well as to its Christian foundations and to its Socialistic trends and implications.

4. The anthropological and sociological concepts of National Socialism form an organic whole with the German claim to political expansion and hegemony.

5. There exists today in Europe a great nation, of the highest achievements in the past, which now professes a creed of unbridled and irrational power.
6. The National Socialist doctrines, though ultimately false and immoral, and liable to degenerate into comic vulgarity, are at their highest endowed with spiritual grandeur and relevancy.

7. National Socialism is at bottom incomparably more anti-Western than Bolshevism.

8. National Socialism, though by no means identical with Germanism, is nevertheless deeply rooted in German history and expressive of the German mind.

9. National Socialism essentially embodies and also transcends the socio-political principle of Fascism; Nazi Germany bears within it the seeds of a Pan-Fascist as well as a Pan-Germanic Imperial construction.

10. Because of its anti-humanitarian drive for expansion on nationalistic and at the same time religious and anthropological grounds, National Socialism constitutes a fountain-head of propaganda and a menace of war.

An enquiry like the present one is naturally based on the assumption that ultimate spiritual realities are of practical significance; that their neglect may lead to, or rather is the consequence of disastrous illusions. Information about the Nazi creed, and discussion both of its fundamental principles and of its details is designed to evoke the organized resistance of Western society.

What we are here envisaging is Nazi, semi-Nazi, and pre-Nazi theory and mentality; not the concrete actions of Nazi leaders and authorities, not the administrative, economic, statistical and military facts which characterize contemporary Germany. We are reproducing, either literally or in substance, the contents of Nazi and neo-German books, essays and speeches, adding on most occasions some remarks of interpretation and criticism. Our method can be summarized briefly thus: “Let them explain themselves”, preferably where their words are most ingenious, expressive, characteristic and vigorous. These words are the main thing, whereas my comments have merely a secondary function; nevertheless they belong equally to the framework of the book.
INTRODUCTION

Some perhaps will question its objectivity, others may even charge me with overrating the adversary. The truth is that "objectivity", though a most important and indispensable term, has several meanings. If objectivity means being impartial, neutral or inactive in one's outlook, then I disclaim objectivity, for neither do I think that all things are equally good or bad, nor that National Socialism is half-way good and half-way bad; nor do I pretend to do so. If objectivity means the faithful presentation of a thing according to its own essence and undistorted by one's own feelings, then I may claim that I have at least made a sincere attempt to be objective. Readers who are familiar with ordinary anti-Nazi polemics may miss some of the usual arguments and may find that others are advanced with more caution and reserve. In short, I have taken great pains to do justice to the object of my enquiry; but to do someone justice does not necessarily imply that one justifies him. Let us suppose, for example, that we have to characterize an eroto-maniac, a sombre, tragic, insatiable and dangerous Don Juan. It would be unjust to describe him from sheer dislike as a thief, when in fact he scrupulously respects the property of others; or as a sadistic pervert, which he need not be at all; or as a vulgar profligate, which again he is not. On the other hand, it would not be in the least "objective" to interpret his actions as a harmless pastime, a sublime quest of friendship or a cult of beauty notable for its high educative value. This also answers the charge of over-estimation. Both the refusal to see unpleasant, horrible and minatory things in their true colours, and the refusal to see the relative virtues and achievements attached to them, are symptoms of that intellectual cowardice and self-complacency which are bound to bear sinister fruits, and which I am more than ready to contemn.

The reader will notice that I have not concealed the schisms and divergencies to be found within the circle of Nazi thought and in its neo-German nimbus. We shall meet openly Pagan and ostensibly Christian, formally "revolutionary" and strongly traditionalist, more strictly racial and more strictly fascist, more "imperialist" and more "nationalist", heavily capitalist and "National Bolshevik" shades of Nazi opinion; yet I think there can be no doubt that the whole complex is a
2. THE MENACE AND THE LURE

"The ambition of the National Socialist leaders to re-Nordicize Germany, to provide Nordic tutelage for the rest of Europe and to substitute the morals and customs of a tribe of warriors for those of urban capitalism, seems fantastic. It would be a serious error, however, to assume because the purposes of the Party leaders are abnormal, that they are non-existent. They may, indeed, be impossible even of approximate attainment, but they are wholly real in the sense that they are effective stimuli to action."

C. Hoover.

In a word, these querelles d'Allemands are a weighty and disquieting affair; were it not for Fascism as a "prevailing fashion", and for Germany's military preparations, they might be considered by "practical" people of the West to be real "Professors'" quarrels, curious, perhaps, but of no further consequence. Unfortunately, since international fascism and German armaments really do exist, our "practical" people must admit that such a stream of fanatical and ingenious theorizing both reveals and augments the practical reality of the danger. It has been well said by the Viennese democrat Oskar Benda (1981) that "even the remotest spiritual currents, which in their abstractness appear to be exceedingly harmless, can, by their incorporation in the process of national education, become vital powers of the first order".

As to the threats they contain, I will confine myself to quoting the pithy words of an English writer, Robert Dell (1984), with which I entirely concur. "If we are to preserve Western civilization, then we must make up our mind to destroy Hitlerism, which aims at the destruction of precisely what is of most value in Western civilization. Ceci tuera cela." A Nazi
pact with France, leaving Germany a free hand in the East, would only mean a postponement of the fall of the West. "An alliance with Nazi Germany would be a betrayal of the Allies, a treason against Western civilization, and also a suicidal act on the part of France." As for Great Britain, "We are as much threatened by Nazi Germany as France and the rest of the Continent, even though the menace to us may be further off".

"Menace" and "Lure", however, are closely related. For Western society the imperialist designs of Germany are by no means the only danger created by National Socialism; the Fascist tendencies alive in Western society itself lend it real virulence. Nazi Germany is the strongest symbolic vital centre of Fascism. Now Fascism is a serious attempt to "solve" the socio-political problem of the present age, and it doubtless offers certain advantages. All those among us who cherish the idea that rulers should, after all, be rulers, that masters should be masters (and slaves should be slaves), that the prevention of proletarian ascendency is worth any price, that "efficiency" must ruthlessly be secured at the price of progress and justice, all who support these views are actual or potential allies of Nazidom. And this sympathy when applied to the racial and national aspects of the case only tends to strengthen the alliance. Since Germany is a mightier nation than Fascist Italy, and claims for its racial fabric a mystical excellence which is practically foreign to the Italian mind, German world hegemony might well be held to be the logical perfection of the principle that masters should be masters. Moreover, some share of the glory might be enjoyed by the "Teutonic" dependencies of Germanism, among which the Anglo-Saxon states—politically if not racially—rank highest.

This aspect of the question is by no means irrelevant. The Western "bourgeois" who are flirting with Fascism or are even ready to espouse its cause should bear in mind that, for the sake of naked, and in part illusory, class interests, they are sliding into a betrayal of their national, as well as of their human and spiritual honour and aspirations. In order to make sure of the English or French workers they would capitulate to Mussolini, but above all, and more finally, to Hitler. They would exchange the noble traditions of a glorious past for ignoble thraldom under foreign slave-masters. Basely masquerading as
economic self-preservation, this would in fact be abdication, renunciation, and self-annihilation. I admit that proletarian and Russian Socialism confront the world of Western democracy with a series of complications and embarrassments. But these difficulties could never make it justifiable or reasonable for Western industrial and peasant society to re-establish the supremacy of those powers of oppression in opposition to which they have achieved greatness, prosperity and self-fulfilment. The most virulent form of Bolshevism is still infinitely more akin to the civilian (bürgerlich) idea than is Nazi Anti-Liberalism; the most extreme Left Atheism has infinitely more in common with Christian morality and its social implications than has Nazi Paganism. These statements, gratuitous as they may now seem to some of my readers, will be amply borne out by a survey of the most representative and brilliant literary exponents of National Socialism.

I am sorry to say, however, that the livid gleam of National Socialism also exercises its fascination upon minds whose leaning towards Fascism can hardly be attributed to hypertrophied and mistaken capitalist or clericalist interests. There is a type of man, chiefly to be found among radical intellectuals, who cannot help feeling “impressed” by Nazi “totality”, “vitality”, “finality”, “unconditionality”, etc. Not all of them are morbid aesthetes; it is a human weakness proper to the best of us to be susceptible to seduction; and I set myself the task of proving, not of disproving, that National Socialism is a thing of grandeur. Anyhow, all genuine revolutions in the grand manner, be they even counter-revolutions, capture the imaginations of their opponents. Marcuse, a German emigré writer in Paris, has justly remarked that “to be a victim of the Nazis does not necessarily render one immune to their mental infection”. We must also take into account the exaggerated desire to be as fair as possible to the enemy, a delicacy of mind common to many English “sportsmen” and German “Geistige” (intellectuals). “My experience is that the proportion of silly—I do not say unintelligent—people is even larger among people of the Left than in the human race in general. Perhaps this is because they are the children of light” (R. Dell). As for pacifists who take an unhealthy pleasure in martyrdom, and are the more disposed to cower before a tyrant
the more violent and ruthless he is, I can only beg to express my opinion that their philosophy is in many respects identical with that of the tyrant, e.g., in holding that there are no morally different forms of compulsion and violence, that pure souls have no business to interfere in the affairs of the world, that absolute slavery is better than limited freedom, etc. Some English people of the Left are, I understand, more sympathetic to National Socialism than to Italian Fascism. This paradoxical attitude may be due in part to Teutonic strains in themselves of which they are unaware; perhaps also they appreciate the fact that there is far more religious sincerity in Hitler than in Mussolini; this fact is incontestable, and contributes greatly towards making the German dictator the more dangerous and more rigidly anti-Western of the two.

As regards Nazi vitality, to some people most attractive in its reckless aggressiveness, we will say that vitality in itself is undoubtedly preferable to sickliness, but at the same time the question whose vitality it is and what purpose it serves cannot be evaded. To resort to a somewhat grim simile: the cells of a cancerous tumour reveal a perfectly amazing vitality, an unparalleled power of rapid and remorseless growth—only we do not happen to like that kind of vitality. We are bent on stopping that growth in spite of its magnificent élan, and we support the emaciated and failing organism with its commonplace inexpensive cells. Naturally this choice—apart from other reasons—is not independent of the fact that the carcinomatous tissue is precipitating the end of all life and organic form around it, even its own. The revival of spiritual barbarism, in the same way, embodies a threat to material civilization, and life gone mad, though it may afford a splendid pageant for a time, is bound for death.
8. THE CHARTER OF THE WEST

"Hitlerite Germany", writes Wickham Steed, "or the Third Empire, as it is currently called, represents a challenge to Western liberal civilization. Few things seem to me of higher moment than the safeguarding of this civilization and of the principles upon which it has been built up. Of these principles the Nazi ‘Aryan’ doctrine and its denial of democratic rule are a direct negation. The issue is now fairly joined between the two incompatible systems and philosophies. Upon the outcome of this contest the fate of European and of Western liberal civilization may depend."

"There is", writes O. Benda, "a disheartening difference of structure between the bürgerlich mind in Germany and the bürgerlich mind in the nations which constitute Western civilization proper.” He adds a reference to Wolters, who as early as 1910 demanded (in the Stefan Georgian “Year-book of Spiritual Movement”) the elimination of such “bürgerlich revolutionary survivals” as liberty, equality, republic, etc., and of “all inflated idols of Europeanism”.

It may help us to pause here for a moment, and, since we are so much concerned with anti-Western rebellion, to consider what we mean by the “West” as a spiritual and historical reality. The following brief summary, attempting an answer to this question, is an abstract from a (hitherto unpublished) essay on “Western Civilization” by my friend Béla Menczer (London), to whom I am greatly indebted for his valuable assistance.

1. For the ancient Greeks “the West” (or “Europe”) meant society with a free constitution and self-government under recognized rules, where "law is king", whereas the "East" (or "Asia") signified theocratic societies under godlike rulers whom their subjects serve "like slaves".

2. These, however, are transferable spiritual essences rather than geographical localizations. To us to-day the “West” means “Western Europe”, though the Scandinavian states are more inherently Western than Spain or Portugal. The cultural term covers the geographical term but inexacty.
3. "Western" and "Eastern" types appear extensively and inextricably commingled in the web of European civilization of different ages. But it is the Western traits which characterize the progressive, creative and enduring cultural formations.

4. In contrast to predominantly theocratic and traditional modes of life, the "Western" type implies public bodies ruled on lines of rational ethics and secularized politics, the leaders of which are not magical incarnations of divinity, but organs and functionaries of an earthly community.

5. In the Secularized State terrestrial power (being no longer linked with the Divine) is no longer absolute but becomes relative, hence a correspondingly heightened appreciation of human personality and individual conscience. The main religious impulse behind this process is to be found in Christianity, with its appeal to the human "soul" and its sundering of "God and Caesar", but the way for Christian inspiration was prepared by Socratic and Stoic thought.

6. Another decisive element was Roman legal order, and the rationalization of property relationships which it embodied. The synthesis between Roman Imperial universalism and Christianity in St. Augustine's Civitas Dei contains the mainsprings of the subsequent evolution of Western society.

7. The rational and secular aspect of Christian society tended to predominate in the Western sphere of Christian influence; in the East the "magic" element prevailed. In some sense intimacy with the Latin language and mentality is even to-day a measure of "Western" coinage. The creation of a "nobility" as a broad class of "representatives of the State" was also typical of the Western hemisphere.

8. It is characteristic of the Christian and Western medium, but in some way foreshadowed by the Greek city-states and Hellenistic culture, that men, in their reasoning and moral feeling, should behave as members of universal mankind rather than as subjects of a particular king or particles of a special community. The princes of Christendom are themselves considered the free vassals of a spiritually universal Realm of Man. Prior to the period of revolutions the most typically "Western" governments in Europe were certain city republics (above all in Italy).

9. Western civilization is characterized not so much by a
complete abolition of the magical and traditional elements of power as by the ideal of a mobile equilibrium between them and the rational utilitarian, equalitarian elements, though the latter tend to take the upper hand, tolerating their counterpart merely as the second term necessary for balance, the provider of that stability which makes freedom practicable. The principles of control (in the sense of check), division of powers, constitutionalism, etc., become intelligible when viewed in this light. The Church herself sets the element of "free assent" above the magical "incorporation" of her members in the holy community. On the other hand, the pronounced laicalism and religious indifference of a state like the present French Republic is merely an extreme manifestation of the basic Western tendency.

10. The democratic principle of a constitutional "opposition", most peculiarly Western of all social phenomena, is deeply rooted in the general philosophy of the West—the postulate of empiricism requiring all original beliefs to be proven by experience. Individual liberty and freedom of organization are inseparable from analytic thought and from the iron distinction between "objective truth" and "preconceived opinion" imposed by ruling bodies of any kind. The stress laid on experimental research and the dialectical development of the sciences throughout the centuries are also peculiar to the West. The practice of magic is doomed to disappear, and this too is a consequence of the rational and modifying influences of Christian theology itself.

11. Another point inherent in the doctrines of "personal dignity" and "dialectics" bears on the attitude to sex and on the relationship between the sexes. Personally accentuated erotic tenderness, the by-product of ascetic self-control and the trend towards the emancipation of women are keenly distinctive of the West.

12. Finally, there is the supremely Western element of "Nation" proper as a comparatively small "collective personality", intensely aware of itself, with its emphatic (if controversial) membership of a "society of nations", a supranational "cosmos of civilization", a universal mankind transcending closely defined political units and sovereignties of power.
INTRODUCTION

It merely remains for me to add that the basic formulas for this elucidation have already been advanced by the greatest, noblest and truest representative of Western civilization (both in its ethical and political aspects) of our present age. In his books on the Great War, “The new Europe” and “World Revolution”, T. G. Masaryk has pronounced “Democracy versus Theocracy” and “Christ versus Caesar” to be the pivots of the Western Allies’ spiritual position in their struggle against the Germanic Empires.

NOTES ON CERTAIN UNUSUAL WORDS

INWARDNESS (e.g. page 87)
An attitude of mystical emotion, a sinking into cosmic communion. Hence the basic formula “Inwardness fused with power”, a religious pursuit of power as opposed to the materialistic lust for power of ancient Rome or modern Italian Fascism.

SACRAL (e.g. page 55)
“Holy” in a strictly institutional and non-moral sense, i.e. not implying a favourable judgment of value. Many ecclesiastical objects and persons are “Holy” in this sense without implying piety or righteousness.

DISTANTIATE (e.g. page 78)
To set at a distance from.

FUNDAMENT (e.g. page 179)
Something more basic, solid and unitary than foundation.

CONGRUOUS (e.g. page 190)
Indicates explicit correspondence as between two geometrical figures which, though different in scale, fit each other. According to the Nazi racial point of view, body and soul must “fit” each other, they must conform to one another.
NOTES ON CERTAIN UNUSUAL WORDS

FRONT SOLDIER (e.g. page 275)
A man who has actually fought (not merely served) as a soldier in the War.

EXPROPRIATE (e.g. page 279)
Taking away from a principle or idea that which properly belongs to it while at the same time retaining the outward form for its ornamental value, so to speak.

UNCANNINESS (e.g. page 525)
From the German Unheimlichkeit. Something novel and disquieting which does not fit into the habitual, familiar categories of the bourgeois Western world but evokes a sense of strangeness, distrust and uneasiness.

CORYPHAEUS (e.g. page 642)
Leader of the chorus. Representative spokesman of a creed or ideology.
CHAPTER I

THE CENTRAL MEANING OF THE NATIONAL SOCIALIST ATTITUDE

“Formerly, we were in the habit of saying: this is right or wrong; to-day, we must put the question accordingly: What would the ‘Führer’ say? This attitude towards the ‘Führer’ as well as his own person, are the Categorical Imperative to which German life must henceforward conform. We are under the great obligation of recognizing as a holy work of our Volk’s spirit the laws signed by Adolf Hitler’s name. Hitler has received his authority from God. Therefore he is a champion, sent by God, for German Right in the world.”

H. FRANK, Imperial Minister of Justice
(Frankfort a.M., October 30th and 31st, 1935).

1. TRIBAL EGOTISM VERSUS HUMANITY AND OBJECTIVE STANDARDS

“The consciousness of Kind can only be blurred and obscured by Reason. . . . In degenerate communities of ants, the ants assume a mixed odour pervaded by the smell of the parasites, and thus lose the instinctive faculty of discrimination between the parasites and their own kin.”

P. KRANNHALS.

In the eventful spring of 1938 General Hermann Göring (Minister of the Empire and of Prussia) in reply to certain
reproaches declared: “As for me, I am subjective, I commit myself to my people and acknowledge nothing else on earth. I thank my Maker for having created me without what they call a ‘sense of objectivity’”.

It would be difficult to express the essence of National Socialism more succinctly. The nation as the ultimate standard of its own conduct—or, to put it in still more fundamental terms, the absolute subjectivity and sovereignty of a closed social group—is indeed the moral charter of the new Germany. The nation (in this pretentious and comprehensive sense) owes no allegiance whatever to humanity as a higher unit or to humanity as the embodiment of generally applicable laws and conventions. It constitutes a world apart, responsible to no human tribunal outside its boundaries and, as another aspect of the same idea, it towers above all human rights within them.

For the negation of humanity and the negation of the rights of man are mutual implications. Humanity is not merely a larger nation or state made up of states, it is the community of all who are endowed with a human soul, and transcends the limits of any closed and organized collective body; on the other hand, the rights and freedom of man in any such collective group and in relation to its rulers by no means pertain simply to any “part” within any “whole” but depend on the fact that man in some way represents humanity itself as opposed to the organized social body, which always fails fully to comprehend the spiritual substance of its members. (Now Nationalism, in this strained form of all-pervasiveness, maintains that the closed collective body, as a clearly defined unit of mind, will and power, is the ultimate reality in human life, all other things being fictions, false prejudices or the expression of base material interests.) According to this conception, the executive of the national will does not act on behalf of “the citizens”, nor need it conform to the rules generally observed by men in their dealings with one another. The reader should realize that this attitude extends far beyond mere patriotism or even jingoism, and equally far beyond mere dictatorship or state omnipotence in the technical sense. Individual rights are not encroached upon, they are deprived of meaning; the access to humanity is not obstructed, it is entirely cut off; humanitarian standards are not violated or disregarded, they
are denied outright. Once the particular group has superseded humanity, then the individual, far from having merely to submit to stern governmental discipline, is philosophically considered and politically bound to live under the absolute domination of his own particular group over his wishes, mentality and habits. It is no longer a question of state reason, but of reason engulfed in the state; violence is no longer a means, it is the natural expression of the spirit underlying the new structure of the state; the voice of the ruler does not merely drown the voice of the individual soul, it entirely assimilates it.

That is why I feel tempted to speak of a return to the "tribal" mind. In the typical primitive "tribe" there is but one social reality, but one level of social environment, imbued with a psychical fluid which is crystallized, so to speak, in the person of the ruler.

This social body represents a unity in which the Godhead and things mystical coincide. The parallel is inescapable between descriptions we have read of the primitive mind—as, for example, those of Lévy-Bruhl—and the ideas of National Socialism. The tribal group is, according to Lévy-Bruhl, "immanent" in the individual, who has no raison d'etre, no sphere of relationship apart from it. Not only does he live for the community's sake alone, he actually only lives "through" the community. "Therefore anyone acquiring from personal experience a mode of thinking other than the one proper to the community lays himself open to merciless destruction. Sasa ordered one of his sons to be put to death because he had dared to modify a prescription of the custom-law." (Tribes in French West Africa.) Discipline and education are designed to produce an absolute uniformity of thought, though this is not accompanied by anything approaching equality of rights, for a man's place in the group is determined entirely by birth. A mystical union exists between the Chieftain and the community. The latter without its chief is like a woman without her mate, its vital functions are bound to cease. The Chieftain exercises magical powers, he is in possession of special medical drugs. The primitive tribe is on much the same level as a "beehive", and man does not count outside his own group.
Naturally I am aware that a universally fixed type of “primitive tribe” does not exist, still less do I mean to suggest that the present rulers of the German nation consciously wish to reduce it to such a social form. I merely wish to point out that the Nazi attitude, when contrasted with more civilized and complex societies, is somehow strikingly reminiscent of certain fundamental features of such tribes, and that the mental revolution accompanying National Socialism reveals, in its conception of the ultimate problems of the value of man and his subjection to power, a mysterious reversion to prototypes of that kind. No further comparison between Nazi Germany and “uncivilized” societies is intended. Nor should the primitivist ideology of Nazi Germany, in so far as it exists at all, be considered wilful evil or stark madness. The political and economic circumstances which gave rise to that ideology, without of course supplying an adequate “explanation” for it, are not under discussion here. It will be sufficient to show that a reversion to barbarism, though bound to be horrible, certainly far more horrible than original barbarism, derives directly from the inner tensions, hardships and failures encountered by that civilization in the arduous course of its development. Again, the type of consciousness we briefly describe as “Nazi” certainly does not begin with National Socialism itself. I should not be surprised if English readers, always prepared for a certain amount of national self-criticism, should be inclined to minimize the significance of Goering’s confession of faith, arguing that Englishmen, too, have or might have made declarations amounting practically to the same thing. “My country, right or wrong”—is not this the same thing as Goering’s more philosophical statement? And is not National Socialist frenzy merely a different form of a quite familiar compound of conservatism, capitalism and nationalism, frightened into heroic nihilism by its very difficulties?

Although such reflections are undoubtedly useful in restraining any inclination to complacency or injustice, two further considerations may cause us to take a more serious view. Firstly, the difference between “My country, right or wrong” and Goering’s statement lies precisely in what has been termed the latter’s “philosophical” intent. Most Englishmen will agree that in some rough and tumble situations the welfare of
their country may “rightly” prevail over an “abstract” consideration of right and wrong; but few Englishmen would honestly rejoice in this, fewer still be tempted to raise it to a general principle of behaviour. It is one thing to uphold one’s country at the expense of objective good, and quite another to deny any meaning to the idea of right and wrong save what is to the advantage to one’s country. In other words, the confession “I am subjective and I boast of my lack of all sense of objectivity” differs radically from the admission “I cannot invariably afford to be moral.” It is all very well, too, to contend that National Socialism is only a desperate manifestation of capitalist and nationalist conservatism; the obvious answer is that the manifestation is indeed unusually desperate, so desperate as to threaten with destruction the cherished principles of conservatism and modern capitalism themselves. The question whether capitalism in resorting to such methods has not condemned itself, cannot be discussed here; the point is that such a capitalism would brazenly have deserted its own spiritual and moral foundations. Furthermore, it is impossible thoroughly to understand the spirit of Nazi Germany in the light of the post-war economic and moral crisis alone; the catastrophes of defeat and financial disaster may have provided the soil in which the germs could thrive, but the germs themselves can be traced back with certainty to pre-war times.

For this purpose I propose to begin with a typical pioneer of nationalist Germany at the end of the nineteenth century, the Englishman Houston Stewart Chamberlain, who later adopted German nationality. Chamberlain was in the main a disciple of the French racial theorist, Count Gobineau, and one of the founders of the National Socialist racial ideology. It is to him that Alfred Rosenberg owes the body of his ideas. Chamberlain lived to express his approval of the young Nazi movement, but some traces of his English descent and his old-fashioned preference for some aspects of Liberal constitutionalism prevent his being classed amongst the sponsors of what is known to-day as the Fascist or Totalitarian State.

It is important to note that Chamberlain launched a powerful attack against the spirit of objectivity. There is, he maintained, no such thing as “science without preconceptions”; the final aim is not science, but “culture”, and any science not subservient
to a definite ideal of culture is entirely devoid of sense. Even in religion, dogmas, i.e. material propositions claiming to be truth, are despicable things of unmistakably Jewish and Syrian character; real, noble Germanic religiosity does not pursue teachable, ready-made knowledge, it is the free attitude of worship inherent in the soul. Genuine religion and myth have nothing in common with faith in the sense of a conviction implying validity, this being but a Semitic poison which has contaminated Christianity. Salutary truth which all can believe and a universal right to freedom are equally lacking in sense. Liberty should only be accorded to man in proportion as he possesses the physical and moral qualifications to exercise it. Only a specifically "state-building" race can really claim to live in freedom. (Here we can observe the transition from a subjectivist ideal of freedom to the pre-fascist negation of freedom.) Personality, in Chamberlain's opinion, is a fine thing; yet it is not simply an attribute of individual man, it is fostered and supported by the race, by fundamental racial purity, just as a mongrel dog, however intelligent it may be, will always display mongrel behaviour. Individual man can neither obey a moral law nor form an ideal of life by himself; these things must have "grown" with the group. Positive law is distasteful to Chamberlain because of its kinship with arbitrary will, emphasized in Jewish and Roman rather than in Germanic thought. "Arbitrariness in place of instinct as a principle of relationship between men is called law." In a word, we are faced with a general dislike of objective standards as applied to men as rational beings, and a tendency to replace them by the mysterious and inexpressible "nobility" of particular breeds of men, a justification of whose existence according to a universal standard is neither necessary nor permissible.

Let us now turn to Rosenberg, the official high priest of National Socialist party lore. He makes use of more energetic and impressive language, hailing the "estrangement from the limitless Absolute", the "non-recognition of one Value independent of earth-bound and organic things", the repudiation of a "superhuman community for all", as a hopeful sign of our times. Christianization and humanization have happily failed, and credit is no longer given to the self-sufficient Ego detached from his blood ties. Even Positivism and Darwinism were
great (though damnable) protests against these impotent and nerveless ideals, which are, according to him, of Syrian origin. The "flow of genuine blood-red life" had been disregarded, the "vision of nature" had fallen into oblivion, reason and intelligence had been severed from race and kin; the individual had fallen a victim to empty abstractions, had been mixed with foreign blood. . . . But at last we are beginning to dispel these clouds of empty ideas, the vague shapes of the Absolute; we shall give ear once more to the dulled surging of our innermost life-sap with its peculiar values. . . . "The spirit of the race realizes its own ability to assimilate everything racially and spiritually akin, and, at the same time, the iron need to eliminate and suppress everything foreign. Not because it is 'false' or 'bad' in itself, but precisely because it is out of tune with our kind and violates the inner construction of our being." (For the building up of "Nordic cells of soul" is the paramount task of our generation.) Rosenberg voices even more strongly the cry of Chamberlain against objective science. Science, too, is but a product of blood, especially a "product of Germanic creative forces". Personality is hardly more acceptable to Rosenberg than objectivity. The Christian virtues of Love and Mercy, as opposed to "Honour", must be abandoned, for, not being at all formative for People and State, they are guilty of addressing themselves to the mere individual. The tree of Christianity, however, bears other fruit better suited to Rosenberg's taste. He dwells at length on the heretical mystic "Meister Ekkehard", and somehow manages to interpret him as the prophet of an aristocracy in the spiritual, almost racial sense. For Ekkehard is not interested in tenets which one should "believe". He demands a special inner faculty for the mystical communion with the Deity. He addresses his words only to those who "already possess them as their own life". He directs his appeal only to such as are "of kindred spirit—men of inwardness and nobility". As Ekkehard expresses it, there is something in man which is neither conscious will nor the sensuality of the flesh. He calls blood that higher substance in man's soul which is not subject to his will. "The noblest thing in man is his blood, if it wills rightly; if it wills wrongly it is the vilest." I am not prepared to say that blood, in this sentence, is really used in the racial sense, but on the whole
Rosenberg appears perfectly justified in borrowing support from these ecstatic doctrines of super-moral self-deification. For the thing of root importance, the vital point of the Nazi attitude, is not so much Race in the purely biological sense, as the subjectivist conception of a peculiar breed of men, claiming, by virtue of its very peculiarity, to be a law unto itself, and ultimately to the whole world. There is one other saying of Ekkehard which is also quoted by his political exploiter. The good actions of the soul should not be performed for the sake of the Kingdom of Heaven, of God, or of the salvation of self. “I act in order to act”, that is the true motive. Rosenberg completely eliminates objective standards. The bloodless principle of a Right in itself must be abandoned; we know nothing but “Our Right”. The ancient Indian maxim reappears: “Right is what Aryan men find right”. A new theory of punishment arises. Punishment for dishonourable offences is neither a retribution nor a means of correction—it is simply “the ejection of foreign types and of essence that is not kindred”.

Hence “Honour” is in no sense a standard of conduct appealing to men on the strength of some convincing evidence (to which many may be blind, but which nevertheless strikes a chord in every soul); it is but the essence of a closely guarded “Kind” of human beings. Perhaps the idea is rendered in an even more plastic way if, instead of “kind”, we say “type”, “style” or “shape” (Gestalt), for in this way it will be purified of any subconscious moral associations. Gestalt, that war-cry of modern German thought, reaching far beyond the bounds of nationalism, reaction and politics! Gestalt, the blind-alley of a swollen, mystagogic “culture”, despising “commonplace” constructive design, but infused with the spirit of miraculous, mysterious, forceful “Life”! Now Shape, owing to its “plastic limitation”, realizes, if we are to believe Rosenberg, the “true organic idea of freedom”. In other words, the foundation of dominant racial Shape makes freedom possible as the privilege of “strong personalities”—for whom the peculiar laws of that peculiar Shape are still binding, thus assuring their harsh, self-sufficient freedom.

We have discovered that liberty is not a correlate of consciousness and deliberate choice, but implies the unfolding of a definite shape, as it were, a “suchness” (if this odd term may
be permitted). Not only Liberty, but Truth as well, is reduced to a mere facet of Shape. There is no such thing as absolute truth, Rosenberg triumphantly decides, and even if there were the consolation remains that it would be unintelligible to men. The only existing truth is "organic truth", which is reflected as a well-ordered whole by the living Shape: this is the pivot of the new twentieth-century philosophy and political theory. The ability to augment and fortify the Shape, the inner value of the race and its national essence, that is the criterion of truth in the fields of knowledge, art and myth alike. To put it briefly, "organic truth" is tantamount to national essence racially bound.

Again and again from the visions and arguments of the authors within the scope of our research emerges the fundamental motif of Shape thriving according to its own nature. It is answerable to no objective tribunal of human reason or conscience, is unaffected by any call from without and unchecked from within. Let us examine Friedrich Hielscher’s myth of the “Empire” (Reich). This refers of course to a German Empire, but can be defined in philosophical terms as a realm where things terrestrial are permeated by a divine essence, or, more concisely, where “Power” and “Inwardness” merge together. Administration is confluent with magic; neither environment nor soul represent valid “worlds” outside the universe of the tribe. Once the day of the West (the main adversary) is over, Hielscher eagerly awaits the final union of the Empire’s “chain of Inwardness”—Ekkehard, Luther, Goethe, Nietzsche, with the Empire’s “chain of Power”—Theodoric, Henry VI, Gustavus Adolphus, Frederick the Great, Bismarck—each of which is mighty but incomplete by itself, and which though converging at various points are still divided. Power and Inwardness, the soul merged unconditionally in the state, the state an epitome of sacredness. Nothing could impress this boundless subjectivism more firmly on our minds than the quotation from Nietzsche: “There is a road which only thou canst take. Ask not whither it leads, take it”. And Hielscher leaves no room for doubt that this subjectivity is an impersonal one (at any rate except for the “person” of the Chieftain). For “the individual is nothing and the ‘œuvre’ (Werk) is everything; the individual soul exists merely as a wave that
draws its meaning and direction from an encircling tide . . . the soul is a doorway". Nay, "man himself is but a means, he belongs to the Empire entirely ". It could hardly be otherwise in a country whose creed is "One People, one God, one Faith, one Empire ". I, as a person, am nothing, for my clan is the world.

It is impossible even for one fully conversant with the sociology of those national and class-war conditions which give birth to fascist movements to master the philosophical substructure of National Socialism without studying the ideas of the poet Stefan George and his numerous followers. Of these, a part have become known as the "George Circle", a somewhat exclusive association, slightly sectarian in character. George died in 1938, at the age of sixty-five, having possibly rather resented the Nazi régime proper, especially as regards its gross zoological racialism and anti-semitism; for some of his most cherished pupils were Jews, for example, Gundolf. But apart from that, George, and with him many of the more intellectual partisans and initiators of the new Nationalism, sees in "racial value" a kind of nobility of the body "built" by the soul, or rather of body (Leib) and soul in a deep inseparable unison which is permeated with and fostered by an impersonal and masterful spiritual power (Eros), and which is for the most part independent of the mechanical facts of mere descent.

At this stage, however, I must refrain from dealing further with George's general views, merely remarking that the formation of such fundamental concepts of National Socialism as Shape, Race, super-moral Force, the dependence of freedom upon peculiar Type and Nobility, the Spiritual Sovereignty of the Ruler, Leaders as Demigods, the existence of the People merely as a league of satellites and worshippers—to name but a few—owe much to his influence. The evolution of George's own poetry reveals both in choice of subject and growth of popularity a strange and fateful progress, leading, as it were, from Nietzsche's proudly aloof "individualism" to Hitler's "National Socialism"—a slow pilgrimage from the practice of an ostensibly private and esoteric art to the hard-won office of a Pindaric "builder of the nation". As Gundolf puts it: "It became increasingly clear to him that the incarnation of the Deity (Die Verleibung des Gottes) demands the deification of the People ". Obviously, we are here concerned with a conception
of “the People” lamentably unfamiliar to Western minds, implying the exact opposite to what is meant by Democracy. “He reveres the People as the dark womb of growth, not as a source of public opinion.” “People” in a more conscious sense, too, must not be a society of men, a section of mankind, but rather a unit of feeling engendered by a godlike central ruler, and impregnated with his “spirit.” It is as if an enlarged “Circle”, following somehow the lines traced by the original “Circle” around its divine “Centre”, silently and secretly lays the foundations for a new national world in the face of the hostility and deafness of futile and undisciplined liberalism. Thus the apparent exclusiveness at the outset was but the introductory stage of revolution, or rather of counter-revolution, surging out of the depths of the spirit. Consider Gundolf’s interpretation of one of the early works of his idol, a strangely vicious glorification of that monster of a Roman emperor, Heliogabalus. In the figure of Heliogabalus, George sensed primeval forms of human instincts and cosmic powers transcending bourgeois morals and Christian values. “Even the historical Heliogabalus was less a rake than a ‘frenzy of more than personal obsessions and forces’, which overwhelmed an otherwise insignificant creature. This is not a book of individualism, but a book of cult . . . no immoral confessions of a profligate, but the unmoral vision of a devout soul. His sins and insensate excesses merely emphasize his transcendence of everyday categories and his liberty to fulfill a peculiar law.” Indeed the poem runs: “I am as One, like them as many; I do as does Life with me”. Are we not vividly reminded of passages from Hielscher and Rosenberg?

Wolters, another devotee, hails George as the “spiritual Ruler”. The essential point in this attitude is that creative power and the power of domination are necessarily one and the same. While we are accustomed to assume that real creative genius should willingly, in the spirit of fair play, as it were, submit to impartial human judgment, the very opposite is stated here. Domination (Herrschaft) is the “formative potency of the forces of the age”, which, “heedless of any judgment save that of its own inner god, evolves the law as it pursues its constructive task, thereby stamping its own character upon the members and factors of its world, and determining the coinage of the Realm Spiritual for the period of its duration”. “Thus
the Ruler incorporates the power that performs the Spiritual Deed.” I venture to call it an attempt at tribal self-enclosure embracing an entire civilization. Hermann Drahm, another writer of the George school, points out the departure from Nietzsche’s conception of the Superman, which, he maintains, was only a fleeting fancy. “The new conception of life, on the contrary, sets up the ideal of the Hero engendering the People; we of the age of heroism and corporative comradeship comprehend only the moulding of forces, the establishment of values and forms which issue from the Mighty One, the Ruler, and irradiate over the people and the community.” Men must not think, they must devote themselves to their “engendering”, “moulding” and “irradiating” neo-supermen. For it is “not Reason, but Love, Eros and Charisma”, that form human society. (The term “Charisma” signifies a special divine grace imparted to a leader which attracts his followers.) Evidently “the secret lore can be understood only by the initiate to whom the vocation is given”. The doctrine is expanded thus: “The true standards and boundaries now disregarded by man shall be reinstated, for a select few at first; instincts must be re-born, a new spirit must arise out of the blood. In time the healing of the few shall be extended to the people, to mankind”. Here the conception of mankind appears not as a compromise with the customary idea of humanity transcending particular states and groups, but merely as widening of the scope—the sect swallowing up society; the imperialism of the tribe. It is a dangerous contradiction for a doctrine steeped in exclusiveness and yet puffed up with pretension, but it is not a self-renunciation; they may condescend to conquer humanity, they may consent to create humanity, but they will never acknowledge humanity. For mere humanity, with or without a transcendent Deity to rule and inspire it, is not an ultimate reality or standard by which we should adjust our decisions. One Ruler (Herrscher)—“the” Ruler—must be the “mainstay” of the whole community. The Ruler is invested with “divine sacredness”, his Form, in its abundance of values, being the “uppermost Absolute”. He is the one legitimate anointed, the vessel of God, “God’s proper instrument”. To quote Otto Kohlmeyer: “God is not manifest in the too-many, but only in the fully qualified, creative personality”, the “whole” man, the “hero, leader and
MEANING OF NATIONAL SOCIALIST ATTITUDE 41

prophet”, the receptacle of the divine gift of grace, whereas the “multitude must earn their share by love, allegiance and loyalty”.

Similarly Hans Blüher, brilliant philosopher of the youth movement and of homo-erotism as a driving force of “male society” and of the state as a whole, was once a follower of Stefan George and represents to some extent a departure from pure National Socialism. Like several of the clearer-minded exponents of the new Nationalism, he is openly reactionary (except on moral points) and supremely free from the pseudodemocratic and seemingly “socialistic” bias of orthodox National Socialism. He does not join in the cult of the “worker”, nor would he dream of a German “community of the people” as a homogeneous body of first-class racial stock. For Blüher’s most important discovery is the negation of the unity of mankind, the theory of the “‘allogeny’ of mankind”. Humanity as an anthropological unit will be abandoned as soon as we cease to be duped by appearances, even though it be regarded as a polyphony of races in the usual—rather inequalitarian—sense. In reality it consists of two fundamentally different races, inextricably entangled by a tragic whim of fate, but each retaining its distinctive features in all their unbridged discrepancies. They are termed by Blüher the Primary and the Secondary Race, the Aristoi and the Common People, a dichotomy which mainly and essentially—but, and that is the unfortunate part, by no means exactly—covers the division of society into an upper and a lower class. The Primarians are the essential beings who really “are”, creative, noble, well-born, surely guided by their inherent “shape”, their inward vital law, their art of life. They depend on no moral rules, and need do nothing in justification of their existence. The Secondarians on the other hand lack real esse and the stuff they are made of is the craving for “having things”. They are either quiet, meaningless pariahs or else troublesome wayward creatures, sticking to “work”, “morals”, “good and bad will”, “sin”, “law”, “rights”, “personality”, “progress”, “justice”, “charity”, etc. But worst of all is their desire for “education”, that most disgraceful of all democratic contrivances, the poor counterfeit and antipode of Culture. The rebellion of the people, however, is not wholly or necessarily evil, since it
usually occurs when the ruling class, owing to an increasing deficiency in Primarian blood, fails to live up to its own level. The most despicable rebels are the bastards, the traitors to the Primary race. All really important issues of mankind are the exclusive province of the Primary race; the Secondary has no part in history or in the realm spiritual, it leaves no traces behind it and is indeed condemned to a mere zoological existence. The outstanding characteristic of Secondary thought is the belief in truths accessible to all and ideals attainable by all. Progress, evolution, justice, humanitarianism, enlightenment and the rest are founded upon these two atrocious delusions. One need hardly add that the same morals cannot apply to both "mankinds"; the vices of the petty people may duly count as virtues in the nobles. "Nothing can be more erroneous than the modern doctrine of an equal right for all." The watchword *Egalité*, forced upon Europe by revolutionary France (an agent of Jewish corruptive designs), proclaims the heresy of a spirit common to mankind as a homogeneous entity. The secret of life is acquiescence in the damnation of the many, the renunciation of all vain efforts to "better" things. Again and again, however, mankind through some cruel fate attempts to scale the heights habitable only by the ruling race, more particularly by genius, but it fails to do more than pollute them. As a whole "mankind cherishes a forlorn hope". Not even the kingdom of Heaven shall requite us for the iniquities and hardships which blight the lives of most of us here on earth. The true kernel of Christian wisdom is not the Sermon on the Mount, but the gloomy prophecy "For whosoever hath, to him shall be given", in its most literal sense. The kingdom of God can descend only on precious soil; Jesus came not to save mankind, but to demonstrate the supreme law of value: the principle of waste and selection. The "good news" announces the exclusion of the people from the kingdom of Heaven, because the body of the Elect coincides with the Primary race, while the Damned are identical with the Secondarians.

It may be asked in what manner the aristocratic fastidiousness of Blüher is compatible with what we have termed the "tribal" subjectivism of a closed (and somewhat national) group. The truth is that Blüher's effusions are but a different aspect of the same thing. Conclusive proof of this is the fact
that he is not content with admiration of great men and contempt of the "multitude" (in the numerical sense), but actually divides the species "man" into two separate bodies of White and Black. The former because they are white are at liberty to be black, and the Black are doomed to strive for whiteness without being able to escape from the curse of their blackness. The White are not merely a small community of great men standing out against the dark background of common society; they actually form a society for themselves—which is roughly what we call "society" in the narrower upper-class meaning of the term. It is approximately the same thing, but not entirely so. For Blüher, too, is strictly nationalist, and he is held fascinated by the vision of favoured groups at the feet of beloved and worshipped leaders ("charismatic", as they are often called). To be sure, the Primary race may spread over a large portion of the globe, certainly beyond the frontiers of a single nation; but while some groups, such as the Negroes and—in the main—also the Jews, are entirely Secondary, others, perhaps the Germans, can be more inherently and originally Primary. There may be a link, metaphysical and historical, between the idea of the "Nordic Stock" in the world of nations, and the idea of an aristocratic ruling class in the world of society.¹ The "cream" of society encouraged to an unlimited enjoyment of power, "culture" and other pleasures is one aspect of Blüher's admirably frank inequalitarianism and immoralism, but as a darker background there is the fiery glamour of "inwardness", the initiate sect of masters, serving a demi-god and riding a well-drilled pack of cowering Secondarians; the Tribe, wrapped up in itself, yet desiring even more passionately to terrorize the world. For, as Blüher declares in condemnation of penitence and compunction as signs of decay: "Hubris is the token of nobility"; and Hubris will hardly admit of foreign nobilities on an equal footing with one's own.

¹ All notes in this book appear at the ends of their respective chapters.
2. THE NATIONAL "BEING" VERSUS MANKIND

"The present state of the world is confused, because there is neither a master state above the states, nor a master class above the classes." The most doggedly democratic and anti-Prussian of readers will concede the pithiness of this sentence—a terse and comprehensive formulation of that attempt at world-wide counter-revolution which is the essence of Nazidom. It was written in 1926 by a clever and almost jovially wicked old dilettante, Franz Haiser, the pan-German (and Non-Catholic) Austrian squire. He is one of those outspoken eccentrics who, wrongly it seems to me, are passed over with a smile. They take no part in public platform controversies, but their presentation of fundamental theses is often the more vivid and apposite for that. They have an invaluable habit of "telling tales out of school", and attention to such tales is strongly to be recommended. Haiser for one does not hesitate to point out that the sole function of the people is in the service of the nobility, and he warmly champions the institution of slavery. Though a fervent fascist and particularly friendly to National Socialism (he had conjured the spirit of fascist Caesarism long before it appeared on the horizon), he nevertheless raises weighty objections to the "socialist" tendencies of the Swastika movement and even suggests the tempering of excessive nationalism to the more stringent demands of an international or pan-Aryan (pan-Teutonic) war of extermination against Democracy and the Left in all their forms—a war to be directed by a universal Counter-Freemasonry in command of a pan-Nordic White army. But despite his "Coriolanian" preference of oligarchy to patriotism he is a die-hard nationalist who never ceases to hope that the advent of supra-national Caesarism will be in the hands of a German Caesar. Meanwhile, however, he counsels against a war with the rest of Europe, since this would sap the strength of the noble warrior castes and prejudice the chances of the more ardently desired war against the Chandalas of the earth. But he emphasizes his general approval of war, the function of which is the "biological" selection of lord and serf. Defeated Germany should not rant about "equal rights"
and the "brutality" of her enemies but rather say to herself: "Next time we shall hatch our plot more cunningly in order to obtain the mastery for ourselves and enslave the others." Some may suspect a flaw in the logical connection: if war makes a biological selection which happens to be to our disadvantage what right have we to question the selection merely because it is unpalatable to us? It would, however, be unfair to charge Haiser personally with this contradiction, which is, I think, a flaw inherent in the general psychology of nationalism (in the Nazi or Fascist sense). Nations are sovereign individual beings, distinct universes as it were, and they are justified in fighting and subjugating each other; those who have proved the stronger have thereby proved their superiority and qualification to expand. But the system works only on the assumption that the members of each nation will a priori believe their own nation to be the better one and entitled to victory. A distinction of value is thus suggested in each case and is considered independent of momentary success. The Tribe that is a world must allow other Tribes equally to be the "world" for their members respectively, and must at the same time bid its own members behave as if it were the one real world. The fundamental difficulty lies in the objective situation in which man is placed, for however enclosed by a centralized and characteristically "shaped" community he is, he yet visibly and emphatically belongs to mankind, and must somehow account for the fact. The claim of one nationalism to be the objective criterion for the rest of mankind may be one key to an understanding of the significant relationship between "master nations" and "master classes." Such a synthesis might evoke the resplendent image, however illusory, of a universal aristocracy. But we must not anticipate the chapter on Nation and Race. Haiser himself has an uncomfortable misgiving that a universally relevant mankind really does exist, but he reassures himself with the reflection that there is time enough for other ages to worry over such fancies, for it suits the universal Will to lay down the law that definite and particular aims are binding for each unit of Nature. "Whosoever fails to fulfil the commandments of his tribal gods (Volksgötter) shall never win through to the One God." (Unfortunately in thinking as far as this we have already passed beyond the horizon of "our" tribal gods.)
In his most important work written before the war Haiser expresses the same ideas with equal eloquence. "The values of the group are pitted against the values of the foreign group as it were incommensurably. . . . I will not have the other thing, precisely because I do not like it. . . . Hatred of foreign things and love of one’s own tribe (stamm) are alike a duty and a pleasure." Alien values must be suppressed, innate value upheld—if necessary by compulsion. I may add, in halting English prose, these two fierce distichs: "Values of the Race are knowledge, imported sophistry is nonsense; if to be wise be thy aim, bow to thy Race’s command. Thy fatherland bids thee hate the stranger’s estranging custom; by loving thy nation’s foe thou soilest the Creator’s name". Another book, devoted to slavery, admonishes that a young, vigorous race does not believe in "the" God but in home gods. The relativity implied therein does not destroy but rather exalts morality, since it places man under an irresistible obligation to sacrifice: "Cling to the peculiarity of thy group with the last drop of thy blood". We may never appeal to mankind, for thus we unite what should by rights be separated. "Do not address your commands to mankind but to groups, for you must calculate in conflicting ideas! . . . Abide by your own nation, abide by your own class, for what is a duty for the one is a crime for the other!"

The same inner deadlock of Nationalism, the same breach in egotist Imperialism due to the fatal incompatibility of the sociological metaphysics of tribal relativism, and the implications of tribal absolutism mars the work of Oswald Spengler. The author of "The Decline of the West" "Prussian Socialism", and "Man, a Beast of Prey" needs no introduction. Spengler, too, was what some Nazis indignantly call a "reactionary", a hater and despiser of the proletariat, an upholder of large-scale property ownership. He is also a herald of supra-national Caesarism which as a self-sufficient divine power, soars far above the cares and troubles of the miserable plebs. The "civilization of the West" has produced three truly imperial breeds: the Spaniards, the English and the Prussians. But the Spaniards, who in their prime foreshadowed the glorious Prussian type to come, have been eclipsed, and careful examination reveals that the English "Vikings" are not so truly imperial after all:
so that it is the Prussians, with their mystical militarism, to whom duty and discipline are a religious cult, who ultimately emerge as the stock predestined to supply the "winter" of Western civilization with its indomitable Overlord. (For the French are petty bourgeois anarchists, not worth mentioning when such lofty things are at stake; the same applies to the Italians, for Fascism was still far from power when Spengler published "Prussian Socialism"; as for the Russians, they are excluded from "Western civilization".) In his last book Spengler substantiated his hope that the task of building the Caesarean empire would fall to Germany by pointing out that the possible rivals had already exhausted their state-constructive powers. A more fundamental connection between this vision of society and the national destiny is again suggested by his insistence that Caesarism must be organized on the Prussian model, by means of a small and inspired professional army, with no mass parties, not even such as are fascist and nationalist in conception, with no trade-unions or "workers' socialism", all these being of English origin. Let me quote some passages from Spengler, which, without being in complete agreement with the national or racial gospel, are fairly typical of the ideology of "tribal imperialism". The Faustian nations (i.e. those belonging to Western civilization) will, at the end of the twentieth century, be built on "elective affinities", on the mutual recognition of congenial stocks of men, equipped with the same sense of life, the same "imperative of might", very likely the same language (which is of less importance); little significance is attached to race in the sense of extraction. The main driving forces, however, have always been the "will of the stronger", sound instincts, race in the sense of "raciness" or "breeding", the desire for possession and power. On the other hand, justice, happiness and peace are impotent dreams. Nothing can be more odious than limitations, for they are essentially hostile to the will to power, even to spiritual will. Spengler's visions, as we see, embrace the whole world, but the world is only an inflated tribe. "The triumph of the ideology of one race over all others, not a colourless conglomerate of opinions, is the only path to the true International. . . . The true International means Imperialism, the control of Faustian civilization, ultimately of the whole world, by a single
constructive principle; not by compromise or concession, but by
victory and annihilation." Mankind, being a mere geographical
unity must and shall be subjugated, but it does not exist in
itself, does not consist of thinking and acting individuals.
"We are not 'men as such'—that is part of a bygone ideology.
'Citizen of the world' is a contemptible phrase. We are men
belonging to one century, one circle, one type." I trust the
reader will not erroneously assume these views to mean that
men are merely unripe for unity, or that violence is a last
resort where peaceful means have failed, or that the whole of
mankind cannot enjoy strictly equal power. What is here
stated is that there is no effective moral or rational principle
appealing to mankind as such and thus able to lay the founda-
tion for real co-operation. The geographical area throbs with
life-impulses which brand, herd and flog "men" as they
please, clashing together in their struggle to permeate all space.
"We no longer believe that reason controls life. We have
realized that life controls reason. . . . Life has no 'goal'.
Mankind has no 'goal'. We witness the sublime aimlessness
of a great performance. . . . Ideas act irrationally, through
the blood; consciousness is a matter of indifference. . . . Life
is the alpha and the omega, and Life is devoid of all system, all
progress, all reason, it exists simply for its own sake."

The central idea that a kingdom of heaven upon earth is at
hand, promised to a certain Breed or Type of men (Menschen-
schlag), which is proclaimed with harsh Olympic coldness by
Spengler and in a gay, adventurous spirit by Ernst Jünger (a
so-called "National Bolshevik" to whom I shall refer later),
reappears in more metaphysical guise in the imperial vision of
Hielscher. However hazy and fanciful his dreams may be, they
display literary grandeur and uncanny rhythm, and deserve to
be quoted. Hielscher pins his faith to the wistful outburst of
Nietzsche: "I write for a species of men that is not yet at hand,
the masters of the earth". "These", he adds, "will be the most
exclusive, the strongest, the most intrepid, the most midnightly
of men." Frederick II (the Staufen) and Frederick II (the
Great) are the models for "the Breed of men who are called-for
and elect". "The age of great wars is beginning in which this
Breed of men shall work its will, and that is why our time is
falling to pieces." "All things will be your own." The "first
World War", fought by an army that had been hammered into shape by Bismarck, "inaugurates the changing of the earth, the overthrow of the West. When the Imperial race (das Menschentum des Reiches) declared war upon the world, the ancient faith of earlier centuries re-awoke. For the credo ' We Germans' was flung into the face of the enemy, a symbol of the exclusiveness, the pride and the pretensions of that race. . . . An extravagant heroism, giving no quarter and accepting no mercy, convinced of the sublimity of the world and its warlike, divine essence. . . . The men belonging to the 'Circle' know each other at the first glance. . . . The complete conformity between each individual will and destiny is simply a reality emerging day by day. . . ." "The epoch inaugurated by the first World War of Nietzsche and Bismarck is the epoch of annunciations, breeding the Species to which the earth is allotted and all existence co-ordinated." It matters not if this "fight for liberty" takes three years or nine hundred thousand years to achieve its end. "The form of those wars of souls and bodies which will be waged by each national essence (Volksstum) as a unity of creed and deed is already determined. . . . The war against the West will assume the aspect of wars both religious and imperial."

But we must not neglect our original authorities, Houston Stewart Chamberlain and his more resolute disciple Rosenberg. Even the former was ready to destroy the unwelcome principle of mankind, which he apparently associated with a sense of dullness, greyness and torpor. Curiously enough Chamberlain attacks the universalist belief in mankind from an almost Liberal standpoint. Claiming to champion liberty and the individual, he reasons that the liberty and individuality of the Nation must also be protected from the levelling influence of universalism. This argument, which measured by modern standards has almost a touch of piquancy, is calculated to demonstrate the part played by certain anarchist fallacies concerning liberty in the evolution of illiberal systems. Chamberlain, of course, is unaware that liberty has nothing to do with the cultivation of the "individual colour" of one human community in defiance of objective standards, but refers rather to the specific problem and to the infinite range of human personality. He is quite wrong in supposing that mankind is to the nation (or the state) what the nation (or state) is to the
individual. He fails to observe the obvious correlation of individualism and humanitarianism, as the supra-national and supra-governmental scope of man’s social relationships tend to relieve the pressure of organized “tribal” power, which produces in higher or lower degree both the bondage of inequality and dull uniformity. Mankind, he declares, is in fact non-existent, a mere empty abstraction; only “men various and different” really exist. He overlooks the elementary objection that, if such were the case, the existence of races and nations must be denied as well. Further, we learn that mankind is but a verbal collective, a technical implement of language, which fails to express what is peculiar to man, his personality. What he really—at any rate objectively—means, however, is not personality but national and racial peculiarity; and even that less as a gift of nature than as a quasi-religious standard of ethical and political conduct. The very use of the term “Chaos of nations” (Völkerchaos), a state of things which he persistently condemns, betrays his aversion to a motley rather than a too homogeneous appearance of society, or at least his preference of uniformity within the national Empire to variety in the world. Now in Chamberlain, too, the worship of racial purity is inextricably mixed up with the worship of one particular race supposed to be the “chosen one”, the race representing Race; naturally it is the Teutonic race, equally naturally it centres mainly in the German nation. On the other hand, “Judaism” and “Rome” are the living agents of the “Chaos of nations”; Rome suggesting both the universality of the late Empire and the catholicity of the Roman Church, especially of the Jesuits. Here again is the indissoluble duality of subjectivism and imperialism, the inevitable progression from “Worship your tribal gods” to “Our gods are the true gods”. Hence Chamberlain claims that Luther’s achievement was one of national upheaval, and this is just why he approves of it on religious grounds. But let us return to the theory of national “Being” in general. According to Chamberlain the true state must be national, the true nation must be dependent on race: must be an “organic whole”, a “living Shape” as opposed to a “mechanical system of interchangeable units”, a mere “heap of men”. It might be asked whether being parts of an “organic Whole” is in any way consistent with personality, or if it does not involve the dis-
advantage of being “mere subservient cells”, easily “interchangeable”, too, according to the needs of the “Whole”. I myself am convinced that society conceived on the pattern of humanity is as far from being a “heap of men” as it is from being a “living Shape”. Chamberlain believes that a non-national (more clearly, non-racial) state is nonsense, form without substance, a crowd of men without souls, united only by “common taxes” and, if there is a dogmatic state religion, “common superstitions”—but not by the same origin and the “same heart-beat”. Leaving aside the question as to whether the same beating of the heart cannot be effected just as well by common superstitions as by common descent, I am not at all convinced of the alleged insignificance of a common system of taxes, which after all is only a contemptuous phrase for a common system of laws. I should like to suggest that a system of laws is hardly applicable to a number of soulless objects casually heaped together, and that ability to conform to a system of laws might be considered more valuable than forming part of a “living Shape”. Lastly, it is perfectly true that a social consciousness based on legal or religious conformity points to a universal consciousness of mankind as a virtual comprehension of all human relations and aims, whereas the idea of nation as a peculiar “unit of growth” implies a conception of mankind that is to all intents and purposes little more than a collective noun.

It would be unfair to deal with the national “Being” as an “Organic Whole” without mentioning Carl Schmitt’s definition of the state as a unit of hostility to extraneous political forces, or Othmar Spann’s deduction of the “True State” from the general idea of “wholeness” analogous to the living organism in relation to its limbs. Both will be treated more fully in their appropriate places. Here I will only point out that Spann, while applying the category of Wholeness unconditionally, shrinks, and with good cause, from generalizing it on to mankind as a whole (including international economy). He argues that mankind is more or less unreal, a merely denominational, a lifeless, Whole. It must be admitted that mankind adapts itself to such “tribal” interpretations of society with far less ease than is demanded of it by the “organic” and “racial” thinkers of Nationalism. State or Nation certainly answer the purpose
better, though they, too, even in their tribal stage, are less of a Vital Whole and more of an affiliation of human beings than the theories allow.

Rosenberg, again, may be regarded as a more modern and more desperate Chamberlain, replacing the latter’s veneer of European liberalism by the post-war radicalism of a destitute and unprincipled generation. He, too, scorns the idea of One Mankind. He denounces the Church’s doctrine of one Flock and one Shepherd as a challenge to Germanic man. The Roman curse of catholicity, the embracing of all races and types in one creed, language, ritual and organization, reached its apex during the Eucharistic Congress at Chicago in 1926, where—what an outrage!—“Nigger Bishops celebrated Mass”. If there is anything more odious than orthodox Christianity with its doctrine of universal love, it is the more recent atheistic offspring of the same stock; humanitarianism, universalist and abstract thought; chaotic democracy destructive to nations; the unholy trinity of the French revolution; “man” as a common basis of values; the institution of Freemasonry.

History is only intelligible, at least to the “Germanic investigator”, as an “evolution of the nation’s personality” (Volkspersönlichkeit); in his eyes the occupations of human communities are in no way directed to the “gratification of needs” (as the sordid Jewish belief has it), but justify themselves as “real deeds, that is, embodied spiritual force”, and “the expression of a peculiar inner quality (eigenartiges Inneres)”. As Lagarde, one of the nineteenth-century forefathers, saw it: “Every nation represents a thought of God; it exists by divine decree; and therefore every nation needs its own national religion”. To-day the German nation dreams again the dreams of Meister Eckehard and Lagarde. And their argument must be made quite clear: if every nation as such (not mankind as a whole including and transcending all nations) is “the world”, relying intimately and directly on a somehow specially tinged “God”, then certainly everyone is entitled to regard his nation as being really and finally “the world”, and there is no necessity for “other nations”—no need to bother about arranging things with the “other worlds”, since there is no order of standards and laws “above the worlds”. This consideration holds good in particular for that nation whose
great minds have discovered this glorious truth. But the Nationalist Weltanschauung will always oscillate, according to the need of the moment, between the submersion of self in the absoluteness of the tribe, and acknowledgment of “nations” in the plural—in the latter case patronizing chiefly such as are equally “nationalist”, without at the moment being antagonistic to the interests of one’s own tribal ego. Thus Rosenberg benevolently states: “The awakening of racial types is the essence of the present world revolution”. Why not, provided that my own type is the first to awake, thereby setting the example for a string of humble followers?

Wilhelm Stapel, one of the wittiest and most delightful of Nazi writers, may be chosen to conclude this paragraph. He professes to incorporate both true Prussianism and true Christianity. The first claim must be judged by more competent critics. As for Christianity, Stapel must be recognized without a doubt as its truest champion in so far as it is regarded as a compendium of every possible immoral interpretation of Christian ideals, especially of the Lutheran and similar heresies. In the field of morals Stapel preaches the boldest national relativity. The peoples are moral bodies determined by nature; geographical boundaries condition moral creeds as well as states. For different communities hold different moral views—and there is an end of it. “Beyond the boundaries are those of foreign mores (Sitten); on this side are our moral kinsmen.”

“There is a morality for outward and one for interior use. Just as God’s love is tempered to mere ‘justice’ towards the Devil, what is valid for one people will be altered when applied to the stranger’. He will not be allowed what is conceded to co-nationals.” Not that moral law has not its source in God; nay, our Christian philosopher lays great stress on its derivation from nothing else. But everything depends on the channel through which God chooses to communicate with mere individual man, and that is where the “national Nomos”, the tribal specification of right and wrong, comes in. For the very reason that all moral laws are ordained by God without empirical justification, they successfully resist all efforts to make them into any “rational system” (could I but express the pan-Nazi sneer in these hated words!) and are, as regards their actual content, only approachable through the medium of the particular
Nomos—the tribal deity. In serving the latter we serve God, nor is there any other road than pure "faith", at least no moral one, which leads to Him. In obeying what is above us we duly honour what is in the highest place above us. "Therefore morals vary according to peoples, and so the national idea prevails in the domain of morals." The Gospel itself contains a divine confirmation of the Nomoi, the "national laws of living"; Jesus Christ embodies a fulfilment (plerosis) of the Nomoi. Christian morality teaches us above all else to curb any foolhardy desire to project our moral attitude beyond the tribal limits. The substance of this whole book is summed up in the magnificent declaration of Stapel: "The yearning for a united mankind is the overweening endeavour of a reason that rebels against God". On the other hand, states, or rather rulers, may give free reign to their arrogance in order to forestall the ill-advised insolence of mere men. They should not strive for morality in their conduct, for they are already the leaseholders of morality. "States are under no obligation to improve morally. Their task is to maintain themselves. 'Be fruitful and multiply'—that is their destiny according to the first article of the Christian confession." The sole function of a statesman is to struggle with all his might for the existence and the honour of his nation; only "rulers forgetful of their duty" nurse moral scruples, and they almost invariably go to hell, dragging their unfortunate countries with them. A "Christian state" or a "Christian party" is a misconception (probably involving the danger of something like a "rational system")! but Christian statesmen are quite possible. Their distinctive features are hidden "in the sphere of the imperceptible, the substance"; but our curiosity about them is gratified on some points. For example: Christian statesmen "are placed under the Lord of the heavenly hosts. Therefore they think and act on a wider scale than other men, they reach their decisions by a different process, and it becomes them to impose their will more recklessly, and to carry out God's commands irrespective of all things pertaining to this earth, including its moralities". The reader may pause for breath. What follows is even better. "Nationality and calling determine the attitude of a Christian. If he is born a German, then all his efforts must be directed to serving his German nation and his German empire. If he is
born an Englishman he must likewise serve his nation. As for making the two attitudes ‘compatible’, he will leave that to God.” There are several points which need clearing up. Is it, for instance, really necessary to mobilize Christianity to make half-hearted heathens sufficiently immoral? Is one’s duty on earth necessarily determined by one’s geographical whereabouts? Is it as good to be born an English Christian as to be born a German Christian? How far does the concession granted to the English also apply to the French or to the Czechoslovaks? We are to be enlightened further, however. “But what happens if he is born a scoundrel? Well, he will go to hell as a scoundrel. A plucky scoundrel is preferable to a cowardly and miserable scoundrel. Whateover has grown must unfold itself. That is why it has grown.”

Nevertheless, in this same work on the “Christian statesman”, we find the following words: “The Empire means that the whole of mankind shall be united under the same leadership, without endangering the multiplicity of its varieties”. Not a union of consciousness, but a union of power. The Empire, we read further, is a theological concept; it is one of the conditions for the new epiphany of Christ. Now the Empire will be built and led, not by the most moral but by the most “daemonically active”—that is, the “truly Christian”—government. For the Christianization of statesmen means “enhanced activity” also in their daemonic power: whereas states without daemonic powers lose themselves in mere humanitarian morality and are bound to perish. Who, then, is to control this sacral Empire which must encompass mankind without being built on mankind? The answer is neat and unequivocal: There can only be the Imperium Teutonicum, for the Germans are a better people than others and therefore entitled to supreme rule. “As there are no equal rights among individuals, so it is true that there are no ‘equal rights’ among nations either. Nations vary in character, and therefore in ability and qualifications as well.” It follows that they also represent different values. “For no philosophy can alter the plain fact that important achievements and important men are worth more than lesser achievements and men of lesser significance. . . . The Polish nation is not equal in value to the German nation merely because it is also a nation. . . . We do not demand ‘equal rights’ for Germany,
as we are not ourselves disposed to grant equal rights to others. There can, and shall, be no equal rights; what we demand is truth and honour. ... We Germans are not on a level with other nations; nay, we have a right which cannot be compared with that of anybody else."

The reader may now be tempted to ask whether he should accept this as an Imperial truth, fortuitously favourable to the Germans, or admire it, as a masterly exposition of the tribal imperative, for the courage and candour of its author. And if Englishmen were to ask me how better to obey Stapel, by bowing to his Imperium Teutonicum, or by fostering an undiluted English nationalism possibly antagonistic to his imperial aspirations, I should be at a loss to advise them. Tribal Egotism may reckon with mankind as with a passive object of its covetous designs, but it can address mankind in none but ambiguous and insincere terms conveying a deceptive and empty appeal. It carries real meaning for itself alone.

3. THE INTELLECTUAL HEIGHT OF ANTI-INTELLECTUALISM

"Truth is always stronger than falsehood. What propaganda is ... what power ... what means it represents ... we know it well."

J. Goebbels, Imperial Minister of Propaganda
("Racial question and world propaganda", 1934).

"Precisely in democratic circles, people have hardly an approximate idea of the extension and depth of the nefarious influence exercised by Stefan George and his followers; nay, those people are particularly ready to bow before their 'spirituality' and their 'cultural ambitions'."

O. Benda (Vienna, 1931).

No doubt many of my readers feel that the various Nazi theories which I am trying to explain are scarcely tenable; frankly, I should not be surprised to hear that they sometimes
read like sheer nonsense. Now, although I myself think that they are to some extent absurd, I cannot emphasize strongly enough the danger in underestimating the intellectual level or the political significance of the doctrines involved. A grave misunderstanding may arise from the undeniable fact that they attack reason, laugh at "abstract" intellect, and defy belief in objective truth. This is firmly established, and to my mind is also proof of the ultimate falsity of these theories. But it would be ridiculous to infer that they lack sense or intellectual subtlety. I must, therefore, draw some distinctions as indispensable as they are easily overlooked. I have said that the Nazi theories (as a whole) can be regarded as false "ultimately", that is, "in the last instance", but it is well to remember that the last instance is not the only instance. Thus a doctrinal system can be ultimately and essentially false, and yet contain an immense amount of knowledge and intuition, of partial truths—perhaps even of basic truths—all of which have been misinterpreted at the source. Nor must we confound irrationalism with unreasonableness, nor even unreasonableness with lack of meaning. There is no immediate contradiction in fighting the intellect intellectually, or in glorifying narrow-mindedness with skill and originality. A mere country bumpkin, on the other hand, may have a great respect for science and intellect, nor will this praiseworthy attitude of his make him any less of a country bumpkin. It is, therefore, conceivable, in the hypothetical case of a dispute between a Nazi and an opponent (be it a Liberal, a Socialist, or any other brand of humanitarian) that the former would display a higher mental level, would employ arguments more vivid, better balanced, and more firmly rooted in actual human experience. Indeed, I am not sure that such a dispute is so hypothetical after all, and rather imagine that it has taken place fairly frequently in the last twenty years. That such strange situations are possible is one of the paradoxes of Life which we are forced in all humility to accept as a fact; it is by no means peculiar to the present controversy. But I will abstain from further praise of Nazi skill and penetration; the quotations must speak for themselves, even though they be advanced with a certain lack of sympathy. The "sense" hidden in irrationalism seems more important. Those who thus assiduously combat reason have their reason for
doing so. If, for instance, they could succeed in shaking the
estee in which objective reason and individual intellect are
held, it would assist them enormously in their attempt to
undermine Liberty and Humanity. But the negation of Liberty
and Humanity, whether it be a matter for regret or not, is not
sheer unreason; obviously some social problems can more
easily (even if only temporarily) be solved by ousting freedom
and denying the validity of a universe of mankind. To put it
briefly, occasions may arise when it is more expedient for the
bulk of the people to stop thinking and simply do as they are
told. Though they are not animals incapable of thinking they
may yet suppress this evil habit in the belief that their rulers,
owing to some mystical relationship, can think and decide on
their behalf more advantageously than they could themselves.
They are particularly inclined to such self-renunciation when
for some reason their own thoughts and decisions have produced
harmful results. The objection may be raised that even rational
thought confined to the rulers is inconsistent with contempt of
rational thought altogether; it may also be asked whether the
intellectuals who rage against intellect make a point of relln­
quishing their own reason as well or whether they are simply
seeking to obfuscate the understanding of the common people
by doping them with supra-rational myths. However that may
be, there is certainly no hostility to intellectual capacity as
such; the persecution is directed against “ reason”, not as a
power of thought, but as an organ of spiritual objectivity
lifting individual man above the mental coercion of the tribe,
above the identification of “ truth ” with the ideological trend
of the particular group and its rulers. Reason is persecuted as
the general bond of the spiritual unit of humanity, as the guar­
antee of union in place of domination, local oligarchy and
tribal self-exaltation, as the hall-mark of a free community.
Nor is it correct to say that rulers, while condemning the ruled
to the existence of cattle, keep reason (in its deeper sense) for
themselves. This is not characteristic of Fascism or National
Socialism. Undoubtedly the rulers will monopolize important
knowledge and insight, denying them to the masses. At the
same time, however, they are bound by indissoluble ties to
the tribal spirit known as “ racial reason ” or “ the soul of the
people ”, or any other thing you please. Crass deception evidently
plays a secondary part. Neither inherent folly nor the sinister
endeavour to condemn the unhappy masses to complete stupidity
can be regarded as the most important element, but rather the
more gloomy, if less vulgar, resolution to fight the very ideas of
objective truth and universal reason, and to destroy man's inborn
claim of access to them. This renunciation, which is encouraged
by tendencies in human nature itself, may sometimes have the
relative advantage of making certain difficulties, conflicts and
limitations easier to bear—a "rational" function of irrational­
alism remotely comparable to the rational use of drugs in
medicine or surgery. But it is hardly necessary to emphasize
the fact that this political "rationality" is fundamentally and
lastingly opposed to Reason; nor can it on any account be
endorsed as a harmless technicality of government. The breach
with Truth and Reason does not by any means entail an
immediate loss of reason, nor the general triumph of falsehood;
but it is a breach all the same, having manifold and far-reaching
consequences which its authors are powerless to eliminate in the
way they would like. The question as to how far civilization,
in its existing cultural and economic form could survive in an
atmosphere so unfavourable to rational thought and the genuine
search for truth is raised here without further discussion.
I may, however, briefly outline a fourfold conclusion. Firstly,
many apparent absurdities, exaggerations or eccentricities must
be ascribed neither to ignorance nor stupidity or even vindictive­
ness; they arise from a primary and more or less conscious
disregard of objective truth. For the only function of cognition
in political, and even philosophical matters as they see it is to
equip the fighting nation and the leaders who mould it with
the most effective weapons possible. Secondly, one cannot
regard as completely worthless the striking and incisive manner
in which the neo-nationalists have presented such anti-rational
and anti-humanitarian tendencies, for these theories, though in
an effete, disguised and modified form, are by no means com­
pletely new, but have always animated reactionary opposition
to Christian civilization, Liberal society and social progress. In
the third place, some points in Nazi criticism of the inclination
to utopian optimism displayed by the forces of the Left deserve
rather careful consideration than wholesale dismissal. Lastly,
the anti-rational outlook cannot fully be understood unless one
perceives therein the expression of a kind of moral despair and a refusal to relinquish power. Fascism, in so far as it is susceptible of explanation in terms of the class war, demands the renunciation by monopoly-capitalism of actual scientific self-justification, and the invalidation of rational argument. It also appears as a non-economic power of entirely different origin and implications, suffused with an irrational unity and heroism which is safely beyond the reach of the unwelcome consistency of sober argument. Those who can least endure the truth will, lest they be compelled to forsake their interests, be the most inclined to substitute for truth the “bloodwarm” outlook of their own kind.

Rosenberg reviles the Socratic belief that virtue is universally teachable, as being typical of un-racial feeling. Virtue, by definition, can only blossom from the profound genius of the particular group. “The race-bound soul of the people is the criterion for all our thoughts, our emotional impulses and our voluntary acts, the ultimate standard for our values.” “If Goethe’s saying ‘Only what is fertile can be true’ embraces all organic being, then henceforth a new system of values shall prevail, quite unfamiliar to present-day life. . . . Error, illusion and even ‘sin’ can be true in the highest sense, provided that they make man fertile and increase his creative power.”

Blüher informs us that teachable and scientific ethics are but the poor contraptions with which the Secondary race prop up their lives and without which they are bound to collapse. Moreover, it is unseemly to reveal such truth as applies only to the Primary race to the Secondarians.

Stapel maintains that, outside the sphere of religion, there is no such thing as real truth, only an appearance of truth. Original sin has polluted man’s faculty of understanding, as it has his emotions and actions. The only truth is revealed truth, and even then we cannot be said to “have” this truth (to reckon with, as it were), but rather does the truth “tower” above us.

To make the conclusion more palatable, let us conclude our chapter with our old friend Haiser. “Our task is to smother the forces of critical intellectualism which are actively undermining common racial understanding, and to give ‘style’ to the intellect by moulding it to predetermined forms. To me, a
German, ‘common racial understanding’ means the mental ‘style’ of my group, or in other words, the intellectual product of the pure Germanic race. . . . Racial instinct must prevail. . . . Knowledge and truth are peculiarities originating in definite forms of consciousness, and hence attuned exclusively to the specific essence of their mother-consciousness.” Nothing is more laden with peril than the abstract Logos. The preservation of strict “style” in the various classes, as opposed to general education, which reduces everything to a common level, was a wise measure on the part of the ancient Egyptians.

“Styled” (in the sense of well-bred) intellect, the fulcrum of which is racial instinct, is unconsciously dogmatic, pursuing a definite object; it is morally good (in the sense of well-born) whereas there is no such epithet as “well self-educated”. Uncurbed intellectual freedom, on the other hand, will either fall a speedy prey to unmitigated scepticism, or consciously submit to the necessity of accepting conventional “prejudices” as being “truths”. The man of good breeding alone can attain the Good and the True; whereas his ill-bred antipode, the Mongrel or Cur, is in every sense identical with the “bad” man, that is, the man who is of no service to the group, and therefore detrimental.

FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER I

Spethmann’s recent work on Nietzsche provides an illuminating footnote to this chapter. Nietzsche shows us that Socrates was the prototype of the vulgar man. In his intercourse with noble people, he always noticed that they could not say why they thought or acted in a given manner. Nobility contemptuously rules out the need of any motive for virtue. In Nietzsche’s ethics the standards of loyalty are strictly confined to relationships within one’s own circle of “nobles”. In relation to inferiors the master man will behave according to quite other standards.

1 “It is not only for her allegedly menaced safety that France is struggling these last four years: still more bitterly does she fight for the ideas of the Revolution of 1789; for as long as the European peoples responded to the call of ‘Liberty, equality, fraternity’ and believed in the democratic magic resting thereupon, France has still been the paramount European power. Since, however, the German Revolution has been superseding this fading liberal-humanitarian ideology by a clear profession of Volk as the unity of blood, will and destiny determined by Nature, France has unmistakably sensed how much she is already beaten in the field of ideas . . . . In its duplicate struggle against Bolshevist power and the States allied to Bolshevism the statecraft of present-day Germany has organized a firm European Centre, embracing those nations which in their own territories have victoriously terminated the battle against Bolshevism: Poland, Austria, Hungary and Italy. The German nation, having the leadership in this campaign, must emerge from it as the prevalent people (Hauptvolk) of Europe. . . . Germany will protect Europe from African bastardization and
Asiatic barbarism, and in the course of this struggle she will become mistress of Europe (wird Europa gewonnen)" (Karl Springenschmied: "Germany's struggle for Europe," in the monthly magazine "Der getreue Eckart," Vienna, March, 1987). "The Nordic nations, called to be pre-eminent (Vormänner) among the peoples of this earth, have the mission of safeguarding the creative leadership and mastery of Productive Man and the Productive Race against the unbridled hatred of bolshevistic mass instincts" (Hans Grimm: "American speech" addressed to the Germans abroad (Auslandsdeutsche), 1986). cf. Büher's "Elements of the German Position" (1927). This is defined in terms of a "continual war waged against the ideas of the French Revolution", a war which is already won in the spiritual field. "It is we, not these sterile apostles of Moscow, who are the real World Revolutionaries."

A new version of Psalm 85, entitled "Landesbusse" (National penitence), has been written by Emanuel Hirsch (1981):

"O Lord, we will duly accept
From Thee our bitter chastisement,
We are willing to be struck
For all our guilt by Thee.
Thy wrathful hand teacheth us
To conform to Thy word,
To despise the word of strangers,
And to love our country.

To our children grant the hour
That maketh Germany free."

cf. analogous passages from the Doric poets Pindar and Simonides quoted by Professor Jaeger (pp. 279-289).
Chapter II

Community

1. Community Beyond Personality

"In Liberal society, men did not stand by one another in an existential community: they were so many individuals, equal, of equal rights, and self-subsistent, who—rather like stones in a heap, not like the members of a body—formed unions by free decision and contract."

M. Schmaus (a Catholic Nazi).

The very term “National Socialism” suggests an overvaluation of “Community”. National Socialism, in this sense, is not meant to designate a compromise between Nationalism and Socialism; rather does it indicate that Nationalism, an attitude mainly concerned with foreign relations, is deepened into a law for the inner structure of society. In other words, National Socialism amounts to something like “total” nationalism. At any rate, both Latin terms, particularly in their juxtaposition, are designed to stress the unconditional supremacy of the community over the individual; to express the conviction that the individual lacks importance and substance other than what he borrows from the community in which he is incorporated. The hackneyed watchword “Common weal comes before private interests”, although most popular with the Hitlerites, is powerless to convey the significance of the anti-individualism with which we are dealing. In every society a certain priority of “common” interests over “private” interests must be acknowledged and assured if the commonwealth is to endure; and the welfare and culture of each individual member of society themselves depend on its preservation. To put the common interests first may simply be
regarded as an appropriate and accurate method of dealing with the complex interplay of individual interests. (I purposely employ this old-fashioned interpretation of society in terms of a business company, in spite of its being an incompetent distortion rather than an adequate rendering of the Western conception of community.) Now the real substance of the Nazi idea is certainly not to let each individual renounce his special private desires for the sake of the more vital needs of the many; this alone would hardly be noteworthy. What we are in fact told is that the community has its own special level of existence, as well as its own needs and interests justified in themselves, which are emphatically prior to the moral importance or the actual claims not only of any single individual, but of the many—e.g., the "majority"—as well. As the Tribe overlies and overshadows Mankind, so it swallows and encompasses Personality. The philosophers and prophets of Naziism are more assiduous in heaping their obloquies on "individualism" than on any other feature of the West.¹ We may as well accept the invective as a compliment; and yet the term is slightly misleading. I am not so sure that Western, liberal mankind does know "less community" and is more committed to "private selfishness", than the world of Prussian discipline and Nazi "inwardness of power". For "community" has various shades of meaning and assumes various forms. It is possible that a French shopkeeper whose love of his country cannot compete with a German shopkeeper's unbounded worship of the "Teutonic race", will nevertheless be more ready to sacrifice himself for his wife and children. Possibly there is more disinterested fairness in the English attitude of sportsmanship than in the Prussian esprit de corps. If we take community to be the mystical essence of a limited Whole, of which the individual units are the mere products and servants, then the Prussians and Fascists appear justified in claiming validity for their conception of community. If, however, we turn to a different meaning of community, to one that evokes the ideas of fairness, equality, charity, spontaneous kindness, self-denial, self-detachment, tenderness, humility, acceptance of foreign values, etc., then it will be doubtful whether truly rich, genuine experiences of community are not more at home in the West, and harsh, unyielding selfishness on the opposite side. Here we are faced with two fundamental
conceptions of community at variance one with the other. Both of them can be stated in strictly rational terms: the "individualist" conception, as the control of divergent but mutually dependent interests; the "national socialist" conception, as one organized order of aims to which all individual efforts are ingeniously and effectively subordinated. An element of mysticism, however, is equally requisite for both conceptions of community. The individualist view entails the mystery of various acts of communing and uniting of individual souls, which ultimately are free and self-dependent. The alternative view must resort to a mysterious super-individual Being hovering above men and governing what they fancy to be their own free actions. It is by no means merely a difference in the degree of importance attached to community. In fact, owing to a signal diversity of opinions on nothing less than the nature of man, there is disagreement on the very nature of community. Not only do we contend that our opponent is guilty of undue overemphasis of community; we go so far as to deny that he has a real understanding of the very essence of community. We believe that true community can be based only on personality, which is the irreducible core of human existence, with its susceptibility to moral elevation; we are convinced that the superhuman community of the Tribalists, however powerful it may prove, is but a godless ghost, a monster that abuses the devotion of men, misdirects their energies, leads them astray, and drives them to the most brazen and irredeemable forms of collective selfishness. Philosophical argument must now stop; we must allow Nazi authors to take up the word again.

Ernst Krieck, a typical Professor who has been converted to Naziism, the official pedagogue and "culture politician" of the régime, describes man as "part and member of a higher Whole", from which he "draws the destination of his life". "Each man's story begins with his people." Again, more trenchantly: "All rational will and activity in the individual is confined to his everyday life; beyond this range he can only achieve a higher destiny and fulfilment in so far as he is gripped by superior powers of fate... not through his own rational scheming will he be made a creative and relevant being, only through forces that work above and beneath him, that do not
originate in his own self but sweep and work their way, through his self. . . ." Kriecik, to do him justice, appreciates personality. Yet what does he mean by it? He enlightens us on that without equivocation: "Free development for the German who is racially fit! 'Personality', however, means only the possession of a sense of the Whole: fitness for leadership. Personality in any other sense whatever is valueless and superfluous." On another occasion, he maintains that personality only becomes real when forming, in subservience to the Whole, an image of the community. Edgar Jung, an equally famous but rather less orthodox and less servile Nazi intellectual—as secretary of Herr von Papen, he was a victim of the "purge" of June, 1934—strikes much the same note. He admits, though, that individualism is not a synonym for selfishness; it must, however, inevitably lead to selfishness, since it destroys "subservience to the Whole". Every form of individualism sets up the Ego as the highest value, thus stunting morality, which is essentially the "self-abdication of the Ego for the sake of higher values". The latter are tacitly supposed to be embodied in the larger "Whole". The self-evidence of this identification is asserted with peculiar crudity in the recent work of Werner Sombart, that most prominent example of a Nazified don. He states without ambiguity: "Men must realize the idea. . . . There is a super-individual Something to which man is to sacrifice himself . . . the concrete idea that appears in the group (Verband)."

As early as 1922, Paul Joachimsen in his most learned discourse on the "Historical psychology of the German idea of the state" wrote: The doctrine of the "national essence" (Volkstum) shows a German concept of "community" as opposed to the Western notion of "society". "It comprehends the individual in his natural relations to his environment, which determine him completely and in which alone his essence can be realized. The individual is conceived merely as a representative of the type, and his rightful claims originate only in the natural group in which he is born." Even before this, Houston Stewart Chamberlain had given a brief summary of the meaning of all these theories: "Race and the Ideal together make up the personality of man".

Lothar Helbing, who some years ago coined the formula
“new humanism”—meaning, an anti-humanitarian humanism which despises mere man but exalts human grandeur—finds a most impressive way of putting it, too: “It is not the individual soul in itself which is of value; it will acquire value only by incorporating supra-personal powers in an exemplary way. . . . Nor will any divine thing become apparent, unless for the lofty man's sake who is worthy of such manifestation”. He quotes, very aptly, Friedrich Schlegel, one of the galaxy of German romantics a century ago: “Individuality is the original and eternal thing about man. Personality is not so important. . . .”

Some years ago, Wolters, a well-known political exponent of the “Stefan George Circle”, made a speech in honour of the war victims. (Whilst I wrote, the speech was read publicly in Berlin on March 17th, 1985, on the Heroes Commemoration Day, and at the same time, the reintroduction of general conscription was solemnly proclaimed by Hitler and Goebbels.) He glorified self-sacrifice for one’s country, not as a sublime act of heroism, but—and this makes all the difference—merely as the highest expression of a permanent law of life in its normal form. “To assimilate to oneself all rights and duties of the community, by law of nature and without any special individual liberties . . . to assimilate to oneself ineluctably and enduringly all friendships and enmities of the Whole. . . .” It seems to me well worth borrowing a strange quotation that Wolters takes from Hölderlin, a sombre and disquieting pagan poet of the early nineteenth century. A passage even more obscure than usual is to be found in Hölderlin’s curious and fanciful suggestions for the education of a boy, which in my opinion seems to strike the keynote of the whole neo-German system of anti-individualism and hero-worship as opposed to equality. Here the desire is voiced that the growing child should become conscious as late as possible of a distinction between himself and his environment. “The later he realizes that there are men, that there is anything besides himself, the better; for only thus will he become a man. And man is god as soon as he is man; and being god, he is beautiful.”

I can imagine no more extreme negation of the Western idea of a community of free, equal and well-defined personal beings, and no more deeply enraptured glorification of a paradise of masters and slaves. No line drawn between man and his
surroundings! He is absorbed in them or else absorbs himself; he either humbly submits to nature or falls into the way of posing as a god. No delimitation, no "clear agreements" between man and his fellow-men! He is either blindly merged into their stock, or else engulfs them in his superiority. The objection may be raised that this spirit, whatever it is, is by no means consistent with the spirit of Prussian barrack discipline. Nor is it directly translatable into the terms of the National Socialist party programme. And yet it must be considered as the voice of the inarticulate depths underlying those more conscious and adapted manifestations. Here and there we come upon the very same fundamental attitude of anarchical encroachment, of limitless confusion, of undaunted megalomania. The discussion always centres round this point: Community, as a system of links between rational and responsible personalities? Or Community, as a swelling stream of indivisible vital force, with a rhythmical flashing out into forms of exceptional greatness?

Ludwig Klages gives expression to the hatred of rational personality (as the enduring framework of human existence) in a manner no less stupendous. He is, perhaps, the most radical and most admired of the neo-German "Dionysian" philosophers of "Life". No wonder that Klages denies value to personality, inasmuch as he goes equally far in decrying Christianity and Reason, Morals and Civilization, personal Godhead and the Rights of Man. In a paper which first appeared in 1916, he mocks at the idea of a permanent Personality of man on the grounds of its implied "rigidity" and connects it with that most accursed habit of the human race, "conceptual abstraction". Personality is but a circumlocution for the soulless "Ego", a barren centre of conscious purposes, a wooden mask (persona) feeding on the soul and crippling it. (In other words, we might state that same meaning thus: what we are accustomed to call the dignity of man, clarity of thought, reflection, conscience, orientation, right, security, justice, etc., must not be valued as the treasure, the very substance of our spiritual existence, they must be registered as pernicious parasites eating up the marrow of our life.) Even "personality" in the richer and mellower sense of a union between the "calculating" Ego and the vital Soul fails to pass muster with Klages, since it
is bound to prove a "hopeless counterfeit"; for "Culture", though it certainly offers a more inviting prospect than the horrors of "Civilization", is but a temporary truce in the everlasting fight of bounteous Life with mischievous Spirit. Shortly afterwards, Klages succeeds in finding an even more final formulation: "Personality (Person) and Universal Nature (All) are hostile antipodes: one must eliminate the former to realize the latter".

From the point of view of political philosophy, however, the cosmic "All" is but a background for man absorbing absolute "Community". The gloomy unfathomable philosophy of Heidegger glories in the paradox that existence (Dasein) is, from its very depths, a coexistence (Mitsein), "essentially for the sake of others". Gogarten, a theological partisan of Heidegger's "Existenzphilosophie" (Heidegger himself is the mouthpiece of a sort of atheistic Lutheranism), develops similar trains of thought in plainer, more arresting language. Gogarten impresses the reader by his wholehearted disapproval of any kind of ethics issuing from the idea of the self-preservation of man in opposition to nature. The inner values of civilization, mutual respect and consideration, integrity, self-determination, etc., constitute the vocabulary of a false ethic which merely refers to the relationship between man and "things", whereas it misses all genuine relationship between men themselves. These "genuine" bonds uniting men are, in the main, those of bondage (Hörigkeit); they can only be conceived in terms of a direct belonging to one another (Einander-Gehören). Not all bondage, of course, is brutal serfdom; there can be a "liberty in bondage". This liberty, however, has no affinity with detached self-determination, with "living on one's own"; it simply indicates the inwardsness and profundity of the "belonging-to". Gogarten uses an impressive play of words to illustrate his thesis on the entire futility of personal self-existence. If I rely on "my Self" (he writes), if I undertake responsibility for—and just as well to—"my Self", i.e. the objectivated or substantiated form of my Ego, my interests, my body, etc., I cannot but miss "myself", i.e. what is really important and vital in me. On the other hand, if I am responsible to my fellow-man (dem Anderen), if I "belong" to him, I shall obtain a real awareness of "myself". The real self-existence of
man does not arise out of his transcendence of nature; it is derived from the fellow-man (vom Anderen her). "In relation to him I exist really as myself." Freedom is enclosed, or (better still) "happens" in bondage. There is no being "in oneself", only a being "for one another or against one another". Incidentally, too, truth is not an ideal proposition existing "by itself"; it likewise "happens from man to man". It is hardly necessary to explain that this theory of living "by" community falls very far indeed from our wonted ideas of charity, solidarity, and fellowship. Gogarten would dismiss all these things as "ultimately self-asserting." We agree that personality cannot fully realize and display itself except in fellowship, which is at once a gift and an obligation to man; but we think it essential that the individual, while sharing the joys, cares and responsibilities of others, should preserve and exercise his primary and inalienable freedom. Above all he must remain himself, and should think of his soul and manage his own affairs; his connections with others, however numerous and intimate, are various and variable as well. Gogarten, on the contrary, starts by reducing personality to naught, and afterward admits it as a by-product of a unique and overwhelmingly powerful community. His conception refers to bondage, not to fellowship; to an illusory sense of freedom in self-surrender, not to a realization of freedom by mutual limitation and arrangement; it does not demand of man sincere friendship with others but prostration before the other Thing outside him.

The point that community is not an assembly of individuals but a primary "Whole" of which individuals are merely members or partial emanations has been emphasized most persistently, even with an almost fanatical persistence, by Othmar Spann, the Austrian connecting-link between ordinary fascism and Nazi fascism. As a matter of fact, his main preoccupation is to provide support for social inequality, and we shall therefore consider him again when dealing with inequality and the attacks on democracy. The keystone of Spann's system is the purely formal concept of "the Whole and the parts". This, however, is invariably imagined as in some way following the pattern of the vital "organism and its organs" (down to the cells, in the sense of a continuous hierarchy of degrees of totality, which are alike degrees of value and dignity). It
never occurs to Spann that from an abstract and empty preconceived idea of "the" Whole and "the" parts, no relevant inferences as to concrete problems of social order can be drawn, because the mutual relation between the Whole and the parts differs fundamentally according to the special subject to which the category of "wholeness" happens to be applied. On occasion Spann even has recourse to the image of the "house and the bricks". We cannot go further into detail here to show that even the element of totality suggested in the "house" and in the "living body" carries with it widely different implications. What matters is that Spann selects examples where the "whole" really does show a marked and indubitable superiority of meaning and purpose over the "parts", in order to prove that this must also be true in regard to social community. Actually conditions are quite different in this case; but carefully chosen analogies can give a semblance of proof to every false thesis. It would be most interesting if man were to the "corporation" what the cell is to the liver, and the "corporation" to the state what the liver is to the body; unfortunately, it is not so. The underlying intention, of course, is to disprove the possibility—or rather, the relevancy—of personality as a touchstone and of liberty as an ideal of social life. Here again fascist radicalism is seen to supersede mere conservative caution or reactionary mistrust. Man is denied, not franchise or personal self-control beyond certain boundaries, but his moral standing as a personality. As far as Spann generously allows for the idea of "personality", he only does so for the sake of degrading it to a mere reflection and recollection of group allegiances in individual consciousness (Rückverbindung im Leben der Ganzheit). The most surprising corollary of his doctrine, and it evinces a sense of consistency which cannot fail to command respect, is the thesis that there is no such thing as "contact", "intercourse", "groupment" between the "parts of a Whole". Co-ordinated units on the same level of equality (e.g. men as such, brothers or citizens) cannot be mutually connected by any sort of immediate relationship, they can in no way simply "unite", or "rally", or "befriend"; they only hang together by their common bondage to the "Whole", by such threads as are laid through the "next higher authority". Roughly speaking, citizens are only held together by the State
that grasps and coins, in a sense creates, them from above; and even private friends are destined to serve some higher wholeness (for the benefit of the State, the Whole-in-Chief, no doubt!) by complementing one another on the strength of their contrasts. Indeed it may be said that no philosopher's stone is left unturned to destroy every possible foundation for the free association of men and the democratic self-government of groups. It may be concluded, too, that fascist philosophy, by overshooting the mark, destroys the idea of Community. Men form no community, for they do not commune; they are supposed to be, and are treated as, cells of a definite social Body sovereign in its aims, with a hierarchy of equally definite sub-sections of relative "wholeness", to which, like soldiers to their superiors, they are committed both in their individual and in their collective existence.

2. **THE "WE" EXPERIENCE**

"*Nostrism* in the place of Egoism and Altruism. . . . The *We* is a part of eternity . . . personal death is indifferent: merely the extinction of a flash between the past and the future."

W. PEMBAUR.

The Western critic may dispute the claim that Community, as conceived in the Nazi and semi-Nazi consciousness, is the right kind of community; he may even, as I ventured to do a moment ago, deny to it the character of community in the proper and noble sense of the word. However, no doubt can be thrown on its being, in the minds of its sponsors, a strong, firm and compelling community. They believe, not in a congregation of Egos, but rather in a primary *We*, full of reality and positively identified as a unique body with its particular "selfhood". This is what the term "We experience" denotes. It only marks the state of mind which corresponds logically to tribal self-assertion. It emphasizes the effacement of personality and the supreme subjectivity of the closed group. For "We" is not a step along an avenue of progress that leads from the individual self to mankind; on the contrary, it ceases (in
contrast to individualism) to call for the complement of universal humanity. To put it briefly, "We" evokes such a "strong" community, just because it refers, not generally and universally to "community", but to "this unique, elect and all-important community". "We" is an enlarged Ego engulfing personality and defying the world, strictly limited in its closed and "shaped" historical identity and uniqueness, and yet virtually unlimited as regards the extent of its claims to unfolding and conquest.

The writer von Selchow is one of the most enthusiastic bards of the new era of dark tribal heroism. To him we owe that highly suggestive triple division of the course of European history: the epoch of the "All" (Allzeit), down to the close of the Middle Ages; the epoch of the Ego (Ichzeit), which has now come to an end; the epoch of the We (Wirzeit), opening with the spiritual upheaval of Germany after the Great War. He, too, assures us that true freedom can be won only in the absolute unity of the "Kind" and the unshakable comradeship of heroes who cleave together through thick and thin. The Wirzeit "breathes an ethos which precisely by means of binding, will give back to the individual his self and his potentialities. . . . For the certainty of being implanted in a Volkstum imposes on each individual the obligation of placing himself, with all his peculiar qualities and abilities, at the service of the Whole, for the sake of the Whole. . . . Freedom is restored to the individual to be used and made fruitful in the service of the Whole. . . . Heroism is not a matter of goodwill or moral conviction, etc., it is a way of being that lies deeper than all consciousness; a mode of existence which is not at the discretion of the individual, but is imposed on him by the reality in which he stands: our Volk. . . . To us, serving the Volk is not a question of morals or philosophy, it is We}.

In the "We", however, likeness in character and similarity of qualities are no less necessary than the fact of being united by common experience. In Schemann (the great racial theorist of whom we shall hear more later) we find a proud recollection of the Imperial Roman impression of the Germans: they were "so much like themselves" (tantum sui similes). "The purer the race", adds Schemann complacently, "the more the individuals resemble one another". Needless to say, this
involves no prejudice at all in favour of economic equality, and hardly any even against castes. No homogeneity of social status or culture throughout the people is meant; nor, in fact, does the salient point (at least as far as the philosophical sub-structure goes) appear to me to lie in racial purity from the breeder’s point of view. Rather does the "We" experience, which also, at bottom, mainly determines the emphasis of racial self-worship, refer to the idea of a circle of the Elect, closely and intimately linked by the bond of a fateful "event" as well as by a deep innate kindredness of qualities, around which lies the wider ring of the dedicated Volk. This more adventurous and recondite aspect of the "We" is aptly rendered in the dark colours of Hielscher: "A silent host is arming here, known to none. To each one is assigned the task, the object suited to his peculiar character. The men of the Circle find one another everywhere. Their neighbours know nothing of them; yet they are themselves well aware of their mission".

This brings us to Blüher and his pet subject, the idea of the Bund, in which, doubtless, we must recognize the idée maîtresse of neo-German romantic sociology. Before attempting to convey to the reader an idea (however sketchy) of what the Bund means, it will be well to complete the above words of Hielscher by a pertinent passage from Blüher's book on the "Aristic des Jesus von Nazareth". Blüher, it may be remembered, regards Christianity as a gloriously refined and purified form of antimoral Paganism, satisfying the needs of an exclusive set of mastermen. The passage runs: "Christianity is an emphatically aristocratic creed, free of morals, unteachable. The Christians know one another by their exterior type (!); they form a set in human society who never fail in mutual understanding, and who are understood by none but themselves. They constitute a secret league. Furthermore, the kind of love at work in Christianity is the one that illumines the pagan temples, and bears no relation to the Jewish inventions of the so-called love of mankind or love of one's neighbour".

What, then, is the mysterious Bund, also spoken of as Männerbund, or bündische organization, or bündisch type of association? For one thing, it is mysterious indeed; and has no proper equivalent in the English, much less in the Latin or French, tongues. The Greek hetairia, though, may serve to convey a
faint impression of its meaning; the Spanish junta sounds a shade too colloquial. Though in German, Bund also signifies a federation or an alliance, either term in our case would be hopelessly misleading; nor would “association” be of any use, for it smacks intolerably of individualist casualness and the humdrum ideology of civic freedom. “League” might be a little better; but I am afraid I shall be compelled to keep to the technical terms Bund and bündisch. The Bund, after all, has points in common with the League; the Band; the Horde; the Clan; the sacral Order or Brotherhood; the Sect; the Corps. To put it in more concrete and historical terms, it may be imagined as the pattern underlying the associations of young unmarried men in certain primitive tribes; or the kind of military body that also forms a community of thought and life; or the circles of the German “Youth Movement” (which sprang into bud in the years immediately preceding the War); or the unofficial military free corps in the aftermath of the War (“Wehrwolf”, etc.), from which the Nazi “S.A.” finally emerged; or the Stefan George Circle. In some way probably it corresponds to the Ku Klux Klan in the United States; to some types of political unions (by no means always fascist) throughout the world; or again, to some groups of male perverts whose union is not destined to serve mere debauch but is endowed with a certain spiritual purport. On the whole, the Männerbund or Bündisch organization—to a certain degree presumably an ingredient of human society in general, but in some way peculiar to the German emotional type—seems to require the following attributes. (They are, I trust, drawn up to the satisfaction of Blüher and other German sociologists.)

(1) The Bund is based on a principle of grouping (Gesellschaftsprinzip) of its own, differing at the very outset both from the natural and traditional forms of community and allegiance, such as family, patriarchal kingship, or settled social customs—and from the rational and contractual type of association, as embodied in democratic citizenship, trade-unions, social unions, to some extent also professional corps, and all free manifestations of “society”. The Bund ideally is a closed and dominating body, “hot-blooded” as it were, with an iron grip on the whole lives of its members; it evinces a concentrated and swiftly reacting vitality, far removed from traditional, institutional
and bureaucratic laxity, slowness and aloofness. (2) The Bund is never devoted in the first place to the service of values or truths or powers outside itself, which could be designated or laid down without necessarily referring to this actual Bund, in the way that, for example, the Church is applied to the cult of God, the inculcating of certain tenets into all souls etc., or a Party, to the carrying out of a programme, or a trade company, to the promotion of material wealth. The Bund, though certainly not without reference to values more generally intelligible and acceptable, is a central aim in itself; it does not simply "educate" its members on generally accountable standards, moral and intellectual, rather does it "coin" them and stamp them with an unmistakable "imprint", nay, it forms the main contents of their lives. "Man cannot decay in the Bund" (Blüher)—one of the meanings is certainly that Bundisch community will preserve men from unbounded moral depravity or intellectual vacuity; but the more characteristic meaning is that the individual, being bound up in the life of the Bund, will be saved, whatever his concrete actions or omissions may be, from that lack of steadfastness, that ultimate dreariness and desolation, which may threaten a man living outside the pale of a "strong" and exigent vital community. (3) The Bund is pervaded and sustained by a psychological fluid of an erotic, more precisely homo-erotic, order. (The real and primary Bund is invariably a strictly male phenomenon.) The spirit of the Bund counterbalances the milieu of the family as well as the milieu of "social intercourse" in its usual sense, including the forms of love-making belonging to it; yet this spirit of the Bund must not be interpreted as a merely rational or moral principle outside the domain of eroticism; it must be considered as a genuine vital and erotic force of a peculiar but nevertheless fundamental character. While the typical and perfectly developed Bund seems to require a certain amount of actual homo-erotic practice woven into the mesh of its relationships, excess in physical lust might menace its structure; "man-to-man" love must submit to a certain restraint and sublimization in order to become sociologically creative (Blüher). (4) True Bundisch spirit is opposed at once to a conservative appreciation of official degrees and competences, and to narrow-minded democratic equality. For the Bund does not subserve an
abstract idea, nor an administrative or professional delimitation; it crystallizes around the living centre of a worshipped Führer (leader, in a somehow deeper and more personal sense), with his peculiar genius and grandeur and love-spell (charism). A closer circle, surrounding the Leader more narrowly, also accords with the nature of the Bund. (5) There is necessarily a sharp line of division between the Bund and the social world outside it; emphatically the "We experience" of the Bund involves a consciousness of "being different", "being uniquely and inimitably coined": This, however, may turn out to be a preliminary step, a preparatory stage only—if one examines things with a broader outlook of social history. As a matter of fact, the typical Bund, however aloof and self-contained it may be, by no means lacks outward pretension and a claim to imprint its stamp on the face of the world. Normally the Bund carries with it a number of secondary, spurious or at any rate inferior hangers-on, in Blüher's words: "the metoikoi" (guests), who are not really man-loving; now profane society outside the Bund proper, might be conceived and treated as an enlargement of their ranks, a world of common multitudes, which is yet in some way moulded in the image of the Bund, serving as a protecting belt and a fostering-soil for it. Or again, and this rather fits the case of the Nazi state, many Bunds with a consonant spirit may together impose a Bündisch character, in the broader sense of the term, on national society—evoking the image of a Volk kept in a settled traditional community and dominated by a Bündisch superstructure of mastery and leadership.

We learn from Blüher, among others, that there are such things as a specific "male society", a "man-to-man Eros", and "male Bünde". A proper anthropological species, the Typus inversus, underlies them. It must not be confused with sexual perversions as a result of degeneration or of childhood experiences; it represents a primordial phenomenon in some way comparable to the sexless workers among ants. The Inverts have been the real builders of the State, which, far from being rightly described as the supreme Family, is in truth nothing but the supreme Männerbund (pitifully covered over though it is by the festering tissue of "male-female" society). It is to the invert type that we owe the sublime achievement
of "erastic" education of youths by loving and devoted masters; or again, breaking down the barriers of "age classes", it also called into being the German pre-war Youth Movement (Wandervogel). Carl Schurz, the ethnographer and sociologist, who first described the Männerbund phenomenon some decades ago, attributed its formation to an "instinct of combination" as contrasted to the sexual instinct which gives birth to family. In Blüher's opinion, however, there is no such thing as an originary non-erotic instinct of combination; the desire for combination only arises as the result of an erotic urge for approach. Hence, Männerbund distantiates itself from family, not by virtue of asexual foundations, but by virtue of a proper erotic basis different in nature. In a more recent pamphlet against Judaism, Blüher comments upon the peculiar incapacity of the Jews for the Männerbund mode of living. The Jew avenges himself for that inherent weakness by discrediting man-to-man Eros through a display of pornographic "sexual science", thus shaking the belief of the German (who is endowed with a strong Männerbund instinct) in the historical mainspring of his vitality. The distasteful scientific term of homosexuality "is calculated to ridicule a type of man to which the greatest statesmen, generals and princes necessarily belonged. What should we say if a woman-loving man were to be called simply and flatly 'heterosexual'?" There is nothing neurotic, morbid, or indecent in true man-to-man Eros; it must not be misinterpreted by the incompetent fancies of psychopathologists, still less "tolerated" in the name of "forgiving broad-mindedness". Man-to-man Eros is a primitive force analogous and equivalent to the other branch of love; it is compatible with the austere and chaste style of life displayed by noble and well-bred men (a "Doric harshness"); it is "closely linked with the supreme display of power of virile man"; it has to be handled with "knowing naïveté", without problematic fussing and, particularly, without any reference to general "rights of freedom". The Wandervogel youth movement certainly numbered a good many genuine inverts, and owing to them, friendship contained a "deeper tone" there than elsewhere. However, the community was soon invaded, in fact overcrowded, by a mass of parasitical metoikoi, Philistines who enjoyed the wanderings and all the other adventitious benefits,
thus to some extent infecting the movement with banality. (Among them were even those who, from their participation in the movement, seized the opportunity of gratifying inverse lust and yet lacked real *Wandervogel* spirit, for their inversion did not serve as an immediate building factor of the community.)

This is not the place to offer an adequate criticism of the Blüher theory. Assuredly it lacks psychological truth; homoerotic attraction is certainly far from being the equivalent counterpart of normal sexuality, either as regards strength, natural dignity, or biological significance. As for Blüher’s immoralism, it belongs to that more repellent type which chooses to glorify vice instead of merely condoning or explaining it. But what we are more concerned with is the sociological outlook. Here the unsound fancies of Blüher are indicative of two aspects of Nazi thought. In the first place, they propound the belief that human society in all its main forms is bound to be the product of sexual, erotic, instinctual, irrational forces; either of procreative Eros (as are family and banal “society”), or of “creative”, man-to-man “Platonic” love, “Eros paidikos” (as are Männerbund and state). There must be no possible means of ingress for any conception of a rational basis of community, for anything like a *contrat social.* Secondly, it is of immense importance that the inverted love between males should rank as the *superior* and really state-building variety of Eros. For man-to-man love, though of necessity bearing a more “ideal” and less patently “physical” tinge from the outset, is certainly more irrational and more devoid of tangible and evident purpose than the normal love between the sexes. A man-and-woman and family theory of society, with all its conservative implications, is doubtless better calculated to suit the liberal and rationalist social theory than are the ravings of a politically adapted male eroticism. Parliament (to tread a more solid ground) may easily coexist with hallowed family, as well as with tolerated impropriety; never with “holy” prostitution, nor with an “erastic” community of males. The essential thing about a quack like Blüher is not that he throws light on the formative functions of vital forces of nature, but that he invents and encourages such half-imaginary, half-unnatural vital forces as claim to embody and supersede the functions of
reason and consciousness, and of emotional life beyond the realm of instincts.

In regard to the sociological description of the Bund, particularly in contraposition to traditional and familial "Community" and to rational and contractual "Society", we may aptly refer the reader to a study of Schmalenbach, published in 1922. It contributes a well-nigh classical addition to the older standard-work of Tönnies on Community and Society (notwithstanding the undue simplifications and other shortcomings in both works). Community (Gemeinschaft as a technical term) signifies a social body "organically grown", as the romantics (partly following in Goethe's wake), and in particular Adam Müller, proudly termed it, with a polemic thrust at the association (Verein) or the business company. The family, the clan, etc., are shaped, and live, on the "community" pattern. Society (Gesellschaft) suggests a joint-stock company, or again, a system of formal law—a union of men resting on a rational computation of interests, an arbitrary decision on the part of each member. Now Schmalenbach assures us that for the German youth of to-day, whatever the camp into which it belongs (and this by no means includes the reactionaries and nationalists only), Gemeinschaft appears as the central aim, whereas Gesellschaft stands convicted as the incarnation of all evil. The term Gemeinschaft, however, had been used to cover too vast a field; for what people to a large extent had in view was in fact a third category, in many ways ranging with Gemeinschaft against Gesellschaft, and yet deviating from Gemeinschaft hardly less essentially. In contrast to the emphasis on tradition and home life, the Bund springs from the strong inclination of young people to leave their parents' home and unite for a roving and unsettled, howbeit intimate, form of joint existence. As Stefan George sings (in "Stern des Bundes"):

"Without an ancestry arise in the throng
Rare scions of a special rank
And you will know those who belong to the Breed
By the true glow in their eyes."
Or again

“This is the Empire Spiritual: an image
Of my Empire . . . Shaped anew and re-born
Will everyone be here . . . By the mission, by the blessing
You will exchange your kin, your standing, your names,
Fathers, mothers there are no more;
From the ranks of the chosen Sons
I will select the Lord of the World.”

The element of objective content and ideas, Schmalenbach proceeds, is prevalent in the Gemeinschaft (e.g. “the House”, paternal authority, decency, inviolable tradition), whereas the Bund is mainly inspired by direct emotional experience, by greater emphasis on the mutual love-relation itself. In the Gemeinschaft, there appears an emotional reflection upon the consciousness of a bond; in the Bund, however, emotional union itself provides the bond. In the same way that contract is the mark of Gesellschaft, and duration the mark of Gemeinschaft, Bund, in its turn, is characterized by a vivid touch of blending, of fluidity, of ecstasy. The institutional Church is an instance of Gemeinschaft, and even of Gesellschaft; the Sect, on the other hand, is emphatically Bündisch. Now, as a rule, Bunds do not long survive in their initial forms. They gradually lose their original heat, adopt fixed authority and statutory regulations, and assume the forms of Community or Society (or both). Inversely, all other social forms presuppose an initial stock of Community; and Bunds often unexpectedly spring from a milieu which seems to have become completely overgrown with the type of Society. According to Schmalenbach, too, the Bund is more or less exclusively a male affair, while Gemeinschaft bears a certain sign of femininity.

We may as well repeat that Naziism must not be regarded as having an unalloyed Bündisch outlook. In some ways, the Bündisch “boom” is only destined to loosen the joints of liberal civilization and effect the transition to more primitive and irrational “communitarian” forms of society. Yet it remains true that the special factor of oligarchic and military domination over a people reduced to more servile conditions and a more unconscious way of living is reserved for a set of masters tied
to one another on largely *Bündisch* lines. Decidedly, the final vision of Nazidom is more likely to resemble a permanent conspiracy of chosen demigods, controlling a nation of obedient and eager admirers, than a state of patriarchal rule such as might exist equally well in any part of the world.

Some illustrations from Stefan Georgian literature. Gundolf: "Eros, the Daemon spiritually creative and engendering the world, is at work only where a shaped (*gestaltet*) beauty arises out of the cult of man's body". Drahn, speaking of George's poetry: "Wherever the poet bends to youth and to man, wherever he soars up to God, there Eros radiates in his most luminous splendour; wherever he turns his love to woman, there his share is dolorous disillusionment". The average man—we continue quoting Drahn—"needs the Leader, the Master, to achieve his own perfection and gain access to divine essence. . . . His personal law develops out of fond devotion and allegiance to the beloved figure of the Mediator and Master". Love is also the uniting tie in the mutual relation of the devotees. "The autonomous evolution of a proper form befits only him whom the god has kissed, who was born to the purple." Kohlmeyer: "The ethos of community consists in subservience to the superior type of man. Community cannot conduct itself; it must be conducted by the Leader, by the Heroic Man". Love relationship, as manifested in sub- and super-ordination, is the foundation for an ethical community relationship. "Provisionally, the Bund is conceived as a union of those adhering to Stefan George; to them he was, and still is, a 'star', i.e. a leader, a teacher, a priest. Naturally the poet looks upon this Bund as a germ-cell, which, effusing a new life, is expected to breed a community of a new type of man, a new People, for the present certainly the Germans, but in the future, in a vaster prospect of a new mankind, to bring about the true kingdom of God upon earth." Gundolf describes the George Community as "a small number of individuals with a determinative attitude and mentality, united by the involuntary veneration for a great man, and endeavouring to serve the idea he incarnates for them (not dictates to them) in a simple, modest and earnest fashion, both in their everyday lives and by their public accomplishments". The Mediator appears as an instrument for re-birth. "Already, in a narrow circle, God has become visible again,
the world has once more become round, man has a meaning once more.” At this point, Gundolf lets George speak for himself:

"The new word, proclaimed by thee,
The new People, awakened by thee."

Through a clashing entanglement of the spheres and planes of human existence, behind the pallid shape of the artist recluse, we dream that we perceive the shadowy outlines of the stalwart figure of Hitler. George’s famous “Poet in an Age of Unrest” is also prophetic of the coming of Hitler the Messiah to burst the chains, restore order and mastership, give breed and discipline its rightful place.

Here the concluding part of Hölderlin’s educational counsel, as re-told by Wolters, may suitably be added in confirmation of the homo-erotical theory of the state. “He would wish a noble soul in the form of a loving tutor to encounter the boy on his way, and ‘pass golden unforgettable days, full of the joys of love and sweet occupations’, with him, and explain the lore of the gods”, the secrets of nature, etc., to him. “For the youth who had been thus educated and preserved in all his forces, Hölderlin desired above all the friendship and fighting comradeship with an Equal, a Dioscure, a heroic Partner, who would love him with the severity of a Minos and the fire of a demigod. . . . It is on such couples that he pins his hopes of a world renewed on the foundations of the fatherland.”

In 1922, Joachimsen described the great change which then appeared to have taken place; the “turning from the egoistic ideal of the perfection of personality to the demands of life in community.” The youth movement and within it, an increasing taste for leadership, are the principal landmarks. “The way from there towards the State is still obscure.” We may add retrospectively that it has since become traceable, though perhaps not fully to the satisfaction of its early seers. From the more recent date of 1988, however, we cite Werner Pohl’s exposition of “Bündisch education”, which illustrates rather strikingly the pure Bündisch strain developing into more confirmed Nazidom. “In the Bund, education is not built on the haphazard basis of indiscriminately collected men; it moulds a choice material, which is already homogeneous owing to
conscious selection.” The following points determine the selection: (1) requirements as to bodily prowess and hardening; (2) requirements as to steadfastness of will and submission to discipline; (3) “the disposition to ward off all foreign influences” (in society, art, etc.); (4) “the judgment of the leader”.

However eager most Fascist reactionaries may show themselves to disavow Blüher’s complacent frankness and unsavoury exaggerations on the subject of man-to-man love, the idea of Männerbund as the paramount emotional factor in the life of soldierly youth, and also the central state-building factor, is by no means restricted to Blüher but rather the common property of Nazi “culture politicians.” Thus Rosenberg favours the thesis that state is not a derivative of family but an exclusive creation of “striving Männerbünde”. Kriek extols “young men’s Bund (Jungmännerbund) as a primeval necessity and vital phenomenon of mankind, though certainly one which affects us Germans quite particularly”. Alfred Bäumler—a reputed Bachofen and Nietzsche scholar who revels all the more fiercely in a sombre religion of “manliness”—writes: “Apart from the union of free men bound to one another by ties of friendship State is but a mechanical body”. We shall have to deal with him more fully.

3. THE EROS OF MILITARISM

“Eros is the inmost and strongest bond in a community of soldiers: a strong motoric energy that contributes to the idea of comradeship.”

H. Franke (of the "Steel Helmets", 1924).

We speak of an “Eros of militarism” in order to illustrate that the point in question is neither the belief in the necessity of a display of military power nor in the right of a brave soldier to high consideration. “Soldiery”, to the neo-nationalist mind, is not a necessity but a religion; not a rampart of normal life but its main content; not a condition, nor a profession, but the determining prototype of community. Soldiers at the height of
their mutual allegiance (such as creative war experience would call forth), including their inner assent to this mode of life, show the right way for men to stick together on the larger scale, too, of the state and the nation. The warrior band is the noblest and most genuine community, as well as the centre of gravity for national community in general.7

Bäumler states this in a most downright manner. He denounces “militarism” in the old sense—i.e., the mere fact of entertaining, and takes pride in, a strong army—as a civilian state of mind, a half-stifled heroism with a bad conscience. Real heroic soldierliness can only subsist as a fundamental law of life in a thoroughly unbourgeois society. Pre-war Germany, however, had fallen an absolute prey to bourgeois mentality, so much so that the caddish revolution of 1918 had only to consummate an evolution which had already won the ascendancy. Nevertheless, the war experience planted the first seeds of a secular revival of Germanic manliness which were destined to spread beneath the surface and, years later, blossom out into full life. “The Männerbund powerfully reinstated itself everywhere. The Führer and his faithful ones fought the old Germanic fight in a thousand places on the front.” The army as the paragon of community is naturally linked to the worship of “youth” for its own sake. “An essential feature of the image of the heroic mode of life is that it lavishes the highest praise on youth, the heroic age of man.” Bäumler, though irrevocably committed to the idea of the State, frowns at the term “education for citizenship” (staatsbürgerliche Erziehung), as it smacks of bourgeoisdom. (The German terms Bürger, bürgerlich are so important that I hesitate to render them invariably by an English equivalent or an expression familiar to Englishmen. Bürger, with none of the archaic tang of “burgher”, means both citizen and bourgeois; the latter, however, with slightly less emphasis on capitalistic ownership, just a settled townsman following some trade, and rather self-spirited. It is more of a psychological and less of a class description than bourgeois. The implication of “civic” ideals can never be entirely separated from Bürger.) State, for Bäumler, is not a civic state; rather does it answer the alleged Greek ideal of an army suffused with inwardness. “Man standing by man, as column by column: here is the battle-array; here, the temple; here, the
sacrament; here, the state". In the modern Western world, on the contrary man is to other men nothing but a business friend, a colleague, a rival in love. In point of fact, Bäumler follows more or less in the wake of Blüher, though slightly altering his language. He forbears to speak of man-to-man eroticism, instead contrasting "friendship" to eroticism, by which, obviously, he means the man-to-woman case only. Now, according to him, "friendship" and "eroticism" are not only opposite psychological types, but contrast mainly in the fact that the former has a strong relevancy to the State, the latter none. Once more, the true army is not a means to an end, not a costly police force of any kind, it is an embodiment of life. The old militarism had been a materialistic affair, its cornerstone the civilian's desire for security, his claim on the army. Civilian "sport" is the worthy correlate of merely technical militarism, as frivolous as the latter is soulless. As long as it is general for men to cling to their privacy, there can be only a complementary militarism, no true military community. For—the author's supreme contempt is crowded into this brief phrase—"private persons cannot march".

We may add, from Blüher himself, the observation that love—i.e., real, relevant, creative love—in its deepest depths is inseparable from heroism. There is no love of the "good one", only a love of the hero, which tends to a mental fostering of "the hero's image". The first shoot of male society is revealed in the period of war games and playing "Red Indians".

A neat formula is supplied by Carl Dyrsen, an uncompromising Prussianist of "Eastern orientation", for whom even Italian Fascism is still to be classed with the bourgeois West. He demands "a frugal but free (?) life for the German in which he is master (wo er der Herr) and his saints and kings are heroes". The urbane, hedonistic type of man must be opposed relentlessly. "Family must necessarily be an offensive and defensive community (Schutz und Trutzgemeinschaft): the village, a fortified stronghold round a church; the state, an armed camp of Knights of the Teutonic Order". Certainly Dyrsen does not treat Männerbund as a temporary craze of over-buoyant Youth; he means business.

Jünger, who has created the fascio-collectivist myth of the "Worker", purged of the overt, or hidden, moral implications
of the "proletarian" ideal contained in all shades of Marxian socialism, and who seems to be a mouthpiece of the smart "left-wing" young generation of the Third Empire, interprets the triumph of community over the threadbare conceptions of individualism as the transformation of national society into a huge army of technical workers. Man was a "person" in the pre-bourgeois world; an "individual" in bürgerlich society; and the aspect now predominant in him is "Type". The new countenance of man has lost much of its former "manifoldness and individuality"; it has increased, on the other hand, in the "sharpness and decision of each single feature". We witness the "displacement of the bürgerlich individual by the Type of the worker". Civilian attire is outmoded; modern working-dress, resembling a uniform, is the outward expression of the Type. Jünger's fond dream of a barren and cruel yet supremely "real" and "efficient" world, of a "Total Mobilization" (of which the Great War had been but a premonitory sheet-lightning), has fascinated a large set of young hotspurs. Werner Best makes a point of the new nationalism's emphasis of War as a factor of union and Law as a factor of disunion. This, after all, is not entirely absurd, but to me the main point in the argument seems to be: which kind of union we prefer and which kind of disunion we are sooner ready to endure. "Warlike love of fighting and elementary union of the companions" were, according to A. E. Günther, the constituent forces of the Teutonic warriors' band (Gewalthaufen). Its happy resurrection in the post-war irregular military Bunds—who fought Communists everywhere and the Poles in Upper Silesia—is ably depicted by Ernst von Salomon in his Paper on the "Lost Crowd". The post-war free corps, he explains, had the specific character of exclusive communities, clearly visible in their oft-quoted Vemich justice. Subsequently, these Bunds were dispersed among Bürgerlich society, in which their members were to act the rôle of ferments leading to its dissolution. The Freelances were mostly men who, during the entire length of the war, had gained insight into the downright poisonousness of the Western spirit for the German soul. Their own experience of unreserved union caused them to revert to a deeply conceived "Prussian collectivism". They had worked their way through to an absolute "Yes", to a complete "staking of themselves"
(Einsatz). “The Imperium Germanicum, the victory of GERM-
dom over the earth first flashed, a glowing, compelling dream,
through the hearts of the daemonic of the German Revolution,
the volunteers of the German after-war.” They were Lands-
knechte, attuned to the virile lure of constant and deliberately
sought danger, devoured with ardour, revelling in their particular
caste, also living recklessly on comparatively high pay.
“Ruthless treatment of armed and unarmed masses and
adversaries, boundless contempt for the so-called sacredness of
life, a reluctance to take prisoners alive; finally, that rough and
ready justice which was resorted to in quick and expedient
acts. . . . The troops felt themselves encompassed by a mankind
abandoned to utilitarianism, and were ready to assert their
right of self-defence unhesitatingly. . . .” All this brought into
life a “new notion of duty”, specially linked up with the note of
voluntary, which pledged men more finally and totally to
the militant community. In place of the compulsory military service
for all, they sacrificed themselves to their particular privilege of
military service. “Their creed was intoxication and death,
uprise and adventure, heroism and excesses, cold deliberation
and glowing idealism, iron discipline and unrestrained plundering,
pillage, ravage and murder.”
Undoubtedly this premature experiment in the future
Empire reveals no weak, lukewarm, half-hearted or indi-
vidualist type of community.

4. THE UNIVERSE OF THE PARTICULAR

The doctrine envisaged knows only concrete and fully
comprehensive community. It closely follows that there can only
be One community. This of course is not incompatible with a
multiplicity of organizations in a technical sense; it means that
there is but one community in the moral sense, which encloses
and monopolizes every spiritually important social tie and
allegiance of the individual. No provision is made for any state
of tension, division or abeyance in which the individual could
legitimately maintain an even balance between the divergent
claims of different communities. Thus, virtually at least, all
smaller communities refer directly to the Nation (Volk, Volksgemeinschaft) identified as state power, and are root and branch enrolled in its service; whereas all conceptions of community transcending the national scope or inaccessible to the formative power of the national state are proscribed. What at first might appear to be an exception, namely, supernational Race, does in fact corroborate the principle; for it is designed to support the national essence and claim to power in the face of a strange world ordained to self-effacement and subservience.

Humanity as the supreme standard of human conduct is eliminated. "The heresy that mankind is the ultimate and essential community belongs irrevocably to the past" (Forsthoft). Personality, we have already learnt, is in itself a fiction; family is a cell of the People; God is esteemed according to his national dependability; "society" in its vaguer form, flavouring both of the idea of personality and of mankind, is regarded with cold disfavour. Professor Bergmann, one of the major founders of a "German religion", repudiates Christian ethics as an ethic of self-salvation, i.e., of egoism. Christian ethics are found guilty of disavowing the individual self from the Clan (Sippe) and People, and enlisting it in an "international Salvation Army" which is called the kingdom of God. Christian ethics place the Ego in the centre of thinking. "A German Völkisch ethic educates men to make the People the centre of their thought... German Völkisch man is the lord, not the slave, of the Divine essence in him... We are not a society, we are a Volk... Thou art nothing: thy 'Volk' is everything."

Bäumler draws the line at the romantic seclusion of the early youth movement, despite its valuable services in dissolving Bürgerlich society: "There is a Bund only in relation to the State; apart from the political idea, nothing". The chief adversary, however, of the German Männerbund (as the backbone of true Volk) is the system of Urbanity, the Bürgerlich mode of life. Here Bäumler proves himself perfectly aware that community stands against community—tribal community of the Teutonic myth against Western society. He points out that the task is not creation as opposed to mere emptiness and disorder, but war against a thing that really exists and has more or less prevailed: Bürgerlich society; "society" in general, condensed in "good society" which "sets the fashion", with
the "educated private gentleman of property" for its ideal. We must return to the Prussia of Frederick the Great, where the State moulded the form of society, the king as General-in-Chief of the Army filling at once the post of Educator-in-Chief. Krieck, too, gives a vivid account of how the youth movement came to flow over into the more public and forceful categories of National Socialism; how the initial "feeling and seeking for one's truly own", a rather subjective and romantic protest against "soulless" bourgeoisie, developed into a seeking for "our own" Völkisch and racial secrets or values. The juvenile Bund (Jugendbund) will keep its place as a military band (Wehrverband) on a small scale, an educational preparation for a Wehrverband. Family, on the other hand, "must be closely fitted into the national organization (Volksordnung), and by means of the state-power (Machtstaat) and its juridical norms incorporated into the comprehensive will of the nation." Profession, again, finds its place as an intermediary link between the family, a biological cell of regeneration for the People, and the state, representing the Wehrverband of fully qualified males.

The express denunciation of such forms of community as may be labelled "society" (Gesellschaft) is of peculiar interest as an index of the extreme subversiveness of Nazi counter-revolution, a subversiveness which transcends mere reactionary resistance to liberty and emancipation. It also supports our observation that, in guarding the Western world against the onslaught of the new Barbarians, we not only defend the abstract conceptions of liberty and personality, but also the very idea of community as we are wont to understand it. In fighting the Moloch of One Community without a counterbalance, we not only protect the most precious thing we have to treasure, the soul of man, but also endeavour to preserve that sublime manifoldness of communities and relationships the sum of which we are accustomed briefly to call "society". The reason for the hatred the enemies of liberty bestow upon society is that it gives the lie to their assertion that liberty is inconsistent with community. Nothing could be more odious to the addicts of militarism than to think that men can form a real community without surrendering their selves, or that they can submit to an effectual union without pouring all their values into that one collective body, or that they can use their own brains and yet retain a
sound sense of keeping in tune with one another and acting—
according to the issue and yielding to necessity—with solidarity
and discipline. Now this is precisely the meaning of "society",
of which the "dry" type of contractual agreement, as well as
the "superficial" type of social life in town, are but single
aspects. Fidelity to religious traditions or the revolutionary
righting of social injustices are equally entitled to figure among
the accomplishments of "society"—of a civilized race thinking
in terms of liberty, rational agreements and securities. Naturally
the greatest conceivable gulf yawns between society in this sense
and a national community which is at once a sect, an army,
and a ring of lovers. Listen, once again, to Hielscher. He will
have nothing to do with a community which is a "cross-
conjunction of mere surfaces", even if it be a disciplinarian
community of joint obedience. He will be satisfied with nothing
short of a brotherhood of "We, the lords of the ultimate
decision", "We, willers of the divine will", the community of
which Luther sometimes dreamed, and the realization of which
was sometimes adumbrated by the ancient German kings as well
as Prussianom.

Society, in a word, is a mere "stage of decay of community"
(Selchow), community having grown cold and loose and
equivocal and non-committal. Now we deem that "stage of
decay" to be in reality a comparative stage of perfection; we
hold that the increasing souplesse and differentiation of social
ties does not mean futility but rather a pre-condition alike for
personal liberty, for intimacy between individuals, and dis-
interested solidarity; we argue that for civilization a certain
splitting-up of the social surrounding of man is essential. We
are even inclined to believe that "society" is a stronger and
more ineffaceable type of community than the concrete
particular body posing as a finite universe of aims and powers
above the individual: a richer form of community, better
adapted to the possibilities and virtues inherent in human
nature. On the whole, "society" in this specified sense stands
for the correlation between Personality and Mankind; whereby
"correlation" is not meant as a general and abstract corres-
dpondence, in the way that, for instance, the idea of objective
truth points to a correlation between personality and humanity,
but as an actual interdependence by a concrete and local
medium of social relationships. For one thing, the world of civilized "society" implies a guarantee of a certain security of life, and liberty of orientation, to the individual: a basis on which he can develop a private life and form with his fellow-men such associations as are not simply the organs of the particular organized unit of power to which he is subject, and do not necessarily even fall within its limits. The particular national state, invested with a "sovereign" power and authority, remains to some extent technically indispensable and even morally motivated; but it has itself become a means for ensuring the individual's liberty as well as his "lines of communication" with, and approach to, divers sections of humanity. Secondly, "society" conveys to the individual part of the thought and knowledge, the value judgments and moral demands of mankind; the way in which it does this is certainly tinged with local colour and shaped according to local (national, historical, traditional, class, etc.) limitations, and yet the very vagueness, the manifoldness, the imperfect consistency and conclusiveness of society beliefs, prescriptions and conventions leaves room both for the influx of foreign and super-national motives and for final liberty of thought and decision in the individual. All neo-nationalist writers, on their side, are full of weariness and impatience of what in their language might be termed the indecision, suspense and unreality of "society". For they have a craving for a plain and absolute "comradeship" claiming the "whole man" and providing him with a flawless and unbreachable unity of existence and action. They look upon "societarian" civilization as life grown impotent and fragmentary. We look upon them as a type of man labouring under severe infirmity, marked unfitness for civilization, coupled with the spiteful pride of those who are morally in the wrong and yet determined to hold their own. Anyhow, their invectives against "society" rise from the very source of philosophical experience.

The true classic of this attitude is Heidegger. In 1926, that eminent philosopher of "existentialism" published his chief work "Being and Time", apparently without a touch of nationalist or any political tendency. His darkly pathetic vociferations against das Man (or the "general public") sound all the more fundamental and startling. It would be no easy task
to translate Heidegger's phraseology into plain German; it is hardly a more cheering enterprise to put down the meaning in plain English. Probably English scholars of distinction have already attempted it successfully in spite of the thanklessness of the task; naturally we shall restrict ourselves to the elucidation of a few points pertinent to our subject. Heidegger's criticism of our current form of existence, our customary way of living, is mainly directed against the attitude we adopt towards our fellow-men. We qualify them in general terms as "the others", without reference to distinctive qualities or a display of any definite and personal allegiance. We are anxious to keep the others at a distance, and yet at the same time to adjust our behaviour to their average standards. Thus we keep aloof from real community, in which alone a genuine and profound consciousness of existence is possible; we submit, however, to the rule of das Man ("Man" signifying the impersonal pronoun "they" or "one": the French on). "The others" or the On, comprehend "all and every one", including "ourselves" (i.e., any subject also in relation to himself), not in a summative sense but in the sense of average and compromise. The On entertains a lukewarm atmosphere of "publicity" which tends to settle the problems of human existence on a basis of superficial treatment, of specious phrases, of a skilful bridging of gulfs and ousting of mysteries, of smoothing out and levelling all issues. The On exonerates everyday life from the burden of an ultimate responsibility; one is oneself a specimen of "other people", without being condemned to the hardships of strict obedience and real self-sacrifice. In the On, one lives as "oneself", losing, however, one's "real self" (cf. Gogarten in Section 1, "Community beyond Personality") in the, as it were, overwhelming platitude of everyday intercourse. The On, with its spurious air of self-confidence—which hides a mental attitude of glib equivocation and non-committal gossip—conveys a false sense of quiet, comfort, orientation, and self-satisfaction. Without going far wrong, we may say in more concrete language that Heidegger has in view the easy and shallow life of an average business and society man of Western civilization (at a time of prosperity)—the somewhat cruelly distorted image of a type which is originally at home either in France, Holland, England or America, but which has probably produced even
more forlorn and scurrilous specimens in half-Westernized Germany than it did on its native soil. What, then, is the alternative which Heidegger opposes to this enervating condition of "fallenness" and "self-alienation"? It is not, in any sense, the acquirement of a conscious and responsible insight into the social presuppositions and implications of their lives and conduct by all individuals, such as is urged, with varying degrees of clarity, by the socialist schools of the Left. What Heidegger obscurely suggests as a solution seems, to all intents and purposes, to amount to the life of a sworn band permanently at bay, or of a fortress eternally beset, or of a shift of miners always underground. His teaching purports that we shall recover our lost selves and get in touch with the genuine ore of existence by absolute and unreserved unity with those with whom we "coexist"; by being completely merged in the care (Sorge) of our collective existence and devoting ourselves incessantly to secure it; by fearlessly facing death, which may at any moment supervene; by continual embracing, as it were administering to, the deep universal anxiety (Angst) which is indeed the main substance of existence; by a mood of absolute decision to apply ourselves to our task and of full consciousness of our ineradicable guilt. I cannot resist the temptation to quote one most characteristic sentence literally: "The resolute existence (das entschlossene Dasein) may come to be the conscience (Gewissen) of the others. The proper essence of the others may be said to lie in service (Fürsorge). Genuine coexistence (das eigentliche Miteinander) arises primarily out of the proper 'self-being' (?) of decision, not out of the equivocal and jealous agreements and the garrulous fraternizations embedded in the On and in plan-making". I might sum up: if there is anything the metaphysicians of Prussianism abhor more than freedom in general, it is a free accord among men.

One more philosopher may still be mentioned, and one certainly more accessible to the general understanding: Hermann Schwarz, also known as a Lutheran religious thinker. His mental development gloomily reflects the transformation of modern German intellect itself. About a quarter of a century ago, he earned himself a name through his research on moral philosophy and the theory of values, rather in keeping with such thinkers as J. Martineau, G. Moore, M. W. Urban, and Franz
Brentano (who died in 1917), that great German neo-scholastic genius, the scourge of the wild follies of "German Idealism". Since then he has come to indulge in stodgy pantheistic preaching, has discovered the category of "national values", and has finally emerged as an official purveyor of National Socialist Weltanschauung. In 1930, the time had come for Schwarz to discover that the old ideas of objective values (the Good, the True, the Beautiful, and Justice) were no longer good enough for him; they were overshadowed by the 'Value line' of community concepts", especially since this, as a peculiarity of German thought, was opposed to the objectivity line which he declared guilty of French patronage. Already with Herder and Kant, German Idealism began to turn against the claims of universal rationalism. "The old ideas of reason paled before the glamour of the new ideas of community." Fichte's philosophical exaltation of patriotism achieved the rest. "Love does not ask for the rules of general validity. It breaks out wherever it will, and in regard to any object whatever. . . . The love of one's country is of this kind. It sees People and Vaterland in the form of a Vision from the World Spiritual which comes to man and makes his life essential.

Thus Community in the Nazi imagination really means the Universe of the Particular without the control of a truly universal and abstract instance of values, norms and competences. Rosenberg goes so far as to censure a true-bred national Fascist like Spann for his soi-disant "universalism". The fact that Spann deduces his theses from the formal conception of an all-comprehending "Whole", that he admits theoretically such empty "wholes" as Mankind and Zone of Culture (Kulturkreis), that he installs God as an ultimate "Whole" or its Centre—having, practically speaking, nothing in mind but the vigour and grandeur of an omnipotent national state—suffices to make Rosenberg suspect him of Romish and humanitarian leanings. Rosenberg postulates a more mystical and immediately religious nationalism, quoting a dark but grand phrase of Herder: "Every nation has in itself its centre of beatitude, as a ball its centre of gravity."
5. UNITY AND INEQUALITY

"The great mass of people are merely united in the pool of sensual and vital life. The fabric of urges, vegetative life, are predominant with those whose processes of association develop in public houses, at vulgar home parties, at popular amusements, in cinemas, in *variétés* with negro dances, or the like."

O. SPANN.

"The all-too-many . . . the masses calumniating all sublime things, proud of their meanness and vulgarity, rejoicing in their unsavoury teeming. . . ."

F. WOLTERS.

Put as an abstract question of mathematical comparison and measurement, the problem of human equality and inequality entirely lacks meaning. Human equality has nothing to do with the similarity between eggs, nor human inequality with, e.g., a scale of weights. The democratic principle of equality is fully compatible with the infinite scale of human diversities of type, outlook, character, and values; the more thoroughly we take stock of these diversities the more we become aware that their very manifoldness and multiplicity robs them of any decisive and final importance. Similarly, the anti-democratic principle of inequality admits to a large extent uniformity in the people, and even actual resemblance between masters and thralls. Our really relevant conceptions of equality and inequality are deeply engrained in our conception of Community. If community is envisaged as an association of personalities, of spiritually essential and self-determining units, and society as an inter-penetrating and interbalanced system of such communities, then a general and ultimate level of equality will result, as the moral scaffolding of this social world. The closer and more intimate the elements of community appear, the more stress will fall upon the sacred law of equality. On the other hand, if we set up community, as a unique, self-centred and unitary Body with final and substantial individuality, then a basic inequality of men will of necessity emerge as the dominat-
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ing fact: at the same time inequality will result (1) among men as the divers “members” and “organs” of the Body, varying accordingly in function, importance and dignity; and (2) among men as belonging to different communities, i.e., to radically disconnected and incommensurable “Bodies” supposed to be unequal among themselves in substance and value as well. Personality and Humanity mean equality; and the “Universe of the Particular” entails inequality.

Now the partisans of inequality may place more emphasis on one or the other aspect of their position. Orthodox fascism will attach more weight to the technical inequality of individuals as mere “organs”, to social inequality in the narrower sense, without necessarily questioning the aptitude of any man to belong to any community. Inversely, the racial doctrine of Nazism is more inclined to emphasize the anthropological inequality of men, the mysterious differences in quality and “fabric”, and possibly makes more allowance for an immediate community of equals—outside the sphere of command from above—within the bounds of a homogeneous “brand” of men. (In the older varieties of aristocratic theory, both motives appear intermingled and increased by such ideas as traditional hierarchy and appointment by God of all men to their respective places.) However much the chief emphasis may oscillate between the two aspects, they remain essentially linked together. As Fascism employs the idea of italianità, and even the word Oesterreich has laid claim to mystical essence, Naziism, on the other hand, carefully provides for a minute scale of racial distinctions within the German Volk of the very best stock—distinctions certainly not meant to be unconnected with social position. Blüher, who regards the dogma of the “homogeneity of mankind” (assigning to it rightly the place of a dominant theme of the French Revolution and its after-currents) as the most odious aberration into which human mind ever fell, more or less identifies his Primary Race with a pure-bred upper class and his Secondary Race with the working class in its broader sense. After all, we must not forget the supposed historical identity, so sweet to the visionaries of a world supremacy for Prussian Junkerdom, between noble warrior tribes and the wise and energetic governing classes in more complex national units. An excellent summary of the inegalitarian standpoint with all
it implies is supplied by Krieck, who writes: “The human essence (Menschentum) of no man can be separated from his situation, from the place and circumstances of his birth and his evolution. It is not true that a prince of the Blood Royal and a worker’s son are endowed with the same humanity: each in his place is the member of a higher Whole. For this reason mating and marriage which unite unlike types mean degeneration, and are avenged in the children”.

In the thought of the Stefan George school, inequality in the face of the Whole and the inequality of human substances are interconnected. Wolters speaks in lofty terms of the “equipoise between the joy of mastery and the joy of service”. At the pinnacle of wisdom, he who serves will experience his relation to the principle of mastery as a cult, and similarly he who wields mastery will experience his own relation to the principle of the Universe. This is indeed sterling Inequality: the relationship of rule and obedience between men conceived in terms of religious piety and cosmic hierarchy. Haiser expounds practically the same views in coarser language. He boasts of having discovered the “principle of relativity”: the “law of nature” whereby freedom postulates unfreedom, wealth poverty, power feebleness, education lack of education, and so on. If, on the other hand, all men rise to freedom, all grow unfree; if all men study, all grow stupid. The state is bound to become dismembered through lack of energy tension (Energiegefalle) which, in the social realm, manifests itself as the law of value tension (Wertgefalle). The gesture “I am more than thou art—I possess more, know more, can do more, am more handsome, etc.”, is the mainspring of the social machinery. The full personality tolerates no other beside himself—the world is not a “chaos of personalities with equal rights”. But why should it be a chaos? —one feels prompted to interpose. Doubtless because a fascist mind (to use a brief designation) is unable to conceive a “whole” as a system, a sphere of relations, a playground, even a field of divine creation and direction; it must somehow view it as a living body, a vital unit, with its members as “organs in function”. Despite his infatuation for the “full personality”, the world of Haiser is not made up of personalities at all—rather of chieftains and serfs, both representing different stages of the “concentration of energy”, which are required to keep the
“machinery” going. Haiser is a particularly good example of the fatal inability of the fascist mind to grasp the phenomenon of real community, so distinct from mere bullying and submission, or swallowing and immersion: in other words, to grasp the phenomenon of mutuality: disparaging it in its lower form of “business contract”, entirely ignorant of it in its nobler forms of free and dignified brotherhood.

As we already know, however, Othmar Spann is the theorist par excellence of the “unity and inequality” standpoint. To Spann’s mind men, roughly speaking, are mere limbs of a macrocosmic animal, without any primary personal raison d’être, and again without any possibility of direct communion or mutual relationship other than their issue from a “higher whole”. Some points peculiar to Spann’s doctrine may amplify or even slightly obscure this simile, without, however, seriously prejudicing its validity. Spann starts, not from the biological nature of man or of society, but from the empty logical concept of “the whole and its parts”. Therefore the “deduction” of man as a limb of the social body does not strictly apply to man as such; only to man in his character of “citizen”, of “member of the state”. (State is prior to the Staatsbürger.) In the same way, man as a Church believer may count as a limb of the “mystical body” of the Church. (It is interesting to note Spann’s fondness for the Catholic imagery of “Corpus Christi mysticum”, which he glibly transfers to the body politic; obviously he has a far more deeply “mystical” experience of the State than he has of the Church.) But then, such a thing as “man as such” never haunts the dreams of our neo-Hegelian Prussian from Vienna; even if he does theoretically admit man to be the point of intersection of various lines of community, he will never concede that this point of intersection is in any way endowed with freedom of decision, with a faculty of action proper to it. For the only realities are “wholes” in relation to their parts and “parts” in relation to their wholes; and it is an unalterable logical law that “the whole” determines “the parts” “from above”—or rather, comes to full manifestation (Ausgliederung) in “the part”. (The principle of causation, we must remark, seems in Spann’s system to be one of the mirages by means of which the devil sets himself to dazzle weak minds and to dismember the structure of the world.) Thus the reference
to totality must certainly not be reduced to a harmless category of scientific description: it does mean an insistence on the "organism and limbs" pattern and the metaphysical denial of freedom for men. Neither does the introduction of a graduated scale of "sub-wholes", extending between the poles of the "whole" and the parts proper, affect this basic tendency. The grades strictly coincide with a linear dimension of "higher" and "lower", the axiom of determination "from above" remaining in force. Spann then tries to reassure us by saying that he does not mean the simile of the "organism" quite literally. Concerning the province of mind and society he prefers to speak of a "super-organism", an even more intrinsic "wholeness" than prevails in the sphere of organic wholes. This concession, I fear, is hardly calculated to allay our suspicions. In fact, I am not sure (confessing to rank ignorance in matters of biological theory) that the parts of a body have not in some way more independence of purpose than Spann accords to the individual.

It may also be granted that Spann uses the idea of higher and lower values as well as higher and lower scales of wholeness; but he uses both ideas synonymously. "Equality among equals, subordination of the spiritually inferior to the spiritually superior: there you have the true state's laws of construction." This, however, does not mean that higher-minded persons are to be placed in higher positions; for actually Spann does not even bother to identify these higher-minded persons. It rather means that those who hold higher social functions, implying a wider radius of power, are by that very fact the holders of a higher spiritual rank; e.g., the engineer in relation to the worker, the "economic leader" in relation to the employee, as well as the ruling set (Stand der Herren) in relation to all the toiling plebe (Nährstand). Spiritual rank is itself a reflection of the magic of wholeness. What, then, is it good for? Its special use is to make final the fact of social subordination; to invest it with the glamour of a transcendent value beyond mere expediency; to prevent any moral counterbalance which the social inferior, apart from his position in the system of economic or official functions, might derive from the fact of his humanity. But what about "equality among equals"? It is a shallow pseudo-truism blocking the approach to the real problem of
equality—which is certainly that of equality among unequals. Obviously, in any system of government an official will be on equal footing with his immediate colleagues rather than with his superiors and subordinates. But one may ask, not unreasonably, whether in the truly Spannian society there will be any such thing as “equals”. It rather seems to me that no spirit of mutuality, however narrow the space in which it is confined, is likely to agree with the general system of rigid and unipolar hierarchy and strict determination “from above downwards”.

Anyhow, Spann continues to inveigh against “mushy equality” and the “welter of indistinct atoms”, alluding, curiously enough, not to an oppressed mass of slaves under a despotic rule, but to democracy and what he calls “the miserable equality of rights”. For “whatever is homogeneous is not organic, whatever is organic is not homogeneous”. As if the equal dignity and right of men had anything to do with homogeneity, and were not a hundred times more concerned with differentiation! Nevertheless, he grants an “equal importance” to all social functions; which merely conveys that, taken all in all, the lower functions are just as indispensable for the life of society as the higher ones. Each profession or trade would have its appropriate right, its separate law (Fachrecht). For one who is unable to think of men other than as tools answering definite “functions in the whole” (“society is first; the individual, a derivate”), the general sphere of right over and above professional distinctions is devoid of interest. Such a one is as hopelessly cut off from understanding the nature of society itself as a man would be from understanding the essence of music who could only represent tones as the elements of a single melody.

Above all, it must be clearly understood that the elaborate introduction of intermediary “sub-wholes” is not meant to mitigate but rather to accentuate inequality. Certainly provision is made for many inferior “limbs” to act still as “centres of wholeness” in relation to those beneath them. “Limbs” and “partial wholes” are granted their relative self-life (Eigenleben). The worker, for instance, is nominated gratuitously “a king at his turning-lathe” by Spann. This generous solution of the social problem vividly reminds me of an old joke once in vogue among some South German suburban populations: “Let us
have a good time this afternoon, and call one another Your Excellency." But the distribution of mock titles of this kind is certainly not the real meaning of the "scale of gradations"; rather is it the use of broad popular strata, as it were, in the quality of sergeants: higher serfs invested with a particle of the mystical benefit of domination, and thus bribed into complete allegiance to their overlords. This hierarchical system is meant to warrant the strict and perfect incorporation of every human will and soul in the general atmosphere of all-pervading discipline and function by command. "No level should overlap its next higher Centre." It is only necessary to concentrate a little on this sinister phrase, oracular and abstract though it be, in order to discover an iron determination to strip from the community of men any note of humanity. It must not consist of men, only of degrees and charges. Souls must not communicate except in terms of service. Men can only approach supreme values through the mediation of their superiors. A generally accessible contact with spiritual subjects is as peremptorily abolished as the general franchise. I should say that in the following illustration employed by Spann the finest flower of mental Prussianism on record blossoms out: "The student’s relation to Goethe, for example, is transmitted by the teacher; the teacher’s, again, by his higher teachers; theirs, by art critics of genius (Schlegel or Lessing, for instance)". The Chestertonian joke that Lieutenant Smith was very witty, but of course not so witty as Captain Jones, would not presumably be regarded as a joke by Professor Spann!

There is another, very important side to this. I mean the prevention of any direct communication between the individual and mankind. The individual seems to have no natural access to mankind (even though allowance be made for it as an "abstract" or "empty" or merely "formal" whole), except through the Foreign Office of his country. For men are not simply and generally men—what a "bloodless ghost of fiction!"—they are perforce Germans, Frenchmen, etc. A quarrelsome interlocutor might maintain that these, too, are ghosts and abstractions, real men being Bavarians or Westphalians, Picardians or Gascons. I prefer to keep to the main issue: that men are men above all, and in the first place committed to mankind. For Germans and Frenchmen worship the same or
well-nigh the same God, or at least a great many of them do so; the same mathematics and physics apply ineluctably to both; they have much the same attitude as to the binding character of an oath. They understand one another's emotions and passions fairly well. They have a similar attitude, for instance, towards the Hindoos, with whom, moreover, in the last instance they still form an immediate community. D. von Hildebrand, a most competent Catholic critic, proves convincingly that smaller communities are by no means necessarily "sub-sections" of the larger ones in whose area they are placed: the family, e.g., cannot be regarded as a particle of the nation, it is far more directly and intimately related to mankind. Now Naziism, and integral nationalism in general, fanatically support the opposite trend of thought—what we might term the nation's moral monopoly of foreign trade. For undoubtedly this question vitally affects the fundamental conception of community: the issue between a unique and incomparable social "Body"—and society as a world of associations embedded in a universal community of mankind. Lagarde, for instance, the somewhat muddle-headed but gifted and influential pan-German visionary of the mid-Victorian epoch, blames Christ (and Schemann eagerly follows suit) for having contemplated an immediate loyalty between man and mankind—mankind implying his fellows in general—instead of integrating man slowly and gradually into Clan, Tribe, and People. Among the most recent enunciations, again, Sombart's denial to man of any direct relationship between man and mankind whatever must be recorded.

Let us add a few references to the main ideas of Spann. Rosenberg, one grieves to say, again differs slightly. He refuses to assume with Spann that a direct mutual understanding between individuals was impossible on principle, as they could only commune quâ members of the actual social "whole". Direct community may be realized on the basis of racial identity, of community of blood—not otherwise, of course. Stapel, in his pamphlet on the "Fictions of the Weimar Constitution", settles accounts sweepingly—and rather à la Spann—with the unnatural construction of individuals supposed to be "equal in kind and in value", and to form a "rational system of treaties". A different "right" befits different races and different social
classes (Stände) ! "Injustice ", or whatever the Liberals choose
to call it, lies with God who created men unequal! God, thanks
be, does not care at all about humaneness or injustice, He
prefers violence and bloodshed. . . . The "social justice" of
liberal sneaks, on the other hand, is only meant to arm the
individual with "rights" to use against the public body.
Langbehn, known as Der Rembrandtdeutsche, a quaint compound
of Wagner, Nietzsche and Lagarde seasoned with a streak of
medievalism, pronounces his judgment in his robust (kräftig)
manner: "Granting equal rights to the noble and the vulgar
is sham justice—it is no German justice". Lenz, too, as a
pan-German writer during the War (his essay on "Race as the
Principle of Value" was first printed in 1917, published
separately in 1988), admirably anticipated Spannism. He mili-
tates against the then customary error that personality
constituted the final goal of morals. "The People as an organism
is our moral end" ; not the People as multitude of single persons.
"The social idea must be interpreted in the organico-social
rather than the individuo-social sense." The goal of socialism
does not lie in the individuals but in Race. The "state
does not exist for the individuals to exercise their rights on it,
but to serve the life of the race". He proposes to substitute for
"socialism" the watchword "Gentilism" which, to my mind,
really deserves credit, for it successfully blends the meanings of
racism, tribalism, and paganism. In conclusion, let us turn to
some views of Longert, a member of Professor Spann's populous
school. Having drawn the routine distinction between the
"whole" as a mere "heap" and the "whole" as an "organism
in the spiritual sense", he proceeds to expound the latter:
"Heart, hands or eyes (being sub-wholes) have no proper life
independent of the Whole, although (?) they have a highly
differentiated structure and fulfil functions of vital importance".
"The individual is more than himself, he is also (!) part of a
whole." Mankind, Longert must grudgingly admit, is un-
doubtedly a "whole" too; but he is able to adduce certain
happy circumstances which are calculated to make up for such
a blemish. "The notion of mankind, however, pertains rather
to natural history, analogously to the 'animal realm' and the
'vegetal realm'." On a purely logical basis, races and nations
should properly be regarded as sub-wholes of mankind; "how-
ever, they are endowed with such a rich life of their own, and so many marks of an independent organism, that it appears essentially justifiable to apply directly to the single nations the doctrine of wholeness.”

FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER II

1 Professor Vierkandt, a sociologist of note, reproaches the New Age for its “individualistic aberrations” (“ Irrwege eines Individualismus!”) and its “unsociable sociableness”. Modern capitalistic society is conceived in terms of the “relationship between buyer and seller in a shop”. He then proceeds to praise the blessings of the new “We” consciousness.

2 The higher principle within the soul itself, the Fünklein (spark) of mystics like Meister Ekkehard is significantly termed by Professor Grunsky “ der Führer in uns.”

3 The moral imperative “Thou shalt” yields its place to a more vital and comprehensive “I will”, which, however, is merged completely into a single and all-embracing “We will”. “And, if any one were still to ask: “What do we will?”—the answer is given by the basic idea of National Socialism: “Sacrifice!” (“ Wille und Macht”, organ of N.S. youth leaders, Munich, December, 1936).

4 Touching the Greek (Doric) traditions of “man-to-man love creative of State”—or to put it more briefly, political homosexuality—we must refer to Professor Jaeger’s standard work “ Paideia”. (This Greek word, meaning education or rather education of a formative and comprehensive kind, naturally sounds dear to such ears as like the faint suggestion of “ pederasty” in it). cf. on “education” as the plastic formation of a “type” (pp. 12 ff); Greek humanism and poetry as a function of State (pp. 17 ff); the pederastic aspects of Doric ( Spartan) poetry, education, politics, and in particular, virtue and aristocracy (pp. 250–270). Exclusive and conservative nobility, the Doric pattern of which lay at the bottom of aristocratic politics throughout Greece, was closely bound up with an exotic love of “nobleness” and homosexual practice as an established feature of noble life. “The addressed youth is attached to the poet by the bonds of Eros... The Spartan State consciously incorporated Eros as an important factor in its αγωγή (system of education and leadership), and the relation between the Lover and his Beloved (boy) bore an educational dignity well comparable to parental authority.” The ideologies of this society (as formulated, for instance, by Theognis) subserved the spiritual struggle against democracy.

5 National Socialism embodies a departure from patriarchalism as well as from liberalism. The Führer is not primarily “paternal”. “It is eminently Teutonic to subordinate the relation father-child to the relation Führer followers” (Professor Grunsky).

6 cf. the descriptions given by Vesper, and in the same book, by Blunck (the Nazi “leader of literature”). Vesper compares the Youth Movement spirit with “the roaring of a swarm ready to outburst”. “The State of to-day has grown out of the Youth Movement and the exquisite virile cohesion of the fighting Bunds... the self-built Weltbild of German Youth” (Blunck).

7 cf. the closing chapter on “ Soldatische Existenz” : “Führung” von Menschen in a recent book, by the Leipsic philosopher Schingnitz, on... logic! ( “Mensch und Begriff: Beitrag zur Theorie der logischen Bewältigung der Welt durch den Menschen.”)
CHAPTER III

STATE

"History is not susceptible of explanation.—History is composed of varying historical tasks.—History progresses in revolutions.—... There is no such thing as a higher justice in history.—... The State draws its meaning from the historical task.—The State is the incarnation of history.—... The Essence of politics consists in struggle.—Politics are based on personal engagement.—Politics are rooted in faith.—Political ethics are ethics of struggle.—Volk community springs from civil war.—Heroical mentality alone can cope with the requirements of history."

W. ROESSLE ("Heroical Politics", Table of Contents).

1. THE REVOLT AGAINST LIBERTY

"A revolution 'with the special permit of Herr Präsident': the prototype of every revolution from the Right."

K. HEIDEN ("Biography of Hitler").

In our younger days we were well acquainted with a Conservative party whose venerable representatives uttered stern warnings against the excesses of liberty and were anxious to check a political progress which they feared would lead to disaster and anarchy. People who went so far as to urge the removal—or, more generally, the retrenchment—of already existing liberal institutions, were looked upon with less understanding and labelled abusively "Reactionaries". It is true, however, that long before the rise of National Socialism and Fascism we had also occasionally to witness the phenomenon we call "Counter-Revolution". Nor was there ever a counter-
revolution that did not bring in its train a more downright and more final repudiation of liberal and progressive ideas than did mere conservatism in the defence of its remaining strongholds, or even mere reaction bent on recovering a little of the lost ground. Now Fascism (including Naziism) represents a new departure, in that counter-revolution is for the first time here upheld as an experience of actual "revolution", claiming to re-model society from its very foundations on the basis of a complete dispensing with liberty. Thus Fascism has a keen consciousness of opening out a "new era", of closing the "outworn epoch of liberalism", of representing a new political creed of salvation as well as a new political régime of increased practical expediency. It glories in the paradoxical attitude of shaking off liberty as though it were shaking off oppressive fetters. A new youth is breaking the bonds of dried-up formulas and hoary ideals, and hastening to get hold of a brand-new kind of "liberty", which is strangely reminiscent of what we had been accustomed to call bondage. So much for Fascism as a general trend; in this respect Naziism falls almost entirely under the same heading. And yet the immense surplus of revolutionary energy of German Nazidom in religion, philosophy, morals and anthropology, cannot fail to react even on the purely political sphere. It would be far more just to consider Italian Fascism as a premonitory event or as a preliminary sketch of the Nazi Revolution, than to register the latter as an imitation of its smaller and less daemonic twin brother. In point of fact, Mussolini and Gentile are to a very large extent merely pupils of Hegel and Nietzsche; and about 1920, long before Italian Fascists had any idea of what they were going to perpetrate in the next seven years, Moeller van den Bruck actually envisioned his "National Socialism", defying the West and liberal society in its every aspect.

In our days, Forsthoendorf proclaims a decisive struggle "against liberty as a postulate of the human spirit". Ten years ago, Hauser was the harbinger of that struggle, making use of that energetic language which he knows so well how to wield. "Bleeding warriors" must arise for the campaign against liberty; "Ceterum censeo libertatem esse delendam", For "man is a thing that has to be overruled". Three years later (in 1926) Hauser joyfully establishes the fact that his early visions and
exhortations have begun to assume reality. Formerly, reaction (Rechtkskultur) was a brute power without ideas of its own; now only, after Linkskultur has driven the world to the edge of the precipice, does "a spiritual, a diamond-hard, a masterly right arise, and the grandeur and value in Nietzsche's word begin to be known". It is only fair to remember that in the period preceding the war, Haiser had already drawn up a general "programme of restoration". The restoration was to extend alike to military, cultural, judicial, economic and political affairs. It was to include the racial selection of officials; the entailment of landed property; the substitution for parliament of a senate responsible only to the Sovereign; and a more severe condemnation for political than for common offences.

The leading writers of the neo-nationalist movement unanimously agree that liberalism is the main adversary. They make it the target for their heaviest rifle-fire. "Liberalism" is obviously not intended to connote a closely circumscribed system of political or economic dogmas, but liberal society and its prevalent ideologies in the widest sense; the Rights of Man as well as the "greatest happiness of the greatest number", the constitutional state as well as the "party system". Generally speaking, less emphasis is laid on a theoretical refutation of liberal views than on a subjective exposition of the forces of German society growing impatient with, and rising up against, the political and spiritual world of liberalism. The anti-liberal mood, therefore, is firmly rooted in the concrete situation, both national and social, of post-war Germany. The factors leading up to the anti-liberal revolt appear to be approximately threefold: the more or less confirmed incapacity of liberal bourgeois society to grapple with the "social question" and the economic difficulties linked up with its divers aspects; the national failure of a seemingly liberalized Germany; the traditional antagonism between Central European society, and the German claim to hegemony on the one hand, and Western liberalism considered as an aggregate of historical forces on the other. Regarding the truth or falsity of the new anti-liberalism, we may anticipate one summary remark of adverse criticism. The opponents of liberal civilization naturally look at it from a distorted angle: the more so as they expressly disclaim objectivity and officially profess the doctrine that knowledge and
convictions, including their own, primarily belong to the panoply of arms used in vital and political struggle. They are for the most part unaware of the religious foundations, the ethical ideals, the human values of liberal society, which in their eyes becomes an inordinate and yet monotonous crowd of quarrelling hucksters and haggling stockbrokers, cowardly, cautious, greedy, heartless, barren, petty, and occasionally ferocious. Now our answer is that even a society of hucksters and stockbrokers (however unjust and arbitrary this picture of liberal civilization may be), could infinitely more easily be imagined as a ground-plan of a mankind morally united, self-responsible and persistently co-operating, than could a society of irregular military bands and self-enclosed tribes with demi-gods for leaders. Whatever the shortcomings and blunders of the liberal civilian world may be (and I would be the last to deny them), it is still incomparably closer to the Christian axioms of spiritual personality, or to a world-embracing community in God, or to the Socialist vision of a workers' society dwelling in sober modesty, equality and justice, than is the world of a new Paganism, Daemonism and pan-social Militarism.

Zehrer, a brilliant contributor to the once oft-mentioned review Die Tat, is one of the most noted experts in anti-liberal theory. As an organ of the intellectual "activists" of the Left, published by Diederichs at Jena (who was also the publisher of Blüher and many authors of the youth movement, Nietzschean philosophy, etc.), this periodical started in the trail of the November revolution. Gradually, Die Tat had become the "foyer" for a circle of the new independent—or rather, non-partisan—intelligentsia of the Right, strongly nationalist but flirting intensely with "socialistic" ideas, scarcely less pro-Russian than anti-Western, infatuated by the dream of economic "autarky" (Ferdinand Fried). The Tat Circle always resisted complete submersion in the official party ideology of Naziism; their influence reached its apogee between 1930 and 1932, but declined more and more after the instalment of the N.S.D.A.P. dictatorship. However, they doubtless helped considerably to pave the way for Hitler, and are said to have contributed not a little to Brüning's fall. At any rate, Zehrer's expositions (in and about 1981) form one of the most characteristic and illustrative documents of the mental upheaval against liberty.
Zehrer declares that anti-liberalism is the driving power of the victorious new current, attacking the "old order" with an irresistible force; at the same time, he is dimly aware of the logical weakness of this position, and attempts to overcome it by a bold leap into pure historical relativism and egoism. He admits that it is hard to fight the liberal faith in Reason on its own ground, "unless we are to destroy this liberalistic Reason itself". How to prove the absurdity of the "liberalistic" system? Nothing can be more simple: a glance at the present world will amply suffice. Liberalism is wrong, just because it is pronounced wrong by those who are oppressed and prejudiced by a liberal order of the world. Western Liberalism has itself become nationalist; for the countries in the opposite camp it rouses an integral nationalism with a dominant note of anti-liberalism in it. Does liberalism enjoy the unshakable support of "intellectual Reason"? If so, let us assail it with a "higher Reason". "The liberal system may be reasonable in itself; but we no longer desire it. No argument can refute this." Or, to put it less neatly but none the less forcefully: "The moment the belief prevails that human reason is powerless, that the equality of all is a utopia, that man does not acquire freedom because he is freed from all ties and allegiances: at that moment the system of liberalism will have collapsed". This event can be the result of a revolutionary process only, a cataclysm precipitated by hitherto disorganized, unbound, formless, "flotsam"-like (Treibholz) middle-class masses, in strict antagonism to the "petrified leader-groups" both of old Conservatism and old Socialism. For the traditional camps of both Conservatism and Socialism are stamped by the mark of death, since they have compromised with Liberalism and indeed become mere wings of a vast and chequered Liberal "totality". The agents of Liberalism have astutely managed to absorb conservative and socialist parties into their own system of living and ruling, thus securing a common—liberal, conservative, socialist, but mainly liberal—defensive alignment against the surging new forces of "truly nationalist and socialist" will. Even Italian Fascism, by preserving the old "liberalistic" groups of interests, has laid itself open to inevitable failure. What we need is a thoroughly new principle of groupment, invalidating trade-union, syndical and class alle-
giances, and uniting the People immediately under the sign of a national Ideal and Myth. A new socialism is called upon to arise, which will be free of the "liberalization" so eloquently denounced by Sorel. It must be radically anti-individualist, imbued with a signal devotion to "Work and Oeuvre", regardless of the petty problem of the "meaning of life" from a personal point of view. Equally, true renewed conservatism will no longer betray its very essence, as did degenerate conservatism, through self-explanation in terms intelligible to the liberal mind, through self-formulation and through bargaining with "other standpoints". The new conservatism will revert to the original device of power: "I am, I will!" Conservatism and socialism shall thus meet each other, not in their contaminated form around a liberal centre, but recovering their proper character in combining to fight liberalism.

Moderate and broadminded conservatism is hardly behind liberalism in incurring the hatred of the modern nationalist group. Carl Schmitt, Goering's "Crown lawyer", hurls invectives at Stahl, the great nineteenth-century state philosopher of Prussian Protestant conservatism. The latter was guilty of the capital sin of allowing a certain space for personality and individual rights, and with his "oratory and sophistry" smoothed the path for liberalism and democracy. (Among his other crimes, Schmitt exultantly unearths the particularly grave one that "his real name was Joll Jolson".) Nor does Schmitt spare the old monarchical state the annihilating reproach of having established freely elected municipal councils. This "contradiction" of its own basic principle was to bear bitter fruits. It was the thin end of the wedge of the liberal parliamentary principle bent on undermining the foundations of the state. In a word, it is not enough that there should be rulers and subjects. Woe betide the ruler who stoops to grant his subjects any rights! Liberty must not be limited, not even clipped, it must be wiped out without a trace. Schmitt proudly promises that in the new State no such thing as a municipal parliament protesting against governmental policy will be possible. Assuredly not! "Election from below with all remnants of former electioneering practice will cease." We have not the slightest doubt about that.

We hear much the same news from Jünger, the mythologist
of the type of the (fascist) "Worker". New Youth is carrying on a conspiracy against bürgerlich tradition, referring to the "worker" ideal—in a specific interpretation, of course. Liberty demarcated against the state's sphere of influence is gradually proving untenable. Liberal bourgeoisie is compelled to call in the various powers of the conservative heritage; to throw in its lot with Monarchy and other conservative authorities. National democracy on the Western pattern is but an anarcho-individualistic state of transition, necessarily driven to depend on principles which are foreign to its nature in order to gain some degree of stability. In the heyday of democracy party conflicts become more or less theatrical, and such small-scale upheavals as may occur merely contribute to the general aspect of liberal society. In the latter's evolution, however, are hidden the germs of its own destruction. Democracy is compelled to mobilize and enfranchise such popular forces as are utterly out of tune with the character of liberal bourgeoisie itself. A new mobility of the masses will arise which evades the control of democratic constitutions. Parties and movements begin to supersede the state; private groups appropriate public rights and symbols, the very forces let loose by liberal society corrode the State which this society needs for its protection. The old ties have been destroyed too irretrievably for a restoration of Monarchy or any old type of conservative Ständestaat with a hierarchy and balance of powers to be possible. "Here actions of such brutality are requisite that they can only be executed in the name of the People, never in the name of the King. . . . Things can only be mastered by forces which have come through the zone of destruction and drawn from it a proper legitimation." In brief, civilian liberal society ignores the momentous possibility that "the people may also decide against democracy". In reply to that malicious thrust we may repeat Lincoln's grand credo: "You may fool some of the people all the time and all the people some of the time, but not all the people all the time". We must not, however, turn a blind eye to the deep problem, the sore point of democracy to which Jünger in this remark has laid an unsympathetic finger.

We now pass on to Arthur Moeller van den Bruck, the classic of the "Third Empire" myth in its contemporary revival. Moeller-Bruck may be looked upon as the first great theorist
of the post-war "National Upheaval" of anti-Western Teutonism. Actually he was not a Nazi in the strict sense, for he cared little about biological "race" and was rather a propagator of the old Prussian spiritual traditions. Moeller-Bruck was the first to grasp that the very facts of defeat, political and social overthrow, and the "ignominious" peace treaty could, and should, be made the starting points for a new war against the West on an incomparably vaster scale, the starting points for an inner redress, in an entirely different sense from the one envisioned by republicans and socialists—in a sense which he calls "conservative" and which we should call "fascist" or "radical Right". Like Zehrer and the Tat people, or Dyrssen, Niekisch and many others, possibly also Jünger, but unlike Hitler and Rosenberg themselves, Moeller-Bruck pleads for a policy of alliance with Bolshevik Russia against the West, especially France. Even genuine Left Socialism, if it be but honestly anti-liberal, can in some measure enlist the sympathy of these exclusive fanatics of anti-liberalism.

Moeller-Bruck, too, counts on an upheaval of "the People itself, the lower classes, the mass" against democracy: against the poison from the West, the steward of the foreign oppressors. The united force of sixty millions must become one single will before it can be launched against Western bourgeoisie with a fury "barbarian and proletarian". The extreme Right and the extreme Left are to meet and join forces under the banner of "Dictatorship" proper: "the hard human experience that the welfare of man must never be confided to man's own discretion". The November revolution must be blessed for having, by the abolition of Monarchy, liberated the true idea of leadership. Socialism contains much usable revolutionary stock of thought. The Nationalist and Socialist extremes should be encouraged to meet, like the ends of a horseshoe, encircling the common enemy—Liberalism. They must lay the foundations for a new régime of "Social Aristocracy". As a concussion, an upheaval, a mobilization, the Revolution of 1918 was invaluable; it should not simply be ignored or execrated. "A revolution cannot be revoked." "We are out to win the Revolution." The patient, compromising politicians of democracy, whether bourgeois or socialist, whether "opportunists, eudaemonists, rationalists, or pacifists", are the
chief enemies. Not so the communists, who more than any others exhibit some “German ideas”, e.g., the idea of soviets (councils). Above all it is important to oust Western liberalism, which (1) was too late for Germany, and (2) is a tissue of maxims and tactics to cheat the People. Obviously, however, socialism must not insist on its insipid “doctrinal aims”; it must acquiesce in its rôle of supplying “revolutionary energies” for the designs and under the control of nationalism. Communists, in a word, are invited to help their antipodes of the Right in the execution of feats bearing a close formal resemblance to the acts of Russian Bolshevism: strangling the liberal republic, dispossessing a certain set of bourgeois politicians, establishing a government of stern severity and ruthless militancy. They must not, however, expect their allies to adopt in more “detail” a “servile copy” of Eastern communism. This is what Moeller-Bruck condenses so elegantly in the famous phrase: “Each people has its own socialism”. He undertakes nothing less than the transference of the revolutionary consciousness of proletarian socialism to a national attitude of uprising and revindication. German proletarians shall retain their proletarian bitterness, indeed boil with their anti-bourgeois anger, not by any means in order to fight German capitalists, but to whack the typical bourgeois of the West for the “common” benefit of the German nation. For “not classes but types divide humanity”. One of the great mottoes of Naziism! Not classes, types. . . . At bottom this means that history is swayed by the tragic and eternal irrationality of racial struggle; that the struggle can have no content of justice and progress; that conflicts are not caused by evils generally acknowledgeable and remediable according to any moral evidence; that the breach in human society which induces struggle is not founded in moral wrong or insufficient thought, and allows for no redress before a supreme tribunal of human consciousness. Not a struggle for the interpretation and shaping of social order, but a turmoil of tribal life-forces beyond discussion and persuasion, beyond the possibility of solution!

Socialism is wrong, Moeller-Bruck proceeds, because it does not think in terms of nations: “young” nations, “overpopulated” nations, etc. “There is no answer to the social question before the national problems, of which the German
problem ranges first, are solved.” It was, after all, only necessary to drag Socialism into a discussion in order to exploit all possible sources of discontent with Western liberal society. In fact, Moeller-Bruck does not actually appeal to the proletariat, which he uses only to provide revolutionary associations that may prove useful in the psychological preparation for a hard fight against a powerful and sated foreign enemy. He does not mean to assist but rather to imitate the revolutionary working class. He does not act on behalf of the proletariat but rather on behalf of the proletarianized nation. The scattered middle-classes are to function as the sociological basis for the new rebellion in the cause of bondage. “The problem of the masses also menaces bourgeois society from the right”: they are the masses that tend to become proletarian against their will. Henceforth Revolution acquires the meaning of “preparing the rise of a new order of men, and of new powers in man, representing new powers of the nation”. Proletariat is not an international but a national problem: Moeller-Bruck illustrates this theory by the horrible picture of Germany as a despised rabble of “too-many-millions”. And the German proletariat is called upon to submit to the leadership of a counterfeit, to legitimize the theft of its revolutionary apprehensions, to substitute the “oppressed nation” for the “oppressed class”.

But why this crusade against liberalism? Obviously the foreign political situation in which German pretensions are opposed to the interests of nations historically “standing for” liberalism cannot suffice as the sole motive. Nay, the situation itself cannot be understood as the mere fortuitous outcome of historical processes; German jealousy of the West is doubtless not only the cause but to some extent also the effect of the prevailing distaste for liberalism. Now Moeller-Bruck, too, makes use of the basic argument of psychological “fact” and “trend”. Above all, liberalism is despicable because we despise it. Holy “Youth” repudiates democracy, and it does so even more on account of democratic “banality” than of democratic “corruption”. A most significant order of precedence! The paramount factor is not moral discontent but a thirst for more intense experience; not the blots on liberty but the checks to the display of power. It is far less the absence or threadbareness of rules and obligations than the presence of balance and poise,
of domestication and the spirit of mutual arrangement, which makes liberalism so odious in the eyes of Moeller-Bruck and his partisans. The most appalling charge against liberalism is its preference for “mediocrity” and “middle-class principles” (particularly inasmuch as they recall the French middle-class with its self-reliant and unimitative culture of thinking and living). Even before the war, Moeller-Bruck wrote that liberalism meant not liberty but rather the cult of the human average: “Liberty for everybody to be a mediocre man”; “universal bourgeoisdom instead of universal nobility, importance given to everyday life rather than to exceptional life”. Perhaps we might venture to ask how exceptional life could be made universal; however, it would be short-sighted to treat it as an absurdity. For here once more we find ourselves in the heart of the great spiritual battle. Certainly not everybody’s life can be “exceptional”, just as not everybody can be a prince or a “leader”; yet to supply the “exceptional lives” and princely exertions of power with the sap of life can very well be the general state of mind, the generally accepted raison d’être of a society. In any case, we must put up with the average nature and existence of man; the great point of disjunction is whether we prefer to inject as much liberty as possible into that very average life of everybody or decide to “ennoble” average lives by ordaining them to become absorbed in the service of the “exceptional” lives of their masters. In the first case, we uphold the liberty of men, notwithstanding all limitations perforce entailed in that liberty; in the second case, we deny liberty to men but grant them the bliss of participating (as servants) in a liberty not their own, but admittedly far less limited than theirs ever could be. Instead of inuring them to liberty, we make them amenable to slavery, which, too, is a possible, maybe an easier course.

Moeller-Bruck, however, is bent upon dissociating liberalism, i.e., any institutional realization of liberty, from liberty, i.e., the sentimental value of the word. Liberalism, he exclaims, is the utilization of “principles” in the pursuit of business. Liberalism is “the liberty of having no principles and the claim that this is a principle in itself”. Liberals are “doctrinaires who yet do not even care about their doctriness”. Liberalism is equivalent to “halfness”, lack of principles, which yet does
not save it from being at the same time "rigid, disputatious, and rationalistic". I agree that it might be a "halfness" not
to kill a man who for some reason has incurred my displeasure,
and at the same time a cheerlessly "rigid" attitude to protest
against him killing me or my friends. Such are the strange
disabilities of what we are accustomed to call briefly civilized
life; and Moeller-Bruck does not prove so wholly illogical with
his wistful exclamation: "Primitive races have no liberalism".
Another of his monumental intuitions has come even nearer to
the proverbial: "It is through liberalism that nations perish".
Unfortunately, it seems as though nations of the Western type—
England, France, and many others—were still hesitating to
confirm the validity of that unquestionable and reassuring law.
Moeller-Bruck, it is true, hints at the explanation, namely that
these nations hitherto were inclined to use their somewhat
insincere liberalism to encompass the downfall of other nations.
This liberalism acts as a particular poison to the German
nature. Now assuming that such was the case, one might
inquire whether the fault did not lie with the German nature.
Moreover, what is really rather a lack of goodwill is sometimes
considered a tragic fate. Moeller-Bruck, for instance, declares
that parliamentarism has no tradition in Germany. This is a
pity, one would reply; but one reason the more immediately to
start laying the foundations for that useful tradition. Yet the
author corrects us at once, pointing out that his remark was
by no means intended to encourage any such enterprise; he only
meant to expose the debility of German democracy in order to
facilitate its abolition. Nations must "perish through
liberalism"—so that liberalism may perish; and Western
liberalism must be unmasked as a hellish device to ensnare
Germany—so that Germany may be justified in an anti-
liberal policy both at home and towards her fellow-nations.
For, though the "Revolt against Liberty" may be tinged with
madness, it is certainly no meaningless or aimless lunacy.

A remarkably well-stated sociological theory of the "Revolution from the Right" was published by Professor Hans Freyer in
1931, under that title. He describes and glorifies what he calls
the "revolution of the People (Volk) against Society (Gesells-
schaft). It is quite a new sort of revolution. During the epoch of
bürgerlich society revolutions were struggles of interest, led on
by some modest group-egoism under the guise of, and indeed with a certain real claim to, justice. The revolution now afoot has nothing to do either with interests or with mere justice; it is a "total" revolution in the shape of community, destined finally to bring to a close the era of bourgeoisism, of the unfolding of industrial society, of the "Nineteenth Century". In the society of yesterday all revolutions were partial revolts aiming at alleviations and redistributions, and having (partially again) attained their aims, the groups which had made them at last calmed down and reinserted themselves into the unquestioned general machinery of society. Within that society, that plurality of classes and parties, the State had no real power and existence; it acted the part of a "neutral arbiter", lived scantily on the spare remains of the ancient monarchical authority. There, man somehow felt unfree. Why? Freyer does not expressly say so, but we may safely infer that he is alluding to an embarrassing sense of limitation, of settled order, of moral stability, of liberties mutually paralysing each other. We are facing something which, if one insists upon such a nomenclature, might be termed a new "experience of liberty", or the need of a new "kind of liberty"—meaning, the "absolute" liberty of a concrete human will or agency, to which, merely by waiving their individual (or group) rights of liberty, its subjects are "party". "Therefore it is an illusion, a typical relic in our minds of the nineteenth century, to think that all revolutions are disruptions and shiftings in the tissue of collective interests, or that a revolution can have no agent other than an oppressed social class." "The 'Volk' is no social class; it has its infinite reserves in all places and at every spot; it awakes as a whole."

The revolution of the Volk, furthermore, implies or necessitates no rational scheme of future forms of organization. We must free our minds from all lingering ideas of "progress", of "amendment", of a "righting of wrongs"! The revolutionary principle, Freyer proceeds to explain, has nothing to do with structure, construction, order—"it is pure force, pure eruption (Aufbruch), pure process". Once more I must beg the reader not to dismiss such a formula as a mere tirade. He who calls it so might as well call the "Marseillaise" a trivial noise because it is not a mathematical demonstration. Freyer's pompous vision is no mere ranting, but an instance of the high art of
counter-revolutionary ideology which requires ranting for
definite purposes, but certainly not an instance of emptiness of
mind. What better designation than "pure process" could be
found for a process meant to make the mighty mightier? Since
the true aim of the "eruption", if stated bluntly, would hardly
make a universal appeal—for men are ashamed of renouncing
moral standards hitherto held in honour, even if for a time
they feel relieved at getting rid of them—obviously you must
stress the magnificence of the "eruption" as such. Revolution
from the "Right", as Freyer tells us, "would, if stated in
negative terms, amount to this: The People is not a social class
rising against its oppressors and exploiters. It is no group of
interests impaired or wronged which would like to have been
assigned a more advantageous position in the general system
of interests. Its revolution is no sequel to the revolutions from
the Left, with only the subject changed". In my own words, I
should say that neither the thirst for equity nor the need for
readjustment is the motive power for an "upheaval" of this
kind, but brute appetite for conquest; driving those who are out
to conquer in the proper sense as well as those who, for reasons
both cultural and economical, are attracted by the thought of
deriving secondary gains from the conquest of their lords.

Kriek writes similarly: the "revolution" has been surging
from the "existential crisis" of the German people, pervading
all domains of life. Or again, in complete accord with Jünger,
Moeller-Bruck, or Freyer: the Weimar State, the product of
November, 1918, by its own weakness had thrown open the
door to "true revolution": the overmastering of masses by
masses, of parties by the Party. The "legal" victory of the
N.S.D.A.P. concluded the epoch of party politics, of atomiza-
tion, of dissolute masses.

Even a religious opponent of liberalism like Gogarten in some
way refers to liberalism at the present stage of history having
"outlived itself". He sees what he calls "the false individualist
conception of the state" embodied in the American Declaration
of Rights and the French Revolution—or in a formula like the
one by Jellinek, the German liberal jurist: "The individual sets
up conditions on which he enters society, and maintains these
conditions in the state as his rights". He agrees with Jellinek
that these rights are not of political but of religious origin:
"a right of conscience independent of the state". But Jellinek is wrong in associating them throughout with the Reformation. Luther is not responsible for them—only such sects as the Anabaptists or Waldenses, or the Humanists with their Stoic inheritance. The liberal conception of the state, as we witness it to-day, is necessarily heading for catastrophe. For, as already predicted by Burckhardt, liberal democracy would raise increasing demands on the state (to benefit the individual), and yet, at the same rate, deny the state the real and substantial power it needs to cope with its growing tasks and obligations. However considerable in themselves, the single competences granted to the state by modern democratic society are of a merely commissary and ad hoc nature, and no disproof of the wholesale washing away of the real foundations of state power. The state, in a word, is bidden more and more to do everything and at the same time allowed to do nothing. The process must come to an end sometime; "somewhere human inequality will come into its own again" (Burckhardt). There is an element of truth in these reflections; they contain a not unwholesome warning to our optimistic and easy-minded adherents of democratic socialism. Gogarten, of course, is not concerned with the preservation of democracy; rather does he anticipate with whole-hearted pleasure the collapse of "society", "what the French call civilization", the sinful "sphere where man is king over himself", and heralds the elemental resurrection of the "state", where "man is subject to a power".

Another Lutheran state philosopher, Wendland (in the anthology "Künnet-Schreiner", 1984), interprets the triumph of National Socialist revolution as the counter-revolution against the state of liberal democracy, the re-erection of a real state which implies an order of mastery (Herrschaftsordnung) and an order of the people (Volksordnung) at the same time. "The authoritarian state-power (Herrschaftsstaat) means political direction with a concentrated power of decision. Liberal principles are erased. The democratic confusion of the ruling and the ruled is eliminated. Lordship takes the place of equality and brings about hierarchical articulation. Command and obedience supplant the idea of the unfettered individual. We are, in every particular, subjects (Untertanen)."

The Revolt against Liberty has attained its Heaven.
2. THE EMANCIPATION OF TYRANNY

"The Hitlerian State is directed towards German Power as its highest goal. Therefore the sphere of discussion, of the so-called ‘spiritual life’ (Geistigkeit), in which all power of will and all earnestness undergo disintegration, must be suppressed."

W. Stapel (1928).

We have already seen that the Revolt against Liberty is closely associated with something like an “outcry for liberty” namely, liberty of a different kind, the freedom of the “unique will” which is incompatible with man’s rights of freedom. That is why to the “revolt against liberty” I add what might rightly be called the “emancipation of tyranny” or, at any rate, the “emancipation of the tyrant”. Now the bare fact that men desire enhanced power for their trustees who act on their behalf is not in itself a psychological curiosity. There is no reason why I should not benefit by an increased freedom of action for the rulers, even in relation to myself; for the strengthening of their grip on the conduct of others and on public affairs in general may result in advantages for me which will turn the scales against the inconvenience of my loss of rights. The pathos of the “emancipation of tyranny”, however, reveals a vastly different state of mind; it reveals a special gesture of irrational surrender which has no longer anything in common with intelligent and regulated self-restraint in regard to individual liberties. The primary principles of civilized human existence appear reversed. Here, as elsewhere, Naziism seizes upon such criticisms of the democratic, optimistic, idealistic and utopian Left as are certainly not unsound in themselves; yet it does not merely demand that men take into account the “dark sides” of social existence (such as irrationality of instinct, the scarcity of goods, the necessity of compulsion and violence, the inevitable antagonism of different centres of collective action, etc.) and adjust their democracy or socialism to this more mature and case-hardened knowledge of social realities. It tells them to put darkness before light, to hug the chains of life as though they were Paradise, to construct glorious
ideals out of the experience of dire necessity. Owing to this queer perversion the attack on freedom appears in the form of a liberating revolt, and the reinstatement—indeed the re-creation—of tyranny is felt as an enlivening emancipation of the soul of the entire community. Here the point is reached where counter-revolution, merely because its meaning is stated in extreme terms, assumes the guise of genuine and creative revolution. A swindle of this kind is facilitated by the romantic conception of an inner and direct "identity" between the ruler's and the "people's" soul. We dealt with this idea in the chapter on Community and will refer to it again in our survey of the "leadership" theory; it is also the main bridge between pure political fascism and the religion of race, for it is evident that my master is more justified in claiming the absorption of my will by his own "freedom" on the presumption that he incarnates the particular blood which also flows through my veins which is essentially different from the blood that circulates through other human communities. Returning, however, to the elation attached to the "emancipation of tyranny", it remains to emphasize the strange radicalism of this kind of counter-revolution. I mean that it does not simply mark a reversion to "yesterday" but (in its more characteristic strain) a backward leap across the ages; not a withdrawing to our "fathers" but the roaming return to the nebulous dimness of our "ancestors"; not so much a reawakening of bygone things as the creation of new things in the spirit of a total inversion of the general trend. It is just because Naziism makes an absolute creed of the negation of liberty instead of accepting this negation as a partial or temporary necessity, that it can dare to hail as a "new creed of liberty" what is nothing more than the fullness of tyranny.

Freyer actually speaks of a "deliverance of man" from the fetters of the old system. . . . "The positive meaning of the formula of 'Revolution from the right' is that here, for once, the State is being emancipated from its century-old implication in society interests . . . the State becomes a free being . . . the emancipation of the State vouches for the emancipation of man." In fact, a new state is being born, pending the crisis of industrial society: apart from, and at war with, the latter's own state system which is doomed to dissolution. The new state acts
as an organ, a vanguard of the People’s revolution against society. The new state of the People can certainly be described as a “democracy”, to wit, an anti-liberal democracy: “Volk that has become conscious and so acts in an historical sense”. The “consciousness” of the “people”, however, in no way means a conscious collaboration of the citizens or public discussion or decision by vote; it means the consciousness of power in the Government and the consciousness of absolute assent in the population. For it is to Freyer that we owe the startling revelation: “the People must be exclusive”. It attains consciousness and activity through the mediums of “selection and the categorical imperative”—plainly speaking, by inequality and command. This sort of “democracy” can easily dispense with such stale and flimsy structures as constitutional safeguards. “Not status, but tension, not redundant (!) form, but a constructive framework of lines of power.” In plain English: it is none of our concern what the holders of power must or must not do, provided that they may do what they choose and control the will and activities of every man. “Man is free, being free in his People, and the latter being free in its sphere of life (Raum).” In his additional book on “Ruling (Herrschaft) and Planning”, Freyer proffers some valuable additions. “Planning” symbolizes that human history does not merely come to pass but is made”. “Being made”—according to Freyer’s vision—not by men, by mankind, by the people concerned, but by some omnipotent human agent! Hegel, with his somewhat circumstantial deification of the state, seems a long-winded scholastic when compared with the smart way in which his descendant Freyer manages to fit anarchical tyranny into a system. The character of freedom and resolve inherent in historical action implies the necessity of “pure decision and arbitrariness”. Planning must not fall into the “utopianism” of seeking contact with an “Absolute Good” in the religious or moral sense. It must not endeavour to realize the “best plan”, for it would thus forfeit its original quality and relapse into the heresy of a static “order”. It is not so much the contents of the plan that matters but the power that backs it. No doubt! For who needs obvious principles, an eternal appeal to mankind, or accord of those subject to laws and administration? The “pure process” of Freyer suffices. His formula: “It is not the
planners who rule, it is the rulers who plan", has rightly become a household word with the German neo-nationalist public.

Altogether the great concern of Freyer (as well as of Stapel, or Blüher, or Carl Schmitt and the rest) is the rehabilitation of mastery (Herrschaft). He not only attacks the defamatory and polemical theories of mastery propounded by liberal and Marxian writers, he even takes exception to the sociological classifications (class power, governmental power, etc.) of the one and indivisible Herrschaft. He will not have it mixed up with mere exterior manifestations of power, however dictatorial. Mastery sways the essence of men, not merely their momentary actions. "Mastery reaches down to those realms where man's resolutions regarding readiness to do things mature." Mastery and the set of masters cannot be "founded" or "organized" (presumably as this would expose them to the blot of a reference to "abstract principles" or the "best order"); they must "be there" as real "forces". The Herrschaft, however, carries a responsibility: it must take care that the People are always ready to do what history requires, and are even in their collapses always "aware of the Empire".

True freedom is the "inner freedom" inherent in the Prussian spirit of self-effacement before the call of the community and its rulers; libertas obedientiae—thus Spengler. Similarly Spann: Liberty is not selfish isolation (Fürsichsein), which would amount to "spiritual death". "Liberty, in positive terms, is not doing what I please but doing what fruitful community demands: what I ought to do." To which we only reply that a private who obeys his sergeant's command may represent a necessary, an approvable, and even a pleasant aspect of life, but somehow it fails to convey the sense that we associate above all with the idea of freedom. One might even hesitate to identify moral duty with either "liberty" or the requirements of "fruitful community"—but there is no need to follow this trail. The fact must not be concealed that the Italian fascist theories of liberty are of much the same coinage, though perhaps expressed with a little more sobriety and less metaphysical aplomb. Thus Corradini's "state-conditioned liberty" has a slightly more conservative ring. Mussolini's formula that fascism supports the "liberty of real man: the liberty of the state and of man in the state", whereas man as conceived by liberal individualism is
but an "abstract puppet", could just as well be issued by Freyer; it is only the absence of the dark "racial" understructure of the \textit{Volks} that makes the picture neater, more logical and therefore less suggestive of boundless tyranny. Even the authoritarian conception of the fascist state directing the interplay and evolution of the forces of society at its own discretion sounds more realistic and less sacral than the Nazis' fanatical "revolution" in favour of integral tyranny. Italian fascism is devoted to the same cult of political realism; but there is more of the realism and less of the cult in it; its tyrannical realism is less tempted to overbalance into a weird idealism of tyranny.

In a recently published book, Schulze-Soelde calls the idea of the "state of leadership" (\textit{Führerstaat}) a "Copernican turn" in the relation between \textit{Herrschaf}t and \textit{Volks}, and is quite right; it is hardly less of a "Copernican turn" for the traditions of Western civilization than it would be for an even more solid human tradition if men were told to cure the ills arising from the upright gait by walking on their heads. Schulze-Soelde, too, detects that it is precisely our own "moral freedom" which prompts us to bow before the will of the Leader and the State—to persuade ourselves "how indispensable it is that the Leader should own a maximum of fully undisturbed liberty for his professional activities". As opposed to the ancient authoritarian state (\textit{Obriheitsstaat}), however, the people are not despised, but highly honoured in the new \textit{Führerstaat}. If I were the "People" I should protest that I prefer contempt and disregard to having my will absorbed and my feelings prescribed for me. I would rather be despised as a social inferior than be robbed of my ego as an infra-personal being. The plebeian twist of the new tyranny certainly imparts to it a note of inescapable finality rather than of moderation.

Naturally the conversion of liberty into the "positive" benefit of being on the same side as a domineering power inspires Jünger too. He defines the real claim to freedom as a "claim to work"—an interpretation which will impress the unbiased reader much as though someone were to say that the only sense of bodily cleanliness lies in having the body protected from cold. In addition we read that the old ideal of liberty which implied a delimitation of the state's sphere of influence is now
being supplanted by a "different conception of liberty, which considers command and service synonymous, and embraces the state as the most important and comprehensible means of transformation". There are, I fear, still backward masses who fail to understand the new grammar in which command and service rank as synonyms. On the other hand, it would probably do no harm to find a German translation for the English phrase of "mistaking big things for great". For it seems to me as though the mistaking of the element of "liberty" realized in the boundlessness of state power for the genuine idea of liberty came pretty much under this heading.

The state is disemarrassed of the odious obstacles to its free activity known as the citizen's "fundamental rights" (Grundrechte). According to Koellreutter, they will lose all meaning because they are before and above the state, and therefore alien to the state (staatsfremd). The Nazi party jurist, Nicolai, asserts the same truth even more vehemently: "The forces of individual selfishness ready to thwart the State and the People, revealed in the so-called 'fundamental rights', are incompatible with an organic state. If we value the People as the highest good on earth, then the duty of sacrifice for the Whole has no limits. In truth only one fundamental right exists—right as such—and only one fundamental duty for every German (!), and generally for everybody: to keep and observe the right".

The pleasant confusion woven into these sentences is not easy to render in English, as Recht is the German both for "right" and for "law" in the sense of a system or order of laws. Nicolai simply tells his fellow-subjects that they have no rights except to obey the law and to expect the others to obey it too. We certainly do not deny the value of lawfulness; but humbly we think that it makes some difference what kind of law it is, and that a law which lacks reference to the fundamental rights of the citizens is a bad law. Unfortunately, it is this very lack of reference that matters very much more than the law itself to Nicolai.

The sombre new creed of state omnipotence with its Lutheran (even more than Hegelian) origins is admirably preached by Gogarten. The institution of state-power is based upon the wickedness of man, and consequently moral sensitivity is out of place. We have to rely upon a potent state; not to nurse day-
dreams of a "good" state. State—or better still, authority (Obrigkeit)—"is present wherever one man is officially placed above another". Its symbol is the Sword, expressing its right to dispose of the life of its subject, which corresponds (?) to its duty of protecting it. For "the political and social bondage of man is his only chance of existence in this world"; and "the highest and most condensed expression for this bondage is the sovereignty of the state, its 'holy' right over the life and the property of its subjects". Man being incurably evil in his fallen existence, no ethical progress in concrete and palpable things is possible, and all moral precepts of this kind only acquire meaning as political commands, as a harsh compulsion by the "Polis" authority to ensure the outward preconditions of earthly existence, as the exercise of state power. ("Polis": the political community, the city-state in Ancient Greece). The aspirations of individualistic ethics to liberty and perfection are harmful nonsense. We can only submit to "the necessities of the state, born of man's wickedness, and certainly to no state answering some ideal conception". Nay, if any existing state had the misfortune to realize some canon of ethical standards, this would not only be wasted on Gogarten but would actually rouse his hostility. A state rid of the haut-gout of evil would no longer be palatable to him. For the state, he tells us, gives man "freedom" by curbing the power of evil and making men conscious of the same; now it "cannot do this unless that power becomes visible in itself and through itself".

The Spann-Andreeae school reintroduces Hegel's justification of state omnipotence on the ground that the state is the supreme manifestation of good, just as Gogarten (and Heidegger) revive Luther's state-worship based on the belief that man is hopelessly subject to evil. Personally I am inclined to think that in spite of its Christian polish, Luther's pessimism is more pagan than Hegel's pagan optimism, the latter being not entirely foreign to nineteenth-century progressive and constitutionalist views. For black despair is the very core of overweening arrogance. It is true that with Luther this is wrapped in the threadbare guise of reckless belief in God's grace independent of man's conduct. Hegel, on the other hand, preserves some elements of actual morality by making them a facet of state ethics. Be that as it may, the modern fascist certainly creates the impression of
being a simplified and coarsened Hegel, with none of the grand subtlety of the original. However, taking it all in all, they do follow Hegel’s main trend. Andreae calls upon Schelling (Hegel’s immediate forerunner) to testify that true liberty is only conceivable in complete separation from “individual arbitrariness” that the “good will” is arbitrary and futile; that absolute morality in human actions can only exist through direct divine control; that the objective validity of science, religion and culture can be safeguarded only by unified state management. And Hegel himself assures us that objective ethical will (surpassing mere “morality”) is identical with state-bound will. Individual will as such is unreasonable; the ethical significance of individual actions is dependent upon state will; therefore the ethical will of the individual can never be at variance with the state will. This, practically, amounts to the emancipation of power from every possible moral control. We may safely agree with Wickham Steed in his assertion that “the ‘totalitarian’ absolute state cannot be moral because it is responsible to itself alone”, and that in practice Hitler and Hegel are the same. At any rate we should add that this flattery applies to the intrinsic meaning of Hegel rather than to the historical Hegel in his entirety. Nor could one understand Hegel’s infatuation for the state, still less its present-day Nazi derivatives, unless one is aware of the underlying contempt for reason and human personality.

3. THE VICE OF DEMOCRACY

“The people detest being dragged into majorities; they detest being pestered with projects; they yearn for a direction in which they can believe, and nothing more!”

A. HITLER (N.S. Party Convention at Nürnberg, 1937).

“Only let the Volk be silent, and it will speak thus perceptibly!”

HOUSTON STEWART CHAMBERLAIN.
“Opposition is tantamount to Treason. Opposition has no longer any moral justification. . . The people do not know what they want: they have only instinct. But the Leader knows what the people want: that is what makes him a Leader.”

W. Stapel.

The Nazi criticism of democracy, laid down in innumerable passages from countless writings, presents a gamut of qualities from undeniably keen observations up to climaxes of injustice and nonsense. Very often, naturally, it merges into ordinary reactionary argument against liberty and equality or the party system. On other occasions, however, it bears the distinctive traits of a more final and violent hostility, of the rupture with a conservative order that (for want of a dynamic and comprehensive unity of the “people”) provides nutritious soil for Liberal microbes. Let us now pass in review some of the more outstanding points of anti-democratic polemic scattered over the Nazi and half-Nazi neo-nationalist reactionary-literature.

We begin with one belonging to the second group, Edgar Jung, the author of a big volume entitled “The Rule of the Inferiors” (Die Herrschaft der Minderwertigen), meaning—need I explain?—Democracy. Poor Jung is not in a position to solve the puzzle as to whether the “purgers” who shot him on the same day as Röhm and Schleicher, and who were at all events anything but democrats, are to be considered as inferiors or superiors. It is, however, only fair to record that Jung incurred this summary execution for composing the text of a speech made by his chief, von Papen. The latter, although usually more discreet, indulged on this occasion in some mild warnings against the orgies of party dictatorship. Even in his book, Jung charges Fascism with being too prone to exact mechanical uniformity in the people. This is a consequence of the original error of individualism (?); for “Fascism, in virtue of its Latin roots, is still deeply involved in individualist ways of thinking”. Obviously, Mussolini is still too much of a liberal; if his methods are slightly too oppressive (the book had appeared long before those methods became all too successfully emulated north of the Alps), the blame falls on liberalism. The equivocation between popular government and a dictatorship exploiting certain popular passions produces an amusing tangle of notions.
such as the following: "A rule of violence built upon mass favour knows no responsibility. For he who is responsible to the mass is in truth responsible to no one". Or again, an even grosser confusion: "The individualism of modern democracy with its doctrine of equality destroys all values". One would imagine that it is only one step from equality of votes to compulsory equality in talent for art! And what is the ideal of equality? The indignation of the oppressed or those who think themselves so. An annihilating exposure. As for liberty, we learn that the ethical idea of liberty has been lamentably contaminated through confusion with a political idea of liberty. Surely none would doubt that moral ideals were made to supply academic highbrows or literary beaux esprits with a subject—never to be put into practice. Everything else, however, is surpassed by Jung's sweeping criticism of the parliamentary and party system. We know, and of course deeply resent, that plutocracy figures as a serious disease of democracy in some of its forms and at some periods. But Jung does not even find it worth while to distinguish between the patient and the disease, for the obvious reason that, in reality, he does not transfer his aversion from the disease to the patient but merely harps on the disease because of his hatred of the patient. Nay, he would (as it were) accuse him in the same breath both of obesity and consumption. He calls a party "a private association for the exertion of sheer money rule". He then subscribes to the words of an older conservative critic, C. Frantz: "Crowds of men who assemble only to perform the act of election are not susceptible at all to representation". Yet seemingly they are susceptible to the power of money, for it is written on the same page: "Thus State-power slips into the hands of money-owners". On the other hand, "he wins who cries the loudest". Here a moment's pause may be justified. In the meantime, Jung's pessimistic estimate of human psychology appears to have received unexpected corroboration from the rise and triumph of the Nazi movement, whose ringleaders did "cry the loudest" and did succeed. I should not, however, press this argument, for I do not think that the Nazis really won on the strength of their better throats (which they unquestionably had), but rather owing to other factors which enabled them to use their formidable throats as effective weapons. But what of the
"money rule"? Does a greater amount of money ensure an increased vocal capacity? Certainly the real relations are infinitely less simple. Vocal cords are by no means oiled by money alone, nor is there any reason why money should not stand against money in free political competition. Above all, however, there is no danger of Jung insisting on proletarian dictatorship, or persecuting wealth with implacable hatred. He concentrates all blame on the legendary "money property", heedless of the fact that property of any kind (except objects of personal value) is expressible in money. He would not hear of socialism, because "in the interest of money, it combats the state, monarchy, landed property, home-bound (bodenständig) industry (!), the middle class, and finally labour itself, by rejecting every policy of social reform (!)". We may take it for granted, then, that the Jewish bankers and their sons—who usually set up as socialist agitators—are the only real "money owners" who can afford to buy the "loudest clamour", and whose rule is camouflaged as bürgerlich democracy. Our guess is confirmed when we read further that the bogus élite of parliamentary democracy is in truth a "selection of the inferiors", seeing that "it is not those under a social obligation who rule, but high finance".

The odious "money-lenders" and "international men of finance" are the especial pets of the enemies of democracy, for they are sufficiently intangible and wrapped in mystery to be used as scapegoats and bogeys in the attempt to disguise general class-rule and to discredit democratic liberties. Nevertheless, we sometimes meet with more sincere and direct language. Thus Jung writes: "In truth, the masses are not destined to forge fate but to obey". This is plain speaking. Democracy does not deserve death because it is plutocratic, but because it is democratic. Finally, I add a very sensible remark of Jung: "The plea for public discussion can only be understood as something reared in the soil of rationalism (Aufklärung): it was thought that in this way the right thing, or at least the relative truth, could be found, and fixed socially". We confess, blushingly, that we are still not wholly weaned from so monstrous a superstition.

Michael Freund’s sociological inquiry into the nature and succession of élites—following, of course, such pioneers of the
problem as Sorel, Pareto, Michels—may perhaps help the student to understand the decrying of democracy as a "rule of the inferiors". The "élite" theory touches two vulnerable spots of democracy. First, the fiction of strict political equality, which blinds the adherents of democracy to the problem of "élites" in general. The truth is that democracy as a concrete system of rule functions—like any other system—with a particular "élite" group possessing political leadership, but it is more or less unconscious of the fact. Not only does this prevent a systematic selection and education of the "élite", it also makes democratic society unprepared to grapple with the problem of the everlasting struggle and flux of "élites". The truebred democrat is a forlorn conservative, ignorant of the fatal fact that, owing to a law of nature, new "élites" are bound to arise and come into their own even if no redistribution on moral grounds of power and wealth would appear to be urgent. New groups will always arise as claimants for the "prey" (Pareto). We are reminded of Freyer's "Revolution from the Right" as a "pure process" with no regard for claims of "justice", and the similar theories of Moeller-Bruck or Jünger. Certainly a sociological "discovery" that political history is mainly a fight between "different sets of masters", and a coming and going of "élites", with no particular importance attached to the inner meaning and justification of these processes, is well calculated to cut away the ground from under the feet of democracy; for in this light democracy appears, not as the best possible settlement of things under the auspices of an eternal order of moral laws, but rather as one among many types of rule, unfavourably distinguished by the illusionary state of mind of its supporters. In the second place, this purely relativist theory requires but little manipulation to make it applicable to a more direct and material criticism of democracy. Whereas in the initial phases of democracy an "intellectual" élite prevailed, in further stages and in the present stage of mass democracy a purely "economic" type of élite has become preponderant. The final outcome of equality is a form of inequality, which is most unsatisfactory and unstable because it is built on fortuitous circumstances only, and lacks all inward claim to validity. (I did not actually find this formula in Freund or elsewhere, but am rather inclined to think that it gives a fair account of what may be considered the serious—if still untenable—part in the accu-
sations against the "plutocratic" character of democracy.) Freund himself, who consciously goes further than Pareto in taking into consideration the differences of *élites* as to the meaning and purport of their claims, speaks of a bankruptcy of "outward", an appearance of "inner", of "secret" *élites*. Hitler's chief aim is to displace an economically determined *élite* by a "qualitative" (*artmässig*) one. Briefly, what strikes us here again is the claim to make the discharge of *élite* functions in society dependent on anthropological qualifications. The necessary inequality of definite social positions is being justified and "ennobled" by coupling it with the alleged inequality of men.

Passing from the cooler regions of an ostensibly non-partisan sociology to Nazi state metaphysics, we find the fear that democracy will leave no room for an adequately functioning political upper class modified into a peremptory refusal to acknowledge any such a thing as a democratic "State". Forsthoff contends that the liberal system knows no citizenship of the state "in the proper sense". In the first place, the position of the *Bürger* is founded on Society, which exists in itself, independent of the State. Here society appears as a "self-contained social reality, kept in regular motion by its proper laws", whereas the State is reduced to a merely functional apparatus for arbitration and regulation. Some of us might deem this a fairly respectable office, and fail to see any need for the State to overstep these limits and become a direct "unity of life", like, for instance, a camping body of comrades in arms. The reasons given by Forsthoff are strictly nationalistic, and for Western minds, whether they be nationalist or cosmopolitan, very hard to grasp. For the English, French or Dutch, however patriotic or even reactionary their inclinations may be, generally feel their belonging to a super-national order of society and human understanding to be as evident and indubitable as their belonging to their own respective nations; they would never harbour the idea that political liberty could be fundamentally suitable for the French but disagree with the Danes, or vice versa. Forsthoff, however, passes the decisive verdict on "national democracy" (the type of State familiar to the Western world) that it is "not the *nomos* of the German people". "The German bourgeoisie has not proved capable of constituting itself as a militant supporter of the State, carrying ballot-papers and arms, such as the
French bourgeoisie has been for the last hundred years.” A foreign constitution can be imposed on a nation for a certain time; never a foreign “law of living”. “The German people has little affinity with the equalitarian democracy of Western Europe.” There may be a grain of truth in that; and one might suggest that, whether or not the democratic State is generally a “real state”, the Weimar State certainly was not. As regards the consequences, naturally Forsthoff does not consider the aspect that, given the alleged “lack of affinity”, the fault lay perhaps with the “German nation”. After all, no individual can simply defy a moral code on the ground that he, Mr. Smith or Mr. Brown, “has little affinity with honesty of the mechanical, inartistic type”. In the future, we shall have occasion to meet this most instructive, if hardly convincing, type of argument. The general trend of anti-democratic argument, however, remains that under democracy there is “no State proper”, no genuine authority, no capable “élite”, no real ruling will, etc.; in a word, no true vigorous Herrschaft. A shadowy substitute for this sinew of collective life still lingers on, and does office for it; but it is not the real thing. For the loss of elementary brutality and unrestraint invariably means “denaturalization”.

Thus Stapel complains that men grow less and less able to bear leadership imposed by fate. Blood ceases to be the criterion and yields to service, which, in its turn, is displaced by majority rule. Men are first intent on risking, then on securing, and finally on regulating their lives. (I must own that I can find no trace of decay in such a scheme of progress.) There is a growing tendency, so Stapel adds, to eliminate the factor of chance. We are aware how deeply this kind of hostility to democracy is rooted in an ultimate attitude of hostility to Reason and Civilization. On the other hand, Stapel also happens to make the rather plausible (if not too original) remark that chance majorities of the moment do not necessarily represent the general will of the nation. However, chance only enters the picture here in order to accentuate the ugliness of the “mass”. In truth, Stapel seeks to defame not chance but the majority; or even more, the idea of liberty and of rational order based on mutual understanding which underlies the technical expedient of decision by majority (and also the rights of minority). Incidentally, he is quite right in his observation that a democratic constitution, like the one of Weimar (then
in force), does not depend upon *natura populi* but upon *ratio hominum*. That is why it is really a constitution, not a mere confirmation of traditional power. Again it is quite a different matter that "the reason of men" is neither a thing to be ashamed of nor entirely unconnected with "the nature of the people". Let us add that Stapel, too, is unwilling to renounce that clever argument against democracy, so popular with its more demagogic adversaries: the assertion that democratic leadership is "technically fettered, and morally irresponsible". For the absolute ruler whose management of the nation’s affairs has miscarried risks being killed as the visible and undeniable cause of disaster; whereas the multiple democratic "representatives" of the nation, thwarted as they are in the exercise of government, will retire smilingly after a failure. A marvellous imagery of the Nazi idea of "responsibility". Responsibility as a working system of government is too tedious; it is not tragic, not spectacular enough; therefore let us throw responsibility overboard as a daily article, and rely on the ruler’s fear of a violent death. The biting *mot* about Russian Tsarism being tyranny mitigated by assassination, is accepted as a positive principle of statecraft!

Speaking of statecraft, I realize that I must no longer refrain from dealing with Adolf Hitler himself, now Imperial Leader and Chancellor. He is the author of one big volume and many important smaller works written when his movement, which was—in the end—to triumph, was still striving for power. It is not without some feeling of hesitation that I venture to quote the *Führer* with critical intent; yet I brace myself with the grand archaic watchword: *Amicus Plato, sed magis amica veritas*. Now Hitler’s paramount aim has always been the extinction of democracy—as the gigantic national achievement of Germanhood. Edgar Mowrer is not mistaken when he says that behind Hitler’s struggle against Marxism the struggle against the principle of democracy is at work. Marxist socialism as well as internationalism and pacifism are but irradiations of the one insidious and uncanny idea of equality and decision by general discussion. Many of the more subtle and morbid Nazi conceptions of religion, culture, mode of living, etc., would make no appeal whatever to Hitler, the born politician of the sturdiest reactionary substance, the lower middle-class provincial genius who has served with unerring and fervent devotion the worlds both of
romantic nationalist heroism and hard, matter-of-fact capitalism which are the focal point of his orientation and the goal of his aspirations. The fight against democracy has always been the thing which he really understood and cared for, and which he has pursued with undeniable mastery. His great speeches and open letters on this subject issued under Brüning’s and von Papen’s chancellorships, sometimes attained almost classical lucidity and persuasiveness on the subject. He obtained full spiritual success in his double endeavour: firstly, to convince the German capitalists that political democracy, inseparable from a free labour movement, leads inevitably to state interference with private property and to the impairment of the economic position of the upper classes—and secondly, to doctrinize the masses of the German political Right into the view that a merely “authoritarian” and “conservative” régime, recoiling from the complete destruction of democratic constitutional elements and the various parties, was incapable of ousting from power once and for all the internationalist and socialist Left. Under the given circumstances, both assertions contained an ample proportion of relative truth; although, of course, the circumstances which conditioned that truth were not only diagnosed but in part actually created by Hitler himself. For he, having planned and drawn up a huge popular force of fascist counter-revolution with pseudosocialistic stimulants, helped to bring about a situation in which, without the support of political counter-revolution, capitalism appeared gravely menaced—and counter-revolution, for its part, if deprived of the living force of the brown columns, was doomed to impotence. However, this consideration scarcely affects the logical consistency and even the far-reaching (if not unconditional) historical validity of Hitler’s conception. Let us now collect some pithy condemnations of democracy (as well as other weaknesses akin to it) from Mein Kampf, that precious store of Nazi thought of a more directly political order.

“The Jewish doctrine of Marxism opposes the aristocratic principle of Nature, installing in place of the eternal privilege of force and strength, the mass of mere numbers with its dead weight.” Ingenious deeds are a protest of genius against the inertia of the mass. The parliamentary principle of majority defies leadership and personal authority, thus oppressing by the “numeric weights of chance crowds”, aristocracy which is
rooted in Nature. (Again we have the well-known axiom that men in general are inert and contemptible "masses", personality being reserved for exceptional individuals. Along with it, the misconception that Democracy addresses men as "masses". As it is, Democracy stands and falls with the conception of all men, of average men, as personal subjects of deliberation and decision.) Public opinion is by no means a product of self-made experiences but merely an effect of psychological propaganda unconnected with material truth. (Nor did the writer spare any effort to furnish, by his own method of moulding public opinion, a magnificent illustration of his thesis.) Democracy, after all, is an instrument of Jewish power. "Only the Jew can praise an institution which is filthy and untrue like himself." (Neither the logical context nor the material purport of this oft-quoted mot of Hitler will appear convincing to most Western readers, though there is no reason to deny that on many occasions democratic liberties have benefited some bodies of Jews and were promoted by them. Of course, the essential substance of Hitler's doctrine is the illusory transference of the fundamental problem of governmental order into the field of racial contest, of "the Volk's proper ways" and "foreign spells and influences".) "Only the hero is called upon" (to determine the features of the State). Progress and culture of mankind are not a "product of majorities", they "rest exclusively on the genius and resolution of personality". Parliamentarism is generally an alarming sign of decay; wherever it is coupled with a residuary stock of real state authority, it serves merely to decompose the latter. It was by no means since the establishment of the Weimar republic only that the parliamentary system in Germany began to prove poisonous; it has done so long previously, during the lifetime of the old Monarchy. The problem of the State does not depend on the choice between monarchy and republic; the main issue is drawn between the democratic corruption of government (irrespective what the head is called) and the "Germanic State". Here, the Head is "elected freely" (?), but subsequently unlimited power is vested in him. Again I am inclined to agree with the choice of issues. Hitler is quite right in classing constitutional monarchy with the types of state that flavour of democracy; he has good reason for his mistrust of "legitimism" and the formal "respect of state authority". The mighty hurricane destined to
tear Democracy up by the very roots—and, possibly, European civilization with it—must arise out of new depths of anarchical tyranny.

Koellreutter, speaking in favour of “Inequality” as the principle of “natural divisions of the People”, refers to one of Hitler’s more recent speeches (May, 1934): “He rejects the mental plan of Marxism, the plan of the so-called equal essence (Gleichartigkeit) of men, and takes his stand on the ground of creative, Völkisch personality.”

Writers such as Schemann and Rosenberg lay special emphasis on the relationship between democracy and racial inferiority. The habitual struggle between two opposing currents in most nations, the one representing aristocracy, authority, etc., the other supporting democracy and generalized liberty, is due to racial mixture in the people (Schemann). The distinction between free and unfree classes, between those possessed of full and those possessed of restricted citizenship, etc., originates in the superimposition, by conquest, of different racial stocks. Anthropologically, nobility and free yeomanry are of the same class, at least amongst the Teutons. (? Presumably a mere backward projection of present-day political slogans into history.) Rosenberg makes the rather dangerous admission that democratic popular vote might be justified on condition that it were confined to “characters” rooted in the native soil, and similarly disposed (gleichgerichtet). The extension of religious tolerance—approvable in itself—to the political sphere, however, was the great blunder in German history which is responsible for the antagonism of the “two Germanies”: that of the Right, and that of the Left. The democratic “Eastern type of man” (ostischer Mensch), together with his bastardized allies in the big cities, has become, since 1918, the predominating racial element (Menschenschlag) in Germany. (The Myth was of course written in the dark republican period before the dawn of Hitler in 1930.) Liberty, equality and levelling must be opposed by the “German idea” of discipline, authority and “type-creating” force.

Moeller-Bruck associates democracy with futility, feebleness, outwardness. How could such a nondescript act as voting contribute to the shaping of fate? Only the oppositional parties (1922: Communists, Nationalists, Nazis and other völkisch factions) are endowed with real will-power, and they are in-
variably hostile to democracy. Once there used to be such a thing as genuine Teutonic democracy—but it was built upon Blood, not on Contract. Our own democracy has gone hopelessly astray. "We did not conceive the State in an organic connection of the limbs, but in the mechanical computation of votes" (i.e., we were victims to the error that men formed a society, and blind to the truth that they form a single living being). "On the other hand, the spiritual representatives of the nations, the great entrepreneurs (this, from a 'socialist'), all men devoted to creative activity, all those who recognized that the fate of a nation is not decided in discussions, withdrew more and more from our parliaments." Fortunately, "corporative ideas" have already begun to displace "atomizing ideas". Thus does a daemonic Prussian aesthete, gory with "Revolution" and flirting gently with Russian Bolshevism, become one with a half-scholastic Prussian logician like Spann. Furthermore, we had better add to Rosenberg’s and Moeller-Bruck’s criticisms the commentary of Jünger on the "mire of democracy" where the strongholds of power are occupied by an "amorphous, petty bourgeois and sentimental kind of man", entirely lacking all "sense of distance". The contempt of democracy is, to my mind, intrinsically a contempt for ordinary men and their everyday lives, closely united with a tendency to make them even more ordinary, dull, commonplace and jejune, so that instead of aspiring to freedom and self-realization, they should completely subordinate—nay, consecrate—their souls and their lives to the service of the Mighty and the splendour of the Great.

As we have recently had occasion to refer to Spann, I consider it only proper to recall one of his fierce exclamations against democracy: "At bottom nobody has the responsibility in democracy, nay, the wire-pullers frequently stand behind the scenes and are invisible, intangible, are hungry money-powers . . ." One of Spann’s pupils, Heinrich, when describing the Fascist paradise of "collaborating corporations (Stände) in the place of classes and parties at loggerheads" suddenly hits upon the obvious question why parties would not function equally well as "sub-wholes" or articulations of the nation. In the West this does indeed appear to be the natural idea, for the nation is supposed to consist of men endowed with intellect and will-power who group and distantiate themselves, according to
their convictions on public issues. Heinrich, however, decides that parties are "no real members of the whole", since they "lack spiritual purport which could be organized". The Stand of an industrial branch which "embraces" (zusammenfasst) factory owners and workers placed under the lead of an official appointed by government, is doubtless provided with the necessary "spiritual purport"!

In Spengler's anti-democratic theory two distinct lines of argument converge, their coalescence giving rise to the confusion so often observed in nationalist literature of this kind. Spengler, in this respect not unlike Moeller-Bruck, considers Democracy both as a disgracing ulcer in general and as specifically un-German, implying thereby that it proved even worse in Germany than in other commonwealths. Democracy supplants the people by the mass; it amounts, not to serving the people, but to making use of the people. Viewed from another angle, it means "formlessness as a principle", occasionally mitigated by such remnants of authority, left over from the eighteenth century, as are Monarchy, the body of officers, diplomatic usages, or the English Parliament. The English parliamentary system, however, has exhausted itself, seeing that it is no more two sets of the upper class which fight one another but the two irreconcilable classes of the rich and the poor. (The English themselves will be able to judge better than I as to whether this construction displays any thorough knowledge of English history; personally, I consider it a merely specious generalization from certain rather secondary aspects of reality.) At any rate, there is a signal difference between the English system at home and its foreign, particularly German, counterfeit; for in the latter no original national unity pervades the parties, and opposition embodies a real negation of State. "Except with reference to a concrete nation, terms such as Republic, Parliament, Democracy, etc., are mere fashions of speech." In Germany, parliamentarism necessarily means nonsense and treason. (There is, too, an almost universally valid law that reactionaries regularly think the Socialists of their own country distinctly "worse" than their foreign comrades. This delusion has its obvious reasons, both of the nationalist and the tactical order.) "England sapped the strength of all states to which she prescribed the poison of her own 'form' as a medicine." Conversely, England will cease to be successful as soon as
the general course of our civilization has rendered parliamentarism impossible. Within the boundaries of the Occidental (or "Faustian") civilization, the English spirit of Viking Liberalism and the Prussian spirit of military State Socialism are the paramount antagonists; Privacy and Society stand against the Whole, the collective Body. Liberal democracy, therefore, is at once the mark of a period of dissolution, and the political manifestation of a foreign, an anti-German historical power. The contempt aroused by the first reason seems to be mixed up in a slightly obscure manner with the hatred caused by the second. The author's main concern is the anti-democratic Caesarian Empire to come, and the predestination of Prussianized Germany to wield its machinery of power.

4. CREATIVE ENMITY

"General rules of politics: how to acquire dominion, how to abate an adversary, how to gain and to hold a position of power. . . . Quite a small number of harsh categories: Strong or Weak, Friend or Foe, I or Thou,—govern the field."


"A political man is a man who is himself able to discriminate between Friend and Foe. The Political Soldier of the new Reich detects the foe of his Reich in every disguise, because he carried the Will of his State in his blood: with his instinct of a fighting race, he traces the adversary who approaches him, however camouflaged as a friend. Only he who carries the substance of the new State within him is endowed with this faculty."

G. GÜNTHER.

The State of the "warrior tribe" is committed by its very nature to what has been called the dominating importance of foreign policy. The State aims not at the public good as interpreted in terms of personal happiness and the convenient mutual arrangement of its citizens, but at its own sovereign power and strength and "peculiar essence". Similarly it is not
subjected to a moral standard ideally uniting mankind, nor pledged to any regard for actual humanity or any supranational unit of culture or interests; it recognizes no ties of moral duty or spiritual allegiance outreaching the limits of its definite organization of military power, its orbit of centralized authorities. From this it follows that it is the securing and enhancing of its power among other state “individuals” rather than the right order of society which will form the main preoccupation of a state conducted on the above lines. It must be admitted, though, that not all Nazi authors go to such lengths. The very idea of the Race or of Völkisch mysticism is apt to place some restraint on the fascist and militarist worship of direct power and state sovereignty. Practically, however, it cannot fail to invigorate or even inflame the Machpolitik of the State, providing the rulers as it does with the consciousness of a unique mission which is supposed to involve the extension of their power. Moreover, the relationship of enmity—the mental fixation upon a national Enemy, real or hypothetical—let alone actual war, is particularly attuned to the experience of absolute and irrevocable community limited to a definite group, regardless of the manner in which concrete social relations between individuals and classes within that group are settled and arranged. Not only is common enmity of the vital, the “existential” kind, calculated to act as a bond of unconditioned allegiance and devotion, it may even serve to define the boundaries of the collective Unit of Life, to provide a test for membership of it in the sense of complete and effectual adherence. Just as the token of Race or Kind means “to be different from the others”, so the touchstone of the State is War. Great achievements and decisions can only be attained, says Hitler, if the entire attention of a people is concentrated narrowly on an issue, “as though in fact to be or not to be were dependent on it”. Spengler puts it less passionately but more clearly when he writes that wherever home policy begins to pursue its own aims the State is on the decline.

On this point, we have furthermore the testimony of Moeller-Bruck, who with unique emphasis insisted on having his vision of “Socialism” not only linked up with, but—and this is the pivotal point—even deduced from, his gospel of Nationalism. The inner construction of society must be made a corollary, an
active instrument in the foreign political field, which is the field of ultimate reality. "In this world one nation is the natural enemy of the other"—here is the bedrock on which all political calculations must be securely founded. We must have "Socialism"; we must win over the proletariat. Why? Because Germany is herself reduced to a somehow "proletarian" condition in the world, and may gain invaluable benefit from a cleverly controlled outburst of proletarian energies of rebellion. "The struggle for liberty which lies before us can be fought out only by the whole People." All objects other than foreign policy, not excluding those of the reactionary classes longing for the habits and ornaments of pre-war German society, are now meaningless. "The real Conservative is well aware that we are no longer concerned with anything but the German question." Nor does Moeller completely lose sight of more theoretical and general aspects. He heartily endorses the function of catastrophe in the history of nations. "The problem of catastrophe is the problem of lives bound up in community."

Carl Schmitt, however, is the man whose name is inseparably associated with the theory of "State born of enmity". His treatise on the meaning of politics (Der Begriff des Politischen) first appeared in 1927, when the sham "consolidation" of the Weimar Republic was at its height, long before he became the "Crown lawyer" of Nazism (now out of favour owing to his Jewish connections). Briefly, the great discovery of Schmitt may be stated in the following terms: The first and original factor of public life is to be found, not in the need for an authoritative regulation of the questions and conflicts arising from the contact and interpenetration of human lives in society, but simply in the phenomenon of collective systems of power hostile to one another. Politics as a struggle between rival centres of power is more vital for the State than its administrative tasks and functions; "the notion of the State presupposes the notion of politics". There can be only several States. "Plurality in the world of States follows from the essence of politics." If once mankind were so organized (which God forbid!) that there could be no more possibility of war, then "neither politics nor State" would exist any longer. For "State" cannot be gauged as a mere unit of administration; so modest a criterion applies to a number of social groups apart from the State. The dignity of
the term "State" must be reserved for such units as are qualified to act as subjects of a "political constellation". Now a political constellation is a situation of conflict in which men are prepared to renounce their lives for the sake of a common cause. A State, therefore, is a community which can expect its members to shed their blood at its bidding. As no political situation—i.e., no situation in which armed fighting on a large scale might become necessary or in any way reasonable—could arise in a humanity comprehended in a universal suzerainty of administration, the unfortunate people subjected to so degrading a rule would actually live in a stateless condition. Unfortunate they would be indeed, for the question is by no means merely one of nomenclature. A world thus ordered (whether it be possible or not) would be a world lacking earnestness, a world of futility. A world (we might say) where the State has been reduced to a kind of large-scale town, the Army degenerated to a mere police force! In a word, enmity, according to Schmitt, is the distinctive feature of political existence—of any existence worthy of its name, of existence "in earnest". It is owing to this note of enmity that political community surpasses mere social community. There are many social bodies which lie below the range of politics, but what makes them political units, or "States" proper, is the casus belli (the "critical case", Ernstsfall), the groupment by enmity. Enmity, to be sure, must not be confused with private quarrels and personal hatreds, which—as is known—are forbidden by Christian ethics. Not as if Schmitt were in any way warmly interested in Christian ethics, but it suits him to point out that the advice contained in the Sermon on the Mount, "Love your enemies", refers only to the private (inimicus), not to the public enemy (hostis). Thus Christ—whether by an accurate judgment of his merits need not concern us further—has been promoted to the rank of Treitschke or Moltke or Bernhardi.

We are told by Schmitt that the "political sphere" is an original province of life governed by its own fundamental and specific laws. Just as the spheres of morality, aesthetics and utility circle around the polarities of Good and Evil, Beautiful and Ugly, Useful and Detrimental respectively—so the sphere of politics has as its characteristic the contrast between "Friend and Foe" (Freund und Feind). This is an ultimate fact, closed to
further analysis, just like Good and Evil or Pleasant and Unpleasant. Certainly the category of Friend and Foe does in a way refer back to other values and interests; common religion, for example, may have its part in an alliance, and economic rivalry may contribute to a situation of contest. Also, in this special significance, the category of Friend and Foe presupposes the phenomenon of public life; for mere private friendship and enmity cannot determine a political grouping. Yet all these data are but conditions for, but preambles to the political fact itself, which in any case constitutes complete novelty. Political conflicts, Schmitt insists, are neither collisions of interests nor antagonisms of a "spiritual" (religious, moral, etc.) order. Since they have no bearing either on material claims or on "normative" issues of right and wrong, they cannot be relevantly settled either by barter or by discussion and persuasion. Their natural solution is provided by war. This does not mean that all political issues really do, or ought to, lead to war; yet, to put it tersely, they are not worth a penny if they cannot. Political situations are those liable to explode into a war; and political communities—i.e., States proper—are those ready to make war and commanding the devotion of their members sufficiently.

"Every conflict of an order religious, etc. . . , turns into one of the order politic, as soon as it grows strong enough to group men effectually in terms of Friend and Foe. . . . At the very moment when the non-political conflict has brought about this grouping (in terms of Friend and Foe), it abandons its former criteria, and submits to the entirely new and specific, often very inconsequential and 'irrational', conditions and requirements of the situation that has now become a political one". Certainly the State has many functions of a peaceful and trivial nature; but war, at least a putative if not real war, remains the centre of gravity. In an enlarged edition of his classic treatise, Schmitt accords divers secondary meanings to politics, in the form of home policy: such as economic policy, educational policy, etc. The primary meaning, however, which is a fundamentally bellicose one, cannot be affected by that. There is only one aspect of Innenpolitik to which Schmitt is ready to grant the real character of politics. It is the attitude of the State towards the political rebel, the "public enemy" (Staatsfeind). The State shows credentials of its character as such, not only by being
prepared to fight a foreign state, but also inasmuch as it is
willing to exterminate its seditious citizens. Again, this is not
recognized as an occasional necessity but as an essential. As the
proof of the pudding lies in the eating, so the proof of the State
lies in the killing and dying. On the other hand, an armed
political party ready to start civil war rises, according to
Schmitt, to the rank of something like a "State". For life in
general, and politics in particular, are a hard business in which
there is no place for cowards and sneak.

We consider that there is a marginal element of sound truth
and a central element of obvious perversity in this. Not only is
actual bloodshed or resort to it as a matter of course no criterion
for the "State": it is no test of "politics" in the technical
sense of the word either. The great issues of governmental policy
and party contest need have nothing to do with any violent
design either direct or indirect; inversely, they inevitably
presuppose the conception of a unity, a common scope of affairs
and decisions, above and beyond the objects of dissension. When
the Southern States seceded, it was not the beginning of "real
politics", but rather the attempted dissolution of a political
system. Even so far as we may admit that war is the "last
argument" of foreign politics, it would be as absurd to suggest
that it is the essential—if mostly "latent"—meaning of the
latter as it would be preposterous to argue that killing the
seducer of one's wife is the ultimate meaning of matrimony.

But it rather seems to me as if the overrating of war was not the
most monstrous of Schmitt's fancies. The establishment of the
"irreducible category" of Friend and Foe is less overtly
offensive, and yet contains a stronger trace of barbarism. For it
means neither more nor less than the grammar of tribal sub-
jectivism couched in a scientific phraseology. It means "Us" as
an ultimate standard of Pro and Contra, an unchecked
sovereignty of group egoism and self-worship, in the brilliant
light of which Right or Wrong as well as True or False are
doomed to wane as bloodless shadows.

The so-called "Copernican turn" of Schmitt has not failed to
attract a swarm of admirers and followers. From these we pick
out Sombart. Quoting Schmitt's Friend and Foe principle, he
elaborates it with a further formula of his own, not a little
obscure: the body politic—so it runs—is ruled by friendship
and enmity (Mit-Wider-Prinzip) as the family is ruled by friendship and mutuality (Mit-Für-Prinzip). For the family is self-centred whereas the political unit is focused externally. The latter owes its existence to there being other units outside it: no political unit would be possible if it were not for "the others". Yet it is incident to God’s world plan that the fate of mankind should be accomplished in the interplay of political units. Sombart proffers a definition for a political unit. This means "a unit in which a group of men—in opposition to another group (!)—defends, and seeks to assert, its existence in its totality". To be sure, Sombart is very old; but the direction in which his senility takes effect is none the less significant.

It would be an unpardonable mistake, however, to presume that in the Third Empire doubt of Schmitt’s theory entails capital punishment. He has a noisy rival of no small talents in Koellreutter who is bold enough to remonstrate with him occasionally, denying him the character of a true interpreter of Hitlerian völkisch Germany. He reproaches Schmitt with his un-völkisch legal formalism—his worship of the State as an abstract unit of power. (Schmitt in truth began his well-planned career in the left wing of the Catholic Centre, with an able criticism of reactionary romantics; a trace of Roman juridical thought and Roman Catholicism still clings to him). War and struggle, according to Koellreutter, only mark a peripheric and extreme case; community and comradeship as such are the primitive matter out of which the state is made. Yet I think the Nazi faithful may rest at ease; the dissension between their two luminaries is not much more than an academic controversy. The kind of "community" which has Koellreutter’s approval is exactly the same as the one responding to Schmitt’s idea of friendship shaped and defined by enmity. It is but a secondary matter of taste that one enthusiast of the French Revolution may revel in the deliberations of the National Convention, whereas another is illumined by the thought of Valmy and Jemmapes. At first sight it might appear confusing when Forsthoft observes that domestic policy is the main subject of present-day statecraft (Lenin, Mussolini, Hitler). But here "domestic policy" denotes a technical, not a moral, conception; it means a preparatory stage, a gathering of forces for the decisive issue, a tactical ruse rather than a genuine restriction
to domestic tasks. Hitler himself gives utterance to the axiom of new nationalism that immediate detail issues of foreign policy are incomparably less important than the securing of a warlike régime, on however restricted a national territory, which is willing and able to organize the discipline and the fighting energies of the people in order, when the occasion arises, to render outward conquest possible on a large scale. Nor need we be anxious in any way about Forsthoff's nationalist, or even Schmittian, orthodoxy, for he prides himself in "turning away from the formalistic ideology of the constitutional state which is bound to ignore what is really essential", as well as in "building on the basis of a distinction between Friend and Foe, between elements attuned to, and out of tune with, the People, German and un-German. . ." In the upshot, it always comes to the same: the tribal proscription of the "foreign Kind".

Gerhard Günther (of the Jünger Circle) presents himself as a veritable high priest of the Religion of Enmity. "The foreigner—the stranger—is not a fellow-man for the Horde, the Tribe, he is a cause for superstitious shudder and abhorrence." God has laid a ban on the enemy, which must be put into effect. Only complete annihilation of one of the adversaries can terminate the struggle, for it is not aimed at a circumscribed political object, but caused by an elemental fighting instinct. "It is this mystical feeling of the exclusive right of one's own tribe to live, combined with the abhorrence of the stranger—with whom neither reconciliation nor fusion is permissible—which lies at the root of the powerful feeling that we rediscover today in the shape of national honour." The existence of the State, too, has its origin in this zone of elemental and compulsive enmity.

Edgar Jung, without, apparently, being guided by Schmitt, is entirely at one with him. "The only politics worthy of this name is the preservation of the State in the midst of the foreign world". Inner politics are but a hundred year old aberration due to the substitution of Society for the State. An enormously instructive remark! Ex contrario it might serve forsooth as a uniting slogan for the gathering of all Liberals and Socialists, along with all Conservative champions of the welfare of men (temporal and spiritual), against the Antichrist inebriated with naked Power! Or again: "Politics is foreign politics. By it will the fate of the Germans be decided". (It must be observed
that "Germany" is not the subject proper of Jung's book, not even of the particular chapter from which I quote. This sentence strikes us in much the same way as if we were to read in a book on Diet: "Proteins, fats and carbohydrates are required for the nourishment of a Scotsman.") "The true politician is concerned with domestic politics in as far as they are calculated to prepare a nation for its mission; but no more." This, too, might be genuine Moeller-Bruck as well as Schmitt: "A nation receives in war the form which is valid for its life in peace."

It would not be fair to leave a military maniac like Bäumler out of this enumeration. The Männerbund, he boasts, unfolds itself in opposition to a "world of foes". There is no State without an adversary, without victory. The true Bund is not an "ethical association" for the pursuit of certain aims, it is a "reality" adapted to a definite Enemy. The Political Soldier—the fulcrum of the Nazi State—is not satisfied with the word "fatherland", which fails to convey to him a concrete image of the sacred Thing to which he pertains. "He wants to know where the Enemy stands... to participate in the State, for it is the State that defines the Enemy."

5. THE MYSTERY OF LEADERSHIP

"The relationship between Führer and Gefolgschaft (followers)... unconditional affinity... mystical holiness of the blood-tie... a permanent connection between Führer and Gefolgschaft, certainly proof against intellectual doubt."

"That formal equality of rights which, contrary to all nature, is bent on an equal treatment of unequal things pertinent to different kinds, which can no longer differentiate between home and foreign things, is henceforward denied recognition:—seeing that German Volk species has a claim to order its existence in congruity with its own type."

H. Marr.
"The Führer is assisted by a Gefolgschaft of young enthusiastic men who contribute to decisions by the atmosphere of their very existence rather than by explicit manifestations of their will—by Stimmung (mood) rather than by Stimme (vote)". (By vow rather than by vote, as it were).

R. MICHELS.

It is not in tyranny pure and simple that the adepts of Nazi Fascism believe. However much is spoken of mastery (Herrschaft), absolute Monarchy and the old-fashioned aristocracy are rather at a discount. Certainly one of the reasons for this is that even absolute Monarchy, as far as it would be possible to reinstate it, is too constitutional for the taste of the new anti-liberalism; the same applies to the old aristocracy inured to democratic moderations and counterweights. Another reason is that mastery is expected to assume a new and peculiar characteristic of more intimate and thoroughgoing community. Therefore the Master (and the under-master, respectively) is called "Leader". The English word does not quite render the slightly deeper tone of Führer, for it is too much associated with the notion of a parliamentary party leader. The word Führer also means a "guide"; in its neo-German use the connotation of a "chief" or "chieftain" is present as well. The intimacy implied in modern "Führertum" corresponds to the idea that the Leader is—in a particular sense—congenial to the People, linked to it by special bonds of affinity. I am speaking of unison in a "particular sense", of affinity expressed in "special bonds", in order to distinguish clearly between the meaning here and the democratic belief in general human equality, even though accompanied by technical qualifications when actually applied. It is by no means merely suggested, for instance, that it is preferable for the German people to be ruled by Germans, who speak their language and know their habits and traditions. This would still be in keeping with democratic conceptions. What Führertum really means, however, is rather that German people are to be ruled by masters so eminently incarnating their peculiar "kind" or "essence" as to be able to divine—and to decree—in their stead, what they want; indeed, to conceive and prescribe the essence and character of the "guided" on behalf of their racial "genius" who is truer to their soul than their own
conscious thinking could possibly be. The Führer’s claim on my loyalty does not originate, as in democracy, in my own choice and decision (as well as that of my fellow-citizens) in reference to his display of abilities and qualifications; not, as in a conservative system, in the dignity of his “office” possibly confirmed by the fiction of a divine ordination. It is derived from the supposition (founded on appropriate experiences of mass eroticism, tribal egotism, submersion in military activity and comradeship, etc.), that in some mystical way he “is myself”, more deeply and securely so than I am; that he has a firmer hold on my inmost striving than has my own personality in its isolated self. Here the democratic creed of equality is opposed, not by an emphasis on the inexorable facts of actual inequality, but by another “ideal” creed of inequality, which is all the more radical because it is at the same time a creed of identity. The more fully I cede my personal self-sovereignty to such a master (“ Mein Führer”) the more I become subject to the illusion that my own will is working integrally in governmental decisions and actions—whereas in the grey meticulous system of liberal democracy my will is just a little modest particle in the vast fabric of popular will made up of so many different minds and tendencies. As Wickham Steed admirably states it: “The claim of the free individual is not that the common decision or the common law shall be identical with his own wishes, but that his wishes shall be heard and be taken into some account”. The mystery of Führertum signifies the exact opposite. The wishes of the unfree individual are not heard (as such), nor taken into account at all; yet they are so directed as to be identical with the common decision and the common law (instead of being simply silenced, and overridden, as happens under more honest and careless forms of despotic government). The gist of the Führer principle is given in the succinct statement quoted by Steed from Georg Schott (“Das Volksbuch vom Hitler”; the use of the definite article in vom, i.e., von dem, recalls the French le Christ): “In this man’s mortal frame, the original Germanic stature is incarnate”.

Years ago Feder, the then official Party theorist who has recently fallen into disfavour, described the objective requirements in a Führer as follows: “He must have a somnambulistic feeling of certainty . . . naturally his mental capacity must be
above the average... but knowledge is not the decisive factor... an inward drive; moral earnestness; passionate will... The Dictator must be entirely free from all unnecessary restraints and scruples... he must know the art of hating... Severe and hard upon himself, he judges himself after his own law... In the pursuit of his aim he must not refrain even from bloodshed and war... In relation to his helpers and collaborators he appears as the first among men free and equal.

We are, however, presently informed that German virile faithfulness (Mannestreue) implies the "need for subordination" to a Leader. The open-minded reader will realize that some of Feder's postulates have since been satisfactorily fulfilled in the actual Nazi State, and the world may look forward to an even ampler corroboration by facts.

"Leadership", unlike the office of hereditary kingship, is bound to arise from an actual and visible wave of popular support, inspired by a strong feeling prevailing at the time, and referring expressly to the Leader's unique person. Hitler professes his faith in what he calls "Teutonic Democracy", which means the "free choice of the Leader" and subsequently, his "full power and responsibility". We are inclined to admit the "full power"; as for the "responsibility", we already know that this misused term simply covers in the language of the modern partisans of dictatorship the notion of the patent power. Nor can there really be any question of a "free choice". The phrase merely suggests that the supreme power shall not be conferred by birth or by lot, but by a kind of enlightened acclamation in the narrow circle of sub-Leaders who still possess the highest degree of reliable "affinity". The system of real "free choice" would be logically incompatible with the system of "full power", seeing that no election in a relevant sense is possible without public discussion and party opinion as standing institutions. What Schacht, the financial lord of the Third Empire, said to American journalists on May 5th, 1938, must be judged accordingly: "The so-called dictatorship of Hitler is somewhat analogous to the power which is at present vested in Mr. Roosevelt. It is the highest form of Democracy (!) to choose a Leader by free election and then entitle him to the full use of power". Seldom was truth so recklessly distorted. In so far as Hitler's ascendancy really did result from "free elections"
(which is undoubtedly partly true), these “free elections” represented the functioning of a state system which the National Socialists openly intended, and in due course proceeded, to stamp out integrally and forever. President Roosevelt refrained from setting fire to the Capitol in the days preceding his election; nor did he abolish the oppositional press; nor is there any evidence for his having as yet dissolved the Republican Party, or driven its mandatories out of Congress, or sent its leaders into concentration camps. Therefore I firmly refuse to regard him as a real Führer, and charge Herr Schacht with the old German vice of exaggerated admiration for all foreign things and people. Whatever President Roosevelt is, he is certainly no genuine representative of “true Teutonic Democracy”, and falls within the modest bounds of mere American democracy.

In an address delivered by Hitler at the Nürnberg Party Congress in 1934, we find the definition: “Our leadership does not consider the people as a mere object of its activity; it lives in the people, feels with the people, and fights for the sake of the people”. It “feels with” the people instead of consulting the people, except occasionally in the form of senseless theatricals known as “plebiscites”. Koellreutter, who refers to the above sentence, is quite justified in underlining “feeling with the people” as the predominant factor. He even makes it a term of scientific state theory. “The representation of the popular will is discharged by the Führer, who feels with the Volk, and thus is enabled (!) as its representative to make its will effectual.”

It is essential for the Leader to be Lord of the souls as well as of the bodies. Whereas the Leader, as regards his direct support in popular opinion, resembles the “Dictator” in the old sense, his claim to power far exceeds dictatorship as a mere technical, temporary form of government. Rather, in this respect, does he approach the position of a despotic monarch, especially of the pagan type (which, of course, is by no means entirely absent from the history of Christendom). Gottfried Benn, a Nazified ultra-modernist poet, writes that the Führer is a “spiritual principle”. Such marked Prussian reactionaries as Stapel or Sombart show a reversion to the phraseology of absolute Monarchy, suppressing the elements of Catholic or Liberal moderation. Stapel demands from true Führertum a consciousness of its religious mission. Sombart gives a vivid
picture of his ideal State and its apex in Heaven, avoiding unnecessary complications. "The 'Führerprinzip' which we profess, culminates in the assumption of a supreme Leader's will, who no longer receives instruction as an inferior from a superior Leader, but solely from God, as it were, the 'Leader' of the world." The Führer principle implies a "continuous revelation". Since "all authority comes from God", the Leader must not listen to the voice of the people, unless he knows it to be the voice of God; the voice of the people as such, of a chance and changing majority of the citizens, is irrelevant. For "the statesman does not serve the interests of the People, only the national idea".

The Führer principle, as well as Naziism in general—I very much grieve to say—has also found a large number of Catholic advocates in Germany. Undoubtedly Störner (a former Jesuit and still a priest, a patron of the Catholic "Youth Movement") excels amongst them. He undertakes the task of showing that the Führer principle is not only compatible with, but is even an expression of the spirit of the Gospels. For the Führer principle is antagonistic to the "mechanical" conception of equality as proclaimed by the French Revolution, which is a "transportation of Atheism into the province of politics". As Christianity is certainly opposed to Atheism, it cannot but regard the Führer principle favourably. The utterances of Our Lord against "the Princes of the peoples and the great ones of the earth" merely refer to "absolute tyranny", or in other words, "abuse of official power". The sentence "He who will be the First must become your servant" means that real Führertum is bound to be a "service of the co-nationals (Volksgenossen)". In this sense, both superiors and subordinates "serve"; the "form" alone is different. State service has a priestly feature, a trait of liturgy in it. Lawful state authority calls for a "wonderful glorification". In fact, the ruler's dignity has the character of an irradiation of Our Lord's glory. The authoritarian principle has now also found its way into the domain of education. We no longer educate from the point of view of the child but rather of the People, no longer with a view to the "little individualistic ego-personality" but rather to "membership in the People, the great whole". The educational trend of the old monarchical army (which, in Hitler's words, enrolled into its ranks "about
850,000 brawny young men a year") bore some analogy to the gathering of His followers around Christ. When the ancient Germans adopted Christianity, they conceived the Passion in terms of a story about the Leader and his Followers (Führertum und Gefolgschaft). We realize that Blüher has found a Catholic rival—less brilliant but no less astounding—in Stonner. National Socialism and Christianity, the latter adds, have in common that both of them demand a training to self-sacrifice. So does Communism, incidentally; yet Stonner offers it no place in the alliance. Taeschner, another Catholic Nazi, openly advocates the theory of Führertum und Gefolgschaft on the basis of racial affinity. He finds a formula of no small illustrative value: "The Leader designs the life-path, and leads the way along it; the others follow him, confiding themselves to his guidance." But an order functioning so smoothly is possible only on the supposition that the Leader and his followers are "kindred" (artgleich). It seems we can rest assured that the success of an attempt at imitatio Christi depends chiefly on the presence of racial consanguinity with Christ—however hard it may be to test it.

It will also be useful to record Jung’s observations on the subject of Führertum. The genuine Leader, he writes, is "feeling" responsible for the community. He is a gatherer, a focus, of the feelings of his people. "Hence the proper essence of leadership lies in the sphere of inner values." If a reader were to mistake such formulations, oscillating between quaintness and banality, for the expression of mere empty romanticism, he would lamentably fail to grasp their real purport. They are calculated to lay the spiritual foundations for a conception of leadership as the very antipode of its democratic conception. These references to "feeling", "inner values", etc., are far more deeply anti-democratic than would be a coarse summons to the people, "Obey the masters set above you, and hold your tongues". Nothing could be more unlike, more ultimately different to, a leader commissioned by the will of the citizens and obliged to act in keeping with the expressions of their will, than a leader who draws his legitimacy from having already "inside him" the "soul" of his fellow citizens, with the values and ideals peculiar to them.

We now bring some further witnesses for the same argument. Carl Schmitt (after Hitler’s victory) proclaims his faith:
"Leadership (Führertum) and affinity (Artgleichheit) are basic terms of the National Socialist right". Führung ("lead", "leadership", "guidance") must not be lumped together with mastery or dictatorship—a strictly neo-Schmittian subtlety of distinction!—even where these be rightful or useful. For instance, British rule in India is no Führung. Führung is a "specifically German and National Socialist conception." Neither does it coincide with the Catholic idea of pastorate, and several other types of social super-ordination. "This conception of Führung springs directly from the concrete and substantial thought of the National Socialist movement." No explanatory image, no allegory, no general idea can illustrate it. (It must be a queer thing, taken all in all.) It can only be understood in its "immediate and real presence". This way of describing an idea is likely to rouse some suspicion. A man praising the beauties of Spain, or the efficacy of a cure for gout, to his friend, may say also incidentally, "You must see for yourself", or "Try it and then doubt"; yet he will have no difficulty in giving an intelligible account—without trading in mystery—to his hearer who has never been to Spain, or has never had his gout treated in a similar way. On the other hand, we may expect a hashish-eater to retort to an incredulous questioner: "In your present condition, I cannot convey to you the bliss of this experience; you must become yourself a hashish-eater in order to get an idea of it". As it is, Schmitt undertakes to reduce the mystery of leadership to another mystery, the fiction of Artgleichheit. "Unconditional affinity between Führer and Gefolgschaft (followers, 'retinue'). . . . Both the continuous, infallible contract between the Führer and the Gefolgschaft, and their mutual faithfulness, are based on Affinity. . . . Affinity alone can prevent the power of the Führer from becoming arbitrary tyranny; it alone is a guarantee of the difference from all rule of a will of foreign kind (fremdgeartet), however enlightened and advantageous the latter may be." It is a hundred to one that the rule of a "will" assured of its "affinity" is likely at all events to be less advantageous and particularly less enlightened.

It is even suggested, much in the spirit of Schmitt, that the Führer system guarantees the only real "democracy", for it alone secures an effective "representation of the people". The Nazi jurist, H. J. Wolff, is particularly eager to use this spark of
genius to kindle the fire of his theory of state. In pre-Nazi Germany the pluralism of parties and groups of interest—and even of single state authorities—undermined democracy, and stunted the growth of any really eminent personal authority. The group leaders were so many holders of power and headstrong dogmatists, among whom no fruitful discussion and lasting agreement was possible. The "Völkisch Republic", on the other hand, is sworn to the service of supra-individual wholeness integrated by the national substance (Volkstum). This integration is independent of any "ideologies", for "the Volkstum in all its wonder is already present in its essence (seinsmässig) apart from any ideology". Such a "republic" is certainly non-liberal, yet by no means necessarily exclusive of liberty. Again we encounter here a variation of the one royal idea of Nazi Führertum: The guarantee of just and acceptable rule is not seen in any juridical restrictions of the ruler's power, nor in any explicit and controllable reference to the decisions of the ruled; it is believed to lie in the assumption that the Leader a priori, universally and invariably, represents the "essence", and lives from the "substance", of the people. The beloved recourse to such terms as "Sein", "soul", "feeling", etc., is but a symbol of this main idea. It must not matter to me (being an average citizen) whether the personal identity and the acts of my rulers really have anything to do with my will; what is required is that they shall "represent" my will perfectly. Elections can only give an incorrect result as to the appointment of representatives, for they are subject to "sources of error"—according to Wolff, who is, to all appearances, over-scrupulous about democratic accuracy. The right solution, however, is a mere trifle for him. A pluralistic, competitive representation of the people is "impossible"; therefore let "well-known personalities be chosen in common by the whole people". A mere egg of Columbus! But I have failed deplorably to convey the original flavour of the German phrasing. I said "the whole people", but it really reads "alle Volksgenossen". Now this pet word of the Nazis, Volksgenossen, does not mean simply "citizens"; it is designed to mean something like "brothers of the same stock", or "racial comrades". And I said "chosen", but what Wolff really wrote was not gewählt (which corresponds to "chosen" as well as to "elected"), it was gekürt—an archaic word sounding very
solemn, with a marked suggestion of an incontestable "divine choice", and also a slight connotation of "mating". Thus, as Wolff opines, Nazi rule actually restores democracy, for it "again" makes of the People a community open to representation—with a common fatherland. The Nazi régime is "carried" (getragen) by the people, and exercised in its "name". However, the "new democracy" is not "plebiscitarian", for the state-power is not dependent on the sanction of society. The occasional confirmation by organized popular consent is destined to "clear up, or rather to prevent, any doubt as to the representative force of a governmental measure".

Professor Schulze-Soelde holds that the governmental method of *Führertum* was entitled to displace both monarchy and parliamentarism, because both had "estranged themselves from the people". The German princes had very often been volksfremd. . . . "How does the Volk best proclaim its will? . . . For centuries the German Volk has been instinctively, dimly and unconsciously striving to express its sovereign will. . . . The true will of the people is to be led by a maximally good (!) and strong government." In the pluralistic party system, the people do not feel that governmental power issues from it. The *Führer* state gives a "Copernican turn" to the relationship between Government and People. (To wit: that popular "essence" is embodied in the government, and popular rights are therefore unnecessary—or rather, devoid of sense.) The *Führer* is legitimate, "because he has sought the Volk and called upon it, and the Volk has followed him." The Volk is "personified in the *Führer*"; there is a "pre-established harmony" between him who leads and those who are led. The *Führer* must be "in keeping with the Kind" (artgemäss); a leader of strange essence (wesensfremd) could not be tolerated by the German (!) people.

It is never advisable to lose sight of Haiser for too long. If he failed to forecast the governmental theory of "affinity", he at least knows that within the orbit of a "Kind", "leadership is due to the higher Kind". Also he lays great stress on setting free the powerful leadership of the future from the one-time fetters of a tamed and ceremonial princedom. "A nation which lacks a ruling class of pure stock, can only be governed by an absolute master." The Dictator has the advantage of being free to rule more ruthlessly than a Prince, as he is not compelled to beg for
love for his heirs. The true autocrat is proud of popular hatred. (On this point, Caesarists like Haiser or Spengler strongly disagree with official Nazi theorists. But it may be suggested that the latter would readily admit that the true-bred Führer, though living on the love of real Volksgemeinschaft around him, certainly regards all enduring and principled opposition as the attitude of a degenerate and outlawed mass—Schmitt: the Staatsfeind—who does not belong to the Volk proper, and whose hatred merely honours him.) All Germans, Haiser continues, await such a master (1928); and the rest of the Occident will soon come to their way of thinking. Germany needs the Man who will knock down all unmanageable fellows, all "personalities." The Man to Come, he writes (1926), must be a man of action, he must even have something in common with "adventurers" and "captains of brigands". For, whereas Monarchy flatters the people with liberty, "we can best be set on our feet by a Dictator who need seek nobody's favours, since he has a bodyguard at his disposal depending on himself alone".

6. THE TOTALITARIAN STATE

"The National Socialist State is the purely political State ... controlled by the Party, the incarnation of what is political: the embodiment of a völkisch community's will for self-preservation, regardless of all other controversial issues within that community ... the Führer State, according to the words of A. Hitler (Party Convention at Nürnberg, 1934): 'It is not the State that commands us; it is we that command the State. It is not the State that has created us; it is we that make a State for ourselves'."

W. Roessle.

"To build up State administration and the Army on the law of personal accountableness, and at the same time to form the general political management of the State on the principle of
parliamentary democracy, i.e., of irresponsibility, is bound to prove impossible. The democratic State, in its insecurity, was helpless against the onslaught of Bolshevist Judaism. In the face of this danger, Monarchy was found to be equally ineffectual, and so were the Christian confessions."


The Fascist conception of the Totalitarian State, the scope of which is extended in National Socialism, does not exactly mean that the governmental apparatus of the State affects to regulate all social, or even private, life of the citizens. This would deserve the term “communism”, or at all events, “collectivism”. Much less does the Totalitarian conception imply that the various groups and trends in national society should acknowledge an impartial “Whole” of State interests beyond and above them, and persuade them to submit at least to its more direct and stringent requirements. This would rather correspond to the ideal of “democracy”, even if it be a “patriotic” or “conservative” democracy, or one with a monarchical or authoritarian “head”. In truth, the Totalitarian State is the very opposite of a state which contains a variety of parties and bears but a very restricted analogy to the Collectivist State. The Totalitarian State is (1) a State which claims to enforce a unitarian and obligatory scale of values upon the whole of society, and to some extent on every individual belonging to it; and (2) a State which is politically uniform in colour, i.e., identified with one definite trend or party, and a set of rulers appearing as a closed body outside competition. To put it briefly, it is the One Party State, whereby the “Party” also presumes, more or less, to do duty for a philosophy, a Church, an Areopagus of social honour and ostracism, etc. The aspect of “One Party State” as such is developed to the same degree in Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany. The aspect of the supra-political encroachment of the Party is incomparably stronger and more serious in the Nazi Empire. Lack of space prevents us from discussing such adjacent questions as to how Collectivism can demand and yet run counter to, the Totalitarian conception, or as to how far a State without a variety of parties must needs be a “One Party State”. We may sum up the purport of the Totalitarian State in the formula: All conscious and arbitrary movement or
organization is totally controlled by the State; the State is totally expressed in the actual governing authorities, and coincides totally with the ruling body. We might as well put it in the way that the Totalitarian State means the renewal of the Tribal State at the stage of industrial civilization, organized by means of the social technique previously developed by the Democratic State with its plurality of parties.

There are strong tendencies towards the Totalitarian conception in this sense, both in Plato—who desired a personal union of kings and philosophers, and dreamed of a State articulated on the pattern of the eternal hierarchy of virtues—and in Hegel, who claimed for state power the embodiment of objective morality. Spann, however, is the modern sociologist whose entire thoughts are concentrated expressly on the desire to prove the Totalitarian State to be the "True State". A threefold theory is worked out to this effect: (1) The doctrine of the "Whole and the Parts", the "Organism and the Limbs", the "determination from above", the "community exclusively through subordination", which has been fully dealt with in the preceding chapter. The purport of this doctrine in favour both of state omnipotence (in the moral sense) and the spiritual monopoly of the actual state authority need not be enlarged upon further. Neither the individual nor a group (as such) can have any spontaneous and effectual self-existence in relation to the Whole, for it draws its entire substance from the Whole. Therefore the central leadership of the State is not only distinct from, and generally superior to, autonomous political associations formed in society; it is even the unique source and standard of all political thought and organization. (2) This is raised to greater clarity in the famous doctrine of mastery as a profession reserved for "the King and his counsellors", or the theory of the Stand Staat, the corporation of the "rulers" whose business it is to attend to state affairs, just as it is the cobbler's business to make or mend boots. This conception of a self-evident division of labour is presented most courteously by Spann in the words that the cobbler may "rule" in the "sphere of cobblership". Naturally, the Stand Staat bears no resemblance to the set of professional politicians in democratic countries; actual mastery is their office. Nor do they even form an exclusive aristocracy with divided opinions, an oligarchy living in political freedom that is
withheld from the people; for they are necessarily the most intimate emanation of the unique State will, the “Centre of the Whole”. They must be imagined on the model of a Bund, a secular Order—least of all as a society of patricians. (3) Lastly, it is most essential that there should be no discrepancy, no deviation, between the hierarchy of state-power and the spiritual sphere. In the True State, political rule is supposed to mean absolute spiritual and moral authority. Mastery (Herrschen) strictly corresponds to validity (Gelten). The “best” shall rule the “good”; the “good”, the “less good”, and so on, down the whole scale of “goodness”. Again, we may smile tolerantly at a vision of this kind as a product of a harmless dreamer of dry schematic “ideals”. Yet it commands our full attention as the expressive and influential ideology of the fascist Totalitarian State—the pretension of an absolute Power, not merely to disregard or violate, but actually to wield and absorb, the Spirit of men.

However, justice prompts us to confess that in democracy itself are also to be found the seeds of the totalitarian aberration. The Pagan “idealism” which craves identity between spiritual rank and official power certainly fosters the moral absolutism of a dominant Set; yet a similar tendency is not entirely foreign, either, to a certain anarchical spirit of mass democracy which proclaims the sanctity of the People’s will irrespective of any objective consideration as to moral or spiritual standards. Historically speaking, this was often present as an undercurrent in the evolution of modern democracy. The ideological links between democracy and the Total State have been revealed in an able (though none the less one-sided) way in H. O. Ziegler’s book on the “Modern Nation”. As soon as the “sovereignty of Reason” was transformed into the “sovereignty of the People”, a further deflection to the “omnipotence of the National Will” seemed no longer impossible. Rousseau’s slightly ambiguous idea of the volonté générale has been interpreted in various manners; Ziegler sets himself with much zeal to the task of stressing the all-importance of the general will, the unreserved allegiance of the individual to the indivisible social whole (aliénation sans réserve). “There is no fundamental law binding for the popular Body, not even the Social Contract itself” (Rousseau). “The will of the nation is always lawful; she is a law unto herself.”
No matter in what fashion a Nation may will, suffice it that she wills; all ways are good, and her will is always supreme law” (Sieyès). Indeed, in the later phase of the French Revolution, including the Napoleonic rule, the ideology of national sovereignty became more and more an ideology of massive national power. Here, the conception of an omnipotence of the ruling group, which “represents”, in a constant and effectual way, the indivisible national will, is already foreshadowed. The transference of the emphasis to this aspect marks the transition from Totalitarian Democracy to the Authoritarian Total State. We see clearly from Ziegler’s description of the evolution of modern nationalism (to which we shall refer again in Chapter VIII) how the German version of the national spirit (Volksgeist), apparently so much more harmless and more remote from any reference to power, proved able to induce a change in this direction. In its proper sense, in its present and material meaning, the “will” of a nation cannot be so simply dissevered from the actual decisions of will of its citizens, from the idea of citizenship in general, from the idea of an ascertained majority—indeed from Democracy, including its Liberal implications. Furthermore, a nation in this sense—which is the Western, and more particularly the French sense—is rather felt (even despite an aggressive nationalism) to be a sectional unit of Mankind, a primary pattern on which other nations are to be organized. Inversely, in a nation conceived in the Volksgeist sense, the stress lies on its unique and inimitable peculiarity, on its “ineffable” substance, on its individual turn of mind rather than on its actual thought or will; now this definite and yet indefinable mentality can very well be conceived as permanently embodied in, and actuated by, a privileged group (whatever its exact relation to the social upper class may be) which is expected to express not only the national will, but even the very deepest soul of the nation, in terms of power, of action, of imposition of will.

A succinct vocabulary of the Totalitarian State may be found in Forsthoff’s book bearing that proud title. The individual is made to be “totally in duty bound” (totale Inpflichtnahme) towards the nation. Each individual, in every details of his life, is “totally responsible” for the fate of his nation. “The privacy of individual existence is abolished.” Certainly Mr. Belloc, in writing his “Servile State”, was not oblivious of the Prussian
flavour of his unloved subject-matter; yet in case he is contemplating a new issue, he may as well provide himself with some valuable quotations from this source. Nor does Forsthoff leave it open to doubt that his Total State is indeed a Servile State, a community built on strict political inequality. As a matter of fact, it could be nothing else; for people in general are a corruptible pack, frequently given to indulging in privacy, and all too liable to arrange their lives as mere human beings, heedless of their particular national essence or mission — wherefore a stern set of Herren alone can be trusted to guarantee the total Inpflichtnahme. Forsthoff assures us that in the Authoritarian Total State, the ruling set will be actually "lifted out" (herausgehoben) of the people; they not only enjoy an outward distinction but are assumed to be "veritably different", a real Order of the Elect — without, however, being disjoined from the people (which would undoubtedly leave the latter a little more liberty). The democratic doctrine of an identity between the rulers and the ruled is actually eliminated. Nor is the Body of ordinary civil servants sufficient to represent the State amongst the people. A special class of leaders is required where issues of a "commissarial character" are at hand, and "a resolute and hard political will" is needed. Or, to quote Krieck as a variation to Forsthoff: The "political class", though entertained by the State for their services, "are not state officials but retainers of the Führer under special laws."

How did the future dictator Hitler, when still a Rebel to the rebellious "Un-State" of Weimar, forecast his Total State? He proclaimed in imperious terms the absolute and exclusive right of his Party, his "Movement", to identity with the "will of the Nation". "The future of a movement is conditioned by the amount of fanaticism and even intolerance with which its exclusive rightness is professed by its adherents. . . . Nothing is more erroneous than the belief that a movement gains in power through union with another one of similar tendencies." The greatness of an organization "lies in the religious fanaticism that kindles it . . . intolerance of everything else . . ." (these views, of course, do not really hold good in regard to all parties or movements, but were perfectly well chosen for the specific aims which animated the movement in question). Also Hitler postulated the right for National Socialism "to impose its principles
on the entire German nation, regardless of the frontiers implied in the federalistic structure hitherto in force". Furthermore, he eagerly preserved the distance between his Movement and the bürgerlich parties of the Right, since the programme of the latter (he said) was rooted in the past, not really in the future; and worse still, inwardly they were reconciled to the democratic era, only anxious to secure for themselves the largest possible share of power in it. Nor was he ready to link up his force with the military bands (Wehrverbände, partly illegal), for they lacked a political idea in the proper sense of the word. Hitler held that the conviction of one's right to employ brutal weapons of violence "depended on the presence of a fanatical belief in the necessary victory of a revolutionary new order". The thing that matters is not the party but the Creed (Weltanschauung). A party reckons with counterparts, with partners; whereas Weltanschauungen "proclaim their infallibility", unwilling to share influence with a competitor. Equally, from their ordinary adherents they demand not spiritual elevation but "disciplined obedience". The reproachful question asked by some non-Nazi völkisch (racial-nationalist) politicians as to whether the Nazi movement had a monopoly of the Völkische idea elicited from Hitler the answer that his movement "had not only a monopoly of the Völkische idea but had even created it for practical use". The rejection of any democratic plan of equality even for a German people racially defined and purified, is thus formulated by the Führer: "A creed which, contrary to the democratic mass principle, demands that the earth should be given to the best people, to the highest sort of man (dem besten Volk, also dem höchsten Menschen), must logically also obey the same aristocratic principle within the range of this nation, and reserve leadership and decisive influence for the best brains". Not majority—"personality"! The völkisch State will know no resolutions by majorities. Decision must rest with one man. A council will only consist of "counsellors", true to the original meaning of the word; it will by no means "represent the will" of the people. The constitutive axiom of the whole fabric of the State will be: "Authority of everyone over his subordinates, responsibility of every to his superiors". (In order to grasp the essence of the Total State, it only remains to be added that all relations or affairs falling within, or bordering on, the sphere of public life, have to be
incorporated into an organization of "subordinates" and "superiors". To put it in the shortest possible way, the Totalitarian State means the totality of domination.)

The absolute enslavement of man to the Total State is most impressively formulated as an ideal by Bäumler. "A National Socialist is one who bears in himself the image of this new order—which took shape in the soul of one man at the moment of the deepest humiliation" (Hitler, after the defeat)—"and who is governed in everything he does by this image". The soldier in the true sense of the word, the Soldier of National Socialism, neither confines himself to mechanical obedience nor aspires to a control or criticism of his superiors. "He feels himself as the soldier of a concretely materialized idea, a historical mission". (We must have a fuller, a more obsequious obedience than mere mechanical obedience—the obedience of infatuation!). Blind discipline is not good enough; a common conviction is not good enough; a harmony of will is not good enough. "Volk Community means something beyond mere solidarity in convictions and will. Who is the interpreter of this conviction and this will? Who instructs the single member; who designates the concrete aim?... Only unconditional devotion to the concrete symbols of the State is politically relevant, effectual, and creative of power. The education of the soldier does not reckon with convictions, which it considers much too threadbare an idea. This education grips the whole man."

To put it in a slightly different way: "Totality" means that there must be no secret corner in a man's soul that would refuse to kiss the sacred Boots of the Superior.

No sooner had the Total State of the National Socialist Party been established in 1938 than the "theory-making cells" of Carl Schmitt were set in motion, and produced a smart new doctrine of the new State. It was the doctrine of a threefold partition of political unity. "State, Movement, and People" form the new trinitarian totality of the Nation. The State represents the aspect of political statics; the Movement—the N.S.D.A.P.—the aspect of political dynamics; the People, curiously but characteristically, the "unpolitical" aspect, "thriving in the shelter and shadow of political decisions". (Koellreutter has taken exception to this; he does not relish the idea of an unpolitical Volk and would prefer speaking of a "Völkisch totality" rather than
of the totality of state-power.) The terms of this trinity, Schmitt continues, cannot be dissevered from, or played off against, one another, as was the case with the dual constructions of Liberalism. The essence of the latter was the contraposition of State and People, Government and People, Authorities and Citizens, etc. No such schism is possible or in any way called-for in the happy fields of the new trinity. There is no longer a State authority reposing in itself; the Movement is the really sovereign order, super-ordinated to the official apparatus of the State, the uniting and directing centre. For “to-day it is not the State that determines politics, but politics that determine the State.” The threefold State is an “obvious condition of political honesty and purity”. It is only a pity, I should add, that this simplest of all solutions did not strike some wise philosopher or builder of constitutions sooner. How much useless and destructive strife, caused by Liberal “dual constructions”, could have been avoided for the benefit of all, had it only been discovered in time that a threefold division vouched for unbroken unity with every factor in its natural place! It is to be hoped that the thought of the Movement as a “uniting and directing centre” will always prevent the People from quarrelling with static State authority, which is itself placed under the command of the Movement; as for rebelling against the Movement itself, the idea is too godless to be contemplated. Speaking seriously, however, the meaning of the “triple construction” is again nothing other than the supplementing of official red-tape rule (whose powers have already been increased in comparison with those of a free government) by a more elementary, more deeply tyrannical institution of overlordship, which erects its strongholds in the souls of men and controls and stimulates even their ordinary everyday masters.

No proof is needed of the assertion that Totalitarian politics are incompatible with any non-tribal religion and ethics, with a humanitarian creed no less than with any form of Christianity beyond mere lip-service. Nevertheless, sadly outdoing those all too numerous churchmen of history who served their Princes and Lords rather than God, there are Christian churchmen in present-day Germany who still appear above all anxious to serve their Princes and Lords who pose as Gods themselves. They are thankful for any obscure back-room the rulers may deem fit to leave
to the Faith. Thus Stonner shows himself assured that all "controversies" are merely artificial and, with a little goodwill, can be easily cleared up. How can a Christian nurse any apprehensions, seeing that Hitler professes to "fulfil the Creator's commandment" in fighting for the Volk? Nor can the Total State interfere with the interests of the (Catholic) Church; for both State and Church are "totalities on different planes", man being "both German and Christian". As a priest, Stonner ought to know that Catholic "totality" has interests and is vulnerable in regions very far outside the boundaries of the strictly supernatural Realm; as a Nazi, or a student of Naziism, he might well know that the "totality" of the Nazi State presses forward far into the mental and moral sphere. Yet for him all such considerations are outruled by the unassailable fact that "every nation under heaven" (Acts of the Apostles) is a "creature of God", consequently "also the German nation" (!): given this, what objection could a man who believes in God raise against the totality of the State representing the German nation? Obviously none. A neo-Lutheran theologian like E. R. Huber may find it even more simple to ease his conscience in the same manner, since his religious tradition (contrary to Calvinism) starts from a downright separation of the City Terrestrial from any idea of a community of Christians. Indeed, Huber brushes aside all conceptions of a "Christian State" just as firmly as he does the "Utopias" of the Left. He allows the Totalitarian State to claim "the entire earthly, world-bound existence of man", without even asking for a "permanent system of harmony" with the Church in her worldly concreteness. He demands neither an established Church nor liberty for the Church in the Liberal sense—merely "liberty as a condition for serving the People". On the other hand, the Totalitarian State does not extend to the "eternal existence of man". Here is the difference between the Totalitarian and the "demonio-absolutistic" (the Bolshevist) State. Without the smallest intention of flouting the belief in, or slighting the problem of, the immortality of the soul, we may safely remark that in this case obviously man as a man is unreservedly committed to State totality, whereas man as a spirit may be considered outside its reach.
7. **ALL-POLITICS, AND NO-POLITICS**

“All honour, after all, is political honour; with the honour of one's country, one's own is lost as well.”

S. BEHN

(The “Ethos” of the Present Generation).

“There are no longer any private people. All and every are Adolf Hitler’s soldiers, and a soldier is never a private person.”

DR. LEY

(Chief of the “Labour Front”, November, 1935).

“The Prussian Army, in the middle of the nineteenth century, was not un-political. It merely declined to participate in discussion—which in that century was widely and most naively deemed to be the sole form of political thought. . . . A Männerbund supported by a soldierly will, sworn to the idea of fighting-power, is essentially political and state-bound.”

G. GÜNTHER.

“National Socialism is not a revolution; nor it is a restoration. According to Hitler, the N.S. Party has a mission to educate the people for the realization of a new idea of the State. . . . To be sure, politics have now become the monopoly of the headship of the Total State . . . hence they are no longer any business of the Churches either.”

H. MARR.

In the Total State, everything relates to politics, and yet politics are in a sense (the sense to which we are accustomed) abolished. All is political; there is no province of life, especially social life, exempt from the application of political points of view, or from the authority of State of Super-State—“Party”—power. And again, nothing is political in the sense that the element of public discussion (and of decisions maturing in its process) is removed. Where there are no parties, there is, as it were, no conviction at all. On the one hand, life is much more integrally subject to the influence of one political will and trend than is the case in either democracy or old-world absolutism; for in the latter, social life was incomparably less overrun by politics, and the holders of power cared less about the inner and material assent of their subjects, provided there was obedience in regard to the necessary points. On the other hand, society is robbed of that specific sphere of political references and issues.
which is inseparable from freedom of association, though not necessarily from a free government. In this respect, too, the Total State is different not only from democracy but even from many forms of absolutist régime. Even where elections for Parliament, as well as parties organized and legally acknowledged, are absent, such rudiments of free unions of men, of group accords referring to the questions of social co-operation and the betterment of general conditions can exist as constitute a certain amount of "political life" in a sense in which it is unknown in the Total State. The subject of One-Party totality is a pan-political and at the same time an un-political being, in the same way that a man whose conduct is regulated, down to the minutest details, by a rigorous and comprehensive moral code, but who possesses nothing in the way of a moral conscience, would be totally moral and yet un-moral. This does not mean the contraposition of inner assent and outward submission; a Totalitarian régime which might succeed in securing the enthusiastic support of an immense majority of the people would not signify an inch more freedom or "political life" based on social consciousness than would the same régime exciting bitter ill-feeling amongst large masses. It is not any lack of readiness on the part of the followers but the very nature of the Totalitarian claim itself that precludes the formation of what might be termed a "political society". Just as there is no real morality without the exercise of free will towards rules and obligations (however objectively right they may be), so there are no real politics without an underlying plurality of individuals with their own political will (however devoted to the service of an objective commonweal).

In other words, society, including even the creative enthusiasm and genius of its members, is affected as a whole by politics, but ceases to be itself creative of politics. A political Army is not necessarily a gaol where the bulk of the inmates abide in sullen negation, but it is not a society evolving in consciousness of its structure and its problems. This must be borne in mind when listening to the Nazi writers exalting the "Political Man" and sneering at "unpolitical" factors, or themes, or culture. It is precisely real political life, with a system of competitive opinions, which needs the complement of "unpolitical" points of eminence or islands of harmony. "Politics" in the Nazi sense, how-
ever, means Power, and the far-reaching omnipotence of a ruling centre. It is entirely different from “politics” in the sense of the people being aware of, and busying themselves with, the “public affairs” pertinent to their central principles of unity.

It is a question apart, and cannot be dealt with here, to what degree and within what limits the Total State is actually capable of winning and preserving the moral and spiritual energies of the people under its sway. Can there be life—in its higher, nobler, more fruitful forms—without freedom? To some extent and for some time, we should say, there can. Life is indeed overstressed and overstimulated while freedom is excluded. Yet it would seem that an unnatural tension prevails in such situations, which always remain “provisional”, however long they may last in terms of years. Perhaps the upshot may be a transition to more stable and less high-flown forms of Caesarism and Slavery, harbouring remnants of civilization with its driving power spent, where politics will again resemble a private feud between the heads of militant bands with mass ideologies left out. For us, however, it is only vital to understand that the hyper-political tension of counter-revolution and particularly of Naziism—in which counter-revolution comes to alter the very foundations of civilization—certainly means political excitement and a political “marching ideology” for the masses, but in no wise means increased political reflection for men, nor an enrichment of their potentialities for political orientation and behaviour.

The voice of an anti-political fascist and volkisch spirit sometimes breaks through from behind the clang and clatter of febrile political vociferations. This is the case when C. Schmitt suddenly introduces the “People” as a passive and unpoltical layer beneath State and “Movement”; when we hear of the constitutional State (Rechtsstaat) of the past, allegedly a dreary servant of soft liberal “privacy”, being supplanted by an emphatically “communitarian” State, the kernel of which is yet in some way a private bündisch army “love-bound” to definite leader personalities; or when attention is turned from legal and social structure to racial type, biological stock, or Volksgeist. In the phraseology of Feder’s party programme, we are struck by the tendency to drain away the political existence of the citizens when we read that the acquisition of citizenship (Staatsbürgerschaft, beyond mere Staatsangehörigkeit, nationality) is a “claim
due to every assiduous (!), law-abiding (brav) German”. It is equally interesting to hear Rosenberg assert that a private person’s resistance to the State threatening to socialize his property may be just; he refers to Bismarck, who said that a State which impaired his property was no longer his fatherland. Lastly, Spann’s negation of any direct relationship between the nethermost “particle” and the uppermost “Whole”, the mere individual as such and the state-nation, must be recalled. Contact between distant grades of the hierarchy is only possible through the “intermediary stages”; a social consciousness and influence of the single members only in “small circles”. The “State” proper is turned into the comparative privacy of a Circle of masters, a Stand.

A charming contrast to a rabid Philistine like Spann is offered by the far less complacent and more sinister militarist Bäumler. In his stern ideal of a pan-military society, an immense Sparta—which has none of the pasteboard character of Spann’s empty theatricality; the ranks of command representing “centres of wholeness”—the Nazi conception of a “political” existence seems to attain its zenith. Everything points to a “decision in regard to the Whole”, to the political aim. The high-schools of the new Empire must be consciously and comprehensively political (politisch) as contrasted to those in the pre-Nazi republic, which were, so to speak, sullied by secondary political influences (they were politisiert). The “theoretical” or “contemplative man”, a secularized monk, must evacuate the field. He is unfit for the demands of modern total existence—a type which “the Volk cannot imagine”. “There is no place for a man where he may exist as a non-political being, in which he could be dispensed from fighting.” The “political sphere” is not a special, much less a subordinate, province apart from the sphere of “spiritual” acts and goods; on the contrary, it is “the central sphere, the ‘human’ sphere proper”. Man is not political in the second place, in order to “realize” values conceived in contemplation; he is primarily a fighting, working, ruling, a political being. The “citizen” of the Liberal world was only spuriously political (concerned with possibilities of choice, not finally committed to a decision); his substitution is the greatest and most difficult achievement of the National Revolution. The Nazi students, the S.A., the Hitler Youth, etc., represent those forces in the People
which first formed a life-pattern of the Man Political whose final realization has fallen to our task.

The philosophical accompaniment is ably produced by Gogarten. He teaches that there is no such thing as a political existence of man in addition to his other existence: “Human existence is in itself political”. Whereas mere “social” existence depends on detail objects which make it necessary, e.g., art, science, technology, trade, etc., political existence is the original and total existence of man. It may be added, in brackets, that Gogarten as a Christian divine only means by this the existence of man in his terrestrial “fallenness”. The religious sanctuary for his soul is respected; only it is represented concretely on earth by nothing but an airy feeling of indefinite “belief” and the pious resolution to recognize the earthly powers of Sin, Bondage, and “political” allegiance to an omnipotent state in their full import.

Let us descend from these sublime regions to the more tangible and practical exaltation of “politics”—of his own political purpose and will—by Hitler, the masterly propagandist and organizer of the “Movement” which has taken shape as the new Empire. Hitler reminds us of the old truth that humanitarian and aesthetic principles are luxuries dependent on the existence of nations and races. He refers to Moltke’s crisp saying that the best kind of humanity lay in “short shrift”. The nation’s struggle for existence annuls “aesthetical obligations”. The latter term obviously includes moral restraints as well. No reasonable critic would flatly deny that situations may arise where such considerations hold good; unfortunately, Hitler is the last person to acknowledge their exceptional character. On the contrary, there is no doubt that according to his imagination the nation is always engaged in a “struggle for existence” (an easily defensible assumption) and therefore “abstract” or “independent” values must generally defer to the exigencies of power. Nay, all thought and feeling of the people must be made permanently “political” in the sense of being drilled for the fixed and definite objects pursued by the rulers—or, in times when the governing set are not real rulers, by those who claim government in order to realize true mastery. The first preoccupation must be, not to produce arms, but to “produce a spirit in the nation which enables it to carry arms”. No “delivery of
Germany” is possible without the co-operation of the “broad masses”; nor will the latter ever be made nationalist by partial concessions and “objectivity”, only by “uncompromising and fanatically one-sided concentration on the object once chosen”. Thus “the inner union of will in our nation will be reconquered”, not, of course, without the “annihilation of the adversaries of these objects”. In questions of propaganda the points of view of success and tactics must prevail absolutely. Hitler’s classical theory of an anti-democratic mass propaganda itself is certainly the best piece of illustration for the Nazi idea of “pan-politics” destined to sweep aside the plane of a genuine political formation of minds. “The number of the adherents cannot be large enough; the active members, for their part, can sooner be too many than too few. . . . When the propaganda has imbued all the people with an idea, the organization may easily draw the consequences with a handful of men. . . . A Movement which, in its own ranks, keeps strictly to the anti-parliamentarian Führer principle, will, with mathematical certainty, some day prove victorious. . . . All truly great things are the achievement of a single victor, and are under no circumstances to be obtained by a coalition. . . . The völkisch State will be due to the steely will of a unique movement, which will have conquered all the others.”

Hitler’s grand vision of propaganda, and its tremendous success when put into practice, have found innumerable admirers even among his most implacable adversaries (who frequently evince jealous and impotent desire to imitate him). As a matter of fact, I am not quite so convinced of the direct and actual effectiveness of those self-supplied instructions for the use of propaganda. The mere recipe of an appeal to mass instincts and of a maintenance of intolerant fanaticism might equally well prove ineffectual for certain types of aims, and in certain situations. The genius of Hitler shows itself rather in the choice of suitable means in the service of his ends, as well as in the grasping of the historical and social situation in which endeavours of this kind could have a relative meaning, and find the support of certain political energies which are going a-begging. The remarkable thing is that Hitler’s propaganda was destined to succeed, in spite of the fact that he had previously published its secret. This could only be due to the presence of certain mental conditions, not themselves the product of that propaganda, which had
cleared the field for its action. The theory of the "intellectual simplicity of the masses" could not have proved so fruitful, had it not been for a spiritual tendency, in higher regions of the national mind, towards the acceptance, the cult, of such an intellectual simplicity. In a word, Hitler's theory of the political mobilization of the masses is not so much a formal doctrine of political action with a claim to general validity, as an account of the political mentality of the people as conceived by National Socialist counter-revolution—drawn up in terms of a plan of action. Mowrer's formula: "Never was politician so contemptuous of the common people, and never one studied them so carefully", gives an elegant impression of the Nazi meaning of politics beyond a mere fortuitous choice of tactics which happened to succeed.

It is also noteworthy as a sign of "pan-political" exaltation that Hitler blames monarchy for providing too much stability for state institutions, whereby the people lose the habit of bothering about the national destiny. (For Nazism requires a race of active and enraptured slaves instead of mere "subjects") Similar opinions were held by Moeller-Bruck (who also expressed views similar to Hitler's concerning the achievement of national unity by a single and unique force of intrepid rebels, and not by compromise and conciliation); he writes that under a monarchical authority the people get used to the idea that the "State" invariably acts for them. I need hardly repeat that the fault which Hitler and Moeller find with monarchy is not lack of freedom but lack of "dynamics" and "mobilization".

It was also a precious manifestation of "pan-political" patriotism when Hitler, in one of his great speeches as Chancellor, declared that it did not matter whether some thousand wayward critics lived or not, as long as Germany lived, relieved of their interference. He only forgot to mention that it was precisely the spiritual life, the real political consciousness, of the German nation, which the eviction of those superfluous and cumbersome critics was destined to destroy.

It is only too obvious that the state philosophy of Naziism recognizes no such conception as an "unpolitical" authority, even in a comparative sense. Koellreutter remarks with caustic irony that it is an attitude common to Liberals to consider themselves "unpolitical". (This may often be justified inasmuch as
Liberalism essentially admits to other political standpoints besides its own, thus acquiring a certain precedence in objectivity.) Carl Schmitt argues that there can be no "objective" legal authority both "above" the state and above private individuals. This is but one of those poisonous and paralysing Liberal "disruptions". An "objective" officialdom means political weakness in the state, which "is no longer able to recognize the public enemy". No "legal issues" can exist, only a "concrete political union", between different bodies of a public character. "Unpolitical" affairs and offices, as mere technicalities, are possible on the basis of an omnipotence of the central political leadership. To sum up: everything is political, in the sense that everything is bound to serve a political trend; nothing is political in as far as no politics can evolve without the toleration of public controversies and competitive beliefs within the bounds of a legal order.

**FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER III**

Usadel on the Totalitarian State argues that constitutional safeguards can be superseded by trust in the leader. Goebbels speaks of a proud minority hierarchically controlling the whole which it surmounts, while Boehm declares that the Volk's power lies in its vegetative patience.

1 "There is no liberalistic solution that would not dissolve liberalism itself" (Grunsky).

2 "Europe will be "national socialist", or it will not be at all! The 'West' will become socio-aristocratic, or it will not survive its second millennium!" (Gründel in "Jahre").

3 "The really free man is the warrior" (quotation from Nietzsche); the unceasing liberal talk in terms of "Both... and" is only a mask of fundamental unfreedom; "As though there were any freedom other than the freedom for action, which embodies all real freedom of thought and speech so evidently that it need not specially be 'spoken of'," (Grunsky.) However, it is only the inner unity of thought and action, not their occasional combination, which is contrary to liberalism. The Liberal need not be a harmless dreamer or even a doctrinaire agitator; he may as well be a filibuster or a criminal. The French and the Russian revolution, which have placed so much degenerated will and energy in the service of unnatural ideas or brutal instincts, are landmarks of liberalistic evolution in actual politics (Grunsky).

4 cf. "National Socialism as a world revolution" (in Gründel's "Jahre"). Liberalism, Democracy, Money, Masses, etc. have caused, and given expression to, the "destruction of genuine mastery by the dethronement of those born for mastery, the ascendancy of those born for servitude and their subaltern viewpoints... mob rule... Teutonic-Aryan man is arming in order to get the upper hand ("rüstet zur Überwindung")... to overcome the chaos of liberalistic democracy and erect a new mastery ("Herrschaft". Italics from Grundel).

5 As regards the "aristocratic revolution" of National Socialism, perpetrated by the "extremely political" means of a mobilization of masses, see Gründel ("Jahre", pp. 117 et seq.).
CHAPTER IV

HUMAN NATURE AND CIVILIZATION

1. THE ESSENCE OF MAN: HEROES AND DAEMONS

The meaning of National Socialist political philosophy—as, for that matter, of any really profound and relevant political philosophy—can never be completely fathomed as long as we consider it as a political philosophy only. Behind the Creed applying to State, Society, Community, Economics, Nation, Race, Empire, etc., a Creed concerning Man is basically at work. The attitude of a political philosopher towards mankind can be judged by his attitude towards a small circle of persons. It can be inferred from his attitude towards a community of two men. It can be guessed, even better perhaps, from his appreciation of one man. For there are no laws valid for “groups”, and applicable to human society, that is, in a sense of mathematical “group theory”. The decisive point is the question as to the material of which the “group” is thought to be made up. There is no better proof of the thoroughness and grim seriousness of the Nazi theory than the fact that its protagonists consciously and avowedly pass beyond the boundaries of politics and sociology, even of ethics and religion, and declare themselves to be in quest of a new anthropology. They know well that “the proper study of mankind is man”, even for those chiefly concerned with political power, provided that they set their hearts on a really “totalitarian” dictatorship which is meant to “unite power with inwardness”. On the other hand, the call for a new anthropology implies a belief in different human “kinds” (as opposed to all “abstract” systems of dogmas or morals) being the primary factors of life, culture, and history.

I attempt to give a brief summary of the “image of man”—as I see it—correlative to the political ideal of Nazi Fascism. Needless to say, however, the theses which follow must by no means be taken for “party tenets”, even of a semi-official kind;
nor could they expect the unanimous approval of the spiritual leaders of present-day Germany. Nevertheless, it will be no hard task to find ample confirmation in the works of divers authors sympathizing with Naziism or responsible for its evolution.

(1) We must return to an organization of both the State and international relations, which accords with the real nature of man. The strong must be made strong again, whereas the comparatively well-bred inferiors must follow them in love-bound and faithful obedience—there is not the slightest contradiction here between the “drummer” Hitler and the aesthete Stefan George. The “strongest” and “noblest” (the meaning is the same) must “finally” triumph over the less strong and the less noble who dare to oppose them—here Hitler has the unanimous support of Rosenberg, Spengler, Blüher, and so forth. Equality, democracy, socialism, pacifism, and all their kin, are above all “unnatural”. We must return to eternal unalterable human nature. Which, for once, happens to be the exact opposite of human nature as conceived by the Encyclopaedists, or their democratic pupils. In a word, what is now meant by human nature is not the nature of a being who is specifically made in the image of God, or who is generally capable of distinguishing right from wrong, truth from falsehood. What is now meant by human nature is simply the human sub-section of impersonal Nature.

(2) Man is a glorious manifestation of Nature, one of the finest and most eminent forces of Nature, though, at the same time, very problematical, and liable to degenerate into triviality. The spiritual side of man is sufficiently and exclusively accounted for by his belonging to animated Nature; his spiritual existence does not centre in the sphere of logic “as such” or of ethics “as such”. Seeing the manifoldness and prodigality of Nature, the main thing about man is the potentiality for development and expansion displayed in his finest specimens and noblest creations; a general right, value or solidarity of men “as such” is nonsense, for the grandeur of the human “shapes” and “incarnations” of Nature is as unequally distributed as the gifts of Nature generally are. Briefly, men are not different units of reason or subjects of law, they are different specimens and types of an important manifestation of experimenting Nature.

(8) It follows that the Great Man or the Master Race must not
think in terms of mankind, or in categories which are meant to be evident to all mankind. Thinking, as it were, "in terms of themselves", they fulfil the command of Nature, and work her creative will. Hence emerges what we have called "the world of collective subjectivism", or the "Tribal State" on a level of philosophical self-consciousness. As for the aspect of the Great Man—the Führer, or the "charismatic" Centre of the Bund—we are called upon to face the paradox that he is supposed both to represent the very "essence" or "type" of his devotees, followers and subjects (Gefolgschaft, Volk) and to differ from them in kind. For he is more than mere man—and why not? Seeing that man is one of the superior manifestations of Nature, and that large numbers of mankind can be passed over as failures, it is only fair to imagine that Nature can also produce superhuman manifestations of exceptional grandeur. Otherwise, the members of, say, the great lordly tribe X might be so frivolous as to imagine themselves dignified beings, just because they are men. But the overlord Xx is put above them, who, though in essence and savour more fundamentally X than are the X's themselves, yet differs from them by being more than man. He is a "Daemon", by virtue of his metaphysical rank between Man and God (who is a personification of Nature as a Whole); a "Hero", in view of his superhuman feats. It is of some importance that the great Man can as little be a solitary jewel, independent of any "racial" fundament, as the Superior Race can dispense with exceptional semi-divine beings. For the biological workshop of Nature does not breed personalities but races; the "superman" is not a solitary genius who happens to "be right" as opposed to the many, but rather the single representative of a foreshadowed "higher race" in the making. And again, the higher race cannot distantiate itself effectively from mere mankind, nor can it elude the danger of being a mere pattern for human society in general, except by worshipping and obeying superior individuals who, incarnating its own essence, at once raise it to inimitable heights of glory and power.

(4) Man being a phenomenon of "animated Nature", his value and greatness centre equally and jointly, or rather identically, in Body and Soul. The essence of man is not primarily spiritual, in the sense of moral or rational; nor is it primarily corporeal, in the sense of physical or material. He is not "body
and soul" (Geist und Körper), not a rational spirit governing a physical "frame" and ministering to its needs; rather is he an "animated body" (beseelter Leib), a vital unit with parallel and corresponding manifestations in the spiritual and the corporeal sphere. A noble, beautiful and well-built (wohlgeraten) body is on a par with a correspondingly well-equipped soul. It will be easily understood that this pagan romantic vitalism is infinitely more hostile to the appreciation of man as a spiritual being (as embodied in Christianity and all varieties of moral idealism) than are all the much denounced schools of materialism, realism, or hedonism. For these schools of thought, in professing a concentration of the mind (however narrow, unhealthy, or even absurd) on the needs of the body and the urgency of their satisfactory regulation, presuppose as a self-evident reality the autonomous spirit of man, with its claims to reason and justice; whereas pagan vitalistic naturalism engulfs man's soul in his body. The body, by the very fact of its being treated as a "Form valid in itself"—instead of as a bundle of mere unavoidable necessities—acquires divine status. It is just by being melted into the body, instead of being merely ordained to look after the body, that the soul is deprived of its dignity. In face of the great and powerful fallacy, the overwhelming heresy of Pagan Naturalism, the controversy between the Christian Faith and the left-wing trends of Progressive Rationalism—even in their more or less atheistic and materialistic forms—appears reduced to a domestic quarrel hardly worth the mention.

(5) Human will and activity—however "heroic" or "daemonical"—are but manifestations of Nature—however sublime; they are in line with growth and expansion of natural forces rather than with metaphysical liberty of the soul, or a rational order of aims. Activity in the fields of culture, education or politics is of a "plastic" (bildnerisch), "creative" (schöpferisch), "generative" (zeugerisch) rather than of a regulative, corrective or philanthropic, character. Its criterion is grandeur and "fruitfulness" rather than justice or rationality. They appeal in the first place rather to man's susceptibility, to his readiness to be carried away and captivated, than to his sense of evident truths or laws.

(6) Finally, the result of all this is a marked aversion to civilization (in its more special and qualified sense), or to put it more
concisely and clearly, to the idea of "progress". To be sure, the
neo-German outlook on life is by no means hostile to "culture" —
even, in a way, to intellectual culture—nor to technical "civilization". By no means does it profess to throw the masses back into illiteracy, or to a system of fist-law. But when we speak
of civilization, we mean a trifle more than works of art, or compul­sory primary education, or an efficient system of communications. We mean an order, and a spirit, of society, in which a general provision is made for "progress", for "the relief of
man's estate", for rendering that very order more human, more rational, more satisfactory, more defensible, more legitimate in the eyes of everyone. The institutions of political democracy are
a powerful, crystallized expression of such a basic trend; but they are not its only expression. How far society just represents "a civilization", or how far it has committed itself to the idea of "civilization", is revealed in the general lines as well as in all the details of the prevailing state ideology, of juridical and educational systems, of religion, science and art in the forms that are encouraged by state authority. Even totalitarian dictatorship can be governed by an obsession of absolute "civilization", as is the case with present-day Russia and (in spite of all the vital differences) Turkey; faint traces of a similar tendency are even present in Italian Fascism. German Naziism is the one great modern power exclusively bent on serving, evoking and expressing national vitality, in conscious indifference to the general standards of " civilized human society" as such. Races can be ennobled, new factors of vitality can be engendered; but the structural conditions of human life cannot be "bettered" or "re-arranged" or "righted"—such is the great axiom of social life viewed as a section of Nature. Here the metaphysics of fascist counter-revolution are completed. "Pure Process"—the reader will recall this significant formula of Freyer—forms the utmost antithesis to "Rational Progress". The social meaning of "pure process" is the jettisoning of rational and moral claims of order in regard to the distribution and wielding of power; the new "original", "biological" uprising and crystallization of mastery, in strict contrast to its limitation and humanization.

When Haiser writes: "You must resort to demons in order to hold your own against demons", he means "demons" in the
vulgar rather than in the pagan religious sense of the word. At any rate, he must be credited as one of the staunchest and earliest heralds of the new self-conscious barbarism. Nobody has ever denounced "idealistic right" in the holy name of the "law of nature" with greater sincerity. Yet he denies preaching "materialism", seeing that the latter is inseparable from the profession of individual self-interest. On the contrary, the individual is bidden to practise "idealistic self-sacrifice for the sake of the Race". The soul of the Race, however, displays itself in her "noblest specimens". On this earth, the divine commands of justice and charity will invariably assume the form of a hideous caricature, whereas the cruel law of nature, when obeyed overtly, still retains the charm of a naive chastity. For to us are given Process (Werden) and Struggle, but not yet the Kingdom of God.

Lothar Helbing is generally considered to be the classic of the "New" or "Third Humanism". As has already been emphasized, "humanism" in this sense is meant to be the very opposite of "humanitarianism". It is meant to be a doctrine of "hardness", not of compassion; of aristocratic breeding, not of democratic largesse; of "plastic Shape", not of moral counsels with a general appeal. An exemplary realization of the "idea" of Man and not a service of the rights, or interests, or improvement, of men, is aimed at. Helbing also speaks of a new "anthropological historism", by which he wishes to suggest that it is our task to outline and elaborate a concrete Type of Man suggested by history. Further, his programme includes an "insight into the working forces of the age", "bound to the divine powers acting in our blood". He urges the return to certain Greek ideals distinctly antagonistic to the plebeian tendencies of the Christian spirit. The democratic universalism of Christianity (St. Paul: "God hath chosen the weak things of the world, and base things, and things which are despised, yea, and things which are not") must be combated. Inversely, the Greek ideal of Paideia (creative education) is "unascetic, for it professes the unfolding of totality . . . aware of the fact that the generative instinct both in the field of the state (!) and of the body is destined to realize divine order". "Humanism is eminently political, although not in the sense of parliamentarian and party politics." It is the only fit basis for the true National State, which must not be made the servant of "banal" or con-
fessional interests. Humanism is devoted to the task of forming "man fully aware of his past and inspired by his future, man fully wedded to the State". Or, in a painfully bombastic but not uninstructive phrase: "we are called upon both to protect with uncompromising severity the highest human essence of a nation, as embodied in his (? or its ? seinen) heroes and poets, from the watchword of the man in the street, and to promote that fertility which forcibly elevates (heraufzwingt) the tremendous pressure of the forces of nature to the level of spiritual planning." A tiring sentence; the reader, however, may find comfort in the assurance that it hardly sounds any better in German. But how is one to translate the following succinct formula? "Humanitas is not 'Philanthropia' (general love of man) but 'Paideia' (verpflichtende Lenkung des Du)." I venture on this circumscription of the latter phrase: a formative education, according to a certain racial image approved by state authority, applied to the national youth with whom the educator is intimately associated. Again, in a word: Humanitas does not mean humanity but a sublime Barracks suffused with the Inwardness of the self-adoring We.

Hommes, who embarks on the breakneck task of interpreting the irrationalist romanticism of a völkisch biological philosophy of life in terms of Catholicism, has coined the remarkable slogan Machtergreifung des Bildners, which means the "seizure of power by the formative educator". Pedagogics of Volk and Kultur are to become one with the totalitarian state authority. The central motif maintains itself: the juridical constitution, the spiritual consciousness, the political machinery of society are not primarily dedicated to the moral arrangement of relationships between men, but rather to the breeding and shaping of men according to the particular image of Man which happens to inspire the supreme set of the ruling class.

The germs of aristocratic naturalism and self-respecting "anthropology" thrive already in Houston Stewart Chamberlain, the father of everything in Naziism which transcends mere fascism. Chamberlain, anti-Catholic though he was, yet professed to be a Christian; accordingly, he wrote that from the standpoint of world history the appearance of Jesus signalizes the appearance of a new Kind of Man. I am convinced that no Mexican or Bolshevik atheist could concoct a more venomous,
more subtly calculated negation of the very meaning of Christian­
ity. For the Christian dogma that Christ was both fully God
and fully Man, and the one unique instance of such a union of
divine and human nature in a single personality, is inseparably
bound up with the tenet that He became flesh in order to redeem
mankind, and to evangelize all humanity. His unique and inimi­
table divinity is the very guarantee for the right of every man to
full humanity. To hail Him as a higher "Kind of Man" is a
trumpet call to enslave man as well as to blaspheme God. Indeed,
Chamberlain adds that mankind is split up into two classes. The
appearance of Jesus "created true nobility, nay, nobility of
birth (!), for only he who is chosen can be a Christian". We
notice that, after making allowance for his pederastic predilec­
tions, Blüher has already been fully anticipated by Chamberlain.
The English Pan-Teuton had progressed as far as the anthropolo­
gical dualism of the "Primary and Secondary Race", moulded
on the teaching and the life-work of Our Lord. Blüher's theory
of the Homo superior and Homo inferior (Jesus and his love­
bound followers representing a unique experiment in the creation
of a community of "superiors") only completes, on a higher
level of crisp cynicism and intellectual clarity, the gigantic
heresy of transforming the universe of God and Man into a
system of Daemons and Vermin.

The Stefan George Circle, again, falls within the scope of this
survey. Wolters ranks his Prophet among the glorious rebels
against the wearying pettiness of "mere" civilization, the "Phi­
listine platitude of an endless progress of the broad masses by
painsstaking labour". This series of Protestants includes Goethe,
Bürckhard and Nietzsche: "damn the tendency of hearts to
become vulgar, of souls to become paltry, of bodies to become
ugly (!)". The flame of God is not yet wholly extinct in the
heart of the People so long as there is One who finds his voice and
cries out. He will keep in check those "merely spiritual ideal­
ists" who, whilst betraying their people "deem themselves
judges and saviours", and who sinfully endeavour to "strangle
the heroic fighting spirit", to "eliminate Fate, which demands
victims", to "veil the antagonistic forces which are as necessary
for the maintenance of life as are peace, quiet, and truce". Yea,
they shamefully endeavour to create a "world without perils
and risks" more suited to cautious weaklings than to "strong
heroes who require space in which to unfold their energies”. In this world of democratic civilization, “the sick and maimed, clamouring for understanding and protection, fare better than the healthy and well-bred. For the latter are prevented from making free use of their limbs, and forced to give up all pride and pleasure in their well set-up bodies for the sake of the shallow happiness of the many”. A particularly valuable confession! It shows that these fervent advocates of the “People”, when speaking of the “healthy and well-bred” mean a Herrenmenschen minority of “heroes and daemons”, whereas they openly identify the “sick and maimed” with the despised “many”. Oscar Benda, a keen-sighted Austrian critic of the George school, hits the mark when he defines the “new humanism” as “the selection through education of an aristocratic group imbued with the consciousness of cultural superiority, and destined to be the ideological agent of anti-democratic mastery”. Drahn says, “The new belief of Stefan George, the belief in fate, in Karios” (the holy period of the maturing and completion of natural forces and processes, as opposed to rational constructions and principles), “the belief in the power of blood and of the senses, in Eros and Beauty, is the creative source of the antagonism to the rationalistic lack of faith of the age”. The “new sense of life” combats everything connected with religious rationalism, a rational order of society, democracy and socialism. It means believing in an ultimate impenetrable power, which is inaccessible to human knowledge and will, and “determines human experience and life in its essential points”. The Divine Power manifests itself, “not in the persons of the many, the all-too-many, but only in the creative personality of the Hero, the Leader, the Prophet” (in 1925).

As has already been intimated, even the “great men” of the “new humanism” must not be conceived as eminent examples of personal Spirit and Will in our Christian, Western and progressive sense. They may be endowed with exceptional intellect and exceptional will-power; but they are special examples of the daemonic forces of nature at work within them rather than special affirmations of human spiritual independence and human free will. In practice, it is seldom easy to demonstrate the distinction. Perhaps the secret mark of the perfect Hero is that in the end he must fail and succumb, out-maneuvered by the
worldly cunning of his adversaries, as was the case with Balder and Siegfried in German mythology. We can only dearly wish that Hitler may fulfil this condition of true heroism as soon as possible. Perhaps, however, Frederick the Great is also a good example. He was not only supremely clever but successful, too, in the end, though his daring raids and desperate battles reveal a streak of mania. At any rate, Napoleon was presumably more of a "hero" (in the sense of a category of nature) than Lincoln or Masaryk; Luther more than Calvin; Bernard de Clairvaux more than Thomas Aquinas; and Hitler even more than Bismarck or Mussolini. But as regards the idea in itself, Klages, about whom we shall have more to say later on, has formulated it most trenchantly. He draws a sharp distinction between the "Doer" (Täter) and the "Hero". The "Doer" is a man of purposes, interests and calculations; one who carries out his will with a fixed object in view. The "Hero", in his turn, is directed by Fate, he performs his actions in the splendour and nobility of his "essence", which is beyond the reach of "will" and the ratiocination implied in will. I fear that some readers may wonder why I bother to quote such idle and merely verbal constructions of an apparently typical German philosopher. (Klages, by the way, is no professor, and is a highly ingenious pioneer of graphology.) Yet the meaning of the theory closely concerns us. For the meaning is that the "Doer" of Klages is a person fundamentally outside nature as a living whole, which the "Hero" is not. The "Hero" is a person fundamentally above the sphere of average mankind, whereas the intelligent and energetic "Doer" is only an egregious individual of average humanity. The "Hero" is an ideal for the world of tribal instincts; and the condemnation of the "Doer" is the denunciation of democratic civilization.

Kurt Hildebrandt, a sociologist of the Stefan Georgian stamp and an expert on Plato, once wrote the expressive sentence: "Only the creative man, the Hero, can be the ideal incarnate". Our consciences must not work on a basis of rules; they must reflect the images of rulers. For man is a "bearer of spiritual values in the flesh"; "blood as well as spirit, the noblest animal". The great Platonic ideal is "to realize the divine essence, both in State and Body". Or again: "Once the new spiritual movement grasps, and with Plato, Goethe and
Nietzsche remains, faithful to the meaning of the earth, and realizes that it is the aim of the Spirit to become Body, and also understands and loves the noble animal in man, then we shall be able to interpret apparent antipodes as organs of the very same Life. We must entrust ourselves to the guidance of “ideas” which are not abstract tenets or prescriptions but “living shapes”, whose service provides for our lives a community of meaning. “The state-founding Hero is the Exceptional Man, the Centre-Man, such as appears only once in a century.”

I propose to conclude this section with the testimony of Erich Voegelin, an esteemed Viennese scholar of both German and Anglo-Saxon culture (Santayana figures among his former teachers). He is himself an exponent of Georgian neo-Platonism and a “sublimized” racial ideology, but of a more scientific turn and with a corresponding note of personal reserve. Voegelin elucidates the absolute antagonism between the Christian or Rationalist, and the Vitalist, or “Daemonist”, conceptions of society and culture. He sees clearly that the principles of human dignity, reason, virtue, etc., however secularized, are but varied and specialized forms of the Christian idea of the human soul placed between God and the infra-human world of Nature. Indeed, a post-Christian Paganism has been arising for the last hundred and fifty years (and more particularly in our epoch), against dogmatic and rationalist, conservative and democratic, Christianity alike. This movement, which obviously has the author’s sympathy, is linked up with a growing interest in the phenomenon of Life—Life, less an object of natural history or exact science, than an object of direct emotional intuition; Life as shape, type, individuality, as a unity inspiring religious awe and aesthetic sympathy. According to this “image of man” (Menschenbild) as distinct from that of Christianity, man, including what is spiritual in him, appears a vital Unit within Nature. The main value of the “Daemonic”—as opposed to the “Holy” and “Moral”—comprehends the qualities “Fertile”, “Generative”, “Productive” (in the full Goethean sense). The “Daemon” is equivalent to “Man intensified, whose entire life springs from his self-acting fertility, with no relaxations or phases of debility”. It is not the mass of his mental products that matters, but rather what may be called his “density of life”. The daemonic character is “divine”, yet by no means a
gift or grace of God, since it is an immanent, though supreme, manifestation of Nature. A well-built body is requisite for the efficiency of the daemonic power. The daemonic mode of life in some way implies the idea of "recurrent puberty", an ever-renewed interpenetration of mental and bodily factors. Voegelin observes that the Germans show a greater receptivity for the daemonic system of values than do other nations, because in the German society the Christian image of man has not been moulded into a firm conception of civic and political community as it has in the Western world. Just as the element of "fertility" in the daemonic ideal is emphasized by Goethe (his pupil, the great medical philosopher Carus, draws his image of "perfect health" and "well-breeding" from Goethe), so is the element of a harmonic unity between the sensual and moral self expressed in Schiller's ideal of the "beautiful soul", with even a suggestion of a social ideal of the "aesthetic State". Nor does Voegelin overlook the deep and essential connection between the "daemonic" image of man and the anti-democratic ideologies of culture and political influence reserved for elites—whether strictly political (fascist corporativism) or racial, which lead up to the Stefan Georgian idea of the New Nobility "rising from the ranks of a disintegrated mankind, and destined to collect around a new Centre, preparing the formation of a new Empire".

The question may be raised as to why writers who are in favour of the new Paganism are willing to use the term "daemon" or "daemonic", which, after all, cannot be freed from an unpleasant connotation, instead of confining themselves to "demigods" or "heroes". It is probably the unparalleled pregnancy of the first-mentioned terminology that attracts them. "Demigod" smacks of the imaginary; "hero" and "heroic" are not always suitable, for they lack a deeper sacral tone, and especially a reference to the impersonal forces of Nature. Lastly, we know it to be a dispensation of Providence that, in spite of all masks and metamorphoses, the evil Demon by some slight token betrays his identity again and again.
2. "LEIB" AND LIFE

There are different ways of appreciating the Body. (As to the kind of asceticism which denies it all appreciation, this is not the place to deal with such lugubrious insanity). We may see in the body primarily an instrument for the human soul in its earthly existence, or we may heartily respect it for its own pleasures and pains. The doctrine of the progressive Left is inclined to concentrate either on the first point of view, which is known as idealism; or on the latter, which is known as materialism. But the two aspects are more or less confluent: On the one hand, rationalism must base its system of purposes on the immediate and obvious bodily needs of men in their interdependence and antagonism; on the other hand, the utilitarian calculation of pleasure and pain is from the first inclined to recognize a mental Ego as being not only the registrar of their physical presence and intensity, but also the judge of their quality tested by some "higher" standard. The doctrine of Christianity sees in the body more than a mere instrument of the mind, and sees at the same time in the soul more than a mere ruler and arbiter of the body. It both expects us to hold the body in higher regard than does rationalist idealism, and—viewed from a different angle—to treat it with more indifferencethan is compatible with materialism and utilitarianism. It knows both the idea of ascetic mortification and that of a glorified body after resurrection. At any rate, the Christian may be either severe or indulgent towards the body, or even honour it with a kind of chivalrous tenderness; the Rationalist, dry and narrow-minded, may be hard on the body; the Utilitarian may allow it too large a place in his consideration; and the Materialist may sink so low as to become a slave to it. But the Nazi—or pre-Nazi, or quasi-Nazi—philosophers of the Body do something entirely different: their allegedly "Greek", or rather "Doric", creed implies a worship of the Body as a manifestation of godhead, as the twin brother of the Soul and its equivalent counterpart. Just as the more radical thinkers of this school cherish the distinction between Geist (spirit or intellect) which they dislike, and Seele (soul or the
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instinctive and emotional self) which they adore, so is the royal partner of the Seele seen in what they call Leib, not Körper. The latter word means "body" in general, and the human body analogus to all inanimate bodies, an object of natural science, a "carcass" as it were, or else a dry mechanism of "physiological" urges and sensations. Leib, on the contrary, is meant to designate the human body in its peculiar animation, in its predestination to be the plastic expression of a peculiar Soul.

Here as everywhere in the realms of sin (which goes far beyond trivial vice), heresy and barbarism, the fault does not lie with the body but with the mind. The Body is made a god, because the Soul is made a daemon. It is the false pride of the soul which fosters the megalomania of the body. Bodily prowess is made into a religion because the soul is militarist, seeking to realize its "inwardness" in the display of power. Bodily "beauty" is deified, because the soul itself is ambitious to appear as a superior, a peculiarly "well-formed", product of nature. The soul being a unit of "creative energy", the body becomes its entirely adequate symbol, its real alter ego. The cult of the body is a corollary of, an appropriate background for, tribal subjectivism, both in its racial (or nationalist) and its "daemonolatrist" aspect (referring to Leaders as "supermen.") The world of logical and moral experience and axioms, the world of Christian dogmatics, the world of the necessities and weaknesses of the human flesh—all this is the world of universal mankind, of human society, of individual beings in mutual solidarity and awareness. The oneness of the soul with its "congruous" body (arteigen) indicates the contrary, that the soul is not primarily concerned with Truth, or with Right, or with God or with a community in which all souls alike must make contribution to its value and sanctity, or even with the humble administration of material creation entrusted to man's care: rather is it directed to revel in its own grandeur, locked up in its own particular form (Artung), and being its own standard. This is what S. Behn, a keen and by no means unsympathetic Catholic observer, means when he writes that the Leib-Idee familiar to present-day German youth is not the Christian idea of a body expectant of glorification but the idea of an immanent ideal of the body as an ultimate standard of values for the evolution of the race. This, too, is meant by Helbing when he extols the ancient heritage of a
“measure drawn from the Body” as a starting-point for the “new humanism” of the West.

Voegelin, even though he condemns contemporary racial theory for its materialistic one-sidedness, its bias for anatomical technicalities, yet makes himself a scientific interpreter of “concepts of Corpus” (Leibideen) as the governing symbols of social units. He speaks of the formative part played by Leibideen in the evolution of political communities. Ideas of this kind underlie the political value of the “dynasty”, the “blood royal”, the “noblesse of blood”, or the “clan” (Geschlechter), also the Corpus Christi mysticum, whose secularized offspring appears in those fragments of mankind which are the Western national democracies. (The writer might well have referred to the English term “body politic.”) The post-Christian racial idea is a new and legitimate Corpus concept, though its foundations have not yet been made sufficiently secure; for no inquiry into the merely physiological determinations of man can yield any relevant knowledge as to his spiritual essence. Yet, Voegelin hastens to add, there is even less scientific foundation for political mistrust of the racial idea and the theories of its opponents. He quotes with approval the passage from Werner Haverbeck’s article in Nationalsozialistische Monatshefte (1938) which states that it is a new experience of the “harmony of Leib-Seele-Geist” (body, soul, spirit) which “has found its symbol in the consciousness of the Blood”. Subsequently he refers to K. Hildebrandt (of whom we have spoken above): the phenomenon Leib, in Hildebrandt’s opinion, is not of the merely physical order but “a process within the spiritual world itself”. The naturalistic racial theory of Günther rouses disapproval on this side; in place of the propaganda for a “Nordic race”, with its anatomical criteria, the suggestion is made to breed a “German race”, destined to be the “body of the German nation and the German state”.

After all, the controversy is in no way fatal; refined scholars and practical politicians must needs work from different levels and, without prejudicing their service to a common cause, must quarrel a little with one another. Voegelin’s formula of racial theory in its narrower sense—belief in the determination of spiritual existence by natural factors—in truth applies to the racial Leibideen, in whatever sense it is used; for the decisive
point is not the belief in gross anatomical tests of racial substance but the idea of the oneness of body and soul as *bearers of corresponding and equivalent qualities*. As soon as such a fusion is postulated, even though the clausula be added that from the very beginning nature and body must have a “spiritual” ingredient, the configuration of the body will necessarily acquire the primacy on the strength of its tangibility and conspicuousness. Whereas the Mind bears the stamp of logic and objectivity, since it is mainly composed of intellectual and emotional references to outward reality, the Body may be regarded as a self-contained “shape”. Thus it is bound to dominate the thoughts of those who revere the “soul” as a non-spiritual, though maybe glorious, growth of nature. In terms of Christian metaphysics, utter humiliation is the nemesis of pride; subjectivism is punished by the loss of personality; the refusal of the mind to observe the ideal order imposed on it precipitates the tyranny of matter.

I must now let Richard Benz speak, a fairly sensible and moderate, albeit uncritical, student of the spirit of young Germany. He admits the belief in a new “primacy of the body”, which often strikes the onlooker as a voluntary renunciation of spiritual and ethical categories. The truth—according to Benz—is that man endeavours to become once more, not an animal but simply man. He is tired of ruling by magic or of being an infra-human slave of technology and the artifices of civilization. Man is longing “to be rid of a thousand rational and irrational relationships and implications, to be nature (!) instead of his life being a system of mechanical functions”. Man is “again nature”, he frees himself from a spirit (Geist) which has been communicated “merely in words and writings”. At present it is not ideas, principles or constructions that interest us above all, but, as is shown again and again, the “image of man” (Menschenbild). Even the tendency of science points in this direction. Its workers are engrossed in the study of characterology, corporeal and mental types (Körperbau und Charakter), physiognomy, graphology, following in the footsteps of Goethe and Carus. Present-day science turns eagerly to such topics as race, blood, anthropological types, the rhythmic phenomena of human vitality. Under the flag of Seele, Geist is opposed. Benz even refers to the increased earnestness with which the dance is
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cultivated, it being a "prophetic symbol of the new harmony" between Seele and Leib. The youth movement, anathematizing the mode of life prevailing in big cities, found—in its search for new forms of community, new customs and symbols—its highest symbolic experience in "Wandering", which has nothing to do with the townsman's "excursions" undertaken for health or aesthetic enjoyment. "They found their way back to the sources of nature and life, to all primitive forms of nature-bound life such as song, dance and play". In the subsequent war and post-war periods, the youth community was notably modified by the "front experience". Reacting from the exaggeratedly spiritual and intellectual phase of the revolution from the Left which immediately followed the Great War, "man preferred to gather for action, evading with a strange apathy all spiritual discussions". (This description, it seems to me, really hits the nail on the head.) Neither brute force nor mere ideals of spiritual creation inspire our march; "we are entering a stage where both these objects merge into the conception of Life, life both sensual and sensible (sinnlich-sinnhaft)".

Benz is on the right track, too, when he observes that the persistent opposition of the Catholic Church to the contemporary cult of the body is not primarily due to moral reasons but rather to the just suspicion that a new—pagan—kind of religiosity is arising here, manifesting itself in the "deification of the body". Nothing can be truer than this. However, a Nazi cleric like Stonner throws himself into the breach. He informs us that the emphasis of the body, as desired by the Führer (will He be canonized in due course, I wonder), is only directed against "exaggerated spiritualism" which fosters "trivial intellect" rather than "genuine spirit". After all, God is also the Creator of all visible things. Jesus Christ was a healer of bodies as well as of souls; the doctors are Christ's Army against illness; the "bodily prowess of Christ in wandering and suffering" is a proper example for our soldierly youth; nor should we forget that the present occupant of the Holy See was a successful Alpinist. If these lines ever reach the Reverend Brownshirt, I offer to supply him with the further argument that there is but a shade of difference between a General of the Dominicans or the Jesuits, and a Prussian General.

A much-used symbol of Nazi naturalism and vitalism is
“Blood”, the liquid essence of Life, the most vital component of the Body. “Blood and Soil” (Blut und Boden, or to use a neat abbreviation: Blubo) is a slogan most popular with the new enemies of Reason and urban civilization. Moreover, the fact that “Blood” symbolizes descent, and also the “vital” and “mortal” method of settling a controversy, speaks in its favour. When some Nazis profess to harmonize Blood with Spirit, whereas others show themselves satisfied with the worship of Blood alone, the discrepancy is hardly more than one of style. No Blood-worshipper refuses to honour the mental effluxes of the “noble blood”; again, no cautious dualist Professor preaching “Blood and Spirit” can nurse any doubt but that what he really means—the championship of the neo-German culture as opposed to old-fashioned Western notions—is nothing else than the supremacy of Blood re-discovered. Thus Professor Larenz, writing on “Volk Spirit and Law”, says: Before a “creative” culture can be built up, blood must become spirit, and spirit blood. This is only possible on the supposition that blood is spirit, potentially. All spirit not blood-bound is but a sterile product of decay. Blood must dare to rouse the spirit; spirit must renew itself from blood. Magnanimously Larenz concedes to Professor Rothacker that “consciousness becomes fatal only to those who lack substance”. The meaning when simplified (in a slightly malicious way) is that no one will be reproved for thinking if his blood guarantees the results of his thinking beforehand, in which case no material deviation from Hitlerian thinking is to be feared. On the surface different, Ferdinand Fried in his “End of Capitalism” has a more outspoken and emotional way of emphasizing the point. He praises the original upheaval carried out by the youth movement, which “had not passed through the rational sphere at all”. The Irrational can make no compromise with the Rational; nor the Soul with the Intellect. We are in the happy position to witness “Blood stirring and revolting against the Spirit”. Similar visions had enchanted the prophetic eyes of Spengler. When the evolution of a “Culture” draws to its close, Race, Blood and Will-to-Power again challenge and sweep away the might of Spirit, Money and Materialism. (This very composition of terms may impress the reader as proof of our thesis that “materialism” is more consistent with spiritual values than
is pagan religiosity—at times hidden beneath a Christian cloak. It is not quite clear why this phase of history should be a gratifying spectacle, seeing that it marks (in Spengler’s system) a further stage of decay in a decaying culture. Perhaps because it reveals, in all its nakedness, the historic process demanding a more direct “love of fate” from strong men; perhaps because Spengler hopes that in the case of our culture the strong men, the men of “blood, race and will-to-power”, will be none other than the Prussians, who alone have the necessary qualifications.

A few references bearing on the cult of “Life” and “Nature” in general may be added here. The central dogma, to put it succinctly, is that human nature is nature in the first place, and only additionally human; that it is merely a remarkable species of animated nature. Therefore both a primarily “spiritual” attitude (Geist) and “civilization”, in the qualified and emphasized sense of the terms (associated with “progress”, “humanitarianism”, “universalism”, a rational order of society, etc.) are essentially wrong and necessarily doomed to failure. They only succeed in worsening the natural conditions of life, because they lead to rebellion against the immutable laws that govern it. This, too, is the fundamental creed professed by Hitler in Mein Kampf. To sum up once more: we are told that the basic pattern of human existence is not “the understanding of things and a mutual understanding between men”: it is the “growth and struggle of vital energies in their anthropological manifestations”. Certainly the neo-German thinkers acknowledge “intellect” or “agreement” as facts and technicalities; just as we, on our side, do not dream of denying the vital and natural material of our life. Yet they and we advocate two contradictory creeds; believe in two opposite outlooks; follow two antipodal criteria of human conduct which are to one another as light to darkness. It is not a legitimate difference in the personal scale of values, such as that between an Oxford scholar and an Oxford oarsman. It is an irreconcilable dissension in the absolute scale of values, like the divergence between a missionary and the heathen who devours him. Not that the latter is less fond of preaching and more fond of feeding; it is the clashing of two incompatible worlds. Experiences are not only differently ranged on each side; the terms used to designate them denote in fact different experiences. They attack, for
instance, our very conception of civilization, and we are averse to their very experience of life.

Exploitation and oppression are necessary: “Life lives on life.” The axiom of Christian ethics, that no man should serve as a mere tool for another, breathes destruction. Only the ancient social order of slavery was “biologically founded” and preservable. There is no such thing as a right to happiness, only a relative right to existence. “Thou art but a tool of Nature, a station of transition and decay destined to serve higher ends. Life lives on life!” (Haiser).

Nor is there any such thing as the primacy of spiritual and cultural values. “The organism knows no such duality of a higher and a nether world: whatever is requisite for its life and growth is of the same importance for it” (Krieck).

War and peace are ever-present, two equivalent powers. “For every life finds fulfilment in destroying other lives.” Life cannot be the object of “cognition”: it works within us. “Each of us is but a drop of the great ocean.” “We affirm Life as it is ... we love the constant transformation in the history of the world ... eternity is working in it ... war and peace together ... ruin and victory, death and fulfilment ... He who is certain of these things, he who is ready to profess this creed, stands in the middle of the world” (Hielscher).

Hommes gives one of the most complete and impressive summaries, bearing terrible witness to the degree in which the mind of important Catholic sections is poisoned by Nazidom. The title of this book: “Philosophy of Life and Education (Bildung), as a Catholic and Völkisch task,” is as characteristic as the name of the publisher: Herder, the biggest and most respected Catholic firm, with its seat in Freiburg in Breisgau, that charming spot in the south of Baden, near the Swiss frontier. Let us now pass in review a collection of phrases from Hommes’s book. “Die and be born” (Stirb und werde) for the sake of the “justice of the Whole”. “... Soil ... thriving Nature ... power of the senses ... strength of the Body ... discipline of will ... health of the soul ... valiancy ... combative self-preservation ... thriving national essence (Volkstum), with the peasantry as its base ... the deeper and more essential layers of human nature, the ‘maternal’ roots and foundations of life, the emotional ego (Gemüt), and the unconscious forces of
community... Nature... cheerful clarity and simplicity... the cosmic rhythm of her seasons... " The Nazi movement: "Creative primeval forces of ethnic (volklich) life surging up feverishly in the body of the Volk"... The appreciation of "one-sided intellect" is done with for good and all. "Instinct, the sense of life dissolved (or diffuse? gelöst) and total", has ascended the throne. The irrational forces of the soul discharge themselves in vigorous political action. This does not imply the suppression of all reason; only of "one-sided and crippled" intellectual reason. Genuine reason is being restored rather than destroyed. We understand that "genuine reason" means a "full consciousness of substance and form". (We of the antediluvian world have been in the habit of imagining "genuine reason" to be a consciousness of truth and right, of evident facts and values. Now we learn, not without reluctance, that it is our expression of racial character, and a self-assertion of animal growth.) We are further instructed that tribal prejudice is a sufficient criterion of truth. "What is thought to be true (in questions touching the foundations of human life) by an entire community is a conviction already amply tested as to its truth". There can be no doubt whatever that this "common belief" really means uncritical ethnic prejudice, and not the public opinion of a democratic community, framed by public discussion. "Thought to be true by an entire community" has nothing to do with, is in fact more or less the opposite of, what we should call "public opinion". The latter corresponds to the idea of a general searching for truth; the belief of an "entire community", on the other hand, to the unchallenged and undebated expression, dreamy and vegetative, as it were, of the "peculiar soul" of a vital unit. But let Hommes speak for himself; we cannot accuse him of prevarication. "The loss in a people of its inborn outlook on life (angestammte Weltanschaung) means the breakdown of the mode of living which is its mainstay, the undermining of its foothold in God." Or again: "Völkische Weltanschaung is based on the psycho-biological (geistesbiologisch) recognition and appreciation of the fact that the entire, even the highest, spiritual life is determined by the bodily (leiblich) aspect of the human being, as well as by the natural laws which govern this bodily essence". Life integrates culture; Life restores spirit... "The subjectivism of life-philosophy overcomes rationalism
aufklärung); not subjectivism relative to the individual but
subjectivism relative to a total unit of life''. Philosophy is the
"supreme spiritual act of the community". The philosophical
submersion in the subjectivity of the Volk, however, is the
correct way in which to grasp the "objective structures of
essence" created by personal Deity and forming the texture of
the world, for the Volk "has its place in this order of essences".
Here clarity and boldness are given up in favour of a desperate
effort both to "have one's cake and eat it". Tribal subjectivism
as such is a striking thing that commands interest; but
disguised as "true objectivism", it breeds dull confusion,
although it indicates a bad intellectual conscience compelled to
stir occasionally.

Ludwig Klages, however, is the true High Pontiff of the
anti-spiritual religion of Vitalism. He frankly declares himself
to be the active enemy of Christianity, current morality, and
technical civilization. All these are excrescences of that mys-
terious and devilish universal principle which he calls the
Spirit, the "adversary of the Soul". A lucid exposition of the
gist of Klages's philosophy is given in a study by Werner Deubel
on the "Biocentric image of man". The trend of human thought,
he explains, is divided between the great principles of "Logocen-
trism" and "Biocentrism", according to whether Intellect
or Life is regarded as the cardinal point of human conduct and
values. The logocentric trend is associated with such names and
factors as Kant, Socrates, Plato, St. Paul, both the "idealist"
and "materialist" school of a basically rationalist philosophy
(which considers nature mainly as an object to be controlled by
detached and systematized human aims), including also synthetic
monism of the colour of Hegel. The "Greco-Judaic" product
of Christianity (God as a spiritual personality; immortality
of the Ego) belongs to the same class. The opposite trend of
biocentrism is associated with Klages; with the pre-Socratic
Greek philosophers of nature; the "Greco-Germanic" spirit;
with Goethe, Nietzsche, Herder, Hamann, and their romantic
epiboni; with Jacob Böhme, Meister Ekkehard, Paracelsus, and
Giordano Bruno. In some respects it is associated also with
Schiller, Kleist, and Wagner, the restorers of the great heathen
teachings of fate and tragedy, which had been suppressed by the
Jahvist creed of arbitrary free will and by Socratic intellec-
tualism. The biocentric revival of to-day provides a new interpretation of mental and political history. The logocentric complex embraces the following attitudes and events: morality of the responsible free will; extra-human nature, mere matter at the mercy of human will, a dead material world of objects; the hierarchy of Spirit and Flesh; the dictatorship of reason and will over non-spiritual reality; vital forces as raw material in the service of calculated utility; the ideal of "deliverance" from nature and her instincts which are stigmatized as the "radical evil"; the "Empire of Logos" (reason) declared to be the real home of man's soul—in fact, an endless string of enticing enterprises, but all the more pregnant with deadly dangers. Apart from some of Christ's sayings, Christianity must in every way be ranked with the logocentric complex. "Christian love" is not addressed to the world of life; rather is it a "solidarity of those endowed with spirit and will". (A tenable and correct distinction!) "Logocentric revolutions": the dissolution wrought in ancient thought by Socratic rationalism; the butchering of the Saxon nobles by Charlemagne (a pet subject in Nazi literature); the French Revolution; the wholesale murders by the Bolsheviks bent on securing a rational organization of society; the frenzy of "progress"; no more than a variation of the Jahvist ideal, the victory of Light (Spirit) over the "dark powers of nature". Such, too, are the contempt for the Body; the doctrine of sin, exculpation and redemption; abstract dogma and creed, etc., etc. The biocentric complex expresses a mentality diametrically opposed on every conceivable point: "Ethics of Life"; the essence of man is his "heart"; the hierarchy of values issues from the principle of vitality. The standard by which men and their conduct must be judged are "nobility" (Adel), "beauty", "richness" or "plenitude" (Fülle), "splendour", "depth of the soul". The "Empire of Bios" (life) is a given reality in which there is no room for doubts or improvements. The degree of human value is not determined by righteousness or correctness, nor by conformity with objective rules, but only by an inherent "height of form" (Formniveau). (The meaning of this is merely a kind of breeding or "raciness" in body and soul alike). Spiritual forces are only valuable so far as they devote themselves to the unfolding and strengthening of vitality—as mere qualities of Life. Heathen
religiosity, entirely free from the misconception of personal and supernatural deity, is postulated. Deity is the "Great Mother Nature", another name for the animated character of reality. Yet the phenomenon of Logos (Spirit) as such, piercing and disturbing the realm of Vital Nature, is a primary and tragic fact; this horrible tension imposed on man cannot simply be eliminated. "Heroic religiosity" implies a "tragic acceptance of Fate" (Nietzsche). Similarly, the logocentric outlook on life, though precluding all forms of moral asceticism, is aware of the ever-present dangers which threaten life, and certainly prevents a lapse into comfortable platitude.

The kernel of Judaism and Christianity is the odious fancy of morality—a "fussing of man in the face of Nature" (Nietzsche). Healthy and well-bred nature needs no morality (Goethe). But the efforts of moral mania to "improve" men and conditions are doomed to a hideous kind of failure. The road of progress down which logocentric civilization marches, leads to sterility, to a war of mutual extermination. The German Revolution, together with its preparatory movements (solitary geniuses like Goethe, Nietzsche, Klages; the experiments in bündisch life, etc.) marks the first great enterprise of a biocentric upheaval. This hopeful interpretation, however, will only prove true if the Nazi re-birth of Germandom outgrows the limits of mere political fascism and nationalism, achieving a real "revision of all values" (Nietzsche's Umwertung aller Werte).

In a short but most instructive volume of Klages ("Man and Earth", 1918) we read the significant observation that moral conscience is not an original fact of experience, since it does not occur in the animal realm. Scruples of conscience are a stigma of "slave natures", as has been pointed out by Nietzsche. The notion of "sin", meaning, in the terms of Logos philosophy, that which is outrageous to the Spirit, must be superseded by the notion of "offence" (Frevel) against Life. "The moral imperative is the very principle of all offence against Life. The educator aiming at 'morality' is an unconscious but systematic offender against Life." Apparently, the philosophical armature of Naziism was already forged, to a large extent, long before the humiliation of Versailles, which, in the imagination of so many benevolent spectators of the West, is integrally responsible for the spectacle of the Third Empire.
I will add a few more examples of Klagesianism, taken from the minute account by Kurt Leese. "The spirit is a power at once inherent in Life and yet directed against it" (Klages). Both idealism (rationalism) and materialism (sensualism) are incapable of "experiencing Life": the acquisition of rational knowledge by the intellect infatuates idealism, the object of rational knowledge, materialism. Whereas vital experience is a continuous, fluid, rhythmic process, consciousness and intellectual appropriation consist of intermittent acts, of insulated and instantaneous points of fixation. (Objectivity, intellectual clarity, rational distance between the mind and the objects of the world—the bugbear of all idolaters of sovereign "Shape", "Kind", "Breeding", and tribal subjectivism!) All natural instincts and impulses wax and wane rhythmically, whereas the Spirit insatiably pursues a single aim, thus creating a painful breach and tension in the fabric of life. (cf. the hatred of logic, personality, personal Godhead, personal immortality, eternal truths, moral axioms!) The original inferiorities, distortions and frustrations in the functioning of natural instincts are the weak spots which the "Spirit" uses as points of invasion; supplanting direct and fluid impulses by artificial and sustained purposes; natural resemblances by logical identities; the vital wisdom of feeling by the application of rational notions, etc. The rational and moral mania for regulations is the most voracious of all passions, bent on drying up the sap of life and constructing in its place a barren skeleton of purposes and sub-purposes. We lovers of Life, exclaims Klages, are in some way the "last of the Mohicans" in the midst of an adverse civilization; we can but wish for the extinction of mankind as soon as possible, so that "from out of the universal massacre, the deep roar of the forest will sound again rejuvenated" (free translation).

In conclusion, we refer to a standard article of the Klagesian psychiatrist Professor Prinzhorn (on Community and Leadership, in an anthology published for Klages's sixtieth birthday). Infra-human nature, he writes, knows a "principle of order appropriate to the laws of life" (lebensgerechte Ordnung). In English we might call it briefly "vital justice". This principle of order, however, "must not be falsified, according to the Judaeo-Christian outlook of life, into a principle of purposefulness, morality or sentimentality". The undeniable harshness of the...
natural order yet admits of a general harmony, a biological incorporation and protection of individual beings, an atmosphere of homeliness and confidence (?) All vital processes are securely guided by instincts; there is no unnecessary striving, no “struggle for life” in the strict sense, no fighting another animal except by coveting it for food. (The tribalist solution of the social problem: replace Capitalism by Cannibalism!) To be sure, a harsh order dominates all; yet no arbitrary will of strange animals sways them (?) The great breach is made by man, the autonomous personality craving absolute self-determination and security. The ideology of “progress”, which expresses the attempt to create gradually the general conditions of an existence thus sublimized, invariably leads to disaster in the end. “Infra-human Nature is the prototype of all life, appropriate order and true community.” (In other words, we can escape from our surplus of troubles by becoming sheer beasts. Such frankness is much appreciated.) True, besides mere submission to biological order the “Promethean activity of a bold Führer” may on occasion be justified. But such heroic deeds of renewal must be sharply distinguished from the “small destructive utopias of progress”, which are now being wiped out by the “return to the ancient ties of Blood and Soil and reincorporation of the individual into the universal Whole”.

8. THE REVIVAL OF ELEMENTAL FORCES

We do not insinuate that a man should have brains alone and no teeth; but we do mean that his brains are more essential to him, and we do object to his being centred in his teeth. The philosophy of neo-barbarism, however, is subject to a perversion of some such order. To be sure, it does not aim at discarding the brain; yet, if a fleeting paradox be permitted, it is prone to degrade the brain into a mere corporeal tool, whilst envisaging a mystical union between the soul and the teeth. Speaking in more general terms, the disagreement between those faithful to civilization and its recently arisen enemies, has no bearing on the question as to whether the “elemental forces” of our lower
nature should exist, and be taken into account, but entirely on
the question of emphasis. We do not deny (at least I, for one,
do not) that in certain situations man must hold his ground
tooth and nail, in a game of brute force and sheer self-assertion;
but they maintain that it is precisely in such situations that
man is purely and supremely man. We fully agree with the
householder knocking down the burglar; yet they, if not actually
preferring the burglar, will be inclined to judge that the house­
holder has only begun to attain a more significant humanity by
that "heroic" act of elemental "existence". We do not with­
hold our respect from the inescapable tragedy of death, from
the even more perplexing tragedy of birth; but whereas the ro­
mantics of Vitalism place the full weight of human existence in
the concussions and spasms of being born and of dying, of
engendering and killing, of pitting one's life against another's or
sacrificing it for that of the Tribe, we are more interested in
contemplating how, on what grounds, and with what success the
time elapsing between birth and death is likely to be spent.
Also we take notice, for instance, of the law of gravity when
choosing the position, or directing the movements, of our bodies,
and we do not consider it good taste to speak flippantly
of that venerable law; yet we have some dim idea that this
and similar things are but a setting for what is really important
in our lives. In a word, they extol as the genuine contents of life
the things we appreciate as marginal situations and values. They
would say that whereas they consider and honour man in his
nakedness, meaning his reality, we smother him beneath pretty
and trivial paraphernalia such as top-hats or tail-coats. But the
truth is rather that we prefer an image of man in full dress as
an indication that, even if he happens to be naked, he is man,
not an animal; whereas they are not so much students of
"naked man" as addicts of a morbid aesthetic of abstract
nakedness. We grieve to admit that in some cases it is advisable
for man to roar like thunder, or to bid the thunder of his guns
imitate an earthquake; but the proper and normal thing is to
modulate one's voice, and to cultivate pure mathematics with­
out ballistic intentions, and technology with a view to railways
and agricultural machines, not tanks and submarines. Our
antagonists, however, see the appropriate greatness of man in
being a kind of thunder, or in "happening" like an earthquake.
It is only fair to point out that Spengler's famous "Beast of Prey" theory and some of his other theories, too, have met with opposition among Nazi authors. Nevertheless, the basic identity is unmistakable, however true it may be that Spengler's theory is not only more sincere in a way but also more scurrilous and exaggerated than other Nazi utterances of the same general trend. The English reader may find comfort in the assumption that the following quotations do not cover exactly the consciously professed ideals of the actual rulers of Germany; but he would go hopelessly astray were he to regard them as the senseless blasphemies of a solitary maniac.

"Man is a beast of prey." "The beast of prey is the highest form of active life." The "beast of prey" mode of living implies "the extreme degree of the necessity of fighting, conquering, annihilating self-assertion. The human race ranks highly because it belongs to the class of beasts of prey". The beast of prey is "everybody's foe". It has a "royal idea of property" : involving no mere possession but "arbitrary domination". The fate of a beast of prey uplifts mankind "through power and victory, through pride and hate". Struggle for life is not a miserable necessity but a thing of glory. Man must exult in the falsity of the "plebeian image of man" as conceived by Rousseau. "On the contrary, the tactics of his life are proper to a gorgeous, bold, cunning and cruel beast of prey. He lives engaged in aggression, killing, and annihilation. He wants to be master inasmuch as he exists." This was written in 1931. Two years later, in his newest book, Spengler shows himself anxious to dispel any apprehension that he might have altered his views. "Man is a beast of prey. I shall say it again and again... The traders in virtue, the champions of social ethics, are but beasts of prey with their teeth broken out."

In his "Worker" Jünger celebrates the downfall of urbanity, of civilization in its narrower sense, of bürgerlich society, as an "incursion of elemental powers". He is swelled by pride when establishing the fact that the German has proved an unfit citizen of such a social order ("a bad Bürger"). It is the distinctive endeavour of the bourgeois to shut out the "sphere of elemental influences" from his field of activity; he is contemptibly fond of the defensive, with no mind to seek out fighting of his own accord. For him, the elemental is tarnished by the mark
of the irrational (sinnlos); whatever interferes with his cult of reason appears to him devoid of reason. The chief instinct of the Bürger is the craving for security—better still, security permanently granted by institutions. The typical city about 1900 is a citadel of security. The bourgeois believes conflict to be essentially avoidable by a system of assurances; he trusts that fighting can be ruled out by rules; he cannot conceive war except in terms of crime or error. He pays no respect to powers of reality, however forceful and sublime, unless they can be tested by some convenient “standard of values”. This mean system of ease and caution is now about to be destroyed. We discover that the question of “value” lacks stringency; “Shape”, the new god of vital reality, is “beyond values: it has no quality”; what is more, “it cannot be described in the usual sense”. The startled reader will be beyond reply save to murmur feebly that “Shape”, to all appearances, does not heap unnecessary difficulties on its shoulders. Indeed, the yelling of the new Barbarians rends the air of our cities. “We” are here; we are young, vigorous, reckless, unhampered by scruples or formulas or habits; we laugh at anyone who questions our legitimacy; woe betide those who attempt to obstruct our march. Some readers may possibly detect a certain analogy between Jünger and the Marxian Socialists’ criticism of bürgerlich society. Both scorn and attack the system of assurances, the boasting of an idealistic veneer of abstract values, that prevails in the bourgeois world; both cry for a more direct consciousness of life, a more living community of man. Yet this undeniable analogy is but the preamble for absolute antagonism. Socialism, with what justification we cannot examine here, reproaches bourgeois society with confining itself to mere general symbols and formulas of rational control and moral responsibility, without the ability or willingness to carry out their postulates in the real life of men, their actual relationships, which are the reality beneath the surface of mere juridical phrases. Inversely, the new fascist Barbarism repudiates the claim to rationality and universal moral solidarity itself, and not the imperfect realization, the perfunctory application of that claim. It does not fight bourgeois society on socialist grounds, but rather because that bourgeois society offers a playground for socialism. Both sides accuse bourgeois society of a kind of hypocrisy; yet whereas the Marxists mean (as the gist
of their thought) that the values professed by civilization are not, but ought to be, realized in actual practice, critics like Jünger mean that this is as impossible as it is undesirable, wherefore the values of civilization ought openly and completely to be dethroned.

The cult of the “elemental”, the return to “primitive” methods of human association, fascinates a number of Nazi authors. Ernst Benn (a renegade from Left revolutionism) writes with some relish: “Obviously man is something far, far more primitive than is imagined by the intellectual clique of the West, something wholly impersonal behind the screen of a shadowy Ego”. Nor does history lag behind man: if the latter is “primitive”, the methods of history are “elemental”, its processes abhor poise and democratic deliberateness. Naturally the National Socialists stress this in dealing with inopportune denunciations of their revolution as a menace to “culture” as such. The enthronement of a “new biological Type”—which is the only possible substance of a genuine historic event—cannot dispense with spiritual sacrifices. “It is inevitable that some of the foremost ranks should be swept clear, that certain spiritual goods should be cultivated, with less devotion than before.” Professor Krieck, endowed with a more virile temper, prefers a less diplomatic way of putting it. What the critics of National Socialism call its averseness to spirituality (Ungeistigkeit) is a “legitimate contempt for rational culture and intellectual virtuosity”. Yes, National Socialism “sets the Acheron (underworld) in motion”. The true Nazi “does not stoop to debate with the Marxist: he ‘refutes’ him by offering a new appeal and new excitement, thus taking away his followers”. “The netherworld (Unterwelt) of the Soul is as far from being evil as the cosmic world; rather is it the reservoir, the womb, of all powers of generation and fecundity, formless but providing every form with material, of all fatal processes; it gives life and inflicts death…” And it is revived, torn open as it were, by National Socialism, making use of symbols rather than ideas, calling forth the irrational, subterranean, elemental impulses, fomenting a new primitivism and romanticism, and so on.

Hielscher, too, the visionary of an Empire in which the fullness of Power becomes one with the Soul in its full potency, is loud in his praise of “elemental reality” in its royal nakedness,
transcending the range of any standard of qualities or morals. "The Ring will close: the new values which harbour the essence of Nietzsche, the values of the Empire, are the values of Eternity. . . . Value and Reality are one, because Reality is perfect. . . . The souls of the Empire are distinct in their ability to bear this Reality. . . . That is why Nietzsche’s idea of the ‘perpetual return’ symbolizes his greatness. . . . The meaning is: He who chooses me as a watchword and a war-eagle, is the knowing one among all forces of eternity, the one who is also aware of the terrible, evil, destructive aspects of eternal reality. He is the Affirmer (Jasager), who approves, blesses and loves the life of the Eternal. He is the Affirmer in action (Jatuer), who supports this life with all the forces it contains."

The “existential” school of philosophy, too—until now the last word of Teutonic metaphysical genius—holds an important place in the context which concerns us here. Its head, as the reader may remember, is Professor Heidegger, among whose followers Professor Jaspers, otherwise an eminent psychiatrist, is recognized as the most original philosophic mind. At first sight, existentialism seems to have little in common with biological naturalism and primitivism; as a matter of fact, it is a secularized renewal of Luther’s theological speculations on fallen man. Luther taught that human reason and morality were utterly futile and illusory; that man in his earthly existence was entirely subject to the stern laws of his corrupted nature; that he must obey these laws in all his concrete dealings, placing his hope of supernatural salvation in the act of faith alone. In Heidegger’s teaching the directly theological elements of God, salvation, faith, sin, etc., are omitted; the remaining essentials are the state of “fallenness” as such (man is “thrown into” existence: Geworfenheit instead of moral abjectness, Verworfenheit), and the futile and specious character of the “values” by which man falsely believes that he embellishes and dignifies his fundamentally gloomy and tragic life. For Heidegger, too, the “solution”—the relatively best course—lies in the open and explicit acceptance of life with all its burden of tragedy and anguish, in the courage for terror, as it were; in fighting out existence with the grim resolution of a military band determined to hold its own until the inescapable end. This abstract worship of naked “existence” is but another expression for the selfsame
withdrawal into the "elemental" sphere which also animates the abstract worship of naked "reality" in its more biological and naturalistic sense. A radically barbarian outlook on life, the diametrical opposite of what the French call the cult of *le Vrai, le Beau et le Bien*, an unspeakably humourless sullen devotion to the "earnestness of life" (being its own exclusive object), is unfolded here as a pagan religion of Life and Death, of engendering and expanding Life, of inflicting and facing Death; a religion of Urge and Fear, of the Triumphant or else the Hunted Beast. As Mr. Chesterton, in his "Ballad of the White Horse", depicts the pagan invaders:

"Their gods were sadder than the sea,
Gods of a wandering will,
Who cried for blood like beasts at night,
Sadly, from hill to hill."

I will not worry the reader with details taken from Heidegger; the main idea which reappears in various formulations is that *existence as such is the very "substance" of man*; that all "qualities" of existence are but products of its striving for self-assertion; that all forms of consciousness which evade existence as its own object are falsified, "improper" (*uneigentlich*) expressions of existence. As for the idols of Death and Anguish, we will refer to them in a special section.

Existentialism, in the variety presented by Jaspers, might be labelled "the philosophy of *marginal situations*"; the philosophical virtue it demands of man, "the heroic endurance of the fact that nothing endures". Life is only really experienced in its *crises*; we attain philosophical consciousness of ourselves, not through the study of human understanding, moral consciousness, works of art, even the permanent structure of our biological instincts, but only by entrusting ourselves to those heights of vital intensity which at the same time indicate that all works and conditions of life are transient and doomed to perish. The milestones of existence, the "marginal situations", are "experiences, such as fight, illness, passion, bliss, which put a limit to the intelligibility of life, and by means of which everyone (however artificially and fantastically he may otherwise have kept aloof) is sucked into the vortex of existence" (Gehlen).
In other words, man as a rational being, as the bearer of personal dignity, is utterly unreal, as are the logical and moral laws that bind him in this aspect; even man as an administrator of his natural needs still suggests permanent aims and logical tangibility, and is therefore unreal. Nothing is real but ecstasy and ruin, eruption and evanescence. A more horrible negation of the spiritual essence of man could not have been thought of even by the grossest kind of materialism and hedonism! For they could only suggest a scurrilous, tasteless, and somehow harmless, misconception of man as a "most intelligent mammal", or a "self-directing machine"; whereas here man is appreciated in regard to some of his really important and human manifestations, without any attempt being made to "explain" him out of any "simpler" category of being: yet he is interpreted, even in so far as he is specifically human and spiritual, as a force and process of nature, with nothing beyond this, nothing placed above this, nothing to judge or to rule this! That is why the old materialism and hedonism were mostly associated (though in a highly inconsistent and problematic way) with a spirit of civilization and progress, whereas existentialism, with all thoroughness and earnestness, exhales a spirit of deliberate barbarism, of a knowing and final despair as regards all aspirations of man to salvation, eternity, enlightenment, and "being at peace with himself". Burgert summarizes Jaspers as follows: "All great realities, all works of art, all political constructions, all philosophies, all religions must some day perish; 'failure' is the last word, nor does man 'taste existence' save in failure, or experience the Absolute save in the tragic annihilation of things and values meant to be imperishable: such is the gloomy outlook of this philosophy. To be sure, it craves 'communion', it is bent on 'communication', it proposes to rouse an awareness of existence in the fellow-man, with an appeal to him to become 'free' himself, to face the terrible 'marginal situations', thereby fathoming with a trembling hand the depths of existence. . . . Yet this kind of communion is nothing positive, no love, no genuine approach to the fellow-creature, only a flight of bare and lonely existence from itself". Burgert is quite right, too, in touching on the Lutheran origins of "the repudiation of all 'carcasses', all institutions, systems, dogmas—in a word, all objectivities—and the exclusive emphasis on the 'soaring' of
existence, which denies all finality to those crystallizations". His concluding judgment: "Existential philosophy means a new paganism, and a break-up of Western humanity", needs no modification on our part.

4. THE SUPERSTITIONS OF CIVILIZATION

"Barbarity as a mannerism is the climax of evil. It is bad enough to persevere in barbarous forms of living; to relapse into them is worse; but worst of all is a conscious return to them. This, however, is the object of National Socialism."

Murner: *Nazispiegel* ("A Mirror for Naziism").

If it be agreed that civilization means the use of machines, the conquest of physical forces by experimental science, a systematic state administration and education, sedulous training in various crafts, etc., the Nazis are certainly no enemies of civilization; perhaps they are even more zealously devoted to its fabric than are most of us. But we—Western mankind in the broadest sense of the word—are accustomed to attach yet another meaning to the notion of civilization. This more pregnant and ambitious idea of civilization covers a vast field of facts and tendencies, of axioms and habits such as the respect for personal freedom and security, the belief in argument and discussion, the humanitarian standards of conduct, the appreciation of a well-divided and well-balanced system of the amenities of life, the reverence for objective truth and impartial judgment, the sense of proportion which comes under the general heading "sanity", or the consciousness of human limitations and frailties (as measured by the generally valid standard of human dignity), which is sometimes called a sense of humour. If asked to condense it into a single formula, I should be rather at a loss to find a more explicit term than "civilization"; yet I am confident that the essential unity of the spiritual content of this long list will be approved by everybody. Perhaps we might speak of an ideal of maturity as opposed to a mental development arrested at an infantile or pubescent stage; of a realization of the spiritual
nature of man as opposed to a mere enhancing of his productive abilities; of the Christian dignity of the soul as opposed to Pagan ecstasy, despair and self-abandonment; of Christian humility as opposed to Pagan (especially tribal and Caesarian) pride and self-consciousness; of enlightenment and charity as opposed to the worship of power and efficiency; of wisdom familiar with the hierarchy and complexity of values as opposed to all kinds of obsession and infatuation.

Civilization in this sense is regarded with implacable enmity by the Nazi and neo-German mind. Some references in proof of this statement, selected from a superabundance of material, will be given presently. Two preliminary remarks, however, may be of some importance.

First, the double meaning of the term "civilization" would be fatally misunderstood, were we to consider the common designation of the two things a mere verbal and fortuitous figure of speech. In fact, technical civilization is closely dependent on mental civilization; and mental civilization is at any rate not wholly independent of spiritual and moral civilization. Without doubt, discipline and self-control in the military, technical and psychological sense are largely consistent with inward immaturity and megalomania, especially as an attitude of people in the mass. Still, this is a divergence, which, given certain conditions, can develop into a real split. We can well imagine that, under a certain amount of strain or pressure, or in some problematic and shifting situations, this harsh and over-accentuated discipline and efficiency will suddenly fall to pieces, for want of a more basic and universal, and therefore more independent, virtue of self-respect, self-restraint and objectivity. It is an open question, too, how long scientific and technical thought can prosper when the more fundamental love of thinking is generally discouraged. It is one thing to believe that a Nazi generation is likely to achieve great things in technical civilization, and another to expect an enduring progress of material civilization, with victorious Nazi mentality underlying it. The cult of efficiency and human "adaptability" is certainly inherent in a type of the barbarous mind; but in the long run there is an antagonism between technical culture and reliability, and spiritual barbarity. The rationality of engineers cannot be fostered and pampered indefinitely along with the irrationality of men.
Secondly, it is no contradiction whatever that civilization in its higher sense implies the idea both of stability and progress; whereas the creed of barbarism repudiates the claim both to "finality" and "improvement", which suggests at once a belief in "eternal change and dynamism", and the "immutability of the conditions and wisdom of nature". The civilized outlook on life attributes a rational and moral constancy and finality to human personalities, human standards of value, human systems of law; that is why it believes in progress, which means that the structure of our actual conditions of life (with a special view to social relationship) can, and will, be essentially modified in order to adjust them to the aforesaid purposes and standards which carry a final legitimacy and validity. Inversely, the barbarous outlook on life, nature being its own meaning and object, necessitates that "things" always remain the same, whereas men are tossed up by the vital wave and swallowed by the impersonal soil, truths and commandments arise and fade, States and Empires expand (may it be, as far as possible, "ours") and decay (the phase we love to associate with "our rivals").

In a word, we must guard ourselves from confusing the conservative principle of the maintenance of spiritual invariables (such as the human soul, actual mankind, a definite religion or civilization, a moral code which appeals to the understanding and claims universal validity) with the sublime cynicism that nature can neither alter nor make perfect the normal state of things. Equally must we avoid confusing the principle of progress aiming at an intelligible goal with the principle of everlasting change and transition. Besides, the insipid evolutionist theory of an automatic and continuous "progress" has done much to discredit the idea of progress altogether, and to smooth the way for the naturalistic worship of "change", "relativity", and the "right of vitality" as opposed to objective Truth, Right and Value, the necessary pole-stars of real Progress.

And now, rather tardily perhaps, I shall again silence my own voice, and show how the Nazis expose the senile idols of our civilization. Erich Jung holds that the Great War was the clash of two contrasting principles of culture—a struggle between the Intellect (the West) and the Soul (Germany). He does little justice to his own cause, for intelligence was certainly not lacking on the German side. As for the "soul", he means by it what so
many Teutons do, the indefinite hazy mass of "animated Life" that looms over the head of "petty individual egos", and means pretty well the opposite of what we should call "the soul of man". To him, the Soul means "super-personal wholes", by no means public order, or law, or mankind, but the cosmos (Weltall), Life, Race, Community; the "wholes" that grow in and about us, and absorb us, not the wholes that become realized by our conscious co-operation. The progress of mankind is a mere superstition—he declares sententiously. Here is another abbreviated but rich formula: "Happiness, liberty, equality, the rights of man, progress—these are the phantoms soaked with chaos. Once the mendacious idea of the rights of man has been erased, there will be room once more for the love of man". (A foul love of man that shuns freedom and rights! And what kind of love is it that does not even intend the happiness of its object?)

Sombart, the author of the well-known pamphlet "Merchants and Heroes" published in 1915, contrasts two systems of civilization under this motto; or rather—as I should prefer to put it—he contrasts a caricature of real civilization with a retouched picture of superior barbarism. The merchant's chief craving is for "happiness", which is comfort embedded in respectability. His scale of virtues embraces such qualities as will "vouch for a peaceful co-existence of merchants" (we should say simply: a peaceful co-existence of men—without being utterly ashamed of the charge!). Such virtues are moderation, modesty, industry, sincerity, abstemiousness, humility and patience, which are held up for contempt! How different the Hero: he lives in order to "fulfil a task", no matter what the task is, to be sure. His list of virtues will comprise self-devotion, faithfulness, courage, piety (?), obedience and kindness (?). The keynote of the Merchant's conduct is the query: "What canst thou give me, O Life?" On the contrary, the Hero asks: "What can I give thee, O Life?" The reader will realize immediately that the Merchant's formula, even though a trifle narrow, is certainly far more sensible. It may be nobler to devote oneself to God, to one's fellow-men or to a good cause than it is to be keen on collecting the benefits that life may have to offer one; but an eagerness to press offerings on "Life" borders on insanity. Indeed, the Merchant's formula can also mean: What does life offer to my fellows, to mankind in general? And again the strange phrase "What can
I give thee, O Life? clearly bears in it the seeds of cruelty and ruthlessness, of treating one's fellow-men, too, as mere slaves of a "super-personal whole". There is, says Sombart, also such a thing as a "mercenary Socialism", as well as a "heroic Socialism". Mercenary Socialism is aptly expressed by a saying of Ramsay Macdonald: "Socialism is the creed of those who recognize that the community exists for the improvement of the individual and for the maintenance of liberty". I do not know whether this is a proper definition of Socialism, but I daresay it formulates the soundest possible views on society in general. On the other hand, "heroic Socialism" is summed up in Mussolini's exhortation: "Memento audere semper!" (Never cease to be daring). Very heroic words, or rather, very much in favour of heroism, it being less clear in what way they convey a meaning of "Socialism".

B. von Selchow, however, with his systematic parallel of the Civil and the Heroic Man, deserves the rank of Crown witness. A "bourgeois", he writes, is a being who "buries" (hides) himself (Bürger—sich bergen): who, "in the safe harbouring (Geborgenheit) of a life without peril, attends to his business, doing his duty conscientiously and zealously". (Better things we know, and worse as well.) The wicked bourgeois or civilian falsifies the notion of power and subverts the hitherto prevailing systems of power, in order to attain to power himself. The Liberal aggression aims at depriving the holders of power of their self-confidence. (But is that not rather a laudable aim?) The doctrine of social contract, the conception of society based on the voluntary agreement of citizens, is the chief instrument forged for that blame-worthy purpose. The bourgeois is essentially a stranger to the political sphere, the relationship of "Friend and Foe" with the "hardness" it necessarily entails; he is bent on substituting debate and negotiation for genuine fighting, and the weapons of the oratory and commercial shrewdness for real arms, following the old immoralist creed that mankind consists exclusively of honest swine and hypocrites, the former evidently being preferable. Not content with that, the bourgeois proceeds to spin philosophical systems to fortify his position; such systems, in particular, are "idealism" and "materialism", which—and here Selchow is right—despite their mutual hostility, agree in the fundamentals. For both of them emphasize "law and order";
in both cases "the philosophical system serves to banish the uncanny, the inexpressible that might endanger the security of the civilian ego". Faith itself becomes denatured and trivialized either by orthodoxy (dogmatism, infallibility, clerical bureaucracy, or the Holy Writ as a Pope made of paper) or else by Liberal dilution. Love undergoes a similar process by being debased to mere sentiment, habit, or the gratification of a need. The central motive is to avoid fighting: the Burgher is anxious to eliminate "fighting against Life, as he lacks the strength necessary to master it in its very nakedness and hardness in a manly fashion". Similarly does the civilian Ego-Man brush aside the reality of Death by means of sentimental wailings and euphemisms. Blessed be the Great War that signalizes the turning of the tide! Youth, still in possession of some uncrippled heroic instincts, turned its back on the stale world of yesterday, rushing forward into a new world whose themes are not gain and business but victory and perishing.

Spengler, urging "scepticism of theories" and "respect for facts", states the very first principle of the new self-conscious creed of spiritual barbarism, the creed which has roused great men of the West such as José Ortega y Gasset and Julien Benda to their eloquent and immortal philippics. It is a consoling consideration that Spengler's own outlook is but an ugly theory, and that he himself forges rather than senses facts. Unfortunately, however, this alone is a somewhat cheap way of disposing of the spiritual threat to which he gives utterance in peculiarly strident tones. The formula really has a meaning of some import; it does express an existing mentality. There is such a fundamental attitude as a grim refusal to listen to arguments, and a resolute concentration of a display of power without acknowledging the need of any standard of justification. Such a creed, when accompanied by a real inner assent and conformity, lends to its adepts a tremendous initial advantage for the struggle in which they are determined to engage. But to return to Spengler: he does not hesitate to set forth his convictions in more explicit terms. He bewails the demoralizing effects of the long period of peace 1870-1914—an enervating epoch which fed the diseases of prosperity, cowardice, and hypocrisy. Luckily, a great reversion set in with the War and its after-effects. "Who will seize the happiness of participating in it?" The "coward security" of
the late nineteenth century has come to an end. "Life in the
midst of dangers, the proper life of history, is again coming into
its own. . . . Ancient Barbary is re-awakening . . . a sound war-
like relish of one’s own power. . . ." In the sequel, Spengler pro-
tests that he would by no means describe this interpretation of
the present, and the time to come, as "pessimistic". Not he!
Indeed: "Who will seize the happiness of participating in it?"
For the "Nordic vital sense" implies "joy in challenging fate
and its adversities"—Heaven grant that the adversities may not
weigh too heavily upon the side which, although ready to cope
with fate, would be loath to "challenge" it!

Nor does Blüher fail us in the context with which we are
dealing. I quote at random some of his sayings in this direction.
*War is an event of nature, and accordingly cannot be prevented.*
Its function is to "generalize the heroic situation". Every war
is an affair of *religio* (the Latin form is used), "and therefore a
sacred thing". "The heroic situation contains an awareness of
the aeonic life, and the futility of individual existence." (Which
one of us, I wonder, can restrain a shudder at this baleful touch
of the Beast.) The *motive* of "reform, correction, evolution",
the atmosphere of the *bürgerlich* novel and drama, the idea of an
understanding of things universally human—all this pertains to
the corruption of culture by the Secondary Race developing a
consciousness of its own. The great vice of civilization is its pro-
viding a level of equality for all races; it is based on the mis-
chievous belief that no race is inaccessible to ennoblement.
Miserable France who admits the coloured races to citizenship!
And, in the field of ideologies, the "unspeakable crime" of
Judaism: "to supersede the fruits of earth-bound growth by
corruptive reasonings". There is only, we may add, a small
difference in spelling between "corruptive" and "corrective",
yet it covers the greatest possible antagonism which can arise
between human minds. The creed of barbarism and the creed of
civilization, the creed of spiteful despair and the creed of aspiring
faith, the creed of proud satisfaction in hell and the creed of
rational and moral sensitivity—two universes within the one
world that ineluctably holds us both!

Gogarten, that subtle neo-Lutheran fighter against ethics,
humanitarianism and liberty, is equally fond of the "bank-
ruptcy" of progressive Western civilization. The cornerstone of
his system is the “radical bondage of man”, the absolute exclusion of human self-direction and self-sovereignty. “There is only one watchword to-day: Stillehalten (to stand still; to lie low). We must shake off completely the “insane reliance on humanitas”. We must reverently accept “wars as divine infictions”—the old worldly-wise amoralism of the undying Heathen, clad in the robes of pseudo-Christian resignation. What is the modern emancipation of man worth, asks Gogarten. Man released from holy “bondage” is all the more subject to the “despotism of circumstances”: money, capital, economy, technology, and above all, the securing of liberty that has itself become an “omnipotent idol”. A cheaply witty remark, but like a searchlight illuminating the barbaric caverns of the anti-Liberal mind! Yes, the more liberty and rationality is asked for, the more order and discipline is needed; the more seriously man raises the claim to rule himself, the more comprehensively he must devote himself to the penetration and the control of “circumstances”. For, as the stern and lucid Latin proverb runs, you can only conquer things by adapting yourself to them. Certainly all this domestication and rationality may in many cases become a nuisance, as for instance, hygiene; and yet it is as foolish a sophistry to call it the “despotism of circumstances” as it would be to call a well-ordered mode of living the “plague of health”. But then we must never forget that the barbarian heart thirsts for anarchy no less than for oppression, that it has the same taste for lawless conditions as it has for unlawful encroachments. Reaction, as we already know, possesses its own ideal of liberty, which is to deliver men from the cares, efforts, and acts of self-control entailed by real liberty. The very theme of Socialism, the raising of the “social problem”, is in Gogarten’s opinion the ultimate goal of the godless adventure on which modern humanity has embarked. Socialism, as he rightly states, is ordained to surpass and to finish the incomplete work of Liberalism: modern civilized man, he expostulates, “is not willing at any price to lose hold of this freedom, of this once gained right to self-determination”. On the contrary, in a last great attack he braces himself “to wrest it from ‘circumstances’ and to secure it against them” (by means of a coalition of the “many”). We see that what Gogarten really abhors is not the “despotism of circumstances” as embodied in plutocratic oppression, but that accomplished regulation
of "circumstances" by a society of intelligent and responsible individuals which is expected to strengthen the edifice of political democracy and to re-civilize capitalist civilization. It is also useful to note that Gogarten distinguishes "social (gesellschaftlich) existence" — a term of contempt—from "political existence" — a term of respect — by defining "political existence" as "human existence" pure and simple, whereas "social existence" has a bearing on the objects that necessitate it, such as art, science, technology, economics. Here, too, the barbarian devotee of tribal magic revolts against the clarity and purposefulness, the differentiation and balance, the divisions and delimitations that are the gifts and meaning of civilization.

In the elegant exposition of Hommes, a flexible Catholic "marching with the times", the revulsion from a civilized outlook on life assumes the following traits. The "irrational" is rising to the surface. A sense of "the tragic" again holds a place in our mentality. It is in a state of mind "Christian and tragic" that the World's order is grasped. What, on the contrary, was the pitiable substance of "Liberalism and Marxism"? It was "a life-tendency bent on outward happiness and well-being, thus forsaking itself and the proper objects of mankind". (For one thing, this voluble parasite of the "rising power" confuses "material goods" with the eminently moral idea of a just distribution and a correspondingly wise management of material goods, a moral idea in the service of which many men better than Hommes made incomparably greater sacrifices as regards their "outward well-being" than he is ever likely to make!) Outward existence... utility... purposefulness... welfare are distasteful relics of an obscure past: Life's true laws are scarcity and eternal danger. (These are doubtless some of the laws of life; but a special pleasure in them is distinctly perverse. What is more, it is precisely the scarcity of commodities to which material problems owe their moral pathos; and the right answer to danger consists in the pursuit of security.) We are rediscovering "the demands of eternal human essence faithful to God's creative design: which are Honour, Fate, Character, Volk community, God". (The characteristic confusion of this sentence is by no means due to malevolent translation.) In opposition to Marxism as well as to bürgerlich rationalism and materialism, to the social vices of the latter as well as to the "self-forged new
artificial forms” propagated by the former, we propose to “re­instatethe eternal ethnic orders (Volksordnungen) which have their foundations in Creation”. In other words, Capitalism is damnable in so far as it gives up too much room to freedom and equal rights. Criticism or analysis of the social structure is pro­scribed. Social consciousness must sink into eternal slumber. In opposition to “social rationalism”, we proclaim the “emphasis of a culture communing with nature, a culture truly spiritual”. Is this the verbiage of a genial fool? It is not. The odious use of the term “spiritual” in contradistinction to “rational” or “intellectual” is familiar to most Nazi pseudo-idealists; it corresponds to the basic tendency of a totalitarian naturalism intent on drowning the spiritual accents of human existence in the cosmic fluctuations of vital forces. Everything resisting this attempt is mere dry and empty “logic”, “formalism”, “intel­lect” or “ratio”, beyond the pale of “truly spiritual” things.

5. AT THE GATES OF DEATH

The idea of “Life” may have different meanings. A pious Christian, a modern Western utilitarian, and a fervent Nazi mean different things when they speak of their devotion to what they respectively call “life”; though I am bold enough to assert that the first two are more closely akin than would appear at first sight, especially in their own eyes. For there is a deep common trait of rationality and justice between them. In both there is personality as the bearer of eternal logic, values, and harmony with the rest of mankind. Life “celestial” embodies an eternal contemplation and reflection, in some way certainly a realization of the “Good”; Life as conceived by a severe and modest common sense is a system, supposed to be permanent and consistent, of acknowledging and enjoying, and dealing with, “goods” in the very widest sense of the word. The “Life” idol of heathen naturalism and vitalism is a thing very far re­moved from that. Life in this sense embraces death as much as life proper; not physical death as the birth of heavenly life, but
physical death as a rhythmic term of physical life; not death as valiant self-sacrifice in the defence of a good cause or of cherished goods, but death as a culmination of life experience. The "fighting spirit" of reasonable pride and self-preservation bids man face death fearlessly if necessary. "Tragic heroism", in its turn, tells him to love the interplay of life and death, the increase and diminution of lives, more than living itself; to place the process of life above all objective necessities; to invite death if the urge of life demands it. Clemenceau once said that it was futile to transact peace with a race that preferred death to life. He certainly touched upon a real phenomenon; only I should put it with less elegance and more moderation: We cannot think of a genuine understanding with a nation so long as she is dominated by a spirit of worshipping Life in the shape of Death.

In other words, what matters is not a good life (with all its implications) but an intense performance of the theatrical function of Life and Death on the stage of cosmic nature. In its vast perspective, the total outlook of the play may appear as "undying Life"; from the point of view of actual human orientation, however, it is rather Death which seems to attain pre-eminence—similarly as in Carl Schmitt's dual category of Friendship and Enmity, where it is Enmity that strikes us as the ultimate creative power. For in the naked, vital story of life and death, the latter is the final and decisive event that moulds the flow of the phenomena of life, that is the boundary of all finite units of life. Thus it is not in vain that a pious barbarian like Selchow begins his confession of faith with the "truly Teutonic" myth of the "Twilight of the Gods" (Götterdämmerung), a symbol for the tragic futility and eternal insecurity of all life. Death, too, is the truest breeder of Community. The "experience of Langemarck" (where a band of young German warriors, mostly students, was routed in a terrible and heroic fight in October, 1914) stands foremost in the new German soul: the situation in which "man in his entire nakedness, debarred from all security" faces terror, is the soil on which an "indivisible community" may grow. "The individual no longer lives his own life but the life of the community . . . ruled by the consciousness of Death and 'Volk' which came to us in the tempests of steel."

Heidegger has undertaken the task of interpreting human existence in its entirety as though it were nothing but an un-
ceasing "tempest of steel" (Stahlgewitter). Existence, he teaches, is determined and formed by death. Death is not merely the ending but actually the end, not only the termination but the decisive term of life. It is not a mere occurrence or calamity (therefore nobody can "take upon himself" the death of another) but the "most proper and absolute possibility", the very meaning of existence. Life is not only bound to end in death but is essentially Sein zum Tode hin, "existence directed towards death". Death realizes the deepest potentiality of existence. Our bondage to death proclaims itself in the "anguish of death": that deep and awful state of mind which has nothing to do with a "mood of weakness", with a fear of "deceasing", but is rather a terrified awareness of our most proper "possibility of being". This feeling, as well as the genuine experience of death in general, is being carefully concealed and assuaged by the system of the On, the bürgerlich world of Das Man, which is busy denaturing death, turning it into a "casualty", a "case of demise" to "other people", obscuring the ineluctable necessity of death for each one personally, and burying our inmost "existence towards death". Das Man provides the means for a continuous unawareness and evasion of death, an everlasting fleeing from death, a working fiction of immortality. "Oneself", thank heavens, is alive for the time being. Yet there is another chance for existence, once that delusion of trivial individualism is unmasked: "to be really itself", and no longer a prey of the On, "to be itself in a passionate freedom to death, released from the illusions of the On, in full self-awareness and anguish". This formula of "freedom to death", the reader may notice, bears a striking resemblance to the fascist slogan of "freedom to obedience". Despair and hopelessness, and the fatality of passing away, are made the very substance of life; impenetrable loneliness is preached as the dialectical starting-point for an absolute renunciation of self, an unrestrained and undivided national fighting community. "Existence towards death" means that there must be no objectivity, no universality, no logical finality in dealing with the material of life; that the "intensity of the life process" is everything; that the only way to save a scrap of one's life beyond death is to stick to the Tribe with the primitive anguish of hungry and hunted beasts.

The infatuation with "productive" and "creative" forces,
the mysticism of "becoming" and "growth" and the worship of sex show signal congruence with the creed of death as the fulfilment of existence. The more we entrust ourselves to the "flow of life" as such, the more securely we are bound for death. This is certainly made clear by Klages, who speaks with religious emotion of the rhythmic polarity of procreation and death, of the "lust both of waxing and waning". According to this, logic, consistency, responsibility or universality are as trivial and decadent as are the ideals of longevity, security, or justice in distribution. It is the intensity of vital "uprise" that matters, and the perishableness of lives, things and values is the one law that endures. Kurt von Hildebrandt, indulging once more in that pastime of which Germans never seem to tire, in distinguishing between *Kultur* and Civilization, connects the former (oddly enough; but think of Spengler!) with "awaking and falling asleep, bringing forth and dying", and the latter with the "flat" conception of "continual and mechanical progress". I should say the difference lies in whether we consider ourselves *primarily* to be personalities endowed with reason, who are essentially bent on keeping and preserving, remembering and securing, as well as on discovering and inventing, on bettering and renewing; or else to be "forces of nature" that rise and fall, devour and decay, expand and shrink, blossom and pass away. Never was the essence of civilization expressed with such magic brevity as in the admirable verses of Kipling in praise of his country's great Western sister:

"*First to follow truth and last to leave old truths behind—*
France beloved of every soul that loves its fellow-kind!"

One final remark on the religion of vitality. The creed of Life, as we see, may more accurately be called a creed of Life and Death. I wish to point out that the biological and psychological basis of such a creed is by no means simply abundant or excessive vitality, as its eulogists or apologists might suggest; nor is it a hidden deficiency in vitality, as might be volunteered by unsympathetic analysts (usually endowed with an aggressive stupidity). One may worship force in relation to having or wanting it; but never for one of these two reasons only. Vitalism is not primarily a question of vital condition but of mental
decision. As for contemporary examples, even the Mussolinian fascist type of man, though similarly bent on a garish display of vitality, is slightly less vitalist in its philosophical outlook; the uncanny and brutal vitality of Stalin is coupled with a creed the main essence of which is almost barbarously realistic but hardly vitalistic; but it is well worth while to pause a moment in front of T. G. Masaryk and the nation bearing the stamp of his royal spirit, the small but stubborn stronghold of Western civilization in Central Europe. Both in his personal record and his doctrine, Masaryk was supremely "vital", his life-story is a romance of victorious energy, surging from the soil, enterprising, enduring, indefatigable; he grappled with old age as his State weathered the onslaught of fascism; his "realism" in political theory aimed at ensuring successful action with lasting results. Yet Masaryk never knew any other than "ethical" ideals, though, of course, legitimately associated with the welfare of his own people; all his long life he had been at bay fighting "Titanism", the "Superman" ideology of all descriptions, the unsound mythologies of national conceit, Czech as well as others. Equally, the new-born Czechoslovak nation reveals heartening, perhaps even exuberant, vitality; all this, however, without a trace of "Life" religion. Enlightened democracy and progress as well as a peaceable pursuit of her normal self-interest, are her only creed. Robust egoism, even if blameworthy and short-sighted at times, has nothing to do with pagan Vitalism. Nevertheless, it would be a gross error to "decipher" German and Nazi life-worship as the impotent dream of people deficient in life-stamina, even in so far only as this may apply to the person of Nietzsche. I should venture at most to say that an enormous vitality is tainted here with a morbid strain of malignant negativism, a mysterious greed for death. The inmost core of the mystery cannot, I fear, be solved in these pages. Some factors may be picked out at random, such as aversion to limits and restraints, proud rebellion against a universal order of human existence, historical tensions on a gigantic scale, the surviving weight of ancestral choices in religious issues, elaborate blind-alleys of barbarism with some false but pithy reason to despise the humdrum highroads of a civilization honeycombed with failures and imperfections. Anyhow, the Germans have very often misunderstood the art of living, albeit they cherish an
unlucky love for life; and unlucky love is likely to be both over-passionate and destructive. To embrace Death is a form of embracing Life, in some way unequalled by any other; and the sons of men must probably try all ways. The ultimate issue is raised between those who accept and serve, who protect and cultivate life to make a good use of it and those who devote their souls and their activities to life as a divine totality, a law unto itself, with its grand rhythm swaying ever into the all-absorbing vortex of death.

6. MALE SUPREMACY AND FEMININE UNDERTONE

The antagonism between the neo-German mind and the spirit of civilization also involves in some way the province of sex. We do not refer here to the code of sexual morality but rather to the general constitution of the relationship between men and women. Civilization, as we understand and in fact live it, is based on a mental superiority and leadership in the male element, women at the same time having full equality of rights, dignity, self-determination and (largely) opportunities. We credit man as the primary initiator and Fashioner of thought, administration and progress, but think it absolutely essential that women should enjoy—or suffer—a practically complete partnership. (I am well aware that this complex topic would require an incomparably more complete and careful treatment; but there is just space to allude to it in a short note.)

In the Nazi mentality we find both prancing "manhood" and "male supremacy", a scarcely veiled contempt for the female, an attitude which we are inclined to think barbarous; and a deeper and more metaphysical undercurrent of feminine atmosphere which at first sight seems to be flatly contradictory, but on further consideration can be regarded as complementary to this barbarity of virile self-consciousness. There is certainly an opposition, but there is also a hidden correspondence between the two opposite poles. The prevalent trend is to pander to male egoism, to drive women out of all sections of public life, to reduce them to the satisfying of male needs and the production of future
soldiers, to glorify the harsh savagery of male warriors as the correct note in a state-grounded “culture”. Yet when this line is at times interrupted by execration of “one-sided male standards” or devotion to the “motherliness of telluric (earthly) Nature”, there is a consonance behind the undeniable contradiction. Neither the “charismatic” love for the Führer, nor the emotional subjectivism of tribal self-worship, nor even—for that matter—the intoxication with the magic of virility are really masculine characteristics. In war-time it is generally observable that the orgies of insane patriotism, as well as of cruel hatred, are rather indulged in by the masses of silly and hysterical women than by real soldiers; and sometimes real soldiers, even though courageous and efficient, resemble infuriated women in their way of thinking rather than paragons of soldierliness. When the bulk of the women are debased to household slaves, a privileged branch of women may, in answer to certain psychological needs, form the guild of hetaerae; or again to satisfy similar needs, men (and, particularly, male youth) may turn into “women” in a certain sense, which need not necessarily imply actual impropriety. We cannot even be sure that a Nazi “civilization” or rather Kultur, after a first period of victorious wars, might not come to develop a more feminine or “matriarchal” system of society hostile to abstract intellect and impartial objectivity, insensitive to the ways of progress, ignorant of higher laws beyond the range of traditions and instincts, and so on.

Excessive “manliness” is preached by Rosenberg among others, whose ethics culminate in the setting up of a code of what he calls “Honour” as against the Christian code of Love, in his eyes “effeminate”. Within the bonds of pagan religiosity, he takes the side of the “solar myth of the North”, suited to a virile conception of existence; he withholds his trust from the “dim forces of the Unconscious”, the worship of the earth, the dreams of a blissful primitiveness, which “may not necessarily have been heroic”. Northern man is certainly a “vitalist”, but no mere particle of “vegetative” nature. A too direct and broad union with Nature does not well agree with racial pride and exclusiveness. Similarly, the “polarity of man and woman” must be respected; “sexual collectivism” is tantamount to “racial confusion”. Man alone conceives and breeds “types”;

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both Matrimony and State are his creation. After these effusions of a stolid and somewhat bourgeois male self-satisfaction, saturated with "heroism" and scented with "mythology", the sombre masculine fanaticism of a more truly scholarly barbarism like Bäumler cannot fail to impress us. There is a touch of genuine grandeur about his confrontation of the stern military system of life, aiming exclusively at the service of State and Power, with the feminine culture of "Urbanity", the civilization of security and "art of life" with woman-worship as its inmost meaning and Paris as its symbol. State, Work and Action stand against the code of Pleasure, the priestess and beneficiary of which is Woman, against Security, Refinement, Charm, or placid scepticism and melancholy. When Bäumler points out that a heroic mode of living is incompatible with the perfection of material culture, his voice rings with a timbre of real manliness. His interpretation of Western civilization is, of course, most vulnerable. High-bred French culture—let alone the general principles of Western society—is more imbued with a peculiar consideration for female values and amenities than feminine in its origin or outlook. There is a difference, sometimes obscured but rather significant, between man's love and tenderness for woman and man's submission to feminine will and standards. I should almost venture to suggest that the legitimate leadership of man is more secure in the system of Western "security" than in the vast warrior camp into which Bäumler would fain transform society, reducing women to half-human child-bearers and servants. There is more danger of a universal triumph of "femininity", of the "chthonic underworld of instincts" becoming dominant, in the faintest surge of bundisch eroticism than in the most effeminate luxuries of godless Paris.

The degradation of woman, in systematic accordance with the State Erotic and "Pedagogic", is most boldly professed in the work of Stefan George and his followers (among the more independent of them, the reader will recall Blüher and Wolters). We only quote, from Benda's critical survey, a line of George: "Woman gives birth to the animal; man creates both man and woman"; and a formula of Wolters: "Man and woman must return to the primal order of generation and conception, of the narrower love-sphere of the mother and comprehensive male domination". However, this "male domination" is very com-
prehensively exercised on more "receptive" males, too. The brutal command that women shall become mere "begetters of men" is accompanied by a suggestion that men shall become as it were sweethearts for "master men". Nor do I dismiss as entirely meaningless the observation that the Tyrant, possessing the "heart" and "soul" of the masses, displays characteristics of the Harlot.

Let us now glance at the "feminist" side. Klages's irrationalism and naturalism, his hostility to "Spirit" and consciousness, his war on civilization, logic and morals, is intimately linked up with his longing for a human existence under "feminine" direction; historically indeed, his philosophy is grafted on to ethnographical and mythological researches into the "matriarchal" state of mankind. It is best expressed by that "mother-earth" symbolism which displeases Rosenberg; however, though I cannot demonstrate it further, Klages appears the more genuine of the two. Subjectivism, race-worship, the rejection of a "spiritual Godhead" as well as of universal standards of thought and conduct, etc., seem to attract us rather to mystical heights of Klagesian anarchy than to Rosenberg's boisterous vulgarities on manhood.

Bergmann, the neo-pagan religious prophet, has been strongly influenced by Klages, but he makes feminism even more his speciality. In his book "Knowledge-Spirit and Mother-Spirit—a Sociosophy of the Sexes", he advances the thesis of a superiority of Woman. He describes the fair sex as creative, productive, "concrete"; bright with tenderness, harmony, and the higher gifts of nature. The male, in his turn, is decried as erring, eccentric, "abstract", instrumental, fanatical, hateful. Doric mothers, Bergmann asserts, were rightly accustomed to expose a number of their new-born sons lest society should be impaired by too large a proportion of males. Whereas man is disposed to excessive sensuality, the love of destruction, resentment and violence, "maternal rule" (Mutterrecht) must be considered the real formative power of society. Bergmann is equally averse to the "andromorphous" philosophy of Rationalism and Idealism, the male deities of Jahveh and Wotan, the commonplace feminist movement which aims at making women the unwomanly citizens of a masculine world. Man nurses a perverse craving for suffering and death; Woman is the depository of
sound and sweet life. The finest flower even of Christian religious sentiment (although Christianity as a whole was an aberration) is to be found in the mystical poetry of medieval German nuns. Man is either a moral pedant or a beast of prey on the pattern of "master morality"; he either obeys duty, utility, or lust; he can never attain the sublimity of "motherly ethics". A new "female religion" with a motherly central deity would do us good. Man is always searching, always coveting something, always thirsty for knowledge; always upsetting the equipoise of nature. "Paternal rule" (Vaterrecht) is an arbitrary construction of civil law, says Bergmann with a disgust that applies as well to civilization in general. On the other hand, there is no need to fear that his woman-worship might beguile him into pacifism; he prides himself on pointing out that warlike nations often obeyed a gynaecocracy, as Sparta, the Mecca of all Nazi thinkers. The natural thing would be a "female state" along with "motherly socialism", with property reserved for women (the national wealth being, as it were, their "extended womb"); the family would exist aside from the relationship of fatherhood, and eugenics would supersede abstract humanitarianism. Bergmann is all for peace, which he holds to be "the mother of all things"; fortunately, this does not hamper him in his opposition to the "Pan-European folly of pacifism", nor in setting his hopes on the idol of militancy (Wehrwille) and the "Teutonic Volksgeist". In his book on "German religion", Bergmann continues to revile the idea of a personal male deity outside nature, the idea of human nature tainted with sin, and the trinitarian godhead of sexless spirituality, praising Nature as the only eternal thing, and the Blessed Virgin (my Catholic readers may suffer with me!) as a "vital (lebenswarm) and ethnical (volksnah) sex deity".

However much the accents vary in their respective proportion, it is yet the same compound of masculine militarism and feminine anarchism that rises up against civilization and spiritual standards. On the whole, I am rather inclined to expect the accomplished paradise of Nazidom to be pervaded by a distinctly more feminine atmosphere than the one obtaining in Western civilization, though the rights of women may be denied even more hastily and thoroughly than the rights of men, and despite the probability that, in the later phases, the trampling of savage
male feet over moral restraints, or the corpses of enemy tribes, will be more audible than the impersonal looming of feminine power in the background. In confirmation of my own conjectures, which may not fully be accepted, I refer to the picture of the contemporary German mind by R. Benz: The rebellion against "Spirit" in the name of "Soul" somehow has a feminine tone; the bankruptcy of "universal Reason" is felt as a failure of the male intellect. "The irrationalism of to-day embodies the striving for a woman-like ("weibhaft") relationship with the world, even where there is a display of man-to-man emotion and warlike attitude."

FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER IV

Karl Polanyi's brilliant essay on the Meaning of Fascism (in Christianity and the Social Revolution) gives an enlightening account of Klages—"Nietzsche without the Superman", and of Spann—"Hegel shorn of his dialectic... the change only serves to increase the reactionary effect".

1 Healthy spirit, i.e. real spirit, will never contradict the totality of blood dispositions: thus Professor Grunsky. Spirit irrespective of Blood, "Spirit-proper", is a product of deterioration. The paramount position of "Blood" also becomes manifest in the following formula by Grunsky: "Blood means the determination of the individual soul by the community; Spirit, the determination of the community by the individual soul". Healthy spirit contents itself with working "on single points" (punktuell).

2 In "Wille und Macht" of December 1st, 1936, an article by "K.E." entitled "The spiritual situation of our time and the elimination of three alien philosophies" declares war impartially against the intellectual International of Mind, the clerical (Pfaffen) International of Soul, and the Marxist International of Matter. Total Man is Mind, Soul and Life alike. Mind, Soul and Body are of equal value between one another, but there is marked inequality between different racial natures. The nefarious Christian doctrine of inequality between Soul (Mind) and Body corresponds to the no less nefarious Christian doctrine of equality between men.

3 Man "takes" woman "for himself" (nimmt sich das Weib); woman "gives herself" to man (Grunsky).
CHAPTER V

FAITH AND THOUGHT

"Religion and Race belong together. German man can only assimilate religious faith and religious thought with a German mind and in a German way. We must not think we can come to God except through our Volk. . . . Wherever our blood rises in protest we act immorally, even though others may try to prove it to be moral."

HANS SCHEMM.

"The German Faith movement poses the question: How far does Christianity agree, how far does it disagree with our Kind?"

PROF. H. SCHWARZ.

1. THE RELATIVITY OF VALUE—THE ABSOLUTENESS OF POWER

"The moral education of the people is incumbent on the State: it has a right to watch over the Church, lest her ministers should teach an unseemly morality, which in its final effects might turn against the State and its power: for instance, pacifism, the ethics of equality, spiritual liberty."


Religion is as dangerous as it is valuable. Nothing can make up for the absence of a Faith; yet even the flattest and coarsest systems of unbelief are vastly preferable to an evil religion. It is certainly a disconcerting and ominous symptom if a man refuses to believe either in God or in the Soul (fashioned by God in His own image), considering himself to be a bundle of animal instincts justified in seeking gratification as best they can.
However, it is incomparably more Satanic and more deleterious to the moral order of the world if a man happens to believe both in God and the Soul, and also believes the Soul to be the attribute of a Tribe or a State, or himself to be God. Equally, a French masonic Radical, though past all explicit belief in God, may have retained much more Christian spiritual substance than a German Romantic bursting with heathen religious fervour, though preserving certain elements of Christian phraseology—nay, of Christian faith. For just as the Mosaic religion is tainted by a narrow and self-seeking spiritual nationalism, as well as by a trivial self-righteousness attached to the correct fulfilment of the Law, Christianity, far surpassing Judaism in breadth, depth and height, contains latent possibilities of an even more final and catastrophic relapse into Heathenism: the religious practice of the Gentiles. The inexhaustible Christian treasure of humility can be distorted into a cowering before mere power; the Christian love of God can be soiled by an erotic interpretation; the Christian idea of an inward communion with God can be disfigured into Pantheism; the Christian encouragement of popular devotion (as opposed to the Mosaic law or to a barren abstract theology) can give way to an ingression of provincial and national Paganism into the prevailing religious practices. In fact, Christianity with its sublime secondary values—moral, metaphysical, aesthetic, and I daresay also political—would soon have been submerged in the barbaric whirlpool of a Gentile world, had it not been for that passionate and oft-derided striving for dogmatic clarity and the maintenance of a right balance between apparently contradictory aspects of the Faith or of piety in its particular manifestations. Again, Protestantism, though re-discovering and exalting some specifically Christian aspects of religion (both Judaic as opposed to Pagan worldliness and sensuality, and supra-Judaic), introduced a variety of new dangers: eccentricity, confusion, disintegration, and eventual paganization. The present-day oppression of the Lutheran Church in Nazi Germany, though it might goad a resurrected Luther into turning Papist or Communist, depends to a large extent on the original Lutheran ideology of religious amoralism, personal bondage beyond the mere "voice of conscience", anticlericalism, and omnipotence belonging of right to the secular authorities over the whole field of human society.
The skeleton of a heathen religion, at least in the sense that concerns us here: in the sense of amoral Pagan mysticism, of political activity burning with the fire of supra-human forces, can be described by the brief formula: Relativity of Value—Absoluteness of Power. There is a hint of this attitude in the Christian heresy known as "Theonomism": the teaching that God does not will the Good because it is good but that whatever God wills is good because God wills it. It requires a tremendous step, yet a step in the same direction, to argue that Caesar is not Caesar by the grace of God but that God is God through Caesar's needing His grace. However, Caesar may still stand for a universal, rational, moral, if earthly order of things. It marks a further progress to debase God into an ethnic household god, a Daemon or Hero of the Tribe, and yet claim him as a representative of awe-inspiring cosmic energies, mysterious and irresistible. The laws of right and wrong, of truth and falsehood, of human understanding and co-operation vary according to the kind of people "We" are; yet "We" and our Kind are absolute in respect to "Us", and to others as far as we come into touch with them and some standard of relationship is needed. God may have different incarnations; but the Flesh itself is sovereign. God is of some value in assisting the Prince; but the Prince prescribes the way in which He is to do it for Him. It is no longer the Majesty of God that solicits our self-denying consideration for our fellow-man; it is rather His omnipotence which impresses us as being embodied in the power of our "Leader". We have little taste for the "abstract fancies" of good or ill, etc., alleged to issue from God; we are rather taken in by the "concrete" unity of goodness and power in God, and piously attempt to imitate that unity by conferring all attributes of goodness upon the most "concrete" local Power that rules us. We are not the "chosen Race" of God like the Jews, jealous, obtrusive, noisy, reminiscent of spoilit dogs; rather do we "breed" God in our Race, "realize" him in our great holders of power who resemble proudly walking beasts of prey, and are overawed by respect for the grandeur in them, yet naively unconscious of any embodiment of power outside and above themselves. Godhead does not become incarnate but rather is absorbed by the tribal Daemon. In spite of some points of contact with Christian mysticism, we are confronted here in the main with a strict counter-religion to
Christianity. For the very essence of the latter is the absolute and universal validity of the moral Call, both in its inwardness and its institutions (in the main confirming, but at the same time decisively purifying and transcending, the Jewish "law"), and, correspondingly, the realization of the merely relative, limited and dependent character of all earthly powers, offices and authorities. The very opposite applies to the Heathenism of State idolatry and racial barbarity. Here, communion with the true Absolute beyond the hierarchy of vital strength and military command is deliberately cut off; divine sanctity is expropriated for the vital treasury of the Race, divine sublimity is hired to give prestige to a particular community.

The title of a paper by Hermann Schwarz, published in "Blätter für deutsche Philosophie", might serve as a brief but expressive motto. It runs: "On the mystery of the unity of God, State and Volk in Greek philosophy". To be sure, the nature of God is relative to "our" State and People, whereas the latter are absolute objects of devotion for each of "us".

Bergmann quotes Niekisch (who was once a Social Democrat, and who still forms a kind of "socialistic" opposition to Hitler): Either a German God, or none at all! The international God of Christendom is a patron of the Treaty of Versailles. "We cannot bend the knee to a God who neglects us for the French." Bergmann himself varies it a little more eloquently: "The God of Christendom has forsaken us Germans. He is no just God, no supra-national God; he is a political Party God of the Others. The cause of our defeat in the great fight was that we had believed in him and abandoned our German God (Deutschgott). For the Deutschgott was the secret of our force, of our vital tenacity.... We are in possession of the only true and right religion, wherefore we, just we (eben wir) call it German religion (Deutschreligion)."

The reader should note the persecution mania indicated by the phrase "Party God of the Others", as well as the grammar of megalomaniac subjectivism which inspires such terminology as Deutschgott and Deutschreligion. For a painful moment let him stretch his imagination and try to extend the idea of the "Established Church" or of "Anglo-Catholicism" to that of an "Anglo God". Again, we read in Stapel, a Christian Nazi, a passage in conformity with his doctrine discussed in Chapter I. "Religion is a revelation of the living God. God reveals Himself
Jew-like in the Jew, German-like in the German. . . . The Jesus and the Virgin Mary of the Germans are Germans." Similarly is moral law " differentiated according to the nations ". Naturally, who could be a warmer defender than Haiser of the " relativity of moral laws ". " Monism " (by which he means universalism) or a striving for general reconciliation are " signs of decay ". A young buoyant race " does not believe in the God, only in national gods ". Yet this relativity of the Things above us takes nothing away from the absoluteness of the duty of self-sacrifice incumbent on the individual. " Stand by your particular essence with your last drop of blood! " Thus I must be a sceptic to Truth but must place implicit faith in the Lie that hangs above me. But in an inexplicable way, the " racial souls " converge in the Absolute, of which man as a mere individual (except Haiser himself) must have no direct knowledge; this is a " mystery of creation ". At any rate, " no error is possible where the racial soul dictates " . The highest Judge on earth is the Power which happens to be greatest and whoever affects to stand above it is guilty of " obstructing the perfect collocation and concentration of power ". To put it more explicitly, if it be possible : " Religion is peculiar to the group; its highest offices should rest with the Chief of the group. " Rosenberg writes in the same spirit : All churches pretend that man is like his creed. Our " Northern European profession of faith ", however, maintains that the creed is like the man. We may repeat from Chapter I that, according to this outlook, there is no objective truth, no reason with a universal appeal, no fixed dogma, and above all, no teachable morality; beliefs and conduct have no significance other than as an index of racial value.

Hielscher's great formula of Pagan religious fervour, the " identity of Inwardness and Power ", may be recalled at this stage; and the " New Kingdom " of Stefan George, as formulated by E. J. Jung : " the Empire in which God and Body (!), Spirit and Power, Virtue and Beauty are again one ". A reader of indomitable benevolence might raise the question whether this does not fairly cover the Christian idea of the Kingdom of God. The answer is that it covers the exact opposite. The Christian idea implies the miraculous incarnation of God in the body of the unique Man called Christ, not the happy coincidence of Godhead with the Perfect Body; the tension between spirit and power in
man, precisely through their separation from the Spirit and Power singularly united in God; the beauty of virtue, not the equivalence of virtue and beauty. There is a difference, slight on the surface but of great consequence, between the Kingdom of God and the Godship of the King.

Bäumler opposes a "system of reality" to the "system of absoluteness". Nothing is above the powers present; yet the latter claim absolute devotion and blind obedience as their due. The sunken Liberal epoch had a completely false idea of "spirituality", of values with an intrinsic, material and universal appeal, as we should put it. A spiritual attitude, Bäumler explains, by no means consists in being occupied with spiritual values, in thinking, criticizing, striving for objective truth and justice, as we might identify it. Rather does it consist in being "spiritually determined in one's existence", or "devoting in fact one's whole existence to a great end". Observe that there is no question even of understanding that end: nor is there any allusion to what kind of an end it must be, apart from the empty postulate of its "greatness".

Lastly, it would be unfair to pass over the fact that the cult of relativity is largely a product of that complacent hedonism and sophistication which is more at home in the habitat of an over-refined Left intelligentsia. There is a curious and unnatural but effective division of labour between the man who denies that anything is absolute and the man who says that he himself is absolute—closely analogous to the division of labour between the non-violent Pacifist and the Bully. The Left Intellectual has taken upon himself the merciless task of exposing the relativity of all values, standards and rules including even those he is most inclined to credit, supplementing it by a secret longing for an unproblematic absoluteness beyond all doubt, criticism or reserve. The Right "Superman" picks up the thread, and gathers the profits of the argument, loudly trumpeting into the public ear the unquestionable and invincible validity of his pretensions, whilst tacitly or with a matter-of-fact cynicism he bases his cause on the axiom of universal relativity, and fills the vacuum which cries for redemption with insolent self-assertion. For in a corner of his heart, the "master man" is an anarchist; and the sceptical free-thinker, as weary of his own principle as he is obstinate in keeping it "pure", clings to the liberty of choosing
unfreedom. The German intellect, disposed to undisciplined roaming and languid inactivity, enamoured of Life and unaccustomed to its control, has long evinced an inclination for this abstract radicalism, so preparing the way for wholesale surrender. The pre-Nazi Republican German’s devotion to relativity and indiscriminate sympathy has found a caustic commentator in Mowrer. “Interpretation of Constitution ‘according to the situation’, without realizing that thereby all law was destroyed . . . ‘commercial morals’ not binding in a historical crisis . . . he erected his instability and thirst for change into general norms that were bound to seem barbaric to less dynamic peoples”. This is an even more basic passage: “For most cultured Germans are so proud with historical relativity that they deny the existence of any ‘absolutely’ higher forms. Each people, they believe, has a right to its own peculiar culture, and no one can be ranked ‘above’ another; they are merely different”. Therefore, it remains to be added, “We” are at liberty to consider ourselves as unconditionally superior, indeed the Salt of the Earth; not on the ground of a Standard we have managed to answer, but because there is no such Standard by the test of which Our pretension could be rebutted.

2. THE NEW PAGANISM

“We know that a genuine outlook on life cannot confine its expression to theoretical principles, or confessions of the soul, but that it must assume a form of cult.”

A. Rosenberg (“Ordensstaat”).

“National Religion means our oneness in relation to a certain terrestrial mode of living. National Church means the State, sustained by a metaphysical faith.”

H. Bäcker.

“Christianity has offered promises of happiness to the materially and spiritually poor, the cripples of body and soul,
the slaves and weaklings; it has heaped menaces upon the rich, the strong, the free, the healthy. It has preached the equality of men, at all their stages of evolution, before God, and thus invested the dull masses with a control over the ingenious, strong and proud individuals."

BARON E. WOLZGEN.

Sin can only be conquered by the Devil himself. . . . We say with Nietzsche: "Turn evil! . . . Evil life must be lived in an evil way. Christians will never subdue the Jew and his empire". Christianity is guilty of having estranged the Master Man from himself, and denounced as sin the noble height of his morality. We have no use for the Christian God; we are in need of a mighty, severe and stormy God. "Only Wotan, foaming with rage, can fight Jahveh!!" Nor does the Moloch ritual really merit contempt, for a genuine Deity wants man to be sacrificed to it. "Back to harshness!" The experienced reader may have realized by now that he is again digesting Haiser. Unfortunately, this hardy Teuton does not pause at the disheartening fact that his cherished Moloch was a dirty commercial Semite; still less is it clear why harsh Jahveh should be fought by an even harsher divine figure, seeing that harshness is not really bad at all. We suspect that the reason why Jahveh is objected to is rather that he is not harsh enough; and that the fault with the Christian God is not so much his alleged military insufficiency in dealing with Jahveh but rather his partial identity with the latter in the sense of insufficient "harshness". Yet Haiser, though always amusing, is seldom merely ridiculous. There is a great illustrative power, a touch of masterly intuition, in the Moloch simile: "for a genuine Deity wants man to be sacrificed to it". . . . Indeed, the new Paganism marks—as contrasted to Christianity—less of religion in one sense, but at the same time intensification of religious feeling in another sense. The material object of religion, the divine thing, is certainly coarsened and made earthly, it is divested of its proper sublimity; yet the formal motive of irrational devotion to a "Power" raising an indisputable claim on man is as doubtlessly strengthened. The Pagan tide may hasten the process of religious decay in a world of anaemic routine Christianity; yet in a sense it may fill the life of that society with an even greater religious potency, however false and barbarous.
Whereas some Nazis, as political reactionaries generally find themselves inclined or compelled to do, prefer to exhibit their loyalty to Christianity (interpreted so as to suit their aims), the more radical and theoretical among them openly object to Christianity in its prevailing form or in its very essence. They mostly do so under the sign of an "ancient Teutonic" (altgermanisch) outlook on life said to be superior or at any rate inseparable from Germanic self-expression and vital efficacy. On July 9th, 1935, Herr Ley, Leader of the "German Front of Labour", depicted in a great public speech the unbridgeable gulf yawning between the Nazi pioneers of German renascence and those who base the justification of their existence on sin, penitence, "negation of life", and the "inferiority and pitiable-ness of men". He pointed out that German social policy is governed by the ideal of "justice and honour", not of compassion; of "eternal struggle", not of peace. "We must not sacrifice the strong to the weak". This is undoubtedly the proper philosophical war-music for the actual campaign that is being carried on—allegedly, on a merely political ground—against the Christian Churches and their clergy (Pfaffen) of both denominations. We stumble against similar arguments when perusing the works of the neo-German Pagan beaux esprits. Thus Helbing charges Christianity with being responsible for the decay of marriage in modern society, since it was the mischievous influence of Christian doctrines which caused us to veer round and stop seeing in marriage the "blood-foundation for the future of the State". For Christianity, hailing from "the East", labours under a "twisted attitude towards Body (Leib) and Nature". Its outlook is wrong, because "it is determined, not by the variety of vital forces converging into Body and State, creating and again destroying the latter and attaining their apotheosis in the Great Man, but by the relationship of fallen man, cloven into body (Körper) and soul, reason and belief, matter and spirit, with a spiritual extramundane Godhead". The notion of such a Deity is particularly repugnant to Klages, if only because it may imply stable standards for the direction of our judgments and actions. He would admit no personal God (writes Leese), "only impersonal, daemonic powers of an 'It' character (Es-Mächte), unstable and transitory like the formation and play of the clouds". In "Man and Earth", Klages flings a number of
accusations at the Christian religion. First of all, "it is in Christianity that the proximate causes of 'Progress' in universal history are rooted." Far be it from us to contest the truth of this accusation, which, in our judgment, is more an encomium. We next learn that the thing that calls itself Christian love is not real love at all, since it does not correspond to "Eros" in fact, it is merely a decorous euphemism for respect (Achtung). It may strike us as surprising that respect is such a wicked feeling that it requires a veiled name for the sake of decency. Incidentally, the fact of the matter is that Christian love amounts to far more than mere dry respect or considerateness; only Klages is incapable of imagining a kind of love compatible, and linked up, with respect and the honour due to dignity. But why is his anger stirred so strongly by respect? The reason is that respect is essentially offered to man alone, not to the whole of Nature; indeed, man is kept "in a godlike opposition to Nature in her totality". Extra-human life is counted valueless unless it serves man. Christianity, in setting up a soulless and monomaniac standard of self-righteous morality, proclaiming the divinity of the "Spirit", and persecuting polytheism, fosters a mentality which in its final phase is called Capitalism or Mammonism. For in the monotheistic and moralistic school of Christianity man becomes a hard, one-sided rationalist and individualist, an abstract unit of calculating, utilitarian, acquisitive consciousness. (A rather distorted picture, which still shows some traces of the real greatness of the Christian faith as a cornerstone of personality and an incentive to civilization).

If there is any truth in Rosenberg's philosophizing on religion, the experience of Sin must be accounted for as an accompaniment of physical bastardization, of racial disgrace engendering twisted characters, lack of direction, mental insecurity. The legend of "Christos" embodied the hope of slave ringleaders eager to achieve emancipation. St. Paul planned a "world revolution" in order to overthrow the Roman Empire; in spite of his abandonment of the old faith, he continued to act on behalf of Jewry. The Ten (or Nine) Commandments were mere paradoxical exaggerations of "old Aryan" morality. In the Gospel of St. John, as well as in the Gnostic speculation of Marcion and others, an aristocratic spirit and a nobler Germanic type of devotion directed towards achieving cosmic grandeur rather
than fulfilling the arbitrary will of the divine Personality are struggling on against the Judaic, proletarian, Oriental elements (!) of Christianity. The inner strife of the first few Christian centuries reveals different racial souls at war with each other. The "abstract spiritualism" of Christianity irritates Rosenberg most. He calls it a "raceless power", a contradiction to organic life, the corollary of an indiscriminate treatment of races (St. Paul: neither Jew nor Greek, neither freeman nor slave), a reflexion of the foul magic of Asia Minor, Syria and Africa. The Christian emphasis on objective "belief" in Christ and the dogmas accessible to all is again a mark of indifference to the actual creative forces of a superior race. The Christian ideal of cheap indiscriminate "Love" (very imperfectly realized, for that matter, in the clerical practice), as contrasted to the aristocratic, exacting, "typebreeding" Teutonic ideal of "Honour", overflows with the same plebeian vulgarity. Now whom are we to believe, Rosenberg or Klages? Is Christian love wrong because it is love instead of honour, or is it wrong because it is respect, which comes next to honour, rather than love? There is no reason why the divers luminaries of Nazi Paganism should agree on all points; but the contradiction is not so vexing after all. The Viking world envisioned by Rosenberg is certainly not equivalent to the Klagesian paradise of a feminized and animalized mankind; yet in that repellent superstition called "Christian love" they both attack the same thing. What they both refuse to countenance is the idea of the fundamental dignity and self-purposefulness of all men as men, as rational beings created by God in His own image on a plan of mutuality, conscious community and universal solidarity. For "honour" as conceived by Rosenberg, the fighting recklessness of adventurous tribal warriors, is just about as much a caricature of the true moral idea of honour as "love" in the sub-conscious sexual sense of Klages is of the true spiritual idea of love.

We know that Rosenberg owes the main trend of his philosophy to Houston Stewart Chamberlain; only Chamberlain represented an earlier stage of neo-Teutonist thought, being as yet embedded in the apparently self-justifying system of European culture. He had called himself emphatically the "real" Christian, proposing to purify Christianity rather than to suppress it, and endeavouring to deduce Christianity as a
product of the Aryan racial genius rather than to oppose them. Both the primacy of race, the repudiation of the rational clarity of fixed tenets as an "Oriental abstraction" and a "Jewish admixture", and the plea for a "Teutonic" religion, are derived from Chamberlain. He demands the restitution of a "genuine deutsch-christlich religion, a new Christianity purged of foreign (!) rubbish, a union of all Teutonic mankind (uns Germanen alle) in brotherhood of blood, precisely by the ties of religion". Chamberlain's stigmatization of "Rome" (that is, the Catholic Church, and especially Popery and the Jesuits) as an intrinsically anti-Christian and yet dominating element in Christendom as it is, is re-echoed, among others, by a whole-hearted enemy of Christianity like Bergmann.

As for the restored "Germanic religion" intended to overgrow or entirely to supersed Christianity, it is represented by a variety of prophets and schools with rather different contents, but with certain common characteristics. A scale of increasing radicalism extends from the "German Christians" who are in control of the official Protestant Church, over the "German Church" (Deutschkirche) which still preserves some Christian doctrines held to be un-Jewish, up to Hermann Wirth ("Archi-religion", Urreligion), Hauer (German Religious Movement), Dinter, Bergmann, Reventlow, General Ludendorff and his wife, the Ludendorffs evincing the most implacable and grotesque hatred of Christianity. The general trend comprises a breach with all Roman Catholic and all Jewish aspects of Christianity, especially the Old Testament; the espousal of a soi-disant Teutonic morality of straightforwardness, outspokenness and mainly pride in contradistinction to Christian compunction, "wretchedness", "hypocrisy" and distrust of life; a Pagan turn of nature-worship and cosmic pantheism opposed to the "Jewish bondage to law" and "Jahvisn". In the Künnethe anthology we find a treatise by J. von Walter on "Teutonic religion and Christian morality" which rather openly demonstrates that the alleged moral superiority of the "Teutonic forefathers" was all rubbish. Teutonic religion was a religion of nature, not of morality, be it only in the sense of a morally accentuated polytheism. On that account, we must indeed look upon the introduction of Christianity as the invasion of an essentially foreign (artenfremd) principle. Violence, blood vengeance,
tribal feuds were the regular forms in which Teutonic society lived. The axiom “Everybody may do what he has sufficient power to do” was largely prevalent. The victory of Christianity was to a great extent due to its evident moral and intellectual advantages; though for many centuries a certain cleavage between religion and pure morality subsisted as a Pagan relic in Germanic Christendom. (Nor do we assume that this blot on the average Christian psychology has entirely disappeared yet). In the same volume, H. Gloege presents the creeds of the Deutschkirche and of Hermann Wirth. The Deutschkirche professes “to seek God in a German fashion and to help our fellow-nationals to help Him”. Jesus appears, “in German interpretation,” as a Hero, a Leader . . . German mythology, German paragons, German Bible . . . popular (volksvertraut) Church . . . Jesus as a Fultrui (full true), a “comrade in life” . . . Jesus as an Aryan who stands and suffers for truth . . . true Christianity is an un-Jewish, a German Christianity . . . Wirth, too, is quick in recognizing in the Jesus-phenomenon “the awakening of a Nordic spiritual germ-substance”. In general, he indulges in a non-historical cosmic mythology of Nature. Matter is eternal; Nature, the abundance of eternal life . . . The Teutonic moral constitution was characterized (1) by tribal solidarity (2) by a sense of responsibility for one’s actions . . . the world, a battleground for Will and Power . . . Struggle, the basic value in existence . . . Sin (or rather Injury) and Salvation have their real meaning in the biological sphere . . . responsibility both for our ancestors and our progeny. . . . Hauer’s Deutschglaube makes a point of eliminating the superfluous figure of a Saviour. For “man of a German belief is aware of his affinity to God”.

We can extract from Murner’s valuable Nazispiegel the truthful observation that the “Wotanistic” spirit of National-Socialism is in no wise a startling novelty but rather the apocalypse of the Prussian evolution, the driving power of which has invariably been Pagan. An anti-European Pagan daemonism underlies both the progressive rationalism of Frederick the Great and the conservative Protestantism of Bismarck. We quote further from Nazispiegel the ingenious revision of Christian ethics achieved by Professor G. Stark, who only accepts “love of one’s neighbour” (Nächstenliebe, amour du prochain) on the
understanding that "neighbour". (der Nächste) means one's co-national of the same blood. Or, as Dr. Goebbels—the finest orator in all Nazidom, and the most cunning brain of the Third Empire—impressively puts it: "Love thy fellow-man (Nächsten) as thyself! Now my fellowman is one of my nationality and blood. I cannot love him unless I hate his enemies."

Count Reventlow dislikes above all the un-metaphysical homeliness of Jewish monotheism. The Aryan, that visionary metaphysician, can only conceive God as an "All-Being". The personal form of Deity is a déclassé humanization. Doubtless to this type of mind a shoal of wandering herrings, for instance, or a huge waterfall, appear more "sublime" than human intellect, or the rational handling of objects. What is Jahveh but an old Jew on a large scale? The Christian dogma of free grace originates in the Jewish idea of surcease of punishment; the forgiveness of sins in juxtaposition to Sansara and Karma, the slow but inspiring amortization of moral debt, gratifies Jewish calculation of gain. On the other hand, the irrelevance of earthly life, the belief in supernatural reality, the conception of a gradual purification and the idea of timeless eternity, as far as they figure in Christianity, must be looked upon as un-Jewish Pagan admixtures. The exponents of official Christianity may feel in a way ashamed at being caught slighting the lofty "irrelevance of earthly life" by Reventlow; however, as he also expatiates on the "compound of Good and Evil in Wotan" and on the world originating "in Good and Evil at the same time", the suspicion is overwhelming that the "irrelevance of earthly life" is in fact employed to prepare us for the far more practical irrelevance of morality. We learn that Wotan is a "suffering half-god"; whereas God as the "supreme reality" according to ancient Aryan views and Ekkehard the heretical mystic, "transcends Good and Evil". Divine holiness is too unworldly to be linked to goodness, reason, compassion, humility, or good works. Let us hope that no truly metaphysical and pious Aryan or Teuton will stoop to bother about such sham values of Philistine worldliness. Further, Reventlow proudly takes his stand on the "unreality of Space and Time" deeply rooted in germanische Weltanschauung. Such verbiage is almost sure to strike us as the airy boasting of reckless aggressors who find it convenient to ridicule the moral indignation of the victims and of
the witnesses of their actions. Needless to say, the creed of Reventlow excludes the freedom of the will and exalts the pre-science of fate. The latter is fully compatible with an "inner urge (Drang) to do one's utmost", which must not be confused with "duty". No doubt natural forces are divine, and natural forces are also at work in the human breast. "Righteousness", "mercy" or "duty" are paltry things, mere masks of Jewish materialism, not supernatural enough. Only what is entirely natural, a blind "urge", irrespective of measures and reflections, is sufficiently "metaphysical". It is again the old Pagan trick of outdoing Christian immateriality, detachment and asceticism, the tale of the Superman whose phantom announces that man is on the highway to bestiality.

Professor Bergmann hopes that the National Revolution will "turn out to be the beginning of a second and greater Reformation". Christianity ought to be gradually replaced by German National Religion (Deutschreligion). "How can a nation develop normally and sanely whose religion is not proper to its kind (arteigen), not native (landgeboren), and on whose soul a foreign religion (Fremdreligion) is imposed? It lives oppressed and enslaved, as though under a foreign political rule. Indeed it is more hardly used even than if its land were occupied by enemy troops." "How can a nation attain leadership (zum Führervolk werden), when the holy places of its religion do not lie in its own country? When it is compelled to venerate a holy Sepulchre in a far-off land?" Missionary work is quite out of place, since it is "ungodly" to force upon a people a God other than the one sprung from its heart. Such a practice is "immoral, for it is against nature". Religion is a paideuma (a growth, a product of evolution helped by education), a fruit of the soil like habits and customs, or the colour of the skin (!). Christianity tends to destroy such notions as "true-to-type" or "autochthonous" (artecht, landgeboren, blutsecht), superseding them by an "international" kingdom of God. "It is hard upon a nation to be forced to surrender its inmost soul and its entire past to hell." Woe upon you, wretched Italians, maimed French, oppressed Spaniards, stunted English, miserable Swedes! Nerveless helots, nondescript slaves of a foreign God, indiscriminately clinging to a Holy Tomb in exotic Palestine! Again, you poor mediocre kings and craftsmen, thinkers and builders of Christian
Gennandom, shadowy epigoni of your autochthonous Teutonic ancestry, which was still unspoilt by the crippling poison from the East! Yet perhaps Bergmann means that the position of a great nation among the other Western nations is not adequate for Germany, the presumptive Führervolk; perhaps what is wrong with Christianity is less that it is too Palestinian than that it is too Italian, too Spanish, too French, too English, too Scotch, too Dutch, too Slavonic, possibly too Austrian and Bavarian. I should suggest different dogmas and rituals for Hamburg and Munich, for the Palatinate and East Prussia, considering the appreciable difference in climate, soil, food products, and racial stocks in the anthropological sense. Or is it fair to force the same God upon Brunswick sausages and Viennese cutlets? Can he grow at once from the heart of a blond Northern sailor and a black Alpine innkeeper? An immoral pretension, for it is contrary to nature.

I will add some further extracts from Bergmann which owing to their vividness will, I hope, impress rather than tire the reader. "A nation which in the great struggle of nations that is coming either thinks that it is possible to dispense with religion and church altogether, or abides by a religion and church that are not the supreme expression of its will and endeavour, will lose that struggle.... We need a Faith that prays to a National God, not an international God of reward and punishment". The Protestant Church of to-day is a cold, dull vacuum, whereas on the Catholic side the Virgin Mary and the Saints are at least "heartwarm popular deities". The State should neither patronize an international nor countenance a free Church. "A nation which destroys its Church or, worse still, suffers her to exist unreformed in its midst, releases its hold over the most effective means of directing and educating the popular soul". The morbid Christian ideas of human debility, sin, penitence and grace must be wiped out for ever. All great and noble deeds in our history have been accomplished without the assistance of either God or Church. "Did this God, for one thing, prevent the War? Did he prevent the Treaty of Versailles? Then what reason have we to build our Church on him?" "We are willing to cast God out of our Church. But we will not lose the Church. Not our Church. Not the German National Church." A church which is built upon "conscience" is lifeless and doomed to
failure, for "conscience" is akin to "science" and ethics. That is why Protestantism has proved unable to prosper, though it made a meek attempt to reconstruct Nordic-German religion. Not "God" but the psychological experience of a divine power in man is the primary thing. We are under the "moral obligation to clear away at long last the venerable debris of the belief in God, in a world to come, and in salvation. There is some value, however, in the general idea of "Christ". Only we must completely give up the superstition that man is a sinner, a scapegoat; and "work out a faith in which we are ourselves Christ". Besides, a good half of all "sins" in the Christian sense consists of the manifestations of sex, which, "being natural processes in the sphere of biology, are, properly speaking, the holiest thing in life". (Here a diversion on temporary marriage and the restoration of matriarchal family is inserted.) "We do not want to save man; we want to ennoble him". We propose to breed men of "purer ethics", of a "more natural religious life", "the Mirthful Man who does not suffer under life".

In a word, we need a German Renaissance, of which the home can be Germany alone. Indeed, we are witnessing to-day an immense turning of the tide, a "Yule-Night of Germany Spiritual", a "rapid return of the German spirit to itself and its historical foundations". There is a spreading interest in primitive history... runic alphabets... ideogrammatic alphabets... solar alphabets... divers ancient variations of the Cross model, all of them more or less similar to the Swastika... Atlantic religion... solar religion... religion of Nature... the scanty life of Nordic stone-age man in close intimacy with Nature... Atlantic original idea of "Christ"... the Passion meaning the dismal pre-Yulic season (November and December)... Christ being a Natural Saviour, re-born in the womb of Mother-Earth... He is not a Redeemer of the world, for the world is in no need of redemption. Nordic mythology does not regard man as fallen, or estranged from God, or damned; old age and death are not punishments. The Saviour is not a Redeemer, he is a Healer or "Un-cumberer" (Entkiimmerer, Ontcommere). No original sin, no original guilt is believed in. "The pure, divine world is immaculate". The new Church will dispense with dogmas, priests (Pfaffen), sacramental magic; but she will have religious "figures" (Gestalten), and preserve the
dim instinctive knowledge of a Northern home of the soul "where life does not cause man to suffer". On the other hand, the invention of a transcendent world (Jenseitsland) "marks a pathological phenomenon in historical man from which prehistoric man was still free. Only the schizophrenic mind doubles the world". "No brave man waits for another life"; lunacy of this kind is a symptom of degeneration. (Possibly, together with morals, civilization, the paternal family, the rights of man, the ideal of objective reasoning, and other such impositions on the "one and unspoilt" circuit of nature!) We adore a Man-God instead of the God of a second world. "Nordic men! Heroic men!... Man is man's relish." There is no need to recall Blüher, since "man" stands here for the German Mensch, not Mann. But is it not a more arbitrary act of a "schizophrenic mind" to split mankind into "Nordic" and "non-Nordic" (as fundamental, religious categories!) than to split it into animal and spiritual, natural and divine, instinctive and rational, etc.?

Time and again, Bergmann seems to stray into the vicinity of rationalistic free-thinking; however, there is on the whole no mistaking the streak of paganism that distinguishes him from the secularized Christianity of liberal and socialistic progress. Thus he writes that there are no truths in knowledge; but he marks out as one of them the "true certitude of salvation (Heilsgewissheit), that is, a solid knowledge of salvation (Wissen um des Heil)". The carefully defined and delimited dogmas of Christian consent and theological speculation are replaced, not by scientific discipline of mind, but by the irrational rule of misty sentiments and moods of tribal self-flattery. In conclusion, Bergmann obliges us with some precious revelations. We must not for a moment presume that his abhorrence of "dogmas" and the "clergy" has any reference to religious liberty; for he holds up for discussion the following proposal for modifying the Imperial Constitution: The Church is State Church; the Head of the Empire is also her Head. The clergy are state officials. Germano-Religion is State Religion. "Neither private religious associations nor religious societies exist". Within the State Church, though, he promises liberty of faith and conscience. How can this be conceived? We may conjecture that the flock placed under the Imperial Shepherd will be free to believe in a dozen
gods as well as in no god at all, whereas they will be strictly compelled to believe that the Deity is of Nordic stock and German character, and that any kind of behaviour calculated to impair the fighting capacity of the German army would be an act of metaphysical irreverence. “Our Volk must receive one religion, proper to its kind, so that the formula may assume validity: one Volk, one Faith, one God, one Church: the Deutschkirche.” The elite of Nazi Youth, the finest combative elements of the S.A., are rife with hatred of Christianity, and are “waiting the moment when a sweeping storm, a powerful movement of Volk and Youth, will blow away whatever is not arteigen German belief”. The National Revolution has only preserved the Christian confessions for reasons of political tactics. The end of the period of transition will be brought about at the consummation of the National Upheaval. This will come to pass as soon as it is evident that “the gratification of spiritual Germany by means of compromises has become impracticable”. In the meantime, our prophets and propagandists have to clear the field of “those modern theorists who cherish the foolish idea that Christianity and Nationalism are consistent one with the other.”

Never has a thesis been proclaimed which meets with our more hearty approval than this condemnation issued by Bergmann. We happen to differ as to which side to take, but we perfectly agree on the mutual relationship between the Cross and the Crooked Counter-Cross.

### 3. CHRISTIANITY HEATHENIZED

“Religion comes before the State, but the State comes before the Church.”

G. Leibbrandt (of the Spann School).

“Unlike Catholics and Calvinists, the Lutheran Christian will always side with the State when there is a question of imposing discipline on the recalcitrant Subject.”

H. Marr.
"The captious emphasis laid on the 'liberty of the Church', imperceptibly slipping over to the 'value of Liberty', is calculated to make the Church a haunt of all treasonable elements . . . a Church devoid of the State and thrown upon mass favour would be used by the masses as a concessioned gathering-place for rebellion."

W. Stapel.

Many Nazis, from tradition or for tactical purposes or merely through intellectual confusion, still cling to Christianity in some form or other. Instead of the frank anti-Christian Gentilism of their more advanced comrades, they profess Pagan amoralism and worship of Power and Self under a more or less transparent Christian cover. Such abuse is rendered possible by those implications of the Christian faith which can superficially be expounded as a Pagan ecstasy or morose worldliness. The attempt to heathenize Christianity can start from three points in its fabric. (1) The Christian religion achieved a revulsion from Judaism (as a national community with a religious privilege) to world-wide humanity, which means, to the "Gentiles" in general. To this point the blasphemous idea can be attached that Christianity aims at a confirmation and rehabilitation of divers "national", "ethnic", "local" forms of devotion and morals as opposed to the "intolerant Monism" of the one Jewish form. The Christianity of the "Gentiles" contends that all peoples except the Jews are "chosen", which is only conceivable if each race poses as the chosen one to its own members. As we see it, the Jewish community was the amazing self-contradictory example of an anti-tribal Tribe, the inhumanly narrow nucleus of a future humanitarian universalism; whereas Christianity came actually to create mankind as a unity in the love of God, governed by His justice and reason. Yet the survivors and new prophets of Gentilism are determined to give a different, indeed an opposite, meaning to the abandonment of Jahvisms: the mystical inner discord and tension of the anti-tribal Tribe must simply disappear in favour of a wholesale restoration of undisturbed idolatrous tribalism throughout the world. Christ, as some Gnostics immediately suggested, has come, not to reconcile and adjust all peoples to the One God of Creation and Moral Law, but to rescue them from the pressure of His demands and
pretensions. This line is taken especially by writers of Lutheran origin, but sometimes also by such as call themselves Catholic. Incidentally, the deviation to which Calvinists are more prone consists in their claiming for their own nation the privilege of a "chosen race", not in the Pagan but in the Jewish monotheistic, moral sense, and in looking down upon others as "Gentiles" and "the lesser breeds without the Law"—to quote Kipling’s "Recessional". (2) Parallel to the abandonment of God’s own consecrated and moral Tribe, the kingless people governed by divine law, Christianity also introduced a partially altered code of morals: less rigid and juridical, less narrow and imperious, more conscious of the multiplicity and interdependence of values, loosened from the historical and ritual traditions of a local community, and above all, less easily applicable in terms of "correct accomplishment" and "transgression". In some branches of Christian thought, especially in Lutheranism, this perfection of morality has become more or less distorted into its negation. No law of moral conduct, no objective canon of "goodness" receives credit; there remains only "mere faith in the Saviour", or the sovereign decision of individual conscience, or—and this is the important point—the sovereign moral competence of secular authorities as a substitute and an expedient for the practical needs of man, whose earthly existence is invariably and irrevocably tarnished with sin and must be wielded accordingly. This backroad to Paganism is naturally reserved for Protestants, whose conceptions of the Church oscillate between the notion of an unorganized, inarticulate, purely spiritual community of souls, and the notion of a social body destined to secure the exercise of authority to Princes and Squires. (3) Finally, there are some well-known links between Christianity, particularly as an organized Church with established power and property interests, and a conservative attitude in politics, which may even end in connivance between certain branches of Christian opinion and a Totalitarian Fascist State. What we have in mind is (a) the tension between the religious emphasis on transcendent salvation, associated with quiet resignation to earthly conditions and their improvement, and the spirit of social progress, always suspect as desiring to build the kingdom of God "on earth"; (b) the clerical principle of an established authority, visible and incorporated in a
system of worldly power, claiming to rule unchecked and uncriticized "from below"; (c) the medieval conception of society as a structure of "corporations" in which the individual is subordinated to the "Whole". These connecting points appeal to the Catholic rather than to the Protestant mind; nor can it be denied that the Catholic Church has generally shown all too great an inclination to be hand-in-glove with monarchical absolutism, with social aristocracy, and recently even with totalitarian fascism. However, it has also been often enough manifest—especially in the latter case—that this alliance had about it an air of temporary truce, of outward compromise, perhaps even of ambiguity. Catholic Christianity, however it may condemn subversive or Utopian plans of the Left, is also naturally driven to oppose the confusion between secular and divine power and authority, as well as to uphold moral standards by which social powers of all descriptions are to be judged. But if conservative Catholicism has its problematic sides, if fascist Catholicism labours under an incurable inner schism, then certainly Nazi Catholicism is a paradoxical freak from its creation and, at present, a most pitiful spectacle, adrift as it is amongst the roaring waves of Kulturkampf spreading all over the Third Empire.

Houston Stewart Chamberlain is the first modern sponsor of a re-heathenized "Aryan" Christianity purged from its Jewish constituents. He held that Christianity represented the coalescence of two fundamentally different materials: on the one hand, "Indo-European symbolical and metaphysical mythology"; on the other hand, "Jewish belief based on history and chronology", to which, during the course of evolution of Church dogmatics, the "speculations of a raceless and irreligious chaos of nations" adhered. Seeing that Chamberlain repudiates all dogmatic and—as it were—juridical definitions, it is hard to tell what "Christianity" as adapted to his taste would look like; taken all in all, we may suppose that it would mean simply a resurrected Teutonic mythology, fused with the more reactionary aspects of medieval and romantic Christendom, and rendered rather vague and tame through being to some extent still in keeping with the aesthetic traditions of western civilization. For Chamberlain, the William II of the spiritual sphere, was as yet a cautious and groping seer of the new Paganism, a
timid and uncertain herald of rising barbarism. A study by Blüher reveals more dazzling hues. Christianity, a fine aristocratic adventure in so far as it is confined to the appearance and the personal effect of Christ, was "from the beginning corrupted by the Secondary Race and falsified by the remnants of Judaism out of which it had arisen". For it continued to understand Revelation in the Jewish sense, as a contract with Jahveh (in spite of softenings and complications), and it abode by the religious appreciation of morality as opposed to the grandeur of pure magic, including an attention to earthly welfare. Christianity was prevented from becoming a true religion of salvation, for it had refused to break with the Jewish conception of a religion of justice, a religion compatible with many partial truths, but necessarily leading away from "healing truth". This can only descend on a field purged of the heresies of free will, moral reward, rational compensation, etc. The orthodox Christian morality of charity, too, is entirely un-Christian in the original sense. Charity may have been a personal feature of Christ, as was cruelty on other occasions (the treachery of Judas was not only foreseen but actually inspired by Christ himself; by his own choice, he picked Judas to be a traitor); his doctrine was never charity but just the arbitrary working of the divine substance in a noble breed of men. The "law of charity" was, and still is, a Jewish doctrine; when Christ said "Love your fellow-man" he was not revealing his own views but simply repeating the obvious Jewish tenet under the screw of the inquisition. His personality is absolutely free from moral prepossessions; neither does he think of rewarding moral goodness, nor is his rejection of men in any way tinged with the wrath of indignation. He certainly stands for love, but only in the sense of Eros, as the passion of generative creation; whatsoever is not needed for the divine play of plastic experiment in line with the magic of Nature is sacrificed without hesitation. As we see, Blüher, himself drunk with the idea of the "passion of generative creation", creates for his own use a Christ personifying some dim unconscious energies of man, bearing the quasi-human features of a legendary Eastern despot, a Prussian Junker, and a sadistic child such as might be born out of American plutocracy.

Let us turn, for recuperation, to Gogarten's more serious and
academic meditations on the salutary virulence of Evil. The muscular Lutheran piety of this half-Nazi Professor may be summed up in the brief formula: it is our fate to be eternally kicked by the devil, and it serves us right. His standard work on "Political Ethics" begins as an "attempt to understand the Christian faith precisely from its anti-humanitarian elements". Now I certainly do not belong to those who think that the gist of Christianity is sufficiently given in the warning, "Thou shalt not kill"; but I see still less point in condensing Christianity to the more sinister imprecation "Thou shalt not kill too seldom". Actually, however, some passages in Gogarten are all but a religious apotheosis of evil, at any rate of real, spiteful, tragic evil. Absolute Evil, which means man's intrinsic self-commitment to "belonging to himself", just as absolute Good means his equally radical "bondage" to powers outside himself, is preferable to the spurious morality of pleasant self-righteousness in obedience to the precepts of the "On" (das Man). For absolute Evil implies at least the formal element of real self-commitment in common with absolute Good. The maximum of Goodness to which we can attain is a full confession to being evil. To conform to moral laws of any kind merely means to acquiesce in the spurious morality of decency or social "cant" (Man-tut-das-und-das); whereas the genuine morality of the divine Thou shalt, which concerns our innermost existence in contradistinction to the usefulness or unpleasantness of our behaviour, simply demands from us a sincere awareness and admission of being evil. Given this, any attempt at "overcoming the evil in us" appears out of the question, as it would "contradict the moral nature of man". All striving after ethical perfection is devoid of meaning. There is only one true ethical phenomenon: the awareness of evil, of the fact that man in his reality, man as being "really himself" is evil. There is only a moral problem for man because he is evil. (I should say as a slight correction, which makes all the difference, because he may be evil, and, correspondingly, may and is called upon to be good.) The moral problem, Gogarten proceeds, would disappear "unless Evil 'were there' for man, and that is, unless man himself were evil". As we see it, the inference indicated in the words "and that is" contains a purely arbitrary extension, indeed a gross fallacy. This sophistry may not be intended to encourage or comfort
common evildoers, seeing that severe punishment is provided for them by the public authorities. Yet the punishment is an acknowledgment rather than an erasure of evil; it forms itself part of the "order of sin" and has the function of making that order bearable in practice, as well as of bringing it home to the minds of all. Therefore, immoral behaviour is indeed encouraged and in a sense justified, as far as it happens to be exempt from such a concrete order or legal retaliation; both immoralities which are not at the same time criminal transgressions and, what is of particular importance, injustice and crime perpetrated by the state authorities themselves come under this heading. Their very evil is "good"; it forms that part of the universal evil of man which is destined to assist in checking the general manifestations of evil but need not be checked itself. For evil is not in itself bad; it only needs partial vindication for the sake of its own completion.

The Christian faith—we continue quoting Gogarten—involves no perfection or augmentation of morality; it rather means a sovereign aloofness from ethical standards, and a firm refusal to be tested by them. Its function is to help men to bear the consciousness of their "guilty nullity" (schuldhafe Nichtigkeit) conveyed by the experience of Thou shalt. Christian faith is essentially the faith of evil man in a good and benevolent God (Gott, der ihm gut ist). This is the only way in which man can have a share in goodness. He must not attempt to be materially good himself; he must just "let God be good". There is no human goodness similar, even though inferior, to divine goodness. God presents himself to evil man in the guise of "law", threatening "trial and damnation"; but it is an axiom that the law cannot be fulfilled. Therefore an attempt would not pay. Fallen man cannot restore his positive bondage to God. He must be "suppressed" by God in order that the New Man, the penitent sinner, can thrive in his place. But man cannot be "wholly" the New One, unless he is at the same time "wholly" the Old One. If he is to be re-born, he must not be improved upon! What Gogarten takes up here is simply the heresy of "reckless sinning as a foundation for genuine virtue": fortiter peccare. "The justice of man" itself still belongs to sin, to the "limbs" and "works" of man who seeks to be himself, not "by God". The power of sin cannot be broken by moral achievement and
exhortation; it merely becomes hardened by force of contrast and by the impotent challenge of morality. Satan will only be dethroned as a Prince through his power being made entirely manifest. Again and again, Gogarten raises his voice against making a tale of ethical perfectionism out of the commandments of God or the Sermon on the Mount. These divine revelations merely serve to bring into light man’s complete “fallenness”; they are not meant to entrust him with a task the real pursuit of which would presuppose moral power and independence in him. To be sure, civil obedience is at the same time pleasant to God; but it is so merely as a general sign of man’s awareness of his state, without any suggestion of moral goodness in the person in question. To summarize Gogarten’s system of religion: it is an amoralist paganism, a reckless fatalism worshipping vital force and state-power, but couched in terms of moral self-condemnation of a Christian origin, paganism that has found its way back to itself but preserves the memory of the Christian side-path which had made it a little weary and over-reflective.

Stapel is a sort of grinning twin-brother to wry-faced Gogarten. Whilst the latter celebrates the sinfulness of man with oily pastoral resignation, Stapel joins in with unbalanced buffoonery. It has fallen to Gogarten’s lot to sojourn in the abstract regions of sin, evil, fallenness, state-power representing the criminal as a lawful taskmaster, etc.; but Stapel is even more at home in the field of cheerful aggressive nationalism imposed by a Christianity that has definitely freed itself from moral implications. Thanks to a healthy temperament, sin has lost its gloom here and Christian reminiscences are only maintained to enhance the headiness of the sparkling wine of Paganism. Stapel has no love for half-statements or cautious reservations. He assures himself that not only man’s intelligence, feeling and conduct, but his very conscience, too, are radically rotten. “Man is under the sway of original sin in his totality or not at all.” The reader, whether he likes it or not, is bound to agree. Be it “totality,” then, lest it be “not at all.” There can be no spot in human nature exempt from the realm of sin. Every attempt at moral reform or progress would call in question the omnipotence of sin, thus eluding man’s true religious consciousness of his estate. Consequently there is no bond between religion and morality (Stapel mockingly refers to “hyphen Christianity” expressed in
the adjective religiös-sittlich, popular with some backward Conservatives), except for the fact that morality apes religion. "All morality is but secularized religion ... Christianity ethicized is, therefore, counter-Christanity through and through." Morality has no place whatever in the Kingdom of God. "The moral conduct of those who are elected to the kingdom of God differs in nothing from the moral conduct of those who are not." The moral qualifications, the material character of our actions makes no difference to their value in the decisive religious sense of the word. "All human works, be they 'good' or not, are godless. Nothing belongs to the kingdom of God but what is done in obedience to God and for His sake, no matter whether it be even penal judgment or war." The context is in some way calculated to create the impression that "penal judgment" is more likely to be done "in obedience to God" than are, for instance, acts of charity, and "war" is more likely to be decided on "for His sake" than an attitude conforming to the claims of objective justice. Anxious to prevent a substitution of an explicit code of morality for God, Stapel carries out a thorough expropriation of God for the service of the entire unmitigated lust of aggression and domination that is alive, or asleep, in human nature. Sheer Paganism, renouncing the Christian God with his unequalled majesty, would entail the danger of submitting to moral restraints just by impulse or habit; we need the Redeemer of sin to save our souls from the blind-alley of "goodness". But in all his effusiveness Stapel himself is worth listening to. He lays great stress on the anti-rational character of salvation, inveighing against the "rational interpretations" of Christian life. Redemption has as little to do with moral elevation as it has with worldly wisdom. The frequent need of having the efficacy of Christ tested by "signs of improvement", by "moral fruits", is utterly unfounded. "Sin and dying" are the essence of life ("Revelling and killing"—we had better read!): "The Christian knows that it is strictly impossible for him to 'live' except in sin; that he can form no decision without falling into unrighteousness; that he cannot do good unless doing evil by it at the same time. Therefore, he steers clear of the pettiness of moral hair-splitting. Christianity, by delivering man from anxiety, gives him courage for life. Christianity without courage is blank deceit. God has made this
world perishable, it is doomed to destruction. May it, then, go to
the dogs according to its destiny! Men who imagine themselves
capable of ‘betering’ it, who ‘want’ to create a ‘higher’
morality, are starting a ridiculous petty revolt against God....
Pacifists on principle cannot be Christians. The growth of pacifist
views is indeed a measure of the decline of Christianity”.

This negative evaluation of pacifism from a “Christian” point
of view is followed by a congenial picture of the kingdom of
Heaven, which appears to lack any distinctive sign that could
differentiate it from the Prussian Army. For Heaven is charac-
terized as an Empire revealing an “order of mastery”; its
citizenship means “allégeance to God”, “entrance into the
Army metaphysical”, “subordination under the Lord of the
Heavenly Hosts”. The claimant for Heaven will “obey” the
“God of Christians” (der Christengott); he will pay little respect
to human life not excepting (!) his own person. The very context
of the words betrays the fact that, notwithstanding a superficial
likeness, this is not a philosophy for Christians who are prepared
to suffer martyrdom, but rather for ruffians and bullying des-
peradoes who adopt some Christian moods in order to silence
fear, remorse and despair. “The hope of Heaven does not mean
the expectation of a happiness of the blessed; it means obedience
and war-comradeship. If God orders His man to go to Hell, then
His sworn adherent, His faithful servant, will accordingly go to
Hell. If God allots temporal suffering to his sworn adherent, this
pain has to be borne. If He allots to him eternal pain, this
has to be borne too. . . . Faith is but another word for
victory. It is victory that the Lord demands; it is victory He
vouches for. . . . Christianity means decision and resolution. . . .
Decide yourself and leave everything else to God. . . . More
than ‘confession’, that is, overt decision, is not demanded. It is
one and everything.” In a word, you must not ask why you obey
the divine Field-Marshal at all, nor whom you are to fight and
why. You are entirely under the command of a foreign will.
Once you have “decided yourself” (but why not decide for
Satan?) you are relieved of the necessity of using your brains
further; you serve a Lord whom others serve as well; you may
hope for opportunity to stab and shoot and trample on such as
do not serve the same Lord. Clearly you cannot conceive a
Heaven that would offer you more than that. I have headed this
section “Christianity heathenized”; but I rather fear that, on the strength of Stapelian Christianity, heathen readers will take objection to so calling what they would sooner have designated as “Paganism Christianized”.

Among other, more serious and less fascinating Protestants we shall only mention the Künneh group, and in particular the line von Gloege is taking against the Wotanist exploitation of Nazism. He argues that the German Protestants should combine the utmost loyalty to the Nazi régime with an equally firm struggle against “its meaning being distorted into mythology”. The Christian religion and National Socialism are not identical in their ideology, but in their concrete development as German Volk forces, they are destined to combine and form an intimate life community. “In this sense, Swastika and cross (Hakenkreuz und Christuskreuz) belong together; in this sense only, but in this sense completely.”

Now to take stock of the Catholic auxiliaries of Naziism. It must be owned they are fairly numerous though many of them are to be expected to play the game with diplomacy rather than with sincerity. We can presume that but few genuine Nazis exist among the confessed adherents of the Catholic Faith (if these two attitudes are at all compatible, even as a psychological fact); most or all of them originate from the more or less covert heresies of the Catholic “Youth Movement” (thus, typically, Stonner). A bunch of feudal, half-fascist and nationalist reactionaries gathered around such figures as Herr von Papen, who helped Hitler to power, and Emil Ritter, a short time ago Chief Editor of the Berlin Centre organ “Germania”, and the author of vile attacks against high-minded German Catholics like the noble pacifist priest Dr. Moenius, now an exile. They endorse Naziism inasmuch as it happens to be the strongest nationalist and reactionary force, any other point of view being a matter of indifference to them. Moreover, in most Catholic periodicals articles are continually appearing which are in positive sympathy with the ruling party. The weekly Zeit und Volk (Time and People), founded a few months after Hitler's accession to the chancellorship, and published by the renowned Catholic firm Kösel and Pustet in Munich, pursues the task of demonstrating and promoting the political unity of will between the Nazi State and the Catholic population. As a programme the editors accept
the statement of Herr Schemm, then Bavarian Nazi Minister of Education: "Christ is our religion, Germany is our politics". But let us glance at random at a recent issue of Stimmen der Zeit (Voices of Time), the ably edited monthly of the German Jesuits, published by Herder and Co. in Freiburg. We are instantly struck by the article of one Father Gummersbach on the Artgemeissheit (racial acceptability) of the Christian idea of sin. Similar officious attempts to show that Catholicism did not come to the ancient Teutons as the spiritual force of a conquering imperialism utterly foreign to their racial genius, are rather common. Or again, we cast an eye over one of the latest issues of the Munich Hochland (Highland), an excellent literary and philosophical monthly, for many years considered the mouthpiece of the more free-spirited and left-wing Catholics. Herr Ernst Michel, formerly an extreme-left Catholic and a "Religious Socialist", discourses upon the palatable subject "The crisis of latterday Liberalism". The article could just as well have been written by Goebbels. None of the fashionable cues—Liberalism as a process of dissolution... awakening of an elementary sense of simple original forces and forms... the symbolic sign of "Blood and Soil"... the temporary dethronement of the Spirit, especially the "modern Spirit", may well be suffered as the price of renewal... modern Catholicism gone astray because it has adopted individualist principles—are omitted. Again, the affinity between National Socialism and a general atmosphere of irrationalism, Youth Movement, vitalism, etc., even with an originally "Left" character, has asserted itself.

Monsignor A. Hudal (Rector of the German National Church, Rome) is making strenuous efforts towards reconciliation. He declares unctuously that no conflict of conscience can arise between the German Catholic's loyalty to Rome and his national and patriotic feeling. The solution is amazingly simple: "Our hearts belong entirely and integrally to Rome, but no less entirely and integrally also to our people and country". The common bond of political reaction forces the issue. The informed Catholic will bear no ill-will to a "Germany groping her way from the socialistic poisoning of the people to the great traditions of her national past". On the contrary, we Christians must repent our recent lapse when we turned to "cold rationalism", "bookish wisdom", the cultural Left, etc. As for Christianity
and Teutonic character, why, there is no reason for them to clash. Christianizing was not meant to be Romanizing. Nor need we assume a fatal tension between Rome and Germandom. Historical Christendom is the fruit of an “organic fusion” between Roman and Teutonic culture; the idea of a universal Empire of Christendom originated in the “Teutonic striving for the Infinite”, coupled with the right of patronage over the Church.

Compared with these rather cautious and non-committal genuflexions of a versatile cleric to the successful counter-revolutionists of his country, a secular writer like Hommes seems to postulate a more final union between Catholicism and Nationalist Fascism. The former notion has obviously lost all meaning apart from a vague “authoritarian” tradition and a general opposition to reason and liberty. The pagan and worldly admixtures in Catholicism (originally justified as pledges of a realistic and universalist turn of mind) have completely outgrown the rest. For instance, Hommes speaks of the “unity and totality of an authoritarian attitude, tending to stint the liberty of science, as it is harmoniously embodied in Deutschvölkisch and Catholic (!) science and philosophy”. Or again, he gives voice to the hope that “the German people will not break away from the idea of ‘German People’ as the eternal divine thought (Gottgedanke)”. For him, Catholicism and Nationalism are not allies but synonyms. “The new will for totality is equivalent to a new religious temper, for it means a reverential acceptance of the bindings (religio) set upon human nature.” A more competent statement of Paganism could not be desired. We complete it by adding some further revelations of Hommes: “Organic thought and action are both the efflux of a religious attitude.” (“Organic” in the Spannian and fascist sense, means “independent of the intelligence and will of the individuals as such, implicated in a social unit or process”). The Liberal epoch was characterized by the decomposition and suppression of mystical Volkskraft. “The laws of life and growth (!) laid down by God were on the high way to being supplanted by technical constructions of petty human reason.” Obviously human irrationality comes from God, whereas human reason does not. Further, the Catholic type of man, though refusing to be enshrined in eternal tragedy, yet respects the profundity of human guilt; he is therefore “the truly tragic type of man who accepts Struggle, the State,
and even War”. To wit: we are to lead the lives of ruthless, thick-skinned pagan Teutonic Barbarians, without, however, renouncing our claim to a snug place in the Christian heaven, and a foretaste of its amenity on earth. It is said that once a Jew, who neglected religious rites but avoided an open breach with the old faith, was addressed by an outspoken co-religionist: “You rogue! You eat bacon; you smoke on Saturday; but you will enjoy lying in the Jewish cemetery!” In some way God is a super-Hitler on an extended scale: “The transcendent Creator forms the monarchical Head (Spitze) of a well-ordered totality which reaches down (!) to the individual”; he is the “Lord of nations”. In reality, this “Christian” God has a thousand and one faces; he is but a nominal subsumption of a multitude of tribal idols, each standing for the “totality” of its respective Tribe.

Taeschner, examining the relationship between the Nazi claim to totality and Catholicism, confesses his discontent with the over-simplified compromise that Nature and the Supernatural, Politics and Religion, lie on different planes, politics forming the incontestable domain of National Socialism, and religion of Catholicism. Certainly they “supplement each other most fortunately”; and above all a conflict between them should be avoided, as it would “only weaken them both” (!). Yet politics and religion are in no way two rigidly disparate provinces; we cannot help asking whether there is not also an “inward consonance” between National Socialism and Catholicism. As it happens, Taeschner’s insistence on intellectual honesty is amply rewarded, for his investigation enables him to answer this ticklish question in the affirmative. National Socialism turns out to be the trustee of the divine will in the realm natural, as is Catholicism in the realm supernatural. Not only does National Socialism appear analogous in form to Catholicism, as having an equal claim to totality; it is also in line with it in so far as it “seeks to convert the will of God manifest in the law of nature and in history, into actual practice”. National Socialism and Catholicism hold similar views concerning the problems of authority, organization, community, discipline, and social justice. The “social” idea of Naziism corresponds to the “Christian ethic of charity, applied to the political community”. Even though medieval Christendom depended on the conception of the Empire, whereas now
the Nation is in the fore, the "ethic of community" remains the same. To repeat it in a less high-flown manner: Catholics should feel at home wherever individual rights and understanding are stunted. Indeed Taeschner's conclusion is that there will be greater harmony and less trouble to their consciences if they collaborate with the National Socialist rather than with the democratic State. I do not wish to argue the point; but we can safely say that an immense number of competent Catholics in and outside the Third Empire think differently; nor need we emphasize the point that, strange to say, a host of leading Nazis again refuse to return the love of those Catholic circles of which Taeschner is a mouthpiece. For there are important factors in Nazism apart from political reaction, and I am firmly convinced that the same applies in a much greater measure to Catholicism and, of course, in a highly different sense.

Dr. Stonner must complete this unedifying review of Nazi Catholics. Stonner is anxious to prove the justification of Christianity from the supreme "Teutonic" point of view. Our Teutonic ancestors, says he, turned to Christianity for reasons which had lain in their own Teutonic religious practice. For instance, prayer is in its essence Teutonic. There are also some resemblances in ritual. The pre-Christian Teutons knew the value of penitence. As for the anti-Christian attacks of post-Christian Teutons, Nazis, Stonner consoles himself that only single representatives of the N. S. D. A. P., not the Party as a whole, are responsible for these hostilities. Among others, Hitler and Feder are all for "positive Christianity". The movement of national renewal embraces divers religious attitudes. But to all intents and purposes, the recognition of anything higher than mere direct life-interests, be it even on a strictly national scale, is vastly preferable to the foregoing prevalence of materialism. (We dealt with this typical and frequent delusion in the previous chapter.) But what fascinates Stonner most are the Instructions of the Imperial Minister of internal affairs, Herr Frick, for the Teaching of History. This document (which Stonner, to all appearances, would hardly hesitate to include in the Holy Writ) contains the injunction that the conversion of the Teutons to Christianity shall not be treated negatively: "rather does the adoption of Christianity appear as a display of Teutonic influence over the whole area of medieval culture". (If this be so, I shall no longer
be in doubt about remaining a Christian.) The message of Christ appealed to the Teutons as an epic of heroism. . . . We may congratulate the Nazi State on its being an “Educational State” par excellence. . . . The chief foundations for national education are: Hitler’s Mein Kampf and his speeches (des Führers Werk); Krieck; Hermann Schwarz; Stapel; the Künneb-Schreiner group . . . ; and further on the Catholic side authors such as Brauer, Schmaus, Lortz. (Schmaus has written “Catholic approach to National Socialism”;) Brauer, some time ago an able social reformer of the Left Centre, earns from Stonner the epithet “courageous”, because he had the pluck to incite the German Catholics to support Hitler’s régime.) Further bases of national education laid down on the Catholic side are the pastoral letters of the German Episcopate. (One of them, shortly after Hitler’s victory, ran thus: “Nobody must withdraw from national reconstruction. . . . The State has a lawful claim to loving collaboration.”) Above all, we may rely upon Hitler. His first governmental enunciation solemnly promises to safeguard Christianity as the foundation of our morals. Hitler believes the Christian denominations to be “perpetuating factors of national substance (Volkstum)”. He admires the firmness of Catholic dogmatics and is eager to imitate it in the National Socialist party programme.

If this were to be attempted in fact, it would meet inevitably with failure; for dogmas are the formal expression of a fundamental belief in an immutable divine and spiritual truth, whereas Naziism merely knows truth as the variable reflection of a peculiar Shape of Life or of a Master Type entitled to “create” truth in exercising their power. Rosenberg, and with him the bulk of Nazi theorists, would sneer at the idea of Nazi dogmatics analogous to Roman Catholicism. Yet those Catholic coryphaei who would revel in the establishment of a para-Catholic “Church Politic” inspired by the pagan Holy Ghost of Race, are indeed, to avoid a more unfriendly term, a wondrous sight.
4. THE GOD THAT IS OURSELVES

"I believe in our own divinity when millions of Germans are leagued around one Leader, I know God to be in the force (Kraft) of our blood alone."

(Profession of faith of the group "Völkische Aktion", February, 1937.)

"Gottestum im Volkstum" (Divinity manifested in racial-national essence).

Professor H. Schwarz.

According to E. Jung, something is wrong with the Catholic Church to-day. The reader, still under the spell of the foregoing disclosures, might surmise that what is wrong is the undue pliancy of the Church in respect of heathen Pride and unlawful Tyranny. Yet nothing of the kind is meant. The unpleasant feature objected to by Jung is that, whereas during the Middle Ages the Church was considered as "German", in her present atmosphere Germandom simply counts as one Volkstum among others. This, of course, is intolerable. Deity must be "national", and must be of our people.

This tribal expropriation of God can also be expressed in terms of pantheistic subjectivism, an anti- or pseudo-Christian pagan creed of Pride. The delusive fancy "I am God" is insane and obnoxious enough where it really refers to the individual Ego; but if this sense is strictly maintained, some kind of democratic moderation or indeed obliteration of the idea seems to be imperative, since there is no reason why the alleged identity with God should not be granted to other individuals, too. If, however, the confession "I am God" is supplemented by "and others are not", or "because I am better than others", the transformation of "I" into "We", the famous "We", will follow logically. For, apart from madness in the clinical sense (which may safely be ruled out as a constructive factor of social ideologies), the classification of mankind into a superior "I" and an inferior "They" is only practicable if there is first established a superior and an inferior Breed, a divine "We" and a contemptible
"Non-We", a duality of our Master Race and their Slave Race. We can observe clearly in Rosenberg this structure of ideas, especially in his interpretation of the German mystics leaning towards Pantheism. Ekkehard professes the absolute liberty of the soul, irrespective of its works or actions; the "inner heaven"; the incarnation of God as His "being born in the Soul"; the Ego being the cause of all things; the "interdependence" between the Ego and God. In becoming flesh, God manifests Himself as a "force", a dynamic agency in the world of human souls. Grace is not the action of a superior principle on the soul; it is rather the soul's "union" with God. It would be meaningless, were not the soul from the outset consubstantial with God. "God could not exist without me" (Angelus Silesius). In its highest stage of purification, the godlike soul needs grace no longer. Moreover, "purification" does not mean conforming to a standard or code, an imitation of divine sanctity; it consists in becoming purely oneself. "Free thyself from everything that forms a foreign admixture with thy essence" (Ekkehard). This doctrine might be applied to all souls indiscriminately; yet we do not think that Rosenberg is guilty of extreme arbitrariness in taking an opposite view. He considers Ekkehardian philosophy as a doctrine of the "noble soul" rather than of the soul pure and simple. He further considers it typically Teutonic, seeing that Ekkehard and his followers were Germans of purest stock; and in fine he concludes that the "noble soul", far from being soul as such, is identical with the "genuine" Aryan, Teutonic, German soul. In a word: those who are fit to understand that God is Myself form a set of privileged Selves, and thus by their very existence attest that God is Ourselves. They are, in actual fact, Germans; we are Germans; thus "Ourselves" really means Us. I do not for a moment suggest the endorsement of this claim; but the idea, as such, is not after all so utterly absurd. Although it might seem at first sight that pantheism or "anthropotheism" is likely to entail humanitarian and democratic consequences, the contrary of which follows from the idea of a personal God as Creator, Ruler and Lawgiver, a more penetrating study will reveal a different order of things. The idea of all men being committed to God's law is more easily realizable than the idea of all men being God. Theism is attuned more to a union of men in equality than is Pantheism. Even the idea of some men holding
over their fellow-men a special office or authority, derived directly from God, is less fundamentally opposed to the principle of universal equality and mutual responsibility than is the con-
ception of some men forming specially condensed units of divine substance. These reflections are intended to help the reader to understand why “the God that is Ourselves” is so much more truly and finally hostile to freedom and universal justice in comparison with either the God of the “chosen People” (for all the tribal pride and harsh self-righteousness that clings to His name) or the God of organized Church authority (for all the oppressive tendencies and overstated claims to power inherent in the latter). It is God the Lord who, in the last analysis, is able to cast down tyrants even though he seems to confirm their power in many ways; it is God the servant, the instrument, the mere badge of human powers who ultimately serves to divinize oppressors and help them to keep the “inferior breed” in utter abjectness.

Bergmann is even more explicit in constructing his “godhead” as a lieutenant of the national genius, a hireling of national power. We have no use either for a God of reward and requital, or for the “existential” God of neo-Lutheran academic speculation. Ours must be “the Force-God of Godly Force” (“der Kraft-Ausspieler der Gotteskraft”). We had better revert to the attitude of “our ancestors who knew nothing of the ‘glacier wall’ between God and Man”. An international God is a pale God of literature and philosophy. (Such was the God in whose name the crusades were waged!) We need “the God who ‘made iron grow’” (this fabulous monster thrives in a famous German nationalist anthem), “the God who won the battles of Frederick the Great, the God of Bismarck who founded the Empire”. I greatly prefer the God of Joffre and Foch who rendered good service at the Marne if only because the people under Joffre and Foch did not engage Him as their God “of Force”. Instead of the Christian Credo, Bergmann proposes a Confessio Germanica which runs thus: “I believe in the God of Deutschreligion. I believe in the Reliever Krist, who fights for the nobleness of the human soul. I believe in Germany, the land where a new humanity is being forged.” (In explanation: Deutschreligion, “Germano-Religion”, sounds of course far deeper and more pregnant than the lame paraphrase “German religion”. “Reliever” I put for Nothelfer, which also reminds us of “commissionaire”. Krist, a new spelling
for Christ, is meant to express that, if need be, we Germans can make for ourselves a finer Saviour than Jesus the Jew. Nobleness, in the original, is rendered by Edelkeit, an affected neologism for Adel. The last phrase is in German das Bildungsland der neuen Menschheit.) I suggest to append a fourth and conclusive article of faith, borrowed from a kräftig old German saying: “I believe that a dog that swallows this is bound to go mad.”

Destroy the legend of God become man—exclaims Bergmann—and erect in its place the ideal of Man become god. “High human spirit” alone deserves the name of god. “Man himself shall rise up as God, as Christ; he shall become conscious of himself as such, and his essence shall take on the divine form.” He shall divest himself of the Christian “virtue” of humility, which means “feeling oneself base, worthless and vile before God.” He shall forsake the habit of yearning for transcendent sanctities “Thy Volk is holy.” “The idea of a higher kind of man is holy. The working of Nature is holy. Is that not enough holiness in the world? It rests with us alone whether God be.” Pantheism is waived aside as an inadequate term; it is not material and impersonal Nature but “superior Man” whom the name “God” befits. Nature, in her turn, “breeds God in Man”. This very sentence, if compared with the foregoing analysis and particularly the notion of a “higher kind of man”, proves (as far as I can see) that Bergmann, though apparently abjuring Naturalist Pantheism, does not really get over, it but rather brings out its exact, and socially relevant, import. God is virtually “All”, but takes concrete shape in “Man”, and is actually present in that still loftier manifestation of Nature which is termed the “higher kind of Man”. Finally, the latter corresponds both to the master group in society and the master breed in mankind, to wit, our kind of Man. That is why the right religion, viewed from a different angle, assumes the character of Deutschreligion, whereas the “imperialist” claim of the Christian faith to objective truth and the claim to convert all nations is uncompromisingly rejected.

In conformity, Stapel writes: “Religion is the self-revelation of the living (!—i.e., vital) God. God reveals himself as Jewish in the Jew, as German in the German (!). . . . Jesus and the Virgin Mary of the Germans are Germans”. He supplies, as proof of this, that the representations of Jesus and Mary in German art have
something peculiarly German about them. The fact is incontestable, and is about as much proof that Jesus and Mary are German as defining Lenin in English, as "the founder of the Communist State in Russia", would create a new and perhaps "true" Lenin who is an Englishman. But, within the bounds of his own obvious madness, Stapel quite logically infers that each nation is also entitled to her "own ethics", owing to the "national variety and differentiation of the moral law and (!) moral practice". The God of Our Force and Our Pride, far from being a guarantor of objective morality, even has the function of easing Our path whenever it suits Us to wrong others, or those among Us who are less genuinely "We", or at any rate more removed from wielding Our power.

According to Sombart, the Nation "issues from God and reposes in God", but is not itself God. In regard to the life to come, man has a supernatural destination beyond the limits of the nation. Similarly Wendland in the Küneth volume: the Volk is not an "incarnation" of God, but is an absolute divine ordinance, irrevocably imposed on the individual by God. Man "cannot think nor live himself except as a member of this particular People. I have to deal in my People with the present God himself". The actual commandments and workings of God are conveyed to the individual exclusively through the mediation of his Volk. We see from this characteristic admission that the verbal distinction between God and Our Nation is merely the last unwilling remnant of a Christian, or rather Lutheran, tradition of faith. Everything is fashioned on earth as if God and Volk were identical, yet on this massive structure of things is set a label with a theoretical reservation inscribed on it, in much the same way that the kingship of Italy is tagged on as an extra trimming to Mussolini's dictatorship.

The hazy reflections of Pastor Asmussen on "Cross and Empire" may be referred to as an example of the strange destiny that impels Lutheran piety to divinize worldly power. In spite of his spasmodic efforts to keep "Cross and Empire" distinct from one another, Asmussen treats "Empire", the idea of a secular order of power reigning all over the world, from the beginning as the metaphysical counterpart of "Cross", as the corresponding term of a religious duality, as a factor living in pari materia with the "Cross". For the Cross, he says, is but a
principle of redemption, it is not a principle of order—a typical piece of Lutheran definition inviting the triumph of Paganism. The “Cross” thus becomes a spectre trembling in the background of the “Empire” that achieves in itself the union of earthly power and religious dignity. “It is Anti-Christian to yearn for the Cross through the Empire, or conversely; it is Pagan to yearn for the one without the other.” Then clearly it is also “Pagan” to yearn for the Cross without the Empire, a startling innovation in religious terminology. Obviously, the “Christian” approach to “the God that is Ourselves” consists in taking the Cross-God into an honourable partnership with Caesar set up as a religious entity. The more the parity and congruency of that partnership are stressed, the more evident will it become that the God outside and above us is condemned to a shadowy existence, lingering on as a requisite of Christian etiquette in a religious and political system of Pagan actualities.

After witnessing these anaemic ballons d’essai, how invigorating it is to penetrate the flamboyant “Theology of the Empire” of Hielshcer, stripped of Christian remnants and ornaments! We are not irritated here by an ethereal principle of redemption above the “union of Power and Inwardness”; proudly and openly may we contemplate the line stretching from Armin of the Cherusci over Frederick the Staufer, Frederick the Great, Bismarck and Hitler to a still more accomplished superman, the road to Salvation in its absolute and totalitarian sense. “The centre of eternal activity excels all powers, for all powers live through the centre. The Centre is the Reich. Therefore all orders (Ordnungen) in the world, which is the Body of God, are ultimately directed to the place (Ort) in which the Reich fulfils itself. The Universe circles around history; and history circles around the fate of the Reich . . . All other powers have their fate above them; the Reich has it in itself. The ‘Reich’ works God; the others have God worked upon them.” The Parsees say of themselves: “We are the strugglers of Light against Darkness.” The Christian speaks: “We are those redeemed by Messiah, and united in love for the sake of God.” They are silenced by the thundering creed of the Empire: “We are creative souls who are bound together by the self-same wariorship.” At another time, Hielshcer rants in ecstasy: “Thus the image of the divine heart embraces the succession (Wandel) of history which points to the
appearance of the Reich”. The very rhythm of Inwardness and Power, the interplay of the motifs Soul, Empire, God, are part of the divine totality. Now this rhythm, succession and change within the divine Empire entail eternal war, not for a definite object or cause, but as a permanent or ever-returning manifestation of comprehensive power and sanctity in a world of multiplicity. “God is war: for the things burning with creativeness fight one another with their fire. . . . The divine havoc is wrought from every part of God on every other. . . . The fighters carry inwardly, in their hearts, the eternal stillness. . . . The Reich is the unity of the souls that possess the completion of faith and the completion of action. . . . The eternal limbs of the Reich are the Perpetrators of God.”

The difference between Our Lord and the “God that is Ourselves” is not, the reader may easily perceive, the relation between an exacting tyrant and a dependable humanitarian. The God of Hielscher’s Empire wages war inside himself; his inwardness fused with power is as devoid of Love as lust is far off from charity; his power aglow with inwardness is infinitely more oppressive than the omnipotence upheld by Theism. True, the biblical “Lord of the Hosts” with His “terrible swift sword” is, for all His just mercy, nothing less than a meek pacifist preacher. But perhaps we could find no better way of visualizing the contrast between the God of Peace who is also a war-lord and the God in whom Peace and War are One, than by opposing the wars of a “jealous God” to the wars that belong to the “harmony in God”; the Divine Wrath feared by the faithful to the “Divine Havoc” rejoiced in by the “souls of the Reich”.

5. THE CALL FOR MYTHOLOGY

“History works in the form of Myth, not of Truth.”

F. WOLTERS.

Obviously belief is not identical with knowledge; and, since both aim at the possession of truth, we must take into account a natural and ineluctable dissension between faith and reason.
Nevertheless, the two compete with each other in the pursuit of a value they both recognize; they are united in the respect for truth as such, even though reason may question the sincere truthfulness of faith, and faith may doubt the capacity of reason to discover basic truth. If a sound mutual delimitation and control is established, reason may very well prove a critical apparatus for the purifying of a faith tending to grow rankly and extend arbitrarily, while faith may turn out to be no less useful as a safety-valve for the aberrations and eccentricities of reason which, after all, are but a part of human psychology.

Faith may goad us to believe a falsehood, because it would be consoling, or in tune with a cherished tradition, or likely to exercise a sound admonitory effect, if it were true. Reason may deceive us into believing a falsehood, because it would suit certain intellectual habits, or confirm the opinion of a scientific authority, or gratify some emotional need linked up with novel impulses of thought, if it were true. Yet in any case both tell man to believe a thing alleging it to be true, even if in reality it be only a tale. On the other hand, art or the craft of entertainment offer us stories for an enjoyment, or for higher purposes, stories that are beautiful, edifying, and ennobling; but for all that they must not cease to be treated as fables. They may reveal profound elements of truth, and impart wisdom; but all the same they are not themselves truth, nor is it wise to believe them. Now we know of a state of mind commonly called "naive", which is both pre-Christian and pre-scientific, undogmatic and irrational, outside the range of civilized thinking, which is not primarily and emphatically concerned with objective truth at all. It accepts in place of truth the fable which appeals to it, not through error or deception in the strict sense of the words, but because it is satisfied with the "appeal" as such, falls short of differentiating between fable and truth in general, and has no need for rational verification or dogmatic fixity. This penumbra of the mind denotes a "belief" which is rather a biological "approach" to or "espousal" of certain ideas and imaginative creations than a "creed" or "conviction" proper. It may be spoken of as the "mythological" attitude. It may also be associated with religiosity that does not aspire to orthodoxy, religiosity rather than religion; or with conceiving that forbeares to mature into knowing, thought errant rather than erroneous. But the
phenomenon that concerns us here is the \textit{conscious and deliberate attempt to revert to this stage of human thought} and the appalling treachery to the spirit of Christian Western civilization enclosed in this vicious renunciation of Truth. A tendency of this kind can be traced throughout the history of German Lutheranism, from Luther's defiance of "fatuous" reason and morals to the sentimental orgies of Pietism and Schleiermacher's debasement of religion into a vague "feeling of dependence", forming a striking contrast, not only to Catholic dogmatics or rebellious French rationalism, but also to Hume's sceptical admission of pragmatic "beliefs" and the commonsense rehabilitation of the latter by Reid. With modern Fascism and particularly National Socialism the "call for mythology", dating from Nietzsche and Sorel, in some way also from the Pragmatists, becomes a dominant feature. This self-conscious subjectivism, this deliberate sacrifice of the intellect, this methodical training to barbarian naïveté has an almost touching air of heroic perversity about it. What is its meaning? Apart from the general "weariness of civilization" and the historical antagonism to the nations and forces that represent it, roused to fever-pitch by the War and its sequel, the Call for Mythology is also in line with the political conception of the Totalitarian Tribe and the anthropological and religious conception of the Master Man, the Superior Race, the Sacred We. Objective truth, enduring and detached (be it of the religious or the scientific order), portends deadly injury to the triple identity of Tribal Egotism: the identification of the racial Self, the master Set, and Deity. Whosoever believes in tenets and principles, can no longer be completely imprisoned in the flux of his "vital nature", the "rhythm of his blood", nor belong in unbounded devotion to the actual rulers who are his masters, leaders, objects of love, or "condensed expressions". The "myth", on the contrary, should play the part of a mere mirror to one's nature or kind (Artung), nor does it affect an objective validity which, if the case arises, could be separated from, and confronted by, the speeches or the doings of the Führer group: as Catholic Truth would inexorably rise against a Pope who were to deny the Trinity, or encourage polygamy, or persevere in conferring clerical dignities according to the amount of Nordic racial qualities in the applicants. In brief, the call for mythology indicates the will to break the spiritual backbone of man, to
supersede personality, with its consciousness of eternal relations, by a flabby vital stock of ethnic unity, to pull down the last strongholds of the mind in which human freedom and dignity could entrench themselves against the totalitarian encroachment of an insane and godless tyranny.

Once again, I have occasion to refer gratefully to Mowrer, whose masterly description of the “revolt against reason itself” that rendered the German mind a prey to Naziism I shall in no way seek to emulate. Post-War spiritual Germany, “rich in instinct, poor in commonsense”, “radiates intelligence, yet its several minds are open to cosmic forces”; it is “chaotic, illogical and romantic . . . ill-defined in its being, hospitable to novelty, paradoxical”; it has “interest in such subjects as ‘characterology’, or to class men into fixed types . . . geopolitics, astrology. . . .” Man’s beliefs are not directed to Truth, his actions are not meant to conform with Right; the trend is to “deduce” or “understand” both from his peculiar essence, type or fate. The first step of relativism is to demonstrate that all beliefs are *but* myths appropriate to the needs of life in a given situation; the second step in mysticism is to *endorse* the myth that suits vital needs and temperament best, as the highest form of belief. Thought becomes an attribute of Kind: the ideal of “racial knowledge” emerges. Rational discussion and understanding have lost their sense; rational coherence of views has ceased to be a recognized standard, as “racial knowledge” cannot be submitted to such neutral tests. Mowrer’s formulations are very much to the point. He is no deluded victim of reason who expects science to make a paradise of earth; with just modesty he admits the “limits of reason” and the drawbacks of “mechanistic rationality”, lucidly adding that this kind of exaggeration and error is “still a long way from hysteria and the ancestor-worship (authority of ‘blood’) that swept over the Germans”. The less he indulges in the “myth” of reason (as it were), the more securely he grasps the meaning of a fundamental trust in reason for the general conduct of human life: order, liberty, personality, a staid and civilized manner of living. He quotes these words of Whitehead, as grand as they are free of grandiloquence: “*Faith in reason . . . is the faith that at the basis of things we shall not find mere arbitrary mystery*”. Now mythologism is precisely the perplexing decision of man to entrust himself
to arbitrary mystery and, in closest union therewith, to arbitrary
mastery.

The programme of "religious renewal", as contemplated by
Count Reventlow, will have for its first article: "Down with the
respect paid to the hegemony of reason!" "Intuition", "the
forces of the soul", "the life of the soul", have to be developed.
(To what end, and by what mode of discrimination if they clash?
No answer is vouchsafed; for with any such fixity reason would
intervene.) "Mere reason is an instrument and an offspring of
egoism, the very evil that must be combated by the forces of the
soul." A rather incompetent way of propagating Klagesian
heathenism. How refreshing to vary it with the artistic eloquence
of Hielser, which this time attains a thrifty precision: "Myth
(Sage) is a reverential self-commitment to the Power by which
one is seized". What Cardinal Newman called "the Grammar
of Assent" is here transfigured into the erotic response of a
susceptible maiden to the conquering male. This is exactly the
difference between "mythology" and Faith in our sense: that
the former cares neither for what kind of power it is that
addresses man's soul, nor for what it has to say, but lays
the chief emphasis on the condition of being "stirred", on the act
of "seizure".

We are to create a Church without dogmatics, clergy, sacra-
mental magic, but not without mythical figures (Gestalten).
Above all, dogma, i.e., the stress put on "believing things",
must be discarded. "Our nordic Ancestors did not 'believe' in
anything, because they were pious." Here Bergmann has found
a trenchant way of stating the issue. Not only can religious
devotion in the neo-Pagan vitalist and totalitarian sense dispense
with a definite creed, but it is even flatly contradictory; for the
very act of definition and statement of (alleged) truth, in spite
of their being "imposed" on men by authority, marks a decisive
step towards rationality, objectivity and spiritual liberty.

But the confrontation of Creed and Mythology can be traced
back to Houston Stewart Chamberlain. He puts forward the
opinion that, whereas the sublime tissue of Christian dogmas and
the creative imagination that inspired them was of Aryan origin,
the dogmatic attitude as such, the rigidness of formalism, the
mania of orthodoxy, constituted a Semitic heirloom. I do not
question the facts, but should like to observe that Catholicism in
the patristic epoch developed a zest for theological subtleties and a high-strung notion of the “duty to believe” which had been essentially unknown in Judaism, at least in its pre-Christian history. The Semitic influence, so Chamberlain puts it, accounts for the non-mythological and non-“poetical” side of Christianity. In the Aryan heaven, no doubt, the sign of corruption embodied in the habit of distinguishing between True and False will be wiped out.

Rosenberg, of course, merits the title “Loudest Prophet of the Myth”. The reader will recall his implacable animosity against tenets of any kind, against didactic morals, against established propositions and universally accessible truths. Racial knowledge, Type morality, truth of the living Shape are alone creditable. Myth and Type are co-ordinated terms. The dream of Myth breathes life into the glorious reality of fate-forging Type. In these days of chaos and corruption (meaning pre-Hitlerian Europe) the toilers of German renascence are entrusted with the mission of “experiencing a new Myth and creating a new Type”. The barbarous conception of “experience” as a task reflects the entire absurdity of the “call for mythology”. It is as though we could hear the summons: “Jump with enthusiasm”, or “Search for a method of acquiring a youthful freshness of vision”. To this corresponds the breeding of a Type, comparable to the resolution: “I must carefully unfold my individual peculiarities”. The mark of insanity is clearly stamped on the face of the new Barbarians.

Our future Church, Rosenberg writes, must be inspired by “Johannine genius” in contraposition to Judaco-Syrian dogmatism. We can only owe allegiance to a Jesus of active heroism, purified of the humility precepts, which are the sly artefacts of Semitic sophistry. Our “image of Jesus” must be revised; the crucified Jewish pacifist must yield his place to an “educating spirit of fire”, a “hero”. Appropriate reforms are suggested in church music and rites. Sanctification of the front soldier (!). . . . Back to the “glorious mysticism of Ekkehard” . . . . “Realize that this man (Ekkehard) and the heroic field-greys under the steel helmet are one and the same.” Practically, churches and religious movements must not be judged by their dogmas but by their attitude to the Nationalist State. Our heart’s desire, however, goes further. “The desire (Sehnsucht) to provide the
Nordic racial soul with the adequate form of a German Church on the basis of Volk myth—in this we see one of the greatest tasks of our century.” Again, nostalgia as a programme! The Volkskirche is intended to be a nucleus of crystallization protected by the State; in due course her life will drain away the influence of the “Roman Haruspex” as well as of the “Old-Testament Superintendents” of the fossil called Protestantism.

FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER V

Usadel urges an alliance between all believers in “godliness”, i.e. all Christians and all believers in hereditary life values against materialists and communists. Schmaus represents Fascist Catholicism and reveals the illuminating fact that this Catholicism is mainly and simply the negation of Democracy. Explaining away Catholic internationalism he argues that this belongs exclusively to the supra-natural realm.

Polanyi’s essay (in Christianity and the Social Revolution) points out that the Utopia of Fascism lies not ahead but in the past, it is regressive, and how infinitely far back, beyond the renaissance, beyond the beginnings of Christianity, indeed far beyond antique paganism.

1 Concerning Teutonic revival and the alienness and inferiority of Christianity also see Friedbert Schulze, “So lebst du deutsch!” (the apparent values in Christianity are in truth a gift of Germanism); Gunnarsson (Teutonic belief in destiny, protecting the “natural” and traditional hierarchy of society); “Godefried” (Christianity, an enemy of nobility, a religion of “anti-value”); Baetke (Teutonic religion, an amoral but sublime and heroic fatalism; Christ appreciated as a “hero” by the converted Teutons).  
4 cf. also: “The German Volk, not the evangelical Church, has been entrusted with a mission by history. This mission refers to the resistance of the arteigen (racially proper) religious forces against the arteigen (alien) ones” (H. Grabert, “The Protestant mission of the German people”).

5 In April, 1937, a Rhenish group of “German Christians” published a resolution claiming to substitute Hitler’s authority for that of the Bible. “Hitler’s word is God’s law; the decrees and laws which represent it possess divine authority. The Fuhrer being the only hundred per cent. National Socialist, he alone fulfills the law. All others are to be regarded as guilty before the divine law.”
In John Stuart Mill’s view it is not solely or even mainly to form great thinkers that freedom of thinking is needed; it is needed quite as much in order to enable average human beings to attain the mental stature they are capable of.

Wickham Steed.

“Morality as such occupies no large section of human life.”

Wilhelm Stapel.

“The art of a Christian century was bound to be Christian; the art of a National Socialist century is bound to be National Socialist.”

A. Hitler
(Nürnberg Party Congress, September, 1936).

“The Poet must march like soldiers of the line.”

H. Schwarz-Berk.

1. THE EXPROPRIATION OF REASON AND ETHICS

“Only where a Power which is fit to rule and willing to rule has gathered, can a Soil be formed out of the earth’s material which is fit to carry the spirit.”

H. Freyer.

“Our moral consciousness is nothing but a deployment of our self-consciousness as natural beings.”

P. Krannhals.

The key formula of Nazi philosophy “the relativity of Values and the absoluteness of Power” applies to all those spiritual
entities or systems, such as reason, ethics, law, culture, which we are accustomed to respect as standards independent of governments and national interests, but embodied more or less perfectly in the commonsense thinking and feeling of society. Seeing that "society" is always but an uneven mirror of "humanity", commonsense is necessarily variable and imperfect; nevertheless, it forms the intellectual and emotional organ of men in their social existence by means of which they strive to keep in touch with objective Truth and absolute Right, with spiritual eternity and perfection. By the operation of rational and moral commonsense, men agree, as best they can, to range the obligations of good sense and goodness above their interests, instincts, impulses and idiosyncrasies. Not that they subordinate their emotional to their intellectual self; rather do they recognize a higher code both of thinking and feeling over and above both emotional egoism and calculating selfishness. Nor do they subordinate their individual to a collective Ego; the fragmentary social universality of commonsense rather carries a suggestion of the mental scope of universal humanity, addressing every individual as a personal depository of human nature and dignity, beyond every concrete system of power and interests, be it even the system of a World Empire or a Pan-Human Republic. Men, on the plane of rational and ethical commonsense, however much they stamp it with the sign of their frailty which they cannot help nor hide, are fundamentally directed towards supra-human values and requirements. These are destined to govern their minds and their conduct and can never be confused with the interests or the soul of any of their groups, nor identified with the command of any of their public authorities.

There have, however, always been attempts made to expropriate reason and ethics, falsifying them into the will of princes, the aims of nations, the particularism of narrow provinces, or the ecstatic "totality" of sects: to substitute an inflated and deified "We" for the divine law in obedience to which "we" may humbly but not without a more enduring dignity understand and co-operate with one another, in order to reach the goal of salvation and progress towards which "we" must move in concord with others. Thus, in our time, Bolshevism declares that whatever is apt to further the aims of the proletarian class struggle is "good". Similarly, in the eyes of Naziism, everything
is good that agrees with the points of view of a powerful and racially constituted Germanic Empire. To be sure, the similarity is only partial, in a sense only apparent; there is a point at which the parallel breaks off abruptly. "Proletarian class struggle" refers to the general structure of society, it can be translated (though not without a slight extension of meaning) into terms of humanitarian morals such as "justice", "equality", "emancipation", "rationalized production", "control of economic processes acquired by those most subject to their effects", etc. But a "German fascist State of pure blood" is in its very essence, beyond mere tactics and technicalities, an ideal of irrational particularity and indissoluble concreteness; it is absolutely impossible to state it in terms of humanity. It does not imply that "we" are justified in taking liberties because we are the active and unique trustees of a universal cause of mankind; it merely claims full credit for "Us" (incarnate in our set of Leaders) because we are the best of mankind in so far as we are "we" and at most, because in "our" belief there exists no higher law which mankind in its diverse bodies should reasonably obey.

Therefore all "superior" obligations for the individual are no longer visualized, registered, discussed, codified and conveyed by society; they are embodied in historical entities and issued by holders of power. Reason and Ethics are no longer expounded and interpreted; they are expropriated by rulers acting in the name of indivisible national "souls". A striking example is furnished by the amended "Categorical Imperative" of Darré, a Nazi philosopher of "racial nobility" and "peasant aristocracy" of Rosenberg's kidney (now Reichsnährungsminister: Minister of food supplies). Kant formulated the axiom of morality in the terms: "Always act so that the principle of your action could be maintained as a universal law of conduct". A noble maxim, though rather lacking in practical direction. It sounds very different in the wording of Darré: "As a German, always act so that your German co-nationals could make you their paragon". This does not exactly convey more, but it has more local zest, more and even overmuch reference to special, concrete conditions of life. Two further "moral commandments" (!) for "German youth", though their text avoids all mention of nationality, attest to the same spirit of group subjectivism: "Become what you are according to your disposition".
“Preserve the treasure of your disposition.” It seems to be taken for granted that the disposition is good; in doubtful cases the competent N.S.D.A.P. official will certainly decide with convincing authority what your “disposition” or mine has to be. The more insane pride and complacent self-worship, the more slavery of will and obscurity of mind! With Darré let us associate Lenz (1917): “Our ethical object is the Volk as an organism (!) . . . the social idea, in an organico-social rather than an individuo-social sense.”

Hommes defines “ethical will” as “vital feeling itself in a moral and religious form”. Philosophy is only possible as a reflection of the vital process, embedded in the activities of life. Knowledge is but life engaged in experimenting. Beware of a Spirit that becomes “mere intellect”; guard against the “tricks of consciousness”. Knowledge must be considered and guided from a Völkisch point of view. Neither sound logic nor rich experience matter in science, but the political soundness and zeal of its cultivators. . . . “In regard to the fundamentals of human life, whatever is believed by a (!) whole community, is ipso facto a conviction amply tested as to its truth.” The following axiom reveals both the proper distribution and the main objects of knowledge: “The lawgivers of a community” (the rulers) “must have a particularly clear knowledge of the eternal laws of Life, of human growth, and of national fruitfulness”. Vital strength and advantage, not “private insight” or the “destructive discussion of many possibilities”, are the test of thinking. The “discipline of national community of ideology and outlook” guarantees rationality in the right sense: So reason is the privilege of those who wield the “discipline”. “This original power of the soul cannot, of course, be handled like a geometrical instrument.” Objective and controllable rationality, demonstrable logic in the structure of thoughts, are replaced by the criterion, for mental processes, of racial and governmental descent. Ethics share the same fate. “We must be good as whole beings, good by nature, in order that good thoughts and intentions may surge from our minds.” Thus the query as to what is right and wrong is dismissed. Why should we conceive models of goodness if we can be sure of having “living” goodness inside us? We are only to follow and obey those who, by imposing “discipline” on us, make our “lives” effective and plastic. Surely they draw good-
ness out of us; no "private insight", no "sterile discursiveness", spurious and irrelevant brain-products that they are, are needed to find and apply its ideal laws. Goodness is not attached to definable types of conduct but to given types of blood; it is not represented by any formula of what ought to be done but is simply identical with "our" way of doing things, agreement and conformity with our "essence" being secured by the ruling wizards of "Life", "growth" and "fruitfulness".

Moralists, like empirical Utilitarians, are helpless when faced by the reality of war (Baumler). Heroism can gain no foundation from mere morality and duty; it requires "concrete supra-moral unity and self-commitment". Moral ideologies will never do justice to the "earnestness of fighting", for "no historical power is completely evil". The conclusion Baumler draws from this is not that the fighting attitude must have its limits but that tribal loyalties rank above moral considerations. Your Foe be your devil; your Master be your god. Power and Spirit shall be one; the Führer, a "spiritual principle" (Benn). In his study on "politics and morality in Hegel's philosophy of history", Heimsoeth conjures up the classical invectives of the great Totalitarian against "false morality", the molesting of public factors with "private standards", "rotten reflections", "Philistine criticism", and the "pure morality" of Pacifists ignorant of human nature. He also refers to the elements of Liberalism and spiritual objectivism in the system of Hegel, who was certainly a broad-minded systematizer rather than a tribal maniac; but the State expropriation of ethics—as opposed to morality proper—remains the prevailing feature of decisive influence.

Heidegger's "existential philosophy", too, is signally calculated to destroy moral reflections and laws, replacing them by the ethics of a concrete and compelling inward Power. The reader will recall Heidegger's contempt for society and commonsense: the "On" ("das Man") and its correlate, "oneself", i.e., the ego as a member of society. He contrasts to them the conception of "one's own real self", in which the experience of an unbreakable and indivisible absolute community of existence and struggle becomes manifest. My shameful dependence on "the others" ceases with the realization that I am identical with them, indeed that the community is myself. Heidegger, modifying
the notion of conscience taken over from Luther, calls "conscience" the phenomenon of existence (Dasein) attaining self-consciousness in antagonism to the spurious selfhood of the individual (as a member of the loose-jointed community of "On"). The "voice of conscience" calls us to face our "guiltiness" of existence, in the sense of metaphysical self-exposure, without any implication of moral rules and sanctions. It does not urge us to repent, to examine our record, to form good resolutions. It simply stirs the depths beneath the surface—nothing else. It speaks in nobody's name, says Heidegger, with no reference to facts, and initiates no "inner dialogue". "Conscience speaks exclusively and continuously in the mode of silence." Its "call" is not susceptible to objectivization; it "refuses argument and discussion". The "call" is identical with the "caller": "In conscience, Dasein calls to itself. . . Dasein, a prey to anxiety in the state of abjectness (Geworfenheit), is the caller." Conscience, being merely a call for genuine existence (eigentliches Seinkönnen), carries with it no practical suggestions, no material ethics, no laws capable of formulation, no "controllable and calculable, secure possibilities of action". It is pardonable if the reader is weary of these philosophical heights and abysses; however, the meaning appears simple enough. I should put it, with apologies for this un-Teutonic profaneness and clarity, very briefly thus: Never let a moral consideration prevail against the command of your superior officer. Pragmatic moralities are but specious constructions; rules are but technical by-laws. There is no perfection for you except being absolutely your true self; which you are inasmuch as you are living and acting purely on behalf of the community of existence to which you belong. The absolute "conscience" of Heidegger is nothing but the inner flag of totalitarian militarism: the inmost soul of man adapted to the requirements of fascism. The Lutheran amoralism of despair with its atheistic hopelessness in the face of God's majesty, with its desperate courage for moral nihilism (peccafortiter) serves as a sub-structure. Heidegger is to Luther what the stern totalitarian tyranny of fascism is to monarchical absolutism strengthened by the Lutheran contempt for and secularization of pragmatic morality. (Compare Burgert's cutting criticism of Jaspers, Heidegger's lesser brother. The tragic and genuine man of Jaspers, too, "would be deprived of
fate (schicksallos) by obeying a moral law". More concrete forms of "obedience" do not seem to interfere with the "depths of existence", because they leave room for collective anarchism, for a kind of cosmic solitude of Man absorbed in his Tribe.)

The solemn immoralism of Professor Gogarten of the "dialectical" school of Lutheran theology, as well as the nationalist romandistes of his more picturesque counterfeit Stapel, the Prussian master of "volksbürgerlich" education, are very much in Heidegger's line, although both have preserved a veneer of Christian religiosity and both have the advantage of a lucid and delightful style. The unconditioned "Thou shalt" linked by Gogarten with every sort of conventional morality ("Man-tut-das-und-das"; such things "are done") fully corresponds to Heidegger's "Conscience" deprecating pragmatic instructions. "Thou shalt", too, is both mercilessly radical and practically purposeless; it addresses no supposed moral ability of man, and is indeed no proper summons, as it cannot really be obeyed; it merely aims at discovering, at laying bare, the unalterable evilness of man. (Dasein calling on itself in its Geworfenheit—Heidegger.) "Thou shalt" is a mirror for sin, an illumination of man in his real position, his abjectness and absolute dependence. the awareness of which forms his only possibility of freedom. "Ethics have no meaning except on the supposition that man is not good." The evil of man does not turn on his bondage to infraspiritual Nature; it is inseparable from his very spiritual essence. Thus the rationalistic designs of progress, cherished by humanitarian ethics, are all trash. Man cannot yearn for "reform" or "improvement"; his only chance, not of goodness, to be sure, but of submission to "unconditioned goodness" and thereby of participation of some kind, is to experience his evil in the light of "Thou shalt", and consciously to accept and accentuate his radical bondage (Dem-Andern-hörig-sein), his incorporation into concrete and commanding community. Here we have the same old story, with only a slight variation in text, as that told by Heidegger. The community of free subjects, united by a common understanding of objective and universal values, and pledged to evolve practicable rules out of them for the regulation of everyday conduct and social co-operation ("On"); pragmatic morality is repudiated as the sphere of superficiality, paltriness and illusion. The community of radical
bondage, of animal heroism and "naked" existence is conceived as identical with the sphere of genuine existence or true ethics. If I may attempt a free translation also of Gogarten, the formula may be propounded: *Never indulge in the dream of turning your evil-will into goodwill: but you can easily give it a content of goodness by surrendering it to the will of your master.* But Gogarten himself states it explicitly enough. Moral demands of the "On" type, he writes, are fundamentally insincere: they call evil good and good evil; they either represent the anonymity, cowardice and mediocrity of conventional morality, lacking ethical relevancy, or else encourage the sham idealism of autonomous personality and the pursuit of ethical "perfection", bound to go to pieces when clashing with the "unintelligible powers of the world". There is nothing to choose between the meanness of utilitarian and the deceptiveness of idealistic ethics. "No concrete demands in the mode of 'Thou shalt', have any certain application". But the "On" in a wider sense, the everyday publicity of society, has still some function; to put a check on crime and on the major crime of ethical aspirations. This constabulary and conventional "On" will protect the "outward orders" of life against the desperate receiver of "Thou shalt"; it "shall prevent this dismayed 'Thou' from carrying the poison of personal despair into the world and its orders of bondage, be it either by his insistence on utility, pleasure and gratification of urges, or by the much more destructive principle of the craving for ethical perfection". Among our authors Gogarten is the least modern, fascist, nationalist, ecstatic, and the most deeply imbued with the wisdom of reactionary resignation. Expropriating ethics in the name of "bondage" in general, he entrusts "bondage" in the concrete social body with the safer task, revealed with more sincere realism, of protecting all dirt, sloth and injustice ingrained in the life of society from ethical criticism and redress.

Concrete powers, no laws, no logical structures in the flesh of life, no moral obligations: this is also W. Stapel's device. The sphere of Religion is good; the sphere of Nature is good; but the sphere of "Rationalism", lurking between these two, has no legitimate place. For once it is expunged, the realm of pagan barbarism, human life centred in the "sphere of Nature", will have little to fear from the "sphere of Religion", which is itself
a mirage of Prussian barrack-rooms in the clouds. The Jewish idea of justice, individualistic, nomistic, casuistic, is unpalatable to "us Germans", who prefer a "Teutonic State and Master (Herren-) justice". "We Germans do not like conscience made into formulas." The sunny side of grim young Heidegger! In his "Christian Statesman", Stapel harries the "modern humanitarians" who, though otherwise mostly atheists, take advantage of the Sermon on the Mount "whenever they set themselves to unnerv the State by morals". What we really need, however, are able and strong rulers, not morals, which appeal directly to everybody and are liable to endanger the State as a weapon in the hands of its subjects. This seems to be the main idea of Stapel, though he may not say it in so many words. Anyhow, he advocates "paternal rule" in opposition to "Right and rights", which he declares to be "an artificial scaffolding of life" that makes the world hard and soulless. He leans on Luther, who said, "thus preparing the way for absolute kingship", that Man stood above the Law and a competent government was more important than good laws. Stapel dedicates himself to the task of disarming the ideology of a "Christian State", meaning a State modelled on the principles of a supposed Christian code of ethics. Such an ideal is bound to lose itself in arrant nonsense. No kind of material ethics can rightly be associated with the Christian faith; for instance, the Sermon on the Mount was merely a collection of homilies for a small circle of the Lord's personal followers. Nor has the conception of "moral height" and, consequently, of "moral progress" any invariable or tangible meaning. The more we enter into practical controversies concerning public administration, the less applicable will ethical standards become. "There are naive Anglo-Saxons who assert that a democratic form of government answers the moral ideal of Christianity and is therefore the 'highest'." But the truth is that ethical doctrines are only applicable within the close limits of "definite historical situations and definite groups of men". Even the axiom "Inflict not upon others what you do not wish for yourself" may fail in practice; for what if, in complete indifference to my fellow-men, I wish nothing for myself but to be left alone; or what if I am a masochist who loves to be maltreated? (Do these shallow blasphemies need refutation? Even the "a-social" man will appeal for help when threatened by
peril; even the pervert who enjoys being kicked by a handsome, fair-haired Nazi terrorist wishes to have his "will" respected, and will probably object to being "shot while in flight".

"Morality is only possible in infinite variety... it is inextricably interwoven with the particular conditions of life." Only "living" morality, not one which is based on "principles", deserves attention. As for the experience of an unconditioned "Ought" ("Thou shalt"), it is never associated with material prescriptions. The will of God has surer ways of manifestation than by moral conscience or, lower than this, by moral laws,—the way of direct revelation and sanction of earthly power. Here we approach the culmination, the very core of the Stapelian criticism of ethical aspirations. "The denunciation and defamation of Power on 'moral' grounds is immoral, a rebellion against the will of God... if power were immoral, God himself who is all-powerful would be all-immoral." Yet ethical idealism, as well as Liberalism, never denounced power as immoral in itself. In the Christian view, power is good when it is controlled and used by goodness, this condition being completely fulfilled in the case of God. True, earthly power has a strong tendency to become preoccupied with the self, detached from goodness and the rational administration of life, and therefore requires close watching, in some cases more than in others; yet it must not be generally denounced, only submitted to moral standards and subjected to moral claims. On the contrary, what Stapel is aiming at is the assumption of moral dignity and authority by power, especially political power, as such.

Morals, the homeless "region of rationalism", says Stapel, are but secularized religion, an unnatural abstraction from religious commandments and biological conditions. Thus monogamy has no ethical justification in itself; it is simply based on the word of God in the New Testament. Moral forces are always interlocked with immoral ones; the soul is a battlefield of daemons; good and evil cannot be defined in material terms, for they do not adhere to types of action but only to the state of mind that happens to accompany them. There is no moral progress, only a "victory or perdition" of the divers daemonic forces. An unknown power, not "myself", brings about the "victory of Good" in me. All practical systems of morals are determined by national situation and temperament; moral codes are ethnic codes (Nomos, "Volks-Nomos").
Although some formal terms are common to all, such as "good and evil", or "prowess", the hierarchy of values depends on sovereign Volksgeist. One should always refrain from overstepping the boundaries of one's own Volks-Nomos, from aspiring to universal morality and a logical system of moral conduct. "Sound ethics do not consist in logical firmness but in the appositeness of the rules of conduct to the biological conditions of the community, as determined by its vital inheritance and evolution. . . . A community is 'morally sound' if its natural ethics are expressive of the vital and creative forces which are at work in it. The ethical 'Ought' has the function of eliminating all rotten, easygoing, weary, slack elements. May the harsh and sturdy characters gather in the midst of our people, and overwhelm with the contempt they deserve the feeble and undisciplined pack who claim morality for themselves!"

From this temperamental outbreak it is easy to infer how little kinship there is between Stapel's Volks-Nomos theory and the justifiable aspect of ethical relativism. Certainly one moral code, identical in every detail, cannot prevail all over the world; nations, at their different stages of evolution, as well as different social circles in general, must have their preferences and make particular inflections in the moral order of values. But the crux of the matter is whether, allowing for the unavoidable limitations and imperfections of the human mind, such diversities are merely meant to be different modes of grasping the objective order of truths and values supposed to be one and universal, or whether the order of truths and values itself is seen as a vital product, a "flower" of tribal temperament and national interests. Stapel obviously has the latter in mind. Actually he does not care for the presence of a "living", a psychologically, moral code in the consciousness of nations; what he really values is the presence in the consciousness of his ("our") nation of such a code as could best ensure military efficiency. His is not a genuine study in moral relativity, but an expropriation of ethics in the service of designs of power. He does not in fact endorse popular morality; for popular morality is not directed to popular "life" or "genius" or "interests", it is directed, even though in a popular manner, to morality; whereas Stapel denounces the very pursuit of morality in general as a sign of degeneration, a filthy sentimental illusion intruding between "simple obedience to
God” and “sound power policy”. “Intelligible morals mean irretrievable perdition for man. . . . Morality is a foul compromise between the illusions of rational purity and the natural brutality of life. . . . Genuine morality (das echte Sittliche) is the spiritual commitment to the Volk.” Stapel objects to accepting the Decalogue, the product of one special “national Nomos”, as a universal standard of ethics, and asks for national ethics “of our own”, adapted to the exigencies of “our national biology” and helping the “harsh and sturdy characters amongst us” to assume control; he is glad to declare that the national Nomos, a “mixture of the divine and the terrestrial”, “cannot be laid down and codified clearly and rationally.” However, the “moral consciousness of our people”, notwithstanding relativities and variations, and even the invasions of national hysteria, is in some ways a section of Western commonsense, and is rather likely to run counter to Stapel’s suggestions. The “moral consciousness of our people”, as far as it exists (which it certainly does), is highly interested in the Ten Commandments, regardless of their “Syrian” origin, just as Bach’s music and Leibnitz’s mathematics have significance in all parts of the world, whether any Germans live there or not, and is at the same time more or less indifferent to the “exigencies of our national biology”, which are scarcely its business. It is perfectly true, for instance, that the music of Dvorak or Mussorgsky differs from the music of Bach or Mozart partly owing to the different racial genius they are bound to express; nor is there any reason why Chinese mathematicians should not show delightful variations in their way of thinking when compared with Leibniz or Gauss. But the relativism of Stapel does not stop here; his doctrine would entail the consequence that Slav musicians must turn a deaf ear to Bach and Mozart, their chief preoccupation being to combat throat and ear infirmities among the Czech people, or to fortify the arm-muscles of Russian violinists; that Chinese mathematicians might ignore Leibniz’s pioneer work in “logistics” or Gauss’ theory of equations, but would be obliged to know all statistical figures relating to Chinese military organization. Thus Stapel does not advocate the relativity of morals but the relativism that kills morals; he does not care about German morality but about German amorality. He is not concerned with the subtle facts of actual moral consciousness in his
people. He stands for ecstatic naturalism and primitivism, urging his people to forsake their moral consciousness and to regress to a tribal condition (no matter how far such a state of things was ever real) in which its ethic is once more confluent with local traditions of sorcery and the Will of the Warrior Wizards—and the test of which will be whether its pursuit enables the community to raid the neighbouring tribe with success.

By calling this an “expropriation of ethics”, I regret to find myself at cross-purposes with Herr Stapel, for he would rather apply this term to describe the attitude of one who really does profess, discuss and apply moral standards in the proper, material sense of the word without, however, losing sight of his own varying interests. To put it briefly in English, Stapel jeers at the maxim “Honesty is the best policy”, because it makes honesty instrumental to policy; his own principle could be stated thus: “Policy without moral restraints is the only form of honesty.” He is one of those blaspheming pseudo-Christians who despise a successful tradesman as a selfish hypocrite but see a successful brigand with the halo of a chaste and wild piety. Ethics, says Stapel, must not be “mingled” with life-interests; therefore life-interests must be made into ethics. The truth is that Western utilitarianism inoculates genuine ethics into the tissue of life, whereas pagan amoralism expropriates the dignity of ethics, substituting for it a reckless “sovereignty” of life. The English or American reader will be flattered to hear how thoroughly Stapel has mastered the psychology of the Anglo-Saxon race: “Not till the Anglo-Saxons found it expedient was political moralism raised to ‘universal validity’; they discovered its usefulness after having conquered a sufficiently large slice of the world by ruse and violence. The moral mania spread over the world by Anglo-Saxon newspapers and the speeches of Anglo-Saxon statesmen is one of the means employed to stabilize Anglo-Saxon world-power. This means is decidedly wonderful” (the author quotes the English word!), “since the moralism of printing-ink is less expensive than are army and navy, though unfortunately for the present, as long as immoral nations, like, for instance, the Germans, still exist, these must also be kept ready.” Let us leave it at that, though the sarcastic diatribe is as full of logical slips as it is lacking in real pungency. Let us comfort
ourselves by believing that in the long run "moral mania" will continue to prove more successful than immoral mania. For we know the profound and fragrant secret of "Honesty is the best policy": In this connection "honesty" is not a question of mere "policy" (though a politic use may be made of it by the wary). It is genuine and because it is so, ultimately proves successful. As Kipling's Mohammedan schoolmaster meditates on the English:

"Certainly they were mad from of old: but I think one new thing,
That the magic whereby they work their magic—wherefrom their fortunes spring—
May be that they show all peoples their magic and ask no price in return."

It would be unjust to expect Stapel to possess the insight of the Moslem schoolmaster of Bengal infantry. But it may prove so much the worse for the misguided youth of whom he has charge as an allegedly "Christian" schoolmaster. Perhaps the less that "magic" is adopted the higher the "price" that must be paid "in return".

2. THE MORALS OF GREATNESS AND RUTHLESSNESS

"The tricks applied by political alchemy look very complicated, and so they are, if measured by the ordinary works of human culture. For the latter count with man as he is; they assuage his natural needs beneficently, they are meant to satisfy him, to make him happy, to ennoble him—not to drive him into a new mode of existence and honour. . . . However, it is the simple canon of Political Art to see simple things simply, as a whole and to look them in the face: to see them as the Hunter sees the Beast, and the Beast the Hunter; such is the logic of Virtue Political, and the Decalogue of its Ethics."

H. FREYER.
“Great history is not made by suave people: it is made by strong men—who are strong because they are absolutely hard men.”

A. Rosenberg.

The distinction between moral greatness and historical greatness, which has recently been discussed by the English philosophers de Burgh and Alexander, provides a valuable key for the understanding of Neo-German ethics. Historical greatness constitutes the very ideal of Nazi morals: the unfolding of “our” qualities and energies, grand, pure, and effective, is bound to prove the “best” thing that can happen, irrespective of any “abstract” code of ethics which would unnaturally force “good” human substance down to the level of mongrels and degenerates. The substitution for genuine ethics of a concrete racial and national Type (Volkheit, Volkestum, Volks-Nomos, Germanentum, etc.), materialized in a concrete Set of Rulers (Führertum) as the interpreters and agents of the nation, corresponds to “greatness” as a visible and workable principle of valuation. We play the right part if we play a part in the profound and pious awareness that it is very much “our” part; moreover, as “we”, incarnated in our Heroes and Daemons, are ourselves the measure and pledge of “goodness”, it becomes an ethical duty for us to play a great part. This idolatry of historical greatness is also an offspring of Naturalism and Vitalism as discussed in Chapter IV. Our lives are destined to form a grand, conspicuous, formative, plastic, memorable manifestation of the cosmic Wave of Life; not, as Christian and Humanitarian philosophy teach, to form a well-ordered system of rational pursuits, just rewards, equitable distribution, responsible solidarity, charity, kindness, self-restraint and self-expression, enlightened peace and happiness, etc., grounded in the nature and claims of human personality. We must organize ourselves with a view to being capable of attaining power, a pre-eminent position above others, “historical greatness”, spiritual qualities and achievements being included under the term “historical” as part and parcel of natural forces, and not with a view to solving the problems of communal life. It is essential that we should “trouble much water”, and determine the course of history by our strongly unique character (Eigenart) and our forceful
intervention, but not that we should put into practice a generally acceptable, convincing, satisfying and salutary pattern of social co-operation and human companionship. The morals of greatness are, naturally enough, directly opposed to the idea of universal responsibility and considerateness; they require indiscriminate sacrifice of human lives, human rights, human purity, human happiness, to the arbitrary designs of reckless adventurers. To "greatness" as an intentional leading idea is also adjoined a code of self-confessed ruthlessness even applied, if need be, to any individual within the range of the "Breed of Greatness", but rising to a standard of normality in relation to those beyond the pale.

Laws, ideals, spiritual "qualities" are a matter of indifference: "Historical power itself determines them at will". Spiritual liberty, with all its amenities, means "liberty of destruction", an anti-heroic ideology ... yet "man wants to be great; this is his greatness" says Benn, the former revolutionary poet, who remains faithful to the bombastic style of 1919, though the world has turned from Left to Right. However, the last-quoted formula is not at all irrelevant; it succinctly states that the new gospel of pagan amoralism will recognize no greatness outside the direct pursuit of greatness. It behoves Bäumler to glorify the pseudo-ethic of monumental deeds in its aspect of austere honesty, bidding man part with the illusions of "goodness" in order to rise to an existence of supreme strength and reality: "To undeceive oneself is a condition of greatness". I cannot resist supplementing this truculent tone by the fiery bravadoes of Stapel, though perhaps the reader is beginning to be surfeited by this brilliant braggart of the Prussian Creed. Anyhow, it would be a pity to pass over a thesis like: "All great deeds were done for glory's sake". (Ruhm means "glory" with a connotation of renown). Or again: "The King is ... what his Volks wants to be. His glory is the Volks's glory... It is through its King that the Volks comes to participate in the higher sphere of life: in glory". True glory, glory "metaphysical" beyond mere fame—here the author probably hints at the distance between a war-captain or a national bard, and a mere prize-fighter or scientist—is the epitome of all "values shining beyond the bounds of earthly life", the token of having "roused the attention of the gods". "Glory metaphysical is the one true
morality.” Its “Categorical Imperative” runs, “Do such deeds as spell glory”, or in a slightly altered version, “Strive to acquire a good name with the gods” (as a Christian: “with God”). To put it more explicitly, we feel the urge to “perform deeds which raise us out of the hustle of mere living and dying to the region of glory, to the gods”. On the other hand, the “good works” of morality proper are nothing but “deadly sin”. Aspiring morality is glistening sin; grovelling morality is disgusting sin. “All morality is an extortion from God. Extorted goodness is offal for hell.” But what is perhaps most illuminating is Stapel’s attack on the Decalogue as a moral code. In conformity with the Volks-Nomos theory, the general acceptance of the Ten Commandments is rejected on the ground that they satisfy specifically the conditions of one people, the Jewish, and therefore, like any other concrete body of moral law, can claim no absolute coerciveness. This may not sound very new or startling; but Stapel selects a concrete example of the utmost interest. He calls in question the evidence of the commandment admonishing us to venerate our parents. Nations under a “stabilized rule of youth” know no moral law to this effect. And, in particular, a royal nation (Konigsvolk) would profess a morality in which the respect for royalty comes before the respect of parents. An amazing expression of ethics devoured by politics, of morality suffocated by the illegitimate expansion of power-worship, of human society overgrown by the hic et nunc exigencies of the State. As though a man could owe his birth, his substance, his education to the “King” as well as to his parents! A vicious concatenation of ideas; it is as if a reformer in medical science were to say that a commercial nation professed a hygiene in which the protection of one’s title-deeds came before the protection of one’s lungs. A “moral” hierarchy placing the King above the parents may also be correctly described as Bolshevik violence and perversion cut loose from the Bolshevik ideals of justice and rationality.

The morals of greatness, ruthlessness, naked strength and efficiency pervade Nazi mentality at every point. Werner Best, of the Jünger symposium, coins the terse formula: “In the epoch of the National State one law alone holds good: Be strong!” Nor is Bestianism confined to Herr Best. As early as 1920, Ernst Mann published his “Morals of Strength”, the main precepts
of which shall be reproduced here: "You strong healthy men, strive for the supreme enhancement of your mental and corporeal strength! This is your supreme law; none other ranks higher. . . . Hard work will earn you supreme enhancement of strength. . . . Your food shall be nourishing, scanty and simple. . . . Keep chaste from your youth: only the strong in their strongest years shall attend to procreation. . . . Destroy all weaklings and invalids! . . . The strongest in body and mind shall have the leadership and mastery of mankind!" In the same spirit, though less ingenuous and considerably more tedious, Edgar Jung hurled himself upon humanitarianism, which to his mind meant "treason to distinctive values and virtues". Presumably a humanitarian is a person who thinks either that a fascist gunman reaches the spiritual height of Voltaire, or that spiritual height is of no consequence. Or else, things happen to be a shade more complicated. But Jung explains: "A true ethos appreciates value, and annihilates the valueless in order to protect supreme value. . . . Supreme value is to be attached to such actions as are intended to serve the aims of the Whole, not mere partial aims". Which "Whole" is meant? The straightforward meaning of the phrase appears to be that supreme value bids the citizens starve and hold their tongues so that the dictator may effect an extension of his power. At any rate, the unhappy author, whilst writing these harsh lines, hardly dreamed that in a few years he, a teacher of anti-humanitarian ethic, would fall a victim to it as well. For in June, 1984, the supreme value of the Nazi Whole was protected by means of a prodigal destruction of the valueless, including, alas! Herr Jung himself. In this context we may as well quote Dyrssen’s approval of the appointment of former Vehmic assassins as Nazi storm-troop leaders on the strength of their having the best records in regard to contempt of death.

The philosophy of ruthlessness is naturally linked up with Teutonic racial anthropology, the denial of the moral unity of mankind. We must refer once more to Blüher’s Satanist vision of the "Two mankinds" of Man Primary and Secondary. What Blüher essentially states is not their inequality in degree; it amounts to their absolute disparateness and lack of communication. They think in different categories, even though the outward terms be identical; when a Primarian and a Secondarian
say the same thing it is not really the same. Similarly, charity and loving one's neighbour, the "neighbour" being whoever happens to be "next" to one (prochain), just for being man (Auch-Mensch), is not a Christian virtue but merely a Jewish fad; the Christian doctrine of "love" concerns the selective Eros inspiring the formation of exclusive aristocratic "Type". Even generally observed customs of law, such as the expiation of murder by the murderer's blood, have nothing to do with morals or a contractual relationship of men in society; they have a magical provenance. (Whenever obedience to morals is inevitable, they must at least be interpreted immorally!) The sinister words of Rosenberg uttered in the summer of 1982: 

_Mensch ist nicht gleich Mensch_, that iron invocation of a new aeon of barbarism, struck the same note. At that time, a Communist called Pietrzuch was murdered at Potempa near Beuthen, Silesia, in a particularly fiendish manner by a number of Nazis, who were condemned to death under martial law issued by von Papen's Cabinet (and afterwards pardoned). Herr Hitler sent them a wire of sympathy: "United to you in unbounded faithfulness . . . your release is a question of our honour". Equally characteristic but far more interesting were Rosenberg's reflections in _Der Völkische Beobachter_: "Man is not equal to man; action is not equal to action. Five Germans are to be shot because a Pole, who was also a Bolshevik, has been slain. Justice of this kind defies the nation's most elementary instinct of self-preservation. National Socialism, however, knows no equality between souls, no equality between men, no 'right' in itself, no object except a German nation of strong men" (quoted after Murner, _Nazi Spiegel_).
3. **THE ROMANCE OF ACTIVITY**

"Our spiritual substance lives through our action (\textit{Tun})."

"Action (\textit{das 'Tun'}) comes to us. We know what we have to do, and we do it."

H. Bäcker.

"Youth is always right, because it sees things in an unspoilt manner, without inner check. For it, every 'Aye' and 'No' is not fraught with a 'But' or 'However'."

J. Goebbels.

There is another side to the naturalist and subjectivist morals of "greatness", ruthlessness and power-worship, which deserves special mention: the over-accentuation of "activity", of immediate effect, of the "plastic" and "formative" tendency in human attitudes, of the "positive" (in contradistinction to merely "prohibitive") principles of judgment and conduct, of the technical rationality of organization and service (notwithstanding material irrationalism regarding men's beliefs and devotions in general), of a reckless and humourless optimism in action (despite metaphysical and ethical pessimism). We call this peculiarity briefly "the romance of activity", though fully conscious of the inexactitude of the term; the more romantic Nazis and Neo-Germans themselves would perhaps sooner speak of a romance of "affirmation" (\textit{Bejahung, Ja-Sagen}). It may be convenient, too, to enumerate in this context the items, well known by now, of "vitalism", "existentialism", "primitivism", "heroic realism". The model warrior of National Socialism staunchly \textit{subordinates} the utilitarian calculus of his life-interests to the "service of the Whole" and the religion of the Tribal Idols; but on the other hand, he knows no \textit{detachment} from his life-interests, fused as they are with the command of the national and racial Genius. Self-sacrifice is commended, laughter at oneself is impossible; in a similar sense we find unselfishness but no altruism; self-denial but no aloofness; self-abandonment but no self-effacement; self-surrender but no self-criticism; renunciation but no abstemiousness; perspicacity
but no perspective; relativism and scepticism as a mechanical assumption, but no reservation of judgments; acuteness but no contemplation; reception of "higher" purposes but no freedom of purpose; "dynamic" change and adaption but no critical balance and so forth. It is an ethic that drowns the Ego in the "We", but forbids him to consider the "They" or acknowledge the "You". It bids him act and develop so as to answer certain collective purposes, but never places his action or development under the check of universal points of view which would require abstention, delay, revision, moderation. Thus the romance of activity by no means enfranchises and further encourages man in creative self-mastery, his personality; what it really stands for is rather the complete subjection of man for the aims of one particular system of power. The bold cynicism of Hauser, urging the supersession of the "ethics of human dignity" by "ethics based on the absence of human dignity", implies no contradiction at all. Enhanced activity in the free man certainly enriches his freedom; an active slave, however, may well be considered more slavish than an inactive slave, whose very laziness and inconsequential musing can form a province of comparative liberty. In the political sense, with a man given to the "romance of activity" it is less a case of him acting according to the Leader's will than of the Leader's will acting through him; in the philosophical sense, he is but instrumental in the action of "natural forces".

Our thoughts turn in this direction when we meet the pompous totalitarian aesthetics of the Stefan George school, extolling the "constructive idea" (Werkidee), artistic creation, Paideia or formative education as the central principles of a spiritual community; or Stapel's deformation of ethics into the corollary of a biological extravaganza: he would allow only "living", not "axiomatic", morals; or Klages's invectives against the belief in the moral perfectibility of the world and particularly against prohibitive ethics, injunctions couched in the form "Thou shalt not". Everywhere man's value is seen in his visible "thiving", his organic "shape" or "plenty", his mechanical "efficiency" or "function", not in his specifically human activities involving choice, self-restraint and responsibility. Klages could not have characterized his turn of mind better than by insisting ("Epistle on Ethics", 1918) on the rottenness of mankind, "the sphere
of moralists" , dripping with gore, murder, treachery, felony, inaccessible to all real improvement or progress, apart from petty mitigations; and in the same breath denouncing moral demands because they are "commands" especially prohibitive, destined to stifle vital activity and vitiate sound instincts. "What falls under prohibition is regularly a 'natural' or vital process. . . . The Categorical Imperative discloses itself as a categorical negation of vitality". The poor moralists seem to deserve contempt for being powerless against man's wickedness and impulsiveness; they deserve hatred for attempting to curb them. In fact, the negative ideas and values of prohibition, abstention, suspension, incompatibility, balance and counter-weights, refusal, etc., have a crucial bearing on the specifically "human", moral, rational, civilized nature of man. "Man" as such begins, not with "spiritual" existence in the sense of mental as well as merely corporeal capacities, but with his awareness of objective data, his voluntary recognition of laws, his readiness to dissociate his will from "positive", "plastic", "tangible" interests and attractions either private or tribal. "Axiomatic" morals, not "living" morals, are a necessity of his very life, of his real vital constitution, which essentially clashes with the morbid ideological worship of vitality. The romance of activity is indeed a romance of passivity, in so far as it repudiates those spiritual tensions and reservations, those attitudes of apparent inaction and retirement which are the indispensable correlates of properly spiritual and moral activity. The prisoners of that idol of activity and positivity fail to grasp that a religious or political martyr can be incomparably more "active", of more decisive influence, of more enduring memory, than the tyrant at whose orders he is executed; that muteness can, in some cases, be of more weight than eagerness to broadcast one's voice; that a discrepancy between moral convictions and social reality can prove more "fertile" than the ostensible omnipotence of Totalitarian holders of power.

The fascist mania of monopolizing spiritual relevancy for the ruler and his sworn supporters is demonstrated, not ungracefully, by Professor Freyer: "It is impossible at all times to have a valid vision except on the narrow basis of real and responsible existence. He alone knows the truth about the present who bears the flesh and blood of the future". We know that "responsible"
in the fascist vocabulary means "endowed with uncontrolled, 
direct and conspicuous power". We might casually observe, too, 
that maybe knowing the truth about the present precedes mak-
ing the body of the future. But one truth remains at all times 
unshakable: that the factors which are to coin the essential 
traits of the "future" are known by nobody.

We believe that R. Benz's sober, though by no means hostile, 
description of the rôle of the "war experience" in forming the 
post-war German "youth community" is truer to facts: "They 
prefered to gather for action, and developed a peculiar apathy 
in the face of spiritual discussion". There is no question either 
of original lack of intellect, or of a "higher" form of spirituality; 
what really has been happening is a deliberate decision against 
belief in human personality, morality and reason.

4. THE LAWLESS LAW

"According to the National Socialist principle, what guaran-
tees the maximum formation of state-power is Right. The feeling 
of Right is brought in relation to the State, not to the individual. 
Therefore nothing is 'safe' from State interference. . . . Right 
is not a matter of agreement: it is determined by the Führer. 
It is based, not on contract but on command. . . . We have no 
longer any competition between ideas: only ideas that are made 
good, and ideas that are expunged."

W. Stapel.

The reader will hardly be surprised to hear that Naziism also 
takes up a subversive position in the domain of jurisprudence. 
The details of that position are naturally determined by the 
ideals of the Totalitarian State, of the primacy of political power 
interests, of "greatness and ruthlessness", of racial particular-
ism, of the aversion to logical clarity and rational consistency as 
well as to "bürgerlich" security. In the Nazi view, Law is not 
a safeguard for the citizen against oppression and chicanery but 
another means of securing omnipotence for the Lords of the 
State; not a precise system of regulations, calculated to secure 
the conduct of national life for those subject to its authority,
but an emanation of ethnic sentiments and a tool for national “life” or “necessity”. In a word, the object of law is no longer to check but rather to encourage the arbitrary exertion of public power. Law, too, is no longer a classic form of the relationship between society and the individual, no longer a standard attribute of human co-operation with its peculiar and unchallenged dignity; it has lost its distinctive note and has become degraded to one of the arbitrarily alterable technicalities of group “existence”, or of the animal manifestations of völkisch “soul” and “style”. The main concern for law is not to be sound as a system, lucid, well-balanced, free from loopholes and anachronisms, with sufficient foundation in extra-legal axioms of justice, rich in legal acumen and tradition, making the authority of public order unassailable, but to be thoroughly “German” and, what is of more practical moment, an easily manageable instrument in the hands of the ruling set. Perhaps from no other section of the battle-line, which extends from religion to industrial order, do we gain such a vivid and pungent impression of society turning away from civilization and descending conspicuously to a level of brute existence: for Law is both a formal aspect of the framework of society and a concrete regulator of the everyday life of all within it.

In the pre-war Germany of Kaiser Wilhelm, Professor Erich Kaufmann, an eminent teacher of law, aroused considerable attention and some indignation with his polemics against the then prevailing “idealistic” schools. He took much pains in pointing out that in treaties of all kinds, but especially of international law, the clausula Rebus sic stantibus (meaning, “on the condition that circumstances remain the same”) was a vital ingredient; that the axiom Ultra posse nemo obligatur (meaning, “nobody is obliged to do more than he is able to”) deserved a generous interpretation; that, consequently, there were limits set to that other axiom Pacta sunt servanda (meaning, “pacts have to be kept”) which belonged themselves to the order of law instead of being mere extra-legal cases of an unforeseen and compelling necessity. In other words (he also used Bismarck’s affirmations of “the State’s duty to egoism” to justify his theory), he meant that weighty self-interests which would be injured by the fulfilment of a treaty not only provided extenuating circumstances for its breach, but actually annulled the
treaty. The Neo-Kantian philosophy, blessed by the semi-Liberals of Kaiser Wilhelm's Germany, colourless and anaemic stuff though it was, certainly could not give unqualified approval to these manifestations of a massive "realism" that degraded the lofty order of law to an ephemeral codification of contemporary practices. Yet it was doubtless Erich Kaufmann who gave voice, in a more outspoken though still moderate and quiet manner, to the very soul of Germany under the Prussian sway; when three years later the hour of decision came, it was on a theory like his that the rulers of Berlin took action, invading, for the sake of strategic advantages, the country whose neutrality they were pledged to protect. However, the Third Empire is to the Reich of William II what pure stuff is to adulterated ware, what gorgeous nakedness is to hybrid disguise, what the unrestrained roar of a lion is to a muffled snarl. Let us listen to von Selchow for the sake of enlightening contrast, though he, be it granted, is not a lawyer but a free-lance cavalier of anticivilianism: The law that will rule in the "We State" (Wir-Staat), "the We Law, will be an eminently virile law . . . resolution ready to assume responsibility, elementary, not overburdened by brains (unverhürt), unsentimental . . . pure reality, pure decision, destined exclusively to safeguard the Volk and its future".

But there is no dearth of university professors who think along the same lines. Thus Erik Wolf's pamphlet, "Right law (richtiges Recht) in the National Socialist State", forming Number 13 of the "Freiburg University Speeches", is adorned by the following priceless jewels: "This law (Recht) really living in us, lived by us, is the right (richtig) one. For an un-real, un-vital law is the negation of law (Un-Recht)"). Right law means "law in harmony with the essence of the Volk". He becomes more and more explicit: "The foundations of a new law are laid wherever real Volk life of the present time is stirring. Living law in practice begins to crystallize in the unwritten laws of comradeship among the S.A. and S.S. troops, or the new customs of living that flourish in the ranks of the Hitler Youth".

Professor C. Schmitt draws up a Totalitarian doctrine of law, chiefly concerned with the exclusion of any such thing as an "un-political law". The political duty of faithfulness towards Leadership (Führung) and Volk is also eminently a duty of law.
For law is no longer confined, as it was in the dark Liberal epoch, to "pre-determined abstractions cast into a system of norms". To use a gloomy English flower of speech, we Western shadows of a vanished age in the bright Fascist epoch may well dream of the old days when "lawyers were lawyers", whereas to-day they are mere lackeys and scribes of the tyrants, such as Schmitt, who sat in the Prussian State Council which was whistled together by Herr Goering. Certainly Schmitt deserves praise for his almost punctilious openness of expression. He does not tire of scourging that incredibly mean Liberal past when there was a "settlement by process of law of controversies between the subjects and objects of supervision"; when there were "authorities to supervise State control itself"; when "political Leadership was thwarted by the apparatus of Justice"; when the phantom of "freedom from the State" was at large; when people believed in the superstition of primal rights (Grundrechte) before and above the State. In his newest "phase of evolution", the nimble-minded man of science has even gone a step further. He distinguishes three stages of juridical thought, the great gulf lying between the first or "normative" form, establishing an impersonal system of juridical norms independent of the actual ruler's will and the second or "decisionistic" form, setting up the will decisions of the holders of power as a permanent source and principle of law. Having thus substituted the fascist for the Liberal and constitutional conception, Schmitt introduces a third phase of consummate perfection, which appears to be more especially fitted to National Socialism: "decisionism" passes into "the concrete order of the Volk as a substantial principle of law" (Ordnungsrecht). This final touch of perfection corresponds to Schmitt's super-fascist theory of affinitive or racial leadership (arteigenes Führertum, cf. Chapter III). It is no longer the sanctity of mere Command as such, it is the sanctity of Command arising out of our existing "Volk-bound" hierarchy of powers that he is now professing. No cruder mistake could be made than to see in this development a withdrawal from the anti-objective despotic principle; on the contrary, the Tyrant is confirmed all the more for being anointed not as "the" Tyrant pure and simple but as "this Our Tyrant who actually rules Us". The new Schmittian theory maintains that Law is not a logical precondition for
völkisch community but its "mode of existence", directly founded in "blood". "Community and Law in the concrete dialectical sense are one". Reviewing these streams of modern German thought from an English angle we feel the impulse to remember those beautiful war stanzas of Mr. Alfred Noyes:

Yet for her faith does England fight,
   Her faith in this our universe,
Believing Truth and Justice draw
   From founts of everlasting law;

The law that rules the stars, our stay,
   Our compass through the world's wide sea,
The one sure light, the one sure way,
   The one firm base of Liberty;

Therefore a Power above the State,
   The unconquerable Power, returns,
The fire, the fire that made her great
   Once more upon her altar burns.

Nor shall that divine fire of rational and decent humanity be either crushed beneath the feet of fascist hordes, or extinguished by the inventive Lawyers of Lawlessness.

Views similar to those of up-to-date Schmitt are expounded by Heinrich Lange under the device of "German v. Roman law". In the widest sense, the antithesis means "No individual rights, and no 'rigid' formal system of law guaranteeing normality, continuity and calculability to civil life; in its place a concrete order of community, an expression of concrete justice, entrusted to the care of omnipotent interpreters". The author falls foul of the notion of subjective "rights", of a "right to something" (Recht auf); he challenges the axiom "Qui suo jure utitur neminem laedit" (He who exercises his right injures no one); he scorns the right of citizens to seek justice in the courts; he mocks the Liberal principle "whatever is not forbidden is allowed". Liberalism and justice (Recht) are essentially foreign to one another (!); for Liberalism denies the identity between Law and concrete morality. Most certainly law cannot be identical with morality proper, but is ultimately founded on its more general and compelling demands; we see which political
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philosophy leads up to a wholesale suppression of “concrete morality” from the foregoing parts of the present Chapter. The notions of “honesty and faithfulness” (Treu und Glauben) or “decenty” (gute Sitten), the so-called general concepts (General­klauseln) are merely “eggs in another bird’s nest” in the Liberal system of law. I should rather think that all talk of “law” is but a misplaced ornament in the Nazi system of domination. “Law is the order of the life of community. Like the latter (!), it is not rigid but involved in a continuous flow.” We cannot help inferring that the laws of addition and multiplication change incessantly, for the mental processes of reckoning are undeniably “not rigid but involved in a continuous flow”. Lange accordingly complains of some features of the pre-Nazi German Civil Code: It annoys him that the Civil Code includes no punitive measures; also that unjust possessions are protected qua possessions; that “the interests of the public”, particularly from the standpoint of eugenics, lack protection. The trend of future evolution is correctly characterized by the prophetic conjecture: “The introduction of the ideas of duty and community dismembers the structure of law. The lucid, clearly articulated, strictly deducible constructions of a rational system of law will yield to a living organism, which will be full of fluidity, interplay and inconsequent deviations, and will be supported by a feeling of equity. The intellect must be fused with the sentiment: pectus juris consultum facit (it is the breast that decides the law)” (Lange). The whole thing gives an impression of orgiastic arbitrary power and unrestrained tribal superstition rather than the emotional accents of “equity”; it evokes an upsurge of the subconscious far more than coeur in the sense of Pascal. It may be amusing to re-quote Lange’s stern condemnation of Liberalism as “essentially foreign to Law”.

Professor Koellreutter’s efforts are directed to demonstrate that the new “National State” answers the ideal of a Constitutional State, or State governed by Law (Rechtsstaat) in so far as this ideal is really justified, i.e., more than an idol worshipped without critical awareness and with no bearing on national life. In his book published shortly before Hitler’s advent to power (“The National Rechtsstaat: on the Transformation of the German State Conception”), Koellreutter attempts to rescue some scanty remnants of the classical Rechtsstaat principle and
to ward off the more extreme theorists, who, like Freisler, with characteristic Nazi greed, claim the name of “Rechtsstaat” for the exact opposite of what it hitherto designated. Koellreutter suspects that the present despair for the fate of the rule of Law is mainly an expression of some people’s fears for their own legal positions which it has been supposed to guarantee. In pre-war Germany the bürglicher Rechtsstaat was a self-evident and generally accepted postulate, shared even by those who were intent on a certain modification of its structure in a Conservative or Socialist sense. This unquestioned respect for the ideals of juridical stability, personal safety and legal elaboration was rendered possible by the poise and prosperity which then qualified the national situation, allowing a cult of legal purity without prejudice to the vital interests of the nation, a state of things more or less resembling what had long become traditional in Great Britain. The firm foundations of home and foreign policy were not questioned; even the theoretical elucidation of the relations between the social and the legal system resulted in no problems of really vital urgency. All this underwent a radical change owing to the national and universal crisis brought about by the war and its consequences. National safety and prosperity were gone; the balanced political system of Europe disappeared; political self-reliance reached a phase of permanent disequilibrium. At the same time, the constitutional system of Weimar indulged in a utopian exaggeration of the Rechtsstaat principle, overstrained the fiction of a “normal” condition of society, rejoiced in the pompous perfection of constitutional guarantees of personal and political liberty. Thus the tension between legal correctness and political necessity, which had been treated with tacit neglect in the pre-war era without forcing itself into men’s consciousness, was now aggravated; the legal ideal of the Liberal State entirely lost touch with the problems of national existence, and was bound to go to pieces. A new conception of Rechtsstaat has become necessary, and Koellreutter offers his services in supplying it. His point of departure is the discovery that “the vital moment is just as essential as the ethical moment”. A most equivocal formula! Wherever life is threatened, the “vital moment” can become even more essential than the “ethical moment”; but the axioms of right conduct form precisely the domain of ethics,
the "vital moment" entering merely as a substratum, a material of action. The startling revelation that men, as well as nations, generally claim the right to live, is already taken into account in moral and legal codes. It is obvious that a temporary depression of the moral level of existence (whether or not it also affects the sphere of legal regulations) may prove necessary in cases of emergency in order to save existence itself; but to say that national calamity enforces and justifies an essentially modified conception of State legality, with a partial omission of the "moral moment", is as preposterous as saying that a man who has suffered grave misfortune is entitled to adopt, and wise in doing so, a standard of behaviour with the idea of honesty expunged. Certainly France under the dictatorial rule of Clemenceau was not the same punctilious Rechtsstaat as it had been in 1918; but Clemenceau and his supporters never dreamt of erecting the national distress of those times into a new constitution or a new legal code, let alone a new philosophy of law, centring around the terrible facts of the enemy invasion and the havoc wrought upon Northern France, in place of the ideas of liberty, safety and stability of order.

Therefore it sounds a poor defence of legal justice when Koellreutter tamely accuses Roland Freisler, a petulant Nazi "jurist" (now Secretary of State), of "emphasizing the vital moment in a one-sided fashion". It is as if a man, interesting himself in the product of a certain multiplication, were to say that six times ten lies somewhere between sixty and a hundred and twenty, but it would be too arbitrary to call it six hundred. Freisler, of course, makes short work of legal problematics: "Rechtsstaat means for us the Volk's organized mode of living, the concentration of all vital forces in the Volk, in order to secure its right in interior and exterior relations... the organized mobilization of the compressed energies of the Volk, aiming at the protection of the Volk's life, provides our conception of the Constitutional State". We may as well leave it at that, seeing that civic liberty, too, is defined nowadays as the freedom of the Führer to do whatever he chooses on the citizen's behalf.

In a subsequent publication (1938), Professor Koellreutter paid due tribute to the historical events that had so happily confirmed his well-founded expectations of the previous year, by carefully diminishing the distance between radicalism à la
Freisler and his own more "scientific" formulations. The new State, he asserts, will also experience a certain tension between Power and the order of justice. A compromise between legal and political value is striven for. Yet "at different times the conception of Rechtsstaat is variable according to the prevalence of definite political ideologies. . . . Power and Recht (right; law; legal justice) are the twin emotional values of National Rechtsstaat; only (!) it places the primary Recht value in the legal moulding and security of our national order of life". We witness with satisfaction that disagreement with Freisler has been reduced to a minimum. The Constitutional State, in the form of Nationaler Rechtsstaat, is out of danger, like the vegetarian diet recommended for reasons of health to a confirmed beef-eater, who declared that a mixed diet was the truly healthy one, but that in his eyes, meat was the best of vegetables.

Helmut Nicolai excels among the official party jurists. He, too, inveighs against mere "legal positivism" devoid of the "inner feeling of justice"; and here, too, positive law is combated as an instrument of rational and equalitarian control above the leaseholders of national Power. Roman law is denounced as foreign tutelage: "to each People an indigenous law is due". Nevertheless, this does not prevent Teutonic law from being the noblest one. Such sound legal concepts as can be found in the old Testament have made their way thither from the "Nordic sphere of culture", especially through the mediation of the "Nordic Persians". Right (Recht: just law) is neither a product of State decrees, nor of actual violence, nor of individual thought and will; racial soul and national spirit (Rassenseele, Volksgeist) are its sources. Racial purity guarantees an instinct for right beyond taint of error. Only the bastard, most typically the Jew, needs legal dogmas and niceties and written clauses. Recht can only surge up from a homogeneous plane of feeling; and pure Recht, as the reader will have guessed, from a racially pure People. It is as plain as anything that "racial instinct" as the guarantee of law is not more but less in favour of objectivity and concrete morality, not less but more in the line of pure arbitrariness than are "State decrees" or "actual violence". For State decrees can be discussed, examined and annulled, and actual violence can be met by actual resistance endowed with the very same legitimacy; whereas racial instinct,
directly applicable and intrinsically "right", means that "State decrees" issued, and "actual violence" exercised, by those who set themselves up as the guardians of "racial purity", acquire an unassailable prestige of absoluteness and finality.

In the sequel, Nicolai feels no embarrassment in pointing out simultaneously that "different peoples must have different ideas of law", and that "Teutonic moral ideas", truth, faithfulness, honour the German *Rechtsgedanke*, as distinct from the mere "outward obedience" known to the Orient, are "indispensable for the social coexistence of men". Willy-nilly, the conviction is growing upon us that Germans must have a code of *Recht* of their own, notwithstanding an alleged superiority of Christian ethics or Roman law, whereas non-Germans must submit to the German code in virtue of its overwhelming superiority. For the principles proper to Teutonic and German *Recht* are "both in theory and in fact the right ones". *Deutschrechtlich* jurisprudence, rising from the experience of "vital laws", the "dynamic" law of *Volk* and Life as opposed to the "static" law of State and statutes, is valid not only for the Germans but for all "Teutonic" nations. Englishmen, take note! On the other hand, international law can only have a very poor substance, since it comprehends various races and therefore various senses of right.

In conformity with Rosenberg, Nicolai brushes aside the "Jewish" theory of free will, and refuses to acknowledge responsibility in the proper sense; he only warrants man as the "bearer of certain qualities". The criminal is "unfit to be a valuable member of society". Punishment must not aim at correction, for disposition cannot be altered; "elimination of those of inferior value" is its sole object. Elimination of the trespasser, not requital of the misdeed. Freisler has termed this principle *Täter-Strafrecht*, as opposed to *Tat-Strafrecht*. "Humane" methods of legal punishment are no sign of a higher civilization; they merely betray that more mercy is awarded to the criminal than to his victim. Since legal justice is not based on lifeless "paragraphs" but on unerring racial instinct, the judge himself can recognize the right as well as the legislator, especially if the judge is integrally dependent on the "legislator" who is none other than the despotic ruler! There-
fore the judge may condemn without recurring to definite paragraphs of law.

Nor did National Socialism, after the establishment of its rule, delay very long in putting into practice this fundamental innovation in jurisprudence. The axiom *Nullum crimen sine lege* (meaning, There is no crime without legal definition) has lost its validity in German law. Since June 26th, 1985, the German Law Code, Section 176a, contains the precept that the public Prosecutor shall determine, as the case may be, whether to impeach conduct for which no punishment is provided in the written law, but which “deserves punishment according to sound popular judgment”. We need not be afraid that any German *Staatsanwalt* (Attorney-General), on the strength of “sound popular judgment”, will send to the gallows either the sadistic torturers in the concentration camps, or the kidnappers from the secret police, or any of their high patrons. But anybody can be jailed in Germany, under this law that mocks at law, for having said or done anything unpalatable to the ruling demigods or their local satraps, even if it is not covered by any law or decree actually laid down.

There is no room here to enumerate all the weighty changes in German legal practice since the birth of the Third Empire, due in part to illegal arbitrary measures of State and Party organs, in part to the activity of the Imperial Committee for Penal Reform. On the whole, they aver the semi-official axiom “Right is whatever promotes the interests of the Party”, and show a sustained tendency towards inhumanity, and contempt for the rights of man. Penal law has been extended to fields heretofore governed by statutes of non-punitive character, such as industrial legislation; the safeguards of the independence of judges have been considerably rescinded; the term “severity” was substituted for “humaneness” in the text of the instructions concerning the treatment of prisoners. It may be also mentioned that men of Jewish descent who court “German”, “Aryan” girls, and the latter as well if they receive the “dishonouring” advances with favour, risk being imprisoned for “racial disgrace”. (Legal prohibition of both marriage and illegitimate intercourse between “Germans” and “Jews” was proclaimed on September 16th, 1985). It is only natural that “high treason” has been proclaimed the most heinous of
crimes; and one has not far to go to become implicated in it. The Nazi State, like other totalitarian dictatorships, refuses to make moral allowances for what it defines as political delicts; in the vocabulary of such a régime, the term “treasonable” has no milder shade of meaning than “treacherous”. Every kind of pacifist propaganda comes under the heading of Volksverrat, the crime of all crimes for which Chancellor Hitler, in his first Reichstag speech in March, 1938, threatened “barbarous” repression. He has certainly been as good as his word.

5. IRRATIONAL SCIENCE

“... The organization of knowledge in the experience of Heimat (native country) . . . the Science of German Life . . . knowledge bearing on Heimat Nature . . . knowledge bearing on the nature of German Volk. . . .”

P. KRANNHALS.

“From Munich shall the attack of German Science be carried forward against Western ideology.”

Prof. WALTER FRANK, President, “Reichsinstitut” für Geschichtsforschung”, at a meeting of the Section for the Study of the Jewish question, November 19th, 1936, Munich University.

Stefan George and his adepts, in dealing with the despised spirit of modern Western civilization, coined the adage that true knowledge should abandon the “orgies of Ratio” and return to faith in “artistic vision”. Without being able to start an enquiry here into the ideal of knowledge and the possible shortcomings of the scientific tradition of our time, we may venture to qualify the above-quoted formula as a typical piece of misapplied criticism with a shade of truth in it. In fact, it may safely be maintained that modern science is the instrument of an exaggerated endeavour to imprison in a net of “exact” constructions the objects, presented by nature, life and mind, in
order to render them "calculable" and "previsible" at will; a strategy of knowledge which forcibly induces a loss of contact with the heart of things, and deadens the sense of a humble unprejudiced search for the immost reality of the world without and within. Yet the code of intellectual straightforwardness, logical soundness and rational control has nothing whatever to do with the mania for simplification, with feigned precision by means of an unsuitable use of ciphers and figures, or with quenching the emotional sources of profound and relevant knowledge. The programme of "irrational science" is destructive and barbarous, not because it defies the monopoly of "naturwissenschaftlich" methods and admits intuition into the sphere of scientific research and philosophical orientation, but because it sets up "artistic vision" (as well as "racial instinct" or other biological appetites or mental "shapes") as a sovereign and self-sufficing standard of knowledge, hostile to the mutual correction of data and opinions. It is also hostile to the final claim to material objectivity, to the test of the corroboration of evidence and universal discussion, to the readiness to assume responsibility for one's assertions. In short, the issue turns on whether we are to enlarge the scope of reason, or to eradicate it; to infuse new life into scientific knowledge tending to become ossified, or actually to deprive it of its backbone; to make reasoning more reasonable or to debase it into an ancillary expression of some definite vital or political urge. Here, as on other points, the surging tide of anti-Western Paganism is apt to indicate some flaws and frailties in the structure of the West; but here once more we must distinguish carefully between a good wholesome domestic quarrel we may have to fight out among ourselves, and the attack of an enemy who is questioning the very character of what makes life worth living for us.

Hommes advocates the creed of anti-science in a spirited manner which sometimes attains plasticity and elegance. The achievements of science, he declares, are not to be judged by the "abstract ideal of the discovery of truth" but by its "value for the People". The measuring-scale for the degree of value proper to ascertained truths is provided by the "natural feeling of life". The idea of "science for the sake of science", though not necessarily obnoxious, must not be set up as an explicit theoretical maxim, since it receives consideration automatically
owing to the natural weakness (1) of scientific man. "The principle, opposed to Liberalism, of science for Life's sake" affords the right maxim. Does it make sense, however, to localize science, mathematics for instance, to the service of one particular Volk? Even here, Hommes is not at a loss for an answer. He stuns us with the master stroke that the concept "twice two make four" is "somehow differently tinged" in the minds of a German, a Frenchman, and a Negro. This may be so, though I am less sure about the difference between the Frenchman and the Negro; at any rate one resents the omission of the Jewish mathematician who doubtless makes twice two considerably higher than four when the figures are related to the multiplication of Aryan labour yielding profits for the Chosen Race. As for sciences of a more human and historical relevancy, all pretensions to neutrality and objectivity are evil; the test of scientific truth being supplied by "the firm shape of popular life which, reflected in the Volk's consciousness and even more in its natural driving force (!) as well as in its historical system of forms, needs no corroboration and justification by the persuasion of the individual intellect. In politics above all—and politics encompass life in its entirety (!)—there is a subjectivity at work which is the higher form of objectivity, an indirect objectivity which sees the criterion of truth in the consent of the best men and groups in the Volk." Thus parteiamtlich decisions seem to be authorized to settle scientific controversies. The more so because Hommes continues explaining that the right "will to science" is identical with "will to power", not in the gross materialistic sense of Bacon but in the mystical totalitarian sense of Nietzsche, "briefly, the formative power of völkisch organism". We may well assert that no confusion with Bacon's ideas on science is to be feared.

Heidegger, when appointed Rector of the University of Freiburg in 1938, delivered a speech on the "self-preservation of the German University", which presented with inimitable zest the ambition of to-day's German science to be not only compatible with militarism, not even merely devoted to its service, but to re-model its own essence so as to reflect and interpret the pattern of the warriors' camp-life. The union of nationalist phraseology with the philosopher's professional slang results in prodigies of linguistic effect: "The will to the essence
of German University is the will to science, meaning a will to the historico-spiritual mission of the German Volk as a Volk experiencing itself in its State. Science and German destiny must attain power especially in the essential will”. We must grant that the Germans have not proved slow to conceive war in terms of science; to-day, they complete this achievement by conceiving science in terms of war: “Science means an inquisitive holding one’s own (das fragende Standhalten) in the midst of the existent Whole constantly concealing itself”. What is “spirit” (Geist)? “The originally determined, conscious resolution for the essence of being”. The spiritual world of the Volk is a “world of innermost and outermost danger”. The reader will notice that here Heidegger is merely showing a little more explicitly the concrete backgrounds and consequences of his theoretical philosophy. The student bears a threefold obligation, all the three branches being “equally fundamental to German essence”: (1) service of labour; (2) service of defence; (3) service of knowledge. The last constitutes obligation in regard to the nation’s spiritual mission. Perhaps it is not actually a nonsensical paradox to solace our despair at German culture with the consideration that, after all, there is another Germany of Prussian Generals besides the Germany of Prussianist thinkers.

Professor Krieck scarcely lags behind his dark-tongued colleague. He sounds the death-knell of the “old ideal of science”: pure rationality, validity unlimited by time, unprejudicedness, detachedness. All knowledge marks an attitude, a decision, a valuation. Science depends on the scientist; truth depends on the pre-existent image in the spectator’s mind. Here again, necessary factors and moving forces in the formation of knowledge are mixed up with its standard, its function, its aim, its road to perfection. A more material statement by Krieck of the office he assigns to science will surprise no one: “The place of scientific politics will be taken by political science, extending over all fields of knowledge, for we are engaged in a politically determined order of things, with a task incumbent on us that requires heroic, fighting, soldierly, militant science”. Bäumler shows himself eager to dispel the misconception as if the creation of a bureaucratic “state science” were contemplated; what is imperative is the identity of spirit between science and political leadership: science must be actuated by a spirit akin to the state.
We need scarcely explain that the distinction points to an intensified, a substantialized—verinnerlicht—form of despotic expropriation instead of a mere supervisory patronage. Bäumler also speaks of “heroic rationalism”, alluding to the warlike note in the conquering attitude of research. He insists that it is the “bellicose”, not the theoretical, musing, monkish species of man who has created science. Moreover, man as such is a primarily active being, not one created for reflection first and subsequent action. The neutrality of “pure consciousness”, corresponding to no concrete stand or aim, does not befit man and fails to earn for him the possession of “truth”. Thought clings to a concrete subject; pure consciousness is pure nothing. Nor is our real act of cognition traceable to pure consciousness “blurred” in the sequel. It is simply a work of subjective consciousness adapted to the peculiar nature of the subject; and it is well as it is. Small wonder that “science” in its eminent form owes its creation to the Northmen, especially the Teutons, as their warlike character has provided good nurturing soil for the bold, daring spirit of science, a force of mind far surpassing mere “intellect”. Nordic science obeys the command sapere aude (“dare to be wise”). The “problem” represents an enemy pursued; “knowledge”, victory; its “result”, a battle that has been won. In his efforts to cast contumely on the notions “theoretical” and “objective”, Bäumler proceeds to accuse them of a moral origin. Man affecting theoretical purity and objectivity is a being that pretends to a “condition of innocence” implying neutrality, tolerance, universalist ethics. In fact there is no such thing as objectivity, except within a method, within a system of action. It does not relate, we might formulate it in English, to the objects with which our understanding and our behaviour are concerned; but solely to the object which our action is pursuing within, so to speak a “campaign”. “Every single method is guilty, as it were, because it is not ‘universal’.” Political objectivity (Sachlichkeit) is only possible within a party. Inter-party parliamentarism is the political system generated by the fiction of “theoretical”, “neutral”, “guiltless” man. The idea of a neutral State Court belongs to the same company of ghosts. In reality, politics fundamentally gainsay universality; “one-sidedness” is a necessary condition of effective direction, a “law for every form of activity”. I refrain from pressing on the
English reader an antidote for this virus of rank Satanism, this creed of obscene violence which rides triumphantly on the back of moral and intellectual pessimism. Presumably he will have some dim suspicion, even without my hinting at the fact, that scientific knowledge can be gained by methods different from a cavalry attack down one line of "pursuit"; that a "universalist" combination of viewpoints and aspects does not necessarily entail their mutual self-destruction; that an endeavour for civilized co-operation and moral objectivity is on occasion compatible with definite decisions and inexorable firmness in concrete situations; that sometimes in history parliamentary governments have shown more readiness for "action" than was good for their adversaries, domestic or foreign.

From the endless variations of the same creed by other authors (few of whom have Bäumler’s sombre brilliancy or Kriick’s manly stubbornness) we only select two: Science must be political, since it is tantamount to the Volk’s consciousness of its (!) world. Objectivity and subjectivity make up the character of science. Both inapposite subjectivity (Politisierung: a random contamination with a political undercurrent) and impersonal objectivity (Entpolitisierung: the elimination of political tendency) are wrong (Walter Schönfeld). Science itself must be "sustained by the formative forces of life . . . it appears more and more urgent to overcome its unprepossessing autonomy and lay the foundations of artgemäß ("race-bound", or "affinitive") knowledge" (Schulze-Soelde).

Experts on race like Günther or F. L. Clauss seize upon science (in the genuine, creative sense of the term) to make it an exclusive privilege of the "eruptive", "extensive", "plastic" soul inherent in the Nordic race. Its dull nondescript counter-type, the "Turanian" or "Ostic" (ostisch) race, passive, torpid, immobile, introverted, has merely the tendency to produce scientists of the fact-collecting, labelling, filing brand, useful in their way but devoid of creative genius (Clauss). A more independent and discreet luminary of social philosophy devoted to National Fascism, the Austrian university lecturer Voegelin, undertakes with more subtlety to racialize the concept of science. He does not pretend to demonstrate society and culture as simple products of biological race but inaugurates community actually built up on the idea of race. Do not let us believe in race
because it is the chief spiritual reality; let us believe in race in order to fashion spiritual reality with a racial signature. "No longer is race a mere object of research viewed from a distance: it becomes a reality physical, psychological and spiritual, which comprises the explorer himself"; it is no longer a mere scientific notion but an "instrument for interpreting one's own life and the further life of the community", an "instrument in the service of the future formation of society: the idea of the community of a bodily relationship projected into the future by its own members." Here is a mere polite and diplomatic formulation of the subjectivist tribal conception of "science" as preached by Kriek or Bäumler or other scholars of official Nazidom."

6. EDUCATION FOR THE NATIONALIST STATE

"Mere knowledge is not a warrant of authority over one who perchance knows less as yet, but is worth more. . . . Who has educated our young people for the struggle for liberty, and led them on to that struggle? Was it the philologists, or was it rather the storm leaders of the S.A. and the Hitler Youth? . . . It is a long step from the Liberal to the National Political Educator!"

J. HAUPT.

The University is a "community of fighting between Teacher and Pupil", declares Heidegger. All faculties of will and intellect have to be formed by fighting, in fighting, as fighting.

Contrary to cheap criticism, the essential thing about Nazi Professors is not their servility towards the Fascist State, not their truckling to the owners of power, remarkable though it may be, but their genuine Nazi substance which could not actually be simulated at all. It is of the greatest consequence to understand that Naziism is not a calamitous accident but a secular heresy, not a mischievous adventure but a metaphysical reality. If Heidegger cajoles Hitler, it is because figuratively speaking he has made Hitler; on the other hand, the part played by Versailles in creating Hitler was obstetrical rather than generative. A striking proof of this outlook is provided by Dilthey, that mild and soporific Professor of philosophy who died
in 1911, and who exercised an enormous influence on Heidegger as well as on many other thinkers of contemporary Germany. Dilthey is one of the great pioneers of relativism linked with psychological "typology" and "Life philosophy". He certainly cannot be called to account for the political fructification by his followers of his methods of research; and yet we are baffled by the perusal of his views, printed posthumously, on pedagogics (cf. "Blätter für deutsche Philosophie", Heft 2, 1984): "The truths of pedagogics are dependent on the truths of politics... The point of departure must be a given constitution of Volks life, out of which arise conditions, needs and ideals". The individual cannot be trained to a humanity apart from "the life ideal and the laws of a nation." Plato's demand that private points of view must be made completely subservient to the State ideal had been gaining increasing ascendancy over Dilthey, until, finally jettisoning "Liberal dogmas", he came to believe that "the individual cannot shape his life into a work of art except in adaptation to the conditions and the requirements of the Whole".

In a general way, our ideas on education will reflect our ideals concerning ethics, culture and science. One point, however, may be considered separately. Our traditional conception of education logically contains a certain deviation from our traditional conception of society. The centre of gravity is shifted from the element of liberty and individual rights to the element of humanity and individual perfection. Education, concerned with unfinished beings in the process of growing up, has to face a special problem of discipline and authority; but for the same reason it bears a special relation to classicality and ideality. Youths, more than adults, must be taught definite things and directed to definite goals; but in return they have more claim to have it done for the sake of their own formation, without a view to the exigencies of society. I mean, even of "to-morrow's society", in so far as it is the concrete sequel of to-day's society. We are accustomed to attach an idea of holy chastity and abstractness to the idea of unfinished man: to look upon him as the bearer of an incessant renewal of society in the spirit of eternal mankind. We are inclined to conceive education not merely as a methodical process helping children to become men, but also as a pathway for men to approach Man. This is the secret of teaching children and young people "useless" things, things far removed
from their time, things unconnected with their future destination, things appearing to be an idle luxury rather than articles of immediate or anticipated necessity. Children, though compelled to obey, are kings because they are enticed away, enchanted, into the fairyland of idealized mankind, into the innocent sphere of pure mathematics, into the abstract and leisurely world of eternal forms. It is hardly necessary to say that a gulf yawns between this fancy and the Nazi idea of education, namely, breeding forth "this concrete" nation as a community of life and death, of type and power.

This is called by Stonner, Krieck and others nationalpolitisch education. As a characteristic example for it, Stonner mentions God's dealing with the Jewish people narrated in the Old Testament. Even Jesus was in the first place a pedagogue of His Volk. And, as things are after all happily fitted together, the National Socialist State is an Educational State par excellence. It would be unjust to neglect this formula as mere talk: the Totalitarian Racial State is in fact "educational" in the sense that the breeding and moulding of human material is more closely related to "education" than is the maintaining of legal order, or the coordination of free personalities; in this sense education is an intensified and continual form of mobilization. As to the details of "education", the children must be inoculated with the "timeless contents of the national essence (Volkheit)"; so speaks this priest of the timeless Catholic Church, who, for one, is all too alive to the "contents" of his "time".

Unlike this pliable servant of God, Krieck, with his frank gospel of barbarism, not merely commands respect but even seems to attain an aesthetic impressiveness which rarely fails to reward straightforward and pointed thinking, however monstrous. "Culture, in the narrower meaning of the word, intellectual creations . . . have to provide expression for the völkisch substance and direction of life, to set them up as imagination and consciousness". Education, both scholastic and otherwise, carries the mission of "equipping every co-national (Volksgenossen) to take his conscious share in the nation's total accomplishment, each according to his quality (Art), situation and special organic destination (gliedhafte Sonderbestimmung)." We may feel compelled to infer that culture and education are to be managed and administered in a ständisch manner, apportioned to social class
and standing, very much in keeping with the totalitarian “organic” world-dreams of Herr Professor Spann. But let us resist the enticements of fascist sociology, and confine ourselves to the even more delightful spell of Nordic Fascism as a canon of culture. In a chapter entitled “Creative Culture and Bildung” (this term can be rendered by “education”, with a reference both to “instruction” and “formation”), Krieck states his profession of faith with truly moving sincerity: “The road to Völkisch culture and education will become free by the radical removal of a ‘higher’ world of ideality, of humanity, of all ‘higher’ values of education and culture”. What will thus disappear is not a reality, not a “vital necessity” (!), only a prejudice, a delusion “battened on by a group of men attitudinizing as a ‘higher’ kind of man”. In a word, there is no such thing as spiritual value, disinterested devotion to which would be man’s deed of nobility or an impulse of his inmost super-vital nature; every human act of preference, respect and honour must be determined on the one level of the urgency of the national interests. “The public school is an establishment of völkisch commonwealth, and must serve its objects. . . . The pupil must not be treated as a private person with his private needs and fancies (Meinereien, “opinions”), but as an evolving member (werdendes Glied) of the Volk, subordinated to its authority, its values and aims.” Krieck adduces convincing proof of the harmfulness and futility of free discussion at school, which will hardly fail to affect even inveterate Liberals who are yet willing to credit objective truths. What would become of us, he exclaims, if the pupils were encouraged to offer a “different view” to the dogma that seven and five make twelve! No; even we should refuse to sympathize with such excess of freedom, but we are not quite prepared to say that mathematical propositions owe their compelling virtue to their importance for the protection and expression of völkisch life. Nor should we quite so readily despair of mankind’s fate if “the pupils were encouraged to oppose with a different view” some other and more specific dogma of Fascist and Racist Germany, apart from the fundamental but scarcely characteristic one that seven and five make twelve. Nay, we must testify to a strange doubt growing upon us; when we continue to hear Krieck dinning it into our ears that “general education as such and the universality of high culture will melt
away together with the outworn idea of humanity”, we feel tempted to wonder if the real secret about the dogmatic certainty of völkisch knowledge is not that the pupil shall also be discouraged from “offering a different view” when the teacher, by order of the competent State or Party authorities, may happen to tell him that seven and five make seventy-five.

A glance at the Spartan pedagogic ideals of Bäumler, no matter whether or not their persuasive vigour will captivate the reader, may aptly complete the picture. “Spartan” is not a term of irony; undeniably we are faced here with a certain reversion to pagan Hellenic standards in their Doric form. Faithful to Plato’s “State”, writes Bäumler, we set ourselves the task of breeding types, not “individualities”. To the ideal of universality (many-sidedness) we oppose efficient and disciplined unity (Geschlossenheit); to harmony, force; to refinement, genuineness and simplicity (Schlichtheit); to complicated inwardness, an attitude of steadfastness. The utmost dignity is accorded to bodily training, not for reasons of health but as a direct expression of the preferred “mode of life”. To put it briefly, exercise is not a means but meaning. (Not Zweck, but Sinn-Handlungen.) “The principle of exercise is not ‘life in beauty’, not the desire to ‘keep healthy and slim’: it is a fresh and hearty way of living in the community of Volk. . . . Amidst our culture that has become too inward, too spiritual, athletics restore the principle of visibleness”. Our conditions of life must be simplified. “We shall have to resort to the elemental forces in our People.” Bäumler draws up a detailed plan of “German Athletics” (Deutsche Leibesübungen) as a “mode of life”, and I could never forgive myself if I were to keep it from the reader.

**SPHERE POPULAR**

*Children, Girls, Women*

Pleasure in Playing

Play

Dance

Group Games (“Romping”)

Feasts

Plays and Dance Performances

**SPHERE POLITIC**

*Boys, Youths, Men*

Fighting Spirit

Training

Gymnastics (*Turnen*)

Contest (*Wettkampf*)

(in maniples)

Celebrations

Parades (*Aufmärsche*) and manoeuvres
Hygiene is not considered as an isolated objective, but is directly rooted in life and action. An immense scope will be given to the phantasy and invention of women, their corporeal activities being no longer a private and casual affair but a popular expression of cheerfulness and sociableness. As for the host of male athletes (Turnerschaft), "each single Bund will be at once a genuine Bund of Youths, respectively Männerbund". (cf. on the Bund principle Chapter II.) The agonistic ground shall be with us, as with the Greeks, "the place where youths wrestle"; not a mere place for training and enlivening bodies but "the Centre of Culture and the State."

The formula has the succinctness proper to veritable perfection; I should loathe to spoil its effect by polemics. The pupils of Christian metaphysics and Liberal ethics, the men of Western civilization are left to choose between surrendering to a spell strong enough to darken their creed and tradition, or rousing themselves to full awareness of the fact that they are up against a very great thing. . . . "I want the German boy to be weather-proof, quick as a greyhound, tough as leather, hard as Krupp steel. We must educate a new species of man, lest our People succumb to the degenerative tendencies of the age." (Chancellor Hitler, addressing 50,000 "Hitler Youths" at Nürnberg, September, 1935.)

**FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER VI**

Jünger in his novel "Tempest of Steel" says, "For the time to come we again need an iron, ruthless race. Once more we are going to replace the pen by the sword, ink by blood, speech by action, sentimentality by sacrifice."

1 From F. Schulze’s popular Ethic ("So lebst du deutscll!") we quote here two passages: "Morality is, for us, what is fit to raise the body, soul and mind of German man to a higher level."—"Good is, for us, tantamount to what helps to preserve our Kind and lead us forward, and answers the supreme will of our Volk; evil is all selfishness contrary to that aim."

2 cf. the admirable and congenial description of the amoral morality inherent in Greek Paganism given in W. Jaeger's "Paideia" (pp. 14-45). According to this outlook, virtue (ἀρετή) is a product of breeding and has nothing to do with moral conscience. Virtue in this sense is not essentially different, whether it is applied to gods, noble men, or noble animals (dogs, horses); on the other hand, it has no application to vulgar men. The bodily prowess of a soldier is genuine "virtue". "Herrschaf t and ἀρετή (mastery and virtue) are inseparably linked together."

3 See also the philosophy exposed in "Wille und Macht" of December 1st, 1936. "The struggle for the order of life is a struggle for the fate imposed on man. It has no bearing on Good and Evil in a dogmatic interpretation, it has its own dynamics which we either do or do not feel in our blood."—"Order rooted in the blood, is the law of man." This conception of National Socialism, we read.
further, is invariably opposed to all Jewish, Christian and revolutionary dogmatism "from St. Paul to Karl Marx". In Georg Halbe's article, further on, Kant and even Luther are dismissed as guilty of moralism. "The Teuton knew no 'duty' in this sense. He knew custom and usage: rules, but no laws; rules inherent in life and changing with life in the course of time. All heroes of Teutonic history acted out of an inner drive: Ich will!"

This kind of ethics, culminating in Spengler's profession of faith "Man is a beast of prey", is expressly disapproved by the more thoughtful Nazi theorist G. Gründel in his anti-Spengler book. Gründel is of opinion that the cult of brutality and the romance of the "beast of prey", which are only apt to arouse criticism of the "new Germany", must be superseded by what he calls a "harnessed ethic".

H. A. Grunsky (pp. 12-28), emphasizing that only a combative and voluntaristic thought can be "creative", reserves at the same time the psychological and political "pole of creativeness" (Schaff-Pol) for the "leader", whereas the "community" is located at the "pole of passivity" (Hingenommenheit: "being taken").

cf. in Jaeger's "Paideia" (pp. 119 et seq.) Law in its Spartan as contrasted to its Athenian sense: a "living" traditional Nomos rather than a codification of juridical theses.

Also see Professor Schingnitz's justification of philosophical methodology and logic as Zucht des Begriffes, which means "the discipline of concepts" (pp. 18 et seq.) Schingnitz is eager to believe that the German people appreciate "exact conceptual education". He defines logical disquisitions as "'Ordnung-Uübungen des Geistes' (den militärischen vergleichbar)". I attempt an approximate translation: "Intellectual training for the comprehension of the order of things, comparable to military training".—Let us add, finally, the following advertisements of recent publications in Literarische Zentralblatt (Leipsic, January 31st, 1937). (1) "W. M. Schering: Zuschauen oder Handeln? (Contemplation or action.) A contribution to the position and the task of psychology. [Psychology must act, not as a purpose in itself, but in the service of the theoretical and practical tasks determined by the new Germany. For "also in science, active man (der Handeln) is our point of departure and our goal." ] (2) A. Szalai: Philosophische Grundprobleme der psychoanalytischen Psychologie. A dialectal study. [Exposition of the fundamentals of psycho-analysis by a Jew.]

Consult Professor Jaeger's "Paideia", passim.
CHAPTER VII

SOCIETY AND ECONOMICS

"Instead of values in terms of Money—values in terms of growth."

H. F. K. Günther.

"It will once be recorded as the Führer’s immortal merit to have kept alive, in the fabric of economic production, the War experience of the union of all and every in the Volk’s like."

"The organic life of the Plant (Betrieb) as an autonomous organism finds its paramount expression in the Leader principle. According to present notions, the entrepreneur is Führer (leader), and the workers are Gefolgschaft (retinue; followers).

Dr. W. Schütz ("The factory as an organism").

1. THE SOCIALIST PHRASE

"Protection for honest, national labour. . . ."

G. von Schönérer.

I have neither the inclination nor the ability to “solve” out of hand what we call the “social problem” (an enterprise which is said once to have caused the Cabinet Council of a South German princeling to sit up until midnight). Nor can I claim to possess a secure vantage-ground of economic conviction from which to anathematize Nazi heresies concerning capital, money and national wealth. For the sake of clarity I may suggest that in my opinion Western democracy will not be able to hold its own without introducing socialist principles of equality, public control and co-operative responsibility into the fabric of class relationships and the organization of production. On the other
hand, the Socialist Labour movement is liable to stray from its own central truth if it loses touch with the more universal Liberal conceptions of society, culture, reciprocity, political freedom, and to some extent at least, of such economic laws as still exist, a knowledge of which is capable of restraining the wilder flights of Utopian economists. That both Liberal and Socialist thought may derive considerable gain, perhaps their very salvation, from the re-establishment of direct communication with Christian ethics and possibly even with some of the economic teachings forming part of the Church tradition, may sound less novel or extravagant to English than to Continental ears. At all events, the “progressive” and democratic mind will desire personal liberty and rational insight to be shared by everyone, in the direction of the economic life of society; it will consider Man and Mankind as the supreme object of social discipline and economic effort; it will recognize man’s standard of life (material and mental, in so far as the mental standard is conditioned by the material) to be the main theme of economic science; it will endorse a free organization of Labour in its endeavours to create social justice and solidarity, to eliminate unfairness and brute inequality in social conditions, to breed a keener sense of civilization as regards trade customs and economic instincts. Now all this is utterly alien—and for the most part, antagonistic—to the Fascist mind, most of all when it expresses itself in National Socialism. We shall see presently what the term “Socialism” denotes under this act of brazen expropriation, which is called a “harmless misnomer” by Mowrer; it certainly does not refer to Socialism “mitigated”, or “watered”, or even slightly altered or newly interpreted. “National Socialism” is not a compound of, or a compromise between, Nationalism and Socialism; it means a complete subjection and subservience of society to Nationalism, the elevation of Nationalism to a social counter-creed to Socialism. It signifies, not a construction of society based on the relinquishment of certain individualist illusions and carelessnesses for the sake of individual dignity and happiness, but a savage mood of anti-individualism. Indeed, Nazi “Socialism” has no consistent opinion as to the desirability and efficiency of a definite social structure, nor is it connected with a school of economics in any classic or comprehensive sense of that term. The very doctrine of
the “Corporative State” (Ständestaat), adopted by Italian Fascism after its conquest of power, commended (though with a more democratic accent) by the Pope in his famous encyclical of Whitsuntide, 1931, and selected for its charter by the former Austrian Fascist State, is a thing very much wrapped up in commonplace and contradictory expoundings, without any economic conception of its own. Apart from some additional innuendoes about granting workers a share in the enterprises which employ them, “Corporativism” is chiefly preoccupied with securing a smooth and undisturbed functioning of Capitalism by bringing about, in each branch of industrial production, a benevolent harmonization, a renunciation of class-war, between owners’ associations and workers’ syndicates. Obviously the scheme can only be put into effect by the fascist methods of a State monopoly of syndicates and the suppression of free Labour organization as well as of political parties. In the Third Empire there is talk of “corporative reconstruction” (ständischer Aufbau), without anybody having a clear idea of what it means, or attaching too much importance to it. In practice, the Nazi social law goes considerably further in the destruction of Labour autonomy and “class-war” than do the Italian and Austrian systems, for, far from introducing a fascist compulsory unity of syndical organization, it removes the latter altogether, enthroning the factory-owner as a “Leader” (Betriebsführer) with the workers as his “henchmen” (Gefolgschaft). On the other hand, the entrepreneur is threatened with legal penalties for “unsocial behaviour”. In a word; the Nazi State is not a “bourgeois” but a “Socialist” State, on the strength of which it can afford to prevent workers from defending their own interests.

Nazi “Socialism” is but a mood, not a structural conception; this, however, must not lead us to doubt that Nazism itself, including its display of pinchbeck “Socialism”, is certainly far from being a meaningless and ineffectual mood. The point is that its very function in class-war strategy (as will be seen more clearly below) entails the espousal of a vague “Socialistic” mood, essentially deceptive but not altogether a feint, forming a kind of “false consciousness” but linked to certain important elements in social reality, serving the needs of Capitalism but by no means unconditionally. The vague and evasive character of Nazi “Socialism” is not a sign of an inherently weak or
drifting disposition; any more than Nazi irrationalism is a sign of essential unreasonableness or weak-mindedness. Rather does it indicate a reactionary position in contradistinction to other conceivable positions within the limits of Capitalism; secondly, it bears a special reference to the crisis of Capitalist society; and finally, it reveals the undoubted fact that the "social problem" (as stated in the terms of "capital and labour") is not the primary and central theme of National Socialism.

Let us now proceed to show this pseudo-Socialism in its various forms. Moeller-Bruck, the Prussian aesthete who in the years before his death became a prophet of the Third Empire, demanded that a "Socialism of sentiment" should replace the "Socialism of reason", which had failed to fulfil its promise. He urged that the new Socialism should focus its interests on the problem of population neglected by the old Socialism, "a problem that will overshadow the idea of class-war by extending it into the conception of a war of nations". Among others, Werner Haverbeck ("The rising (Aufbruch) of the young Nation", in "Nationalsozialistische Monatshefte", 1932) discloses the miracle of "German Socialism" which has become the "community experience of the masses"; he then tells us that Germanic man needs property and a "meaning of labour", and mentions the "labour youth of the brain and the fist" and "the sword and the plough". Professor Sombart in his "German Socialism" (1934) defines Socialism as "social regulationism (Normativismus)". The Socialist principle demands that "the behaviour of the individual should be determined essentially by the constraint of norms originating in a general reason rooted in the political community, and finding their expression in the Nomos". In practice, Socialism takes shape in "legal punishment for murder; compulsory education; laws for the protection of labour; injunctions like 'Smoking prohibited', 'Keep to the Right', 'Pay your taxes'. But Sombart adds "essentially regulated planned economy" as a closer definition for Socialism, and proceeds to enumerate its abundant varieties. His own he calls "German Socialism", of which more later. At any rate he would have it known as "thoroughgoing anti-Capitalism", meaning, of course, anti-Liberalism, and not by any chance class-war against capitalists.

Time and again, an apparently "radical" note flashes up in
Nazi social literature; but it soon becomes apparent that its substance is slight: sympathy with workers of German blood as opposed to Jewish money-lenders, aversion to bourgeois (Bürger) because they are civilian (bürgerlich), or a hankering for “final solutions” in order to put a stop to “class-war” and “Marxist” scheming with other than merely prescriptive methods. Thus Feder, Hitler’s oldest comrade and the Party’s official programme-builder, instructs us that National Socialism means the “powerful synthesis between the völkisch idea and the fervent wish to achieve a radical solution of the social problem”; in the same breath he condemns “Marxist tendencies” such as a distribution of the great estates, denies the necessity for part-ownership of factories by the workers, and dismisses nationalization as mere modification of the outward structure of production. The unofficial Dyrssen reproves both Bolshevism and Fascism for offering no solution to the social problem other than police regulation, whereas National Socialism presents a “radical social attitude.” There is no need for the reader to get alarmed, for immediately the text continues thus: “which is indifferent to the primitive plea for a distribution of property, for it does not judge (!) on material but on personal values”. Neither the addition that “genuine, i.e., Prussian, Socialism” is incompatible with “pure profit economy”, nor Dyrssen’s reiterated abuse of “burghers” and his agrarian tendencies, are likely to be more than a bracing tonic for capitalists, and need not cause them to tremble with terror. But it is safest to rely on the benignant sincerity of Benz. He conjures up the picture of uniformed storm-troops (S.A.) at a demonstration. The prosperous “burgher” is eyeing them “timidly and yet with sympathetic fascination”. For these young people are no social outcasts, fed on the poison of resentment; no, “their will is not directed to material aims, it is pure. . . . and their violence only portends menace to those alien and unorthodox from the Volk’s standpoint (Volksfremde, Andersdenkende)”. They are only fighting “mechanization and rationalization”, whether in the abstract guise of the “capitalistic principle” or in the more concrete form of “Marxism and freemasonry”; opposing them with “organic Nature”, with “Nationalism as its most comprehensive and warlike embodiment”. We leave it an open question whether the stolid burgher’s “sympathetic fascination” at the sight of those
martial storm-troopers is entirely justified; but in all probability he is well-advised in abstaining from "material" apprehensions. Nor need he lose much sleep over Gründel's thunderous *pronunciamento* that "the New Generation is the bearer of an unheard-of revolution, in all fields". Among the fruits of the "unheard-of revolution", a new type of Leader is to appear: "personality dedicated to the community". Whoever felt alarmed by the hint that "man's worth, pure and naked, shall decide alone forthwith", would soon be reassured by the pacific promise of "concord based upon the common task in place of dissension obsessed with dogmas". Indeed, the gist of the "unheard-of revolution" is *counter-revolution*, conceived so radically that it certainly overlaps the restoration of yesterday's society and produces a social order with some peculiar and evasive traits of "novelty".

We see in Ferdinand Fried, an apostle of national "Autarkie" and exponent of the pro-Russian "Die Tat" circle, the "brain trust" of the Prussian Conservative (*deutschnational*) youth in the incubation years of the Third Empire. He is an outsider whose "anti-Capitalism" is slightly more serious than is the case with the average Nazi thinker. In "The end of Capitalism" (1981) he argues that the evolution of Capitalism has distorted the people into a "propertied" and a "propertyless" class, provoking an anti-Capitalist reaction furthered by the democratic process of identification between People and State. "The mass of the dis-inherited people is growing into the State" and the State is becoming the battering-ram of a "popular social counter-movement against Capitalism"; State and *Volk* are producing new types of leaders in antagonism to the sphere of competitive economy: The "capitalistic world" in which the value of man is gauged by his income, in which the exchangeable monetary tender, devoid of "quality", forms the common denominator of values, is heading for destruction. The consequences drawn by Fried are not in favour of a socialistic self-government of the masses engaged in industrial production, but in the sense of replacing "dynamics" by "statics" (quite after the heart of Sombart and the votaries of "Corporativism"), of discarding democracy, of an economy planned by the government on a strictly Nationalist basis. The Social-Democrats are rebuked for having "shifted their centre towards democracy"; and the
astonishing discovery is made that the unearthing of great economic truths in Socialism, such as those which refer to the concentration of capital, goes mainly to the credit of the non-Jew Engels, the “Wuppertal patrician’s son”, whereas Marx, “in accordance with his racial genius”, has merely contributed the pseudo-scientific embroidery. It seems to me worth while to add the analogous achievement of Professor Spann, who in a similar manner refuses to be content with the society game called “the refutation of Marxism”. Poor Marx had not only false ideas, but none at all; he was utterly incapable of thinking for himself. Even the consolation of being registered as a Hegelian would be too good for him: “Marx has learnt nothing from Hegel, and never understood him”. Lastly, Fried’s “anti-Capitalism” turns into the usual reactionary diatribe against “international high finance”, which holds in its bondage the industrial no less than the middle classes. The malaise under Capitalism is crystallized out into anti-Western nationalist resentment. In his book “Autarkie” (1982) Fried’s progress along the path of reaction is clear beyond all possibility of misconstruction. “The field of social Nationalism is not the world; it is the nation, it is the Volk, it is man (!). . . . ‘Socialism’ in the word’s best sense, that is, German or National Socialism, as contrasted to the international Socialism of the Marxians.”

Now we perceive what “anti-Capitalism” is worth.

The formulas of Moeller-Bruck echo this view, but in more elegant phrases. “To socialize is to nationalize.” “Socialism” is the general label for a “new will” turning against Liberalism and the obsolete and outmoded idea of the West”, against the Liberal dichotomy, “Capitalism for the victors, pauperism for the defeated”. There is no answer to the social question until a solution has been found for the national, especially the German, question. “Socialism” and “Revolution” mean the rise of a new Kind of men with new instincts; a new rally of popular forces; a thoroughly “elemental” phenomenon. If I were asked to make a brief statement of what these literary adventurers really have in mind when they misuse the term “Socialism”, I should call it “class-war against mankind.”

Hitler explains candidly why a new “Socialism” is requisite. A culturally abandoned people can hardly be pervaded with the fire of nationalism; the success of such an undertaking depends
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on the presence of social conditions which make the experience of Nation generally accessible. Social-Democracy can only be intrinsically overruled by a "doctrine of superior truth but of equal brutality in practical application". Conversely, the blame for its appalling career in the last decades must be laid on the bourgeoisie, whose unsympathetic treatment of "social demands" drove the workers into the arms of the tempter. The bürgertlich parties will never manage to win them over from the opposite camp; time will confirm the victory of Marxism, the younger force, unless a still younger and more vigorous movement wrenches it out of the latter's hand.

This has indeed been carried out; not without mastery, an affectation of Socialism has been used in order to crush Socialism. The positive side of the argument is summarized by Krieck to the effect that "social justice", or "regulation of the social sphere of life", is needed "for the sake of the people's health and energy, which are the substratum and foundation for the evolution of power". Similarly, many others, the "Tat" authors, for instance, hold that "Social justice" must be imposed, not to gratify lower-class maudlinness or rapacity, but to secure national concord and efficiency in foreign relations (Zehrer); "unsocial management of economy" is incompatible with national power (Holzer).

2. THE REVIVAL OF CLASS-RULE

Granted that the term "Capitalism" stands for competitive market economy with the profit principle for its guiding motive, we may agree that Naziism is meant to secure the survival of Capitalism at the price of certain reforms and restrictions, particularly an extension of State supervision, and a partial substitution of militaristic "communitarian" for old-fashioned bürgertlich modes of living. Inasmuch, however, as "Capitalism" denotes the principle of class superiority in an industrial society, the Nazi attitude appears actually to be aiming at a more radical elaboration of Capitalism together with the crushing of all forces opposed to it. The Nazi intervention secures Capitalist class-rule by backing up its more feudalistic and oligarchic elements, by patronizing the remnants of agrarian feudalism, by restoring
oligarchic self-confidence and reactionary fighting spirit in the young generation of the wealthy class, and finally, by attempting to fuse some able and ambitious working-class groups into the political ruling set of the Fascist State who shall be congenial to and in part identified with the socio-economic ruling class. “As in Italy, the owners were to be allowed to purchase an absolute guarantee of nine-tenths of their present rights at the price of granting the remaining tenth to the militarized state.” (Mowrer).

If the Liberal Left advocates generous social reform in order to prevent social revolution, the extreme Fascist Right is anxious to effect a kind of rejuvenating “revolution” within the ruling class and its more or less motley social appendages, a far-sighted counter-revolution intended to forestall social revolution and suppress its every manifestation. The reactionary Right made its compact with Hitler in order “to eliminate the influence of organized labour from the state altogether” (Mowrer); the “pseudo-capitalist” overlords of industry had in mind to “force wages down”, reviving their chances of securing “abnormal gain by abnormal methods”. Behind the war waged against “Marxism”, the “struggle against the principle of democracy” was operative. In his pamphlet on the Stefan George sect, Benda ably delineates this new philosophical and aesthetic phase (“geistwissenschaftliche Revolution”) as a transition of the bourgeois mind from an individualistic and equilibrarian creed of “owners in general”, petty bourgeois, in this sense, to an ideology more adapted to organized big business, justifying, in the form of a boot-licking “science”, the irrational profits of its leaders as a “reward for heroes”. At first, feudal romantic ideologies are merely sympathized with and credited in a secondary, combinative way; in the sequel, they are absorbed into a high bourgeois “neo-renaissance” outlook on life. The side which resists proletarian collectivism is no longer the comparatively democratic “society” of owners; the new mastery of high proprietors is also directed to the subjugation of “mere” or “nether” bourgeoisie with its original instincts of liberty and equality. Apart from Blüher and Spengler, few partisans of the trend analyzed by Benda would openly warrant this exposure of their meaning. Yet Werner Best, famous in Nazi circles for his outspokenness, treats us (in his essay “War and Law”, in Jünger’s War anthology) to the frank admission that class-war
must be acknowledged, since social order can only be established by mastery (Herrschaft), not by concessions. "We endorse class-war, but not only the class-war of rising forces, but also class-war 'from above', waged by the masters against the insurgent mob." This formula not only throws an odd light on the "Socialism" of the Nazi "Arbeiterpartei", but is also interesting as a psychological document in regard to the floating declassed elements of society who, committed to a formally "revolutionary" attitude, are willing to side with the kind of "revolution" that pays them better and is better able to give them opportunity for immediate action, without imposing on them an inner discipline or moral restraints.

The economic destruction of the middle class in post-war Germany, going hand in hand with a feudalistic evolution of high "pseudo" capitalism owing to a system of monopolies and subsidies (Mowrer) did in some way "revolutionize" society. "This process the silly workers tolerated and often applauded, thinking it a magnificent step to eventual socialism". Nothing remains to be added to Mr. Mowrer's gloomy diagnosis. In fact, he proceeds to say that the recently expropriated, instead of merging in the proletariat, "refused, and kept their social identity", clinging to their middle-class habits, and when unemployment on a large scale began, turned revolutionary in the "Right" sense.

This is Freyer's "Revolution from the Right", on which we have dwelt more amply in its political implications: "The outlived (vorgestrig) scheme of bourgeoisie and proletariat" has gone to pieces; no longer do class-war or class compromise form the pivot of social history; their agents have ceased to be the representative actors of social totality. The Volk as such has assumed self-consciousness, and is about to assume power, amidst, against, and above, "industrial society". The Volk will take hold of the latter's heritage of labour and wealth, but it will do so in submission to entirely new principles, considering that fabric "not as a store of goods, not as an object for distribution, not as a property in the sense of the old bourgeoisie, but as a terrain (Raum) for its own historical existence". This revelation is very enlightening. In actual fact, the Volk also consists of living men with their souls and bodies; commodities and means of purchase must be "distributed" as before; rights of "property" are by
no means going to be abolished; the "old" bourgeoisie is bidden to yield its place to a re-educated bourgeoisie. And the chief characteristic of this new sterner set of industrial lords will be that they will axiomatically refuse to discuss problems of distribution, of human equality and inequality, on the moral plane of society or the rational plane of economic science. The Socialist peril appears to be staved off by abandoning the Liberal level of consciousness, the extinction of the democratic vigilance of society, the bold dissimulation of industrial class-rule behind a nebular structure of new knighthood and national totality. Schramm, for instance, has said that Socialism stands for the disinherited of yesterday, and National Socialism for the new "proletariat" unforeseen by Marx, the representative mass of a whole nation declassed and proletarized. The decisive difference, obscurely hinted but not exposed here, is that this new middle-class "proletariat" engendered by national distress and economic mismanagement is not predestined to conceive a structural idea of society, or a concrete ideal of social justice. Therefore, as Schramm himself observes, its anti-capitalist resentment suffers translation into trivial displays of anti-Semitism. In Moeller-Bruck's words, the "half-bourgeois fourth estate", the proletariat we knew, whose class warfare was meant to enforce the socialization of industry and the levelling of standards of life, is about to evacuate the field before the "rising fifth or even sixth estate", which "wills the whole nation". This author expounds "Socialism" in terms of "vital history", new energies, new breed of men, elemental instincts, etc. The irrational aspect of the class-struggle idea becomes dominant, whereas its rational and moral meaning disappears. "Revolution" is evoked, not to end class-rule and transform oligarchic into democratic society, but to re-build class-rule and brush up Herrschaft to be more modern, genuine and vigorous. Sombart, less inflamed with romantic "dynamism" and more at home in the secular categories of reactionary "stability", is of the opinion that German Socialism must be emphatically middle-class and un-proletarian; for the proletarian class is politically untrustworthy, rootless, thirsting for innovations, prone to shake the earth when writhing in its throes. It goes without saying that Sombart is not thinking of an individualist petty-bourgeois democracy, but of a fixed social oligarchy under feudal and
militarist leadership, with a peasant and artisan middle class constituting the mass of more or less contented, docile subjects. He does not approve of the middle class for being good freemen, but dislikes the workers for being bad slaves.

Haiser, in his inimitable way, heralds the recovery of class-rule with more abstract radicalism and philosophical honesty. He defiantly claims justification for the exploitation of the "mongrel" by the aristocrat, since the latter's existence, and his only, has a "metaphysical background". The "German idea" (?) of a society composed only of freemen is ridiculous. In the West the wealthy class have set themselves up as masters, holding the workers in ill-concealed bondage; in Germany (1928) the masses are far too educated and consequently imagine themselves to be free. Yet men can only be free on the back of the unfree (Nietzsche). The Western Liberal system of crypto-slavery will also in due course prove untenable; the State will have to choose between returning to ancient forms of society and complete ruin. For the state itself is not an institute of judiciary and beneficence for every individual's service, but a "transformer of energy", the greatest of "exploiters". Energy must be squeezed out of the mass, in part to be wasted (especially by war), in part to foster creative cultural activity. The noble and wealthy classes have the function of amassing, through appropriation, the state revenues (?); the intellectuals are charged with transforming them into cultural values. The appetitive leisure class is necessary in order to solicit cultural production by refined tastes, as well as to provide the expenses for it by draining the masses. The serf may be doughtier and better skilled than his master: this is but one reason why he must sweat. The aristocracy is the Volk's germ-cell and its sole import. The people only exist for the sake of the nobility. It is unbiological to speak of the rulers as "servants of the Volk". For the common people are only a sub-structure; "the whole beehive is incarnate in the Queen". "Who cares about life, fate or interests of the millions, if only the representative of the racial soul prospers!" The seed of Caesar is sacred; every woman must be happy to be touched by him. The people must worship Caesar as a deity. We had even better avoid war, that noblest of all recreations, if it entails the danger of depleting the ranks of the master race to an irreparable degree. The White Armies
of the world, marching under the signs of their Swastika, Fasci, or Eagles, must consider their social identity rather than fight one another. The racial value of the people as such is nil; the "warrior caste" represents a special superior race, a selection from the nobility and yeomanry; it is desirable that the White Revolution should confiscate the property of mongrels, turning it into a fund for the remuneration of its soldiers. (A slightly personal, but by no means incompetent, statement of fascist economics!) Under the pressure of a supra-national and pan-Teutonic White Army, the "socialistic" bias (das Soziale) will be forced to disappear, and even the wave of mere Nationalism will recede a little. The capitalists of Nordic race ought to understand that their wealth is better guarded by White Guards than by Jews and Philistine politicians. "Financiers of Teutonic race, repose your power in Vikings, not in freedmen!" I must cease to quote, lest Anglo-Saxon "financiers", whether of "Teutonic race" or not, may find the prospect more tempting than would accord with my intentions.

Spengler, too, proves to be a confirmed and avowed partisan of class-war "from above", and for that reason stands only on the outskirts of official Naziism. Whereas in 1919 he still held that Prussian militarism with a Spartan note was the one true Socialism, and the legitimate heir of August Bebel's labour movement, he grew more embittered during the ordeal of the Weimar Non-Reich, so that by 1938 he was heaping abuse on every kind of Socialism or advocacy of labour rights. Though his reactionary leanings deserve unmitigated contempt, his observation of facts is occasionally correct: thus I should not gainsay his formula that Rationalism, Liberalism and Socialism are so many manifestations of the selfsame "plebeian" revolt against the "superior race". His designation of the last hundred and fifty years as "From the French to the German Revolution", is not without symbolic power. A rich chaplet of Spengler's anti-labour vociferations may both exhilarate the reader and give him some food for thought.

The natural feeling of men, says Spengler, agrees with social distinctions, with "organic inequality"; dissatisfaction and class hatred are caused by artificial instigations. Social progress, in all its shades and phases, is due to the poisonous activities of a biological underworld of civilization: freaks, step-children of
nature, upper-class degenerates, a rotten intelligentsia. The
diluted and misconducted instinct for revenge of cripples and
luckless devils finds an outlet in aspirations to political liberty
and social justice. These are always a "bloody sign of decaying
times". Nobility is primarily defied, not by poverty, but by
meanness. The mean spirits who brood on rebellion avail them­
selves of the floating masses. Socialist nihilism, fed on proletarian
hatred of superior forms in every field of culture and society,
seeks to pull down everything to the level of the mob. Bolshev­
ism is a Western, not a Russian, creation; democracy in the
nineteenth century was already full-blown bolshevism. High
culture demands the "dignity of ownership", wealth and
luxury. The nihilistic revolution includes, in a continuous march
from the eighteenth century down to our days, a rationalist
criticism of "grown forms", "historical values", etc., together
with a confrontation of wealth and poverty as moral contrasts.
The whole fabric of modern economics, beginning with Adam
Smith, falls under the same heading; for, apart from direct
proletarianism as in Marx and others, it originates in a cowardly
attempt of the master classes at rational self-justification, which is
in reality a contemptible self-betrayal. Liberalism, the theory of
citizenship, Jacobinism, Bolshevism, are but different stages of
the same destructive movement. The French Revolution was
caused by the depravity of rebel ideologists, not by mass
indigence. The "working class" as an economic unit has no
existence; it is only due to agitation that it takes shape as a
political party, destined to promote the private aims of labour
leaders. The glorification of the worker is part of their well-
calculated tactics in their struggle for power. "Proletarians"
are not men subject to a certain economic situation, but men
of a certain type: anarchical loungers, "Bedouin swarms of idleness"
in the syndicalism of Latin countries, appetitive hordes
in the capitalist and Marxist North; at all events, shirkers from
honest work. Skilled and active workers are bad stuff for bol­
shevist propaganda. Russian Bolshevism is of purely Western
origin, but it threatens to turn into a coloured world revolution.
The bourgeoisie of Western civilization suffers its free institu­
tions to be exploited and ridiculed by the permanent revolution
from beneath, encouraging the latter by its shameful weakness
displayed in the form of magnanimous fairness. "Tolerance is
awarded to the destructive forces of the metropolitan bottom-layer, without being expected from them in return.” (It is also Hitler’s pet figure of thought that Liberal democracy must be deleted, because it inevitably matures into proletarian Socialism.) Prisons and police methods are commented upon with bitter scorn; never a word is said in favour of the guardians of social order. It is permissible to flout everybody except the sacred Worker, who is considered “man proper”, the very “idol of the age”, the “centre of economy”, the “petted darling of politics”, whilst the bearers of “quality”, the inventor, the engineer, the organizer, etc., meet with cool indifference. Liberalism is defenceless in face of the demagogy precipitated by itself; “the Conservative element alone, downtrodden as it was in the nineteenth century, can and will prevent the final collapse in the future”.

After unmasking “proletarian dictatorship” as a dictatorship of private perverts helped by a hypnotized proletariat of incapable and maimed infra-men, Spengler turns angrily upon Christianity, and especially the Catholic clergy with their “democratic” and “socialistic” leanings. He introduces the stage character of the “depraved priest”, who mobs and terrorizes the whole Church, including its highest dignitaries, lends a helpful hand to the Left, and in the guise of charity and social reform proves an effective ally for the subversive forces of the underworld. Unlike Protestant clergymen, who are often debauched revolutionaries for their own persons, the Catholic priests seldom go so far Left, but as far as they go they drag the entire Church with them. As a matter of fact, there is no need for them to over-exert themselves in this direction; for the Church as a whole, just because of her covetousness of power, is “the born enemy of all other organizations of power”(?). In Germany, the black hosts were badly afraid of the red trade-unions, but hastened to make terms with them. Thus engaged in peaceful competition with the Marxist movements, they soon succeeded in bringing about what may be called, not without justification, a sort of Catholic Bolshevism. Nor must we feel abashed by this, for even in the field of pure theory, all communistic systems have grown from Christian ideologies, from “clerico-moral revolt” or “Scholastic conceptions”. The line of droit naturel and political rationalism extends from Thomas
Aquinas through Adam Smith to Marx. "Christian theology is the grandmother of Bolshevism." The Schoolmen, as well as their clerical pro-Labour descendants of to-day, have been "materialists," for all their superficial talk of God. This is easily proven. "Christian morals, like all kinds of morals, mean renunciation and nothing else. Whoever refuses to feel thus, is materialist." As regards the theories of the School, "All abstract pondering over economic conceptions, debarred from economic experience, must, subject to spirited and honest consequence of thought, somehow lead up to conclusions telling against the State (!) and property", postulating a communistic "authoritarian officialdom" whose condition of work is dictatorship. As regards the priests who are acting as agitators in modern economic life, "What, after all, are Christian trade-unions? Christian Bolshevism, nothing else".

All labour movement is suffused with materialistic meanness, and tainted by morbid ethics viciously claiming to influence reality. It is a thing of servile souls looking at the world from below, desiring effort to be reduced and joy of life increased. From the very beginning the word "capitalism" has been a term of wrongly applied moral reproach. "Only the worker is allowed, and advised, to be an egoist... He alone has rights instead of duties." Such is the ideology, not of workmen, but of the "class of those representing the people"; literary men, professors, priests. Whoever starts trade-unions and labour parties succumbs to Marxism. All destruction of economy, all economic class-war, is a means for political purposes, and these purposes can be summed up as nihilism. Liberal and bolshevist "ideals" of social justice are "produced by people who either tried vainly to rise into a higher class of society or belonged to such a class but failed to live up to its ethical requirements".

Besides, Marxian Socialism corresponds to a scheme of capitalist economy which is itself conceived on the pattern of English commercialism rather than of creative industrial enterprise. Economists since 1770 look upon things from the angle of a British merchant, classifying labour as a commodity, wages as a price. Workers' socialism of every description is of English origin; it carries the implication of thinking in terms of money; "Socialism is nothing but the Capitalism of the lower class". We may wonder if the English or the Christian and Scholastic origin is pre-
dominant. But the main thing is that a double reason for despising "workers’ socialism" is provided. The "productive" and "organic" forms of economy are subject to enslavement and expropriation at once by high finance, the institution of shareholding, the credit system (!), and by the labour movement, the "trade unions of labour leaders". Both theories, Liberal and Socialist, are "purely nihilistic and negative". Both, too, are now demoded and have been exposed progressively since 1918, owing to their effects symbolized by New York and Moscow. "Revolution" has achieved victory; the economic crisis, far from being a chance contingency, marks the success of its endeavours. Present-day wages, working-hours regulations and imports, inflict a thorough pillage upon society; they are no longer elements of economic life but form "the pay of the mercenaries of class-war". Their foundation is in the political sphere: "in our days, the accusation of being 'hostile to labour' causes every politician to pale". Even under fascism the party bureaucrat controls economic legislation. (In Spengler’s opinion contemporary fascism is no more than a hopeful inception of evolution towards salutary Caesarism.)

Thus workers’ wages on their present-day level are "imposed by the party leader, not computed by the economic leader". Spengler remembers with a regretful sigh that "in the eighteenth century, in conformity with the general working customs of Nordic peasants and artisans, the working-time amounted to more than twelve hours, without suffering legal restrictions". The revolution, in its turn, installs the worker as a "pensionary of society". He becomes insured against fate in every form; worry and responsibility have been removed from him; he exhibits signs of degeneration such as are customary with very rich families (!). These luxury wages are grossly unnatural, seeing that the distance between directive and subordinate work increases with the height of civilization. They induce depopulation of the rural districts; sacrificing of the peasantry; an increasing demand for credit, and thereby an inflation of imaginary values; bolshevistic expropriation of superior classes as a result of monetary devaluation (?); migration of capital into countries with lower wages; unemployment, increasing dependence on coloured labour; a dying out of quality manufactures, competitive vigour, spirit of enterprise. Even Autarkie is but a sham
solution—the only real one is to send labour politicians about their business and to keep workers in their places. The country where this ideal is best approximated and Bolshevism least powerful is Soviet Russia (!), where wages are lowest, because they are no longer settled by a “party” but by a “ruling horde” (!). We regret that Spengler offers no information as to whether “legitimate luxury” attached to “creative ownership” and “directive activities” can also, thanks to lower wages, be enjoyed more undisturbed in Soviet Russia than in the labour-ridden countries of alleged “Capitalism” or rather “high finance”. Many, however, will be tempted to believe that class hatred of the workers, who make bold to feel themselves human beings, seems to have driven the exalted dreamer of “beast-of-prey” Caesarism out of his wits.

In a less rabid and more systematic manner, the fascists of the “totalitarian” or “organic” school, of whom Spann is pre-eminent, condemn the lower class to definite bondage and everlasting inferiority, in obedience to a hierarchical structure of absolute heights and depths, of domination and subservience religiously sanctioned. No matter whether manufacturers and workers are supposed to form separate “estates” (Stände) altogether, or are “conjoined” in “professional corporations” (Berufsstände) according to each separate branch of production, what turns the scales is the peremptory denial of equal citizenship as well as of co-operative ownership, the fixation of the worker as a “minor means” in the “organic whole” of productional machinery. With ghastly irony, the more so if it be unintentional, Spann calls the worker a “king at his turning lathe”, whereas his relation to his technical superior is that of a “circle to its centre”; with simple but telling contempt Longert challenges the claims of the proletariat, which he says have their only support in “mere numbers”. Society conceived in the terms of an “organic body” rather than in the terms of mankind, economy conceived in the terms of a corresponding “organism of productive effect” rather than in the terms of men combining to satisfy their joint and respective needs, is the proper theory to facilitate an incorporation of class-rule in the “universal order of things” with a reassuring accent of self-evidence and finality. It is true, and by no means unimportant, that, as fascist totality knows no autonomous life of society
apart from state-power, economic class-rule is supplemented and overgrown by more direct relationships of social inequality and political mastery. The "estate of lords" who have special charge of the "State" (Spann) rank at least nominally above the class of "economic leaders", nor would a simple reversal of this order of precedence faithfully describe the real position in fascist societies. For not a moment should it be forgotten that there are other decisive social issues besides class-struggle in the schematic Marxist sense, and that it is most doubtful whether a violent persecution of the labour adversaries of capitalism will secure the greatest possible advantages for the bourgeoisie or the brightest future for capitalist economy. Fascism, from one point of view, is certainly a product of capitalist greed and capitalist desire for power, nay, perhaps of capitalist necessities in a relative sense; but for that reason it is by no means necessarily a product of capitalist sagacity.

Edgar Jung, the Conservative Fascist who was to pay so heavy a price for distantiating himself from orthodox Naziism, expressly states that a Corporative (berufsständisch) State is nonsense, for economic leaders cannot be state leaders. Economy is an "estate", and the State is another and higher one. "As it is, the State and profession are estates (Stand) of a different order. . . . The State, being the supreme estate of organic community, must be an aristocracy, a rule of the best in the final and highest meaning." Thus political dictatorship and social oligarchy merge into each other. Yet within the limits of industry, the bourgeois owners are to enjoy the full benefit of reactionary inequality. "Democratic management would be unreasonable in industry: it contradicts the very law of economy, viz., to be economical." Industrial democracy would require an unwarrantable outlay for "centralistic bureaucracy". On the other hand, a parsimonious individual rationalization of plants "is reserved as a special task for German (!) entrepreneurs". Subsequently Jung reveals what he thinks of the "socialistic State" (der soziale Staat) in general, not to speak of experiments in actual Socialism. The "soziale Staat . . . bestows all its care upon the individual, without paying attention to the stunted growth of the racial body (Volkkörper)". The overrating of "social policy" (old age and invalid insurance, etc.), born of "weak compassion", inspires "a surfeit of medical attention causing . . . the
artificial preservation (!) of feeble, diseased and inferior lives . . . neglecting existences of high value . . . and it may rightly be asked if the total accomplishment (Gesamtleistung) of the people does not forcibly suffer thereby . We must learn to "think again in terms of generations . . . cutting adrift from the irresponsible compassion of the individualist epoch ."

As regards "factory leadership" (Betriebsführung) and the "anti-capitalist" tendency, it is not perhaps without interest to quote H. Eckert's rather modest observations in Die Tat (1934). Under the new regulations, the "factory leader" is assisted by a "council of confidence", whose position, in a "strictly juridical" sense, is feeble than was that of the former "factory committee". (It would be too much to ask in what sense it may be stronger). Since the owner is "as a rule" identical with the "leader", it follows as a surprising sequel that the Betriebführer's post, for all its romantic suggestion of a feudal intimacy, is saleable.

The Nazi trend towards social oligarchy at last finds official confirmation in Darré's book on "New nobility out of Blood and Soil". "We need a new nobility", not of the parchment, however, but of the blood, especially peasant blood. There is merely a difference in degree between peasantry and nobility. (cf. also Rosenberg's slogan of a "peasants' and swordsmen's nobility".) No one shall rank as a "nobleman" who is not a landowner, and the nobleman shall derive his gentile name from his hereditary freehold (Hegehof, "fence-estate" or "hedge-fief"). This institution is meant to follow in some way the Hungarian establishment of Heldenkapitel ("chapter of warriors", or "worthies", introduced by Governor Horthy after the victory of counter-revolution), by which former combatants, both officers and soldiers, known for their prowess and political reliability, are enfeoffed with small-holdings and enjoy certain social privileges. Thus shall proper political leadership be inoculated into the very tissue of society, and valuable hereditary stocks be fostered. Darré's new conception of nobility is based upon a reversion to its pre-Christian Teutonic idea, which the author undertakes to formulate in the following words: "An organization (Gliederung) of the national body (Volkskörper) according to blood-stocks of various qualities, founded on the philosophical assumption of a hereditary inequality of mankind,"
and serving to produce an abundance of well-tested germ-substance in order to ensure the selection of suitable leadership".

This kind of agrarian and racial mysticism flavours only slightly of "anti-capitalism"; still less, however, can it be reconciled with "Socialism", even though a "National" one. At any rate, its central meaning, which consists in increasing the absoluteness of social class distinctions by enhancing their material stability and substantiality, has obviously also an analogous bearing on the social problem in industry.

3. INEQUALITARIAN SOCIALISM

"True Socialism against imperialist Capitalism. . . ."
"The Red Front men and the Baltikum free-lances, even though they mutually smash each other's skulls, are nearer to Volk community than the bourgeois middle-course people musing about it. The extreme wings alone immolate themselves for Volk community . . . at bottom, they both have the same goal, for which they had even (unconsciously) gone to war: German Socialism! We, officers, always admired the German man (of the common people) : never did we look aslant at his class, we merely combated its international leaders. Everybody should admit to-day that we were right in that: for international Marxism, with its hopes set on world solidarity of Labour, has been given the lie cruelly by Versailles! This irrevocable bankruptcy of Marxism is at once the birthday of national Socialism."
"The new Conservatives . . . are those silent men who no longer argue and discuss all night long, why and how and wherefore they are so—who simply declare: So we are! Now comes the reaction against evasive garrulity, against the Liberal dilution of things by endless talk. . . . But this Conservatism will be at least as sozial (kind of socialistic) as it will be national (nationalistic) : for any but a sozial form of economy is as unthinkable for an impoverished State as is any but a national mental attitude for an oppressed nation."

E. E. Dwinger

("Wir rufen Deutschland", a novel, 1982).
National Socialism certainly disclaims any pretence to be “Socialism” in a Communist or “Marxist” sense, or even to be Marxist Socialism with a nationalist accent. But neither can it be called favourable to more moderate species of Social Liberalism or State Socialism, for the main objective of socialistic endeavours, the attainment of an at least partial economic equality related to some moral principle of just retribution and equitable distribution, be it even under the patronage of a conservative state authority, plays no part in the Nazi concept. On the contrary, care is taken to drift away from such topics. What remains of “Socialism” is an essentially vague ideology of “planning”, discipline versus liberty, dictatorial state interference versus economic Liberalism, and a generous grant of “honour” to workers, or more especially, to “work”.

We have seen that it was the royal idea of Hitler to oppose Marxian Socialism with another mass movement of different—and extremely antithetical—tendency, but of a character in some respects similar, in order to be able to meet it and break it on its own plane of action. This fundamental principle, which had been broadly expounded in Mein Kampf, was also to supply Hitler’s decisive argument in his memorable struggle, conducted with invincible strategic mastery, against von Papen’s and General Schleicher’s experiment of a non-fascist “authoritarian” régime of the moderate aristocratic Right in 1932. Hitler exposed with impeccable logic that the masses of the Left were still far too numerous and too well organized to acquiesce in the rule of a handful of officers, barons and industrials; that they could only be really dispersed, made ineffective, and in part dissolved and absorbed, by the compact masses of the totalitarian Right, i.e., the Nazis. In other words, he established it as a certainty that victorious counter-revolution had the choice between the re-admission of vanquished Socialism, its arch enemy, to power, and the cession of leadership to “counter-Socialism” to whose pressure it owed its victory. The well-bred reactionaries, however much they detested the vulgarity, and distrusted the un-aristocratic and hyper-political totalitarian aspirations, of this sham Socialism, thought it safer to choose it, or else some inner urge compelled them to do so. Anyhow, Hitler won the game, and his triumph, shocking though the word may seem to a certain type of Left intellect puffed up with conceit, was not
least a triumph of reason. Subject to the general aim of the German Right, the relation of which to reason we need not discuss, Hitler’s system of means and his tactics were certainly the more reasonable, the better planned, the more closely united to a relative aspect of historical truth. As to the real character of his “Socialism”, the respective passages of Mein Kampf convey sufficient enlightenment. “The National Socialist wage-earner must know that the prosperity of the nation safeguards his own material happiness.” Apart from the quite irrelevant political qualification of the wage-earner, this bright platitude might have been written by any old-fashioned Liberal or Jingo journalist. The author proceeds to declare that it would be a mistake to organize special Nazi trade-unions, because they would forcibly be driven either to compromise or to compete with the others; and trade-union motives would acquire an influence over the political movement. Therefore the party comrades had either to abstain from membership of any trade-union, or to remain in their old one and work for its destruction from within.

Feder, the old party expert on the social problem, who has lately been set aside for his “radicalism”, was, as early as 1924, particularly eager to emphasize the “inviolability of private land property”, and the exclusion of joint industrial ownership, at least as a general principle. In so far as the expropriation of agrarian estates is concerned, it can only be a question of such as are owned by “landfremd (alien, viz., Jewish) elements”. The alleged “right of every one to a parcel of land” must be denied; a system of dwarf allotments is undesirable. However, the idea that bodenständig (stable and well-behaving) workers should “gradually” be admitted into a partial joint possession of the plants, deserves consideration; or again, that “surplus work” (Arbeitsüberschüsse) should be used for the purposes of inner colonization. These are so many “sections of social assistance work”, and “to-day are not yet so very urgent”. One might stop to wonder, then, what else is “very urgent” in relation to the “radical solution of the social problem”. Feder’s answer would presumably cover the maxims “The common weal goes before private interests”, “Private property shall not be an instrument of private power”, “Banks shall be the servants, not the masters, of economy”, etc., and the more tangible and consequential intimation that the “Marxian doctrines of salvation”,

together with the modes of conduct allegedly based upon them, must be eliminated. For in the long run, it is the "populace itself", including labour, who are most damaged by strikes, sabotage, "neglectful and careless work", and destructive teachings. The one concrete project for reform of Herr Feder, which ultimately cost him his position, the arbitrary creation of money, will be mentioned in Section 4.

The problem of joint partnership in industry, which is indeed of crucial importance for every non-communistic type of Socialism, is also elegantly disposed of by the Spannian school, from which we again select Longert. The proletariat, he says, must be released from its class existence, reintegrated into Volk life, and supplied with the "consciousness of being a German" (ein deutscher Mensch). Such effects will be achieved by the workers being represented in the Chamber of Corporations (Wirtschafts-Ständehaus), and thereby acquiring "condominion over the whole national wealth, implying also joint possession (Besitzanteil) in this respect". It is a very threadbare respect; for neither have the fascist corporations anything to do with the ownership of plants, nor can the workers under the Corporative system (where parties are suppressed, the political sphere withdrawn from common people's vision and action, and wherein the principle of majority is denied validity) exercise any influence comparable with their position under even the least perfect forms of parliamentary democracy.

As early as 1921, Bliicher spoke in disparaging terms of "proletarian Socialism, which in the future will be the properly forbidden one". His prophesy has come true; in the course of a dozen years "proletarian Socialism" was indeed routed and subsequently forbidden. Socialism without a "Prussian backbone", he added, was an "empty doctrine", suitable for an "inferior kind of men". To put it crudely, Socialism encumbered with moral ideas on equality and supported by the aspirations of such factors of society as are interested in equality, is petty nonsense; but Socialism in the sense of all-comprehensive militarism is all right. Dyrsen, in his "Prussian Socialism" as has already been said, soars equally high above the filthy level of the problems concerning the "distribution of goods". Fried certainly gets to the heart of the question when he reproaches the Social Democratic movement for having shifted its centre of
gravity towards “Democracy”. For the genuine Socialism of the Left, including the Marxist wing, is nothing other than the transference of democratic equality into the texture of socio-economic relationships; and the Nazi Fascists, though playing on the fears of jealous and greedy owners in pointing out to them that they must disclaim Liberal democracy fundamentally lest they be forced into the clutches of Socialism, are themselves primarily moved by the undying reactionary hatred of the very principle of human equality which they rightly diagnose as the microbe of Labour Socialism. “Men are unequal in race and achievement”, declares Fried with that stupendous lack of discernment which is so characteristic of the ordinary opponents of progress and humanity. As though the doctrine of equality denied the inequalities of men, both in variety and values! In fact, the basic laws and demands of equality emerge all the more imposingly out of the tangle and the patchwork of inequalities. According to Fried, a peasant’s farm (Bauernhof) is emphatically “superior” to the proletarian’s “mechanical work”, wherefore it would be an unnatural destruction of value to force it down to the latter’s level. I should not so much contest the peasant’s alleged superiority as rather insist on the fact that the proletarian has also a superiority of its own kind, perhaps more promising and progressive. The Russian experiment, says Fried, aims at the unsettling (uprooting-Entwurzelung) of the peasant; the German, at the settling (rooting-Verwurzelung) of the worker. In as far as this formula covers a part of the truth, the Russian experiment appears to be either more hopeful or more genuine, in any case more in touch with lasting ideas of equality. It is easier, whether or not there is any necessity for it, to conceive the tillers of the soil as “workers on the economic machinery of society” than to conceive factory hands as settled rustics. There is a weird unreality in reactionary utopias that outdoes even the wildest reform projects of immature radical minds.

Democratic Socialism is also denounced by Jung as an auxiliary of “odious” Capitalism. The deduction is simple and unassailable: “The democratic civilian state represents the domination of money interests”; for that reason all democratic movements are calculated to strengthen the grip of financiers on the life of society. “On behalf of Money, Socialism combats the State, Monarchy, landed property, home-bound (bodenständig)
industry (!), the middle classes, and last but not least, the worker himself by rejecting all social reform policy (!).” The consequences are obvious enough: abolish bürgerlich democracy, smash labour Socialism, multiply the power of bodenständig industrials, and you will have half the work done in building up real Socialism, by having driven “international financiers” back into their holes. If Jung’s theoretical activities were, from the outset, a form of servility to his Junker masters, the analogous views held by August Winnig testify to the amazing evolution of a type of German Social Democrat. Winnig’s book, published in 1980, bears the title Vom Proletariat zum Arbeiterum (“From proletarianism to national labour”). He remains faithful to the Marxist thesis that labour is the bearer of a “new destiny”, as the nobility and the bourgeoisie were in their times; but he sees this “new destiny” in terms of “unused biological reserves”, and in essential antagonism to the Western Liberal world. The main enemy of Labour—of German Labour at any rate, and Winnig’s interests are confined to this—is not the capitalist, the market adversary; it is the “Socialist intellectual”, the home agent of the “French soldier”. The “Socialist intelligentsia”, of Western orientation and mostly of Jewish extraction, purpose to destroy the “autochthonous German order of living” (volkhaft-deutsche Lebensordnung), and attack land and factory owners for being “national centres of power” bound to the native soil. We may safely complete Winnig’s phrase of the “new destiny of labour” by attempting its definition: the workers are to teach their employers a more elaborate consciousness of themselves as “national centres of power”, as well as to wage the proper kind of Socialist class-war by baiting Radical intellectuals suspect of serving “French soldiers” (i.e., “international centres of power”?), perhaps even of reading French novels.

Where Marxism ends, German Socialism begins—announced Moeller-Bruck, whose imperial dream was the stirring up of proletarian energy and bitterness into an anti-Western fury of nationalism and militarism. “German Socialism” will be “corporative, conservative, earthbound (gebunden), organic, dualistic and polar”, to wit, inequalitarian, devoid of any aspirations of humanity, with expansion of vital Forces instead of moral justification as its central theme. “Not classes, types!” No better formula could be found for the swerve from Socialism to “Ger-
man Socialism” than this war-cry of Moeller-Bruck, this sonorous trumpet-call of irrational and particularist self-assertion substituted for the proletarian consciousness of the social situation in its reference to economic justice and universal responsibility. (cf. also Freyer’s “revolution” as a “pure process” or “pure Aufbruch”, unconnected with structural principles or demands of justice.) In one of Moeller’s scattered political essays which form no part of Das Dritte Reich, were written the words: “The nations of the East, which from the Western point of view begin with Germany, are the carriers of Socialism. It will not, however, be that narrow-minded (!) party socialism which seeks its adversary within its own people. Nor can it be that small-hearted class socialism which raises the question of private property. Rather will it be that great Socialism of nations which has realized that there is but one kind of oppression— that of nations, and of all classes and professions within them”. Obviously, Bulgarians harassed by Greeks or Armenians massacred by Kurds, if they are anxious not to be considered “narrow-minded”, must appear concerned only about the Yellow Peril; a wife beaten by a drunken husband ought to be great-hearted and enlightened enough to throw the blame on their neighbour’s family; and it is the duty of the man in the street who is knived by gangsters to bear in mind that snakes and bacilli are the real, common enemies of all mankind.

Every country must have its own socialism—such is the view held by Count Reventlow as well as by Moeller-Bruck and others. “German Socialism must grow out of German nature.” (Were I, if such a thing is conceivable, to have any objection to Hitler’s system, it would be the apprehension that perhaps German Fascism has grown too much out of Italian nature.) “To the German Socialist, unlike the Marxist, his own Volk includes the beginning and the end, the germ and the culmination, both of theory and practice.” (This may be the reason why the content of German Socialism has never really been stated; it would lose its magic flavour by being made translatable into Latin or English.) Everything is contained in the idea of Volk! “One for all, all for one. . . . Socialism means Volk comradeship, in its highest sense, to be made effectual in all fields of life.” Fairness, however, compels us to add that Reventlow is no fascist: he protests that blind uncritical obedience to the Führer is noxious
and—naturally—"un-Teutonic"; that the union of all Volksgenossen must be spontaneous, not obtained by violence; that the masses claim to be themselves the actors "in Volk und Staat"; that the days of unchallenged mastery as the privilege of a group are past. It is to such heresies as these that the queer Count, whatever consideration he receives as a champion of Neo-Paganism, owes his position as hopeless outsider in the Party.

We must now make a brief report on the "Prussian Socialism" of Spengler, the metaphysician of Caesarism (1919), and on the "German Socialism" of Professor Sombart (1984).

Spengler sets out to oppose a "Socialism of paper" by a "Socialism of the blood". "It is the blood alone that decides the future." "We want no more phrases, we want ourselves." We must rid German Socialism of the Marxist excrescence—"German Socialism, for there is no other". We Germans are Socialists, "the others are incapable of being that". Just as every real Frenchman is a bourgeois, so every real German is a worker. The years 1818, 1870, 1914, mark the dates of German revolution; 1914, in particular, witnessed the first uproar of German Socialist Revolution. French society is by nature equalitarian, democratic, anarchic (even in its periods of dictatorship); English society is inequalitarian, "Liberal", competitive, acquisitive (of a "Viking" character); German society in its only classical—the Prussian—form, is predestined to breed an authoritarian Socialism based on organization, the idea and the interests of the "Whole" taking priority. Work, not leisure, is the representative condition of man according to Prussian style. The social conception of Prussiandom recognizes no equality, it involves a respect of rank and distance; yet it imposes stern subordination to the requirements of the Whole even on the highest orders. No moral communication or solidarity is maintained with those who fall outside the boundaries of this Whole; they cannot even understand its uniting principle. In fact, Spengler reveals a kind of religious obsession in regard to the formal idea of "société close" and "morale close", as Henri Bergson describes it in contradistinction to the superior type of "société ouverte" and "morale ouverte". International Labour Socialism is challenged by Spengler in no uncertain terms: "Prussiandom is exclusive. Even in a proletarian setting it dismisses the workers of other countries, and their egoistic
Nevertheless, it is democratic insofar as it makes no discrimination in the moral dignity of work, irrespective of the various kinds. It postulates an "impartial State settlement of wages for work of all kinds, on a scale devised to suit the prevailing economic conditions, to suit the interests of the whole Volk, not of a single professional class". This is an abstract circumlocution for the old Prussian order of great capitalists with their artificially enhanced monopolistic profits standing for a supposed impersonal "economy", die Wirtschaft, and sharing social prestige with ill-paid Junker Leutnants. The English economic code implies thinking of none but oneself, acquiring wealth to the detriment of others; not so the "Prussian idea of Socialism in its most profound sense", which means "will-to-power; a Fight for the happiness, not of the individual but of the Whole". With less confusion, and subject only to a slight exaggeration, we might put it thus: Those who are in command on behalf of the "Whole", have a claim to happiness; the mass of those who obey have to find happiness in the power of their masters. Indeed Spengler, after having confronted the English cult of happiness, luxury, comfort and privacy with the Prussian appreciation of "work for its own sake"—for this inhuman creed is no invention of Feindbund (Entente) newspapers—candidly adds that the English idea, "Work in order to be relieved of the necessity of working later", is more seductive and has more appeal for "the great number of men". On the other hand, the Prussian idea, "Do thy duty by working", sounds "deterrent". "It is for the use of the few who are able to inculcate it to the public body and thereby impose it on the mass." We may well be grateful for the "exclusiveness" of Prussian Socialism, if such be Prussian Socialism; the extra-Prussian peoples will scarcely achieve comprehension of it, they might at very best have it "imposed upon them".

Sombart's "German Socialism", carefully differentiated from "proletarian Socialism", might be called anti-industrial and anti-commercial in distinction to "anti-capitalistic". Here, once again, "Socialism" means carrying counter-revolutionary revulsion as far away as possible from Liberalism. "Proletarianism", says Sombart with a belittling smile, "repudiates the social form only, not the very kernel, of modern civilization". It is concerned with curtailing the amount of work, rejoicing in
a mythical vision of a future where work is all pleasure, glorifying the natural forces of society which are eventually to fill the place both of God and the State. (For a true-bred Prussian is religious out of militarism; he could not do without a Sergeant in heaven.) This socialism of licentious decomposition must be counteracted by another one: "... which I call German Socialism" (*Deutscher S.*, with a capital D). German Socialism is relativistic, totalitarian, voluntaristic (that is, expressing itself in action rather than in theorizing), profane (there is no efflux of Christian dogmatism), heroic, and above all, nationalistic. It is relativistic: "no universally valid order, but merely an order suited to a given nation" forms the underlying assumption. German Socialism has no monistic, dogmatic, doctrinaire, but a "historico-realistic" character. "There is only one thing for us: Germany. For the sake of Germany’s greatness, power and glory we gladly sacrifice every ‘theory’, every ‘principle’, be it liberalistic or any other kind." Even though Sombart never passed as a really serious man of science, a teacher of economics who can write such nonsense is a heart-rending spectacle. It is rather as if a physician were called upon to prescribe for a case of cancer and instead of advocating either an operation or radium treatment were to say that he cared not a penny for surgery or radium, but only for his patient’s health.

We must, however, again insist on the central truth that lack of intellectual standards in Nazis is not primarily a sign of mere default or deficiency but corresponds to the actual tendency itself. Sombart’s book is certainly not void of "principles" and "theories"; relativism, amoralism, national particularism, and a militaristic superstructure as well as camouflage of capitalist economy, belong to his very principles and theories. The organization of German Socialism, as Sombart also puts it, must be appropriate to the peculiarities of the "German soul" and the "German body". Taken literally, this is hardly more than idle chatter, but it conveys a hyperbolic, or may we say artistic, expression of a creed of biological nationalism applied, as it happens, to German mankind, a creed which may have its drawbacks and weak points, but which certainly is a creed, not a mere hotch-potch of words. "For me German Socialism means socialism for Germany, i.e., a socialism that claims validity only for Germany, or rather for the Germany of our day, because it
is conceived in view of the German conditions of the present. It is meant to be a suit, as it were, 'cut to fit the body' of Germany, not ready-made...not a scheme of international order merely adorned with occasional references to the special conditions of Germany." Nor is it construction limited to the economic sphere; it rather includes a "total order of the German Volk". This last remark is very suggestive too; Fascist romanticism, and its Nazi climax even more, imply a general discouragement of economic analysis, for their method of dealing with social difficulties consists to a large degree of drowning all consciousness of social reality in national self-consciousness.

_Genuine Socialism_, we are told by Sombart, _is built upon the principle of inequality_. The State is pervaded in all its parts and members by hierarchy and subordination. Let us have our promised _ständischer Aufbau_ (corporative reconstruction); the mere professional corporation, however, does not exhaust the full meaning of _Stand_ (estate), which also embraces a community of style in living and thinking. Above all, the _Stand_ involves stability of living conditions, "statics", people keeping in their proper places. Equality is also proscribed, and a scale of ranks postulated, _within a "corporation"_. Thus the factory-owners need not fear lest the Corporative State should fuse them with the mass of their workers. Nor is it compatible with _ständisch_ mentality to reduce all kinds of activity to the common denominator "work"; "different activities have different accents of value". The principle of social order, which Sombart deduces from "the will of the Whole", is as follows: _the highest step in the hierarchy of values is occupied by the military profession_ (presumably because occupying places is its proper business); _the lowest place is allotted to economic functions_, and within this humble sphere the highest rank is accorded to agriculture. Caprice may have its part in such an alignment of "castes"; but the tendency is obvious. The more a sphere of life is associated with Power and its traditional possession, the more honour is granted to it, whereas mere men working for their living must well bear in mind that they are merely the grey mass ordained to serve as a foothold for Power. The life process of society (not, however, the historical play of contesting powers and supre­macies) must be kept slow, for socio-economic conditions in a state of flux are apt to lead to equality, bringing to light the
relativity and one-sidedness of men’s differences in value and the absolute dignity of human personality.

I should not have the “inequalitarian socialism” of Prussian, Fascist and Nazi origin labelled either “State Socialism”, or “State Capitalism”, or “Conservative Socialism”. For an effective state control of economic production and distribution, even one managed by an authoritarian state and allowing for considerably unequal standards of living, is certainly not its dominant feature. With more reason could we speak of Capitalism both maintained and encroached upon by a hypertrophic state apparatus of a politically, as it were philosophically, self-conscious and self-asserting military character. Capitalist economy is kept safe from revolutionary—“structural”—disturbances, and in return forced to endure the parasitic overlordship of a military caste widened into a social class. The economic mastery of the capitalist—monopolist—class, rather than capitalist economy in its full sense, prevails in what is retained. Nor is the State in its implication of impartial authority, order, and public consciousness represented here. Both in the economic and in the political sphere, as well as where they intermingle, the immanent logic of social functions and human life-aspects seems to merge into darkness, and above it the contours of unrestrained, irresponsible, formless, anarchical Power appear—power that finds its justification in the first place simply in itself, and in the second place in guaranteeing to keep in motion, for good or evil and for the time being, the given fabric of social livelihood. At what price, and for how long?
4. THE ECONOMICS OF STATE-POWER

"The worker, too, is a Bürger (citizen), provided that he is a racial fellow-German.... We must make a clean sweep of proletarian envy, but equally of bourgeois purse-pride. We must return to simplicity."

D. Eckart
(a völkisch poet, connected with Hitler’s movement in its beginnings: quoted by Heiden).

Properly speaking, there is no such thing as Nazi economics—not, at least, as a real system of its own, among or apart from the Liberal and Socialist schools. It is a feature of Fascism that Capitalism no longer fends for itself on the open battlefield of economic argument, but takes a concealed stand behind the showy and new-fangled hierarchy of popular dictatorship, which is at once a hireling in its pay and its overlord taking toll from it. Briefly it can be said that concentrated trust capitalism (so much more consonant with the Prussian state tradition of economic protectionism than is industrial Liberalism) has substituted itself for the more distributive form of capitalism with its broader basis of bourgeois and middle-class property. It is well in accord with this process that capitalist class-rule has withdrawn from the sphere of direct economic publicity, combining now—in the face of mass consciousness—an equivocal mass of more or less irrelevant and futile economic speculations with a stronger body of non-economic (nationalist, fascist, traditionalist, "revolutionary") ideologies which have also to carry the burden of the economic reality of society in the minds of the people. To this kind of trust capitalism, in an impoverished society at least, the direct bargain it has struck with the socio-militarist "estate of state-lords" may appear to be a more secure and serviceable means of controlling state affairs, as far as this is needed, than the comparatively open and equalitarian system of competitive democracy. We neither mean to suggest that Fascism, let alone Naziism, is simply a product or a reflection of oligarchic Capitalism, nor that the capitalist reckoning we have essayed to reconstruct is bound to be profitable in the
long run; but the inward correspondence cannot be overlooked. The new aristocracy of industrial masters is more easily and genuinely able to avail itself of the romantic creeds of heroic leadership and vital unity than to stand the test of economic rationality accessible to the understanding of all. The supreme class, the active managers of national wealth, form, as it were, a small circle among themselves, in which they are not dependent on any scientific justification; the great mass of the practically propertyless bottom-layer of economy are better provided with “community” enthusiasm and discipline than with an analytic insight both into the process which moulds their own lives and into the leadership which they follow. Spengler’s amazing remark that the science of economics (from Adam Smith onward) implied the self-surrender of the upper class, is really to the point; self-justification in a universal court of reason certainly implies voluntary submission to criticism, and a virtual renunciation of mastery. Capitalist ownership interpreted and even sanctioned as a function on behalf of the general gratification of needs among equals, might as well be regulated or transformed on a higher level of collective consciousness; society foreshadows Socialism. Similarly Spengler’s distrust of any implication of moral considerations in dealing with the “rich” and the “poor”, in spite of Malthus’ canonization of the former, or of the idea of an ambitious “labour class” as a result of economic automatism (he merely sees in it a phantom of propagandists, an evil fruit of instigations) is not entirely groundless. “Economics” are proscribed, or submerged in the darkness of academic irrelevances, flippant generalities or harmless curiosities, in order to efface the underlying idea of society, that is, mankind in the concrete relationship of everyday life. Whatever the actual theses which economic science may hit upon in its quest for a solution of its problems, it cannot elude liberty and equality as its inherent theme. Therefore economics in their classical form (in the broadest sense of the term “classical”), in their thematic dignity, are bound to be set aside. This does not, of course, mean any check to the abundance of economic literature taking up, in part, the tradition of the former “concrete” or “historical” school averse to a logical foundation of economics, or again espousing the more philosophic ideologies of nationalism and “organic” conservatism.
Economic writers of the various capitalist (Liberal or interventionist) schools may, of course, regard Facist or Nazi policy with favour, because it has done away with the Marxist peril or even minor threats to market economy by the inflexibility of labour claims; they may also criticize it for un-productive expenditure on its militarist and propagandistic necessities or foibles. On the whole, experts will probably confirm my suspicion that the violent assertion of capitalist rule has no tendency to bring about an inward strengthening or a lasting expansion of capitalist economy. As for Nazi (or German Fascist) attempts in regard to economic thought, we may discern here five tendencies. (1) The “corporative” school of Professor Spann and his followers is devoted to re-stating the capitalist system in terms of a non-Liberal totalitarian vision of economy as an “organism”. Economy is conceived as a “sub-Whole” of national totality, therefore subordinated to the political command of those high in power, but inwardly managed by its “autonomous” centres—the monopolist owners who, in their turn, constitute the heads of their respective professional corporations and, analogously, their plants or enterprises. On the one hand, capitalism appears sublimized or mitigated inasmuch as it is no longer defended on the basis of an absolute right of private ownership, with the worker as a propertyless individual thrown on his own resources, and labour a mere “market commodity” as its correlates, but is clad in the terminology of a “community” or a “Stand” with a supra-economic emphasis of vital union and a well-ordered hierarchy of membership. The workers enjoy the “status” of members, whereas ownership is rather a usufruct, a leasehold “conferred” by the supreme corporative organs of the nation. On the other hand, economic inequality is stabilized and implemented by civic inequality, perpetuated and legitimized by philosophical deduction, beyond a mere secondary and practical justification. (“Corporative” organization, unless it is inserted into a democratic constitution or a society suffused with political liberty, is bound to invigorate capitalism: Murner.) The economy of high capitalism thus becomes a pageant of idyllic romance, and the Spannian views, though seldom with systematic clarity, colour the socio-economic thought of German fascism and incidentally of Austrian fascism as well—which
adheres even more closely to their detail—seeing that the Austrian ideology renounces "Socialism" and lays emphasis on its claim to be ständisch; some of its builders, however, would not go so far as to credit Spann's anti-individualist romantic and hierarchic vitalism entirely. Since Spann is a headstrong German nationalist but not an orthodox backer of the racial creed, he is an outsider, highly appreciated but rather mistrusted, both in the Third Reich and the Austrian Corporate State. (2) Such elements of social and economic reality as bear the sign of stability, psychological "value" transcending pure economics, feudalism as opposed to commercialism, are accorded some measure of favour and praise: hence a predilection for agriculture, or even for small tradesmen in their struggle against warehouses—and co-operative societies. (8) Certain idiosyncrasies peculiar to Nazi literature concern the condemnation of "Jewish" capital, "high finance", "the tyranny of interest" (Zinsknechtschaft) and they are sometimes bound up with the advocacy of quack monetary experiments. (4) A marked tendency to oppose world economy and to favour economic nationalism prevails; the chief end for economic policy is to ensure the country's military efficiency and preparedness for war. (5) Lastly, a certain air of military collectivism, as revealed in Jünger's famous myth of the "Worker", cannot be overlooked. In some sense, the Nazi "Socialism" of Prussian organization and state-worship, fused with industrial class-rule but less favourable to its aspects of leisurely privacy, has a "proletarian" touch. The motif of a "worker's army" provides the connecting-link between the styles of living proper to National Socialism and Communism. Yet in the sphere of Naziism, the moral meaning of this "mobilization" of social forces is eliminated, whilst the substructure of market economy as well as the traditional heirloom of the "national soul" are preserved.

This second-hand survey may be illustrated by a chorus of living voices. Blüher's lofty remark that "all coveting of possessions, even spiritual possession, is a token of meanness", aptly indicates the general attitude against progressive aspirations to a fair distribution of wealth and enlightenment. What is condemned here is not acquisitiveness as such but the proletarian "arrogance" of coveting goods which those alone are
entitled to "have" who "are" something. The sated and exclusive aristocracy which has assumed control of "trust" industry has thus engaged a new set of snobbish poets and philosophers in its service. For Blüher, the cynical despiser of the "secondary" masses of mankind, is less isolated than it might seem. Dyrrsen's posturings as a "revolutionary Socialist", an arch enemy of "Capitalism", merely reflects the transformations and re-alignments within the capitalist party in class-struggle, in favour of the inequalitarian and anti-Liberal monopolist master set. "Ownship is a heroico-aristocratic task"; "heroic man" is rebelling, with the eternal soul of Germany, against "economic man". Yes, because the high bourgeoisie can safely indulge in the luxury of a new worship of "highness" and a decrying of bourgeoisie and Bürgerlichkeit; and can even derive considerable profit from it. Nay, it is precisely men of a very high and securely established economic position who can afford, and may feel tempted, to set themselves up as "heroic" men looking down on mere "economic" men, mere haggler and toilers for whom property is less visibly or less emphatically a means and a correlate of actual domination. The militant capitalism of heavy industry displaces the international logic of economy incarnate in finance; pauperized middle-classes, even declassed proletarians (unemployed!), are welcome as allies recognizing the "heroic", "non-economic" overlords of economy, against such townspeople and workers as still stand by a fundamental conception of equal terms. This must be kept in mind when considering what reason Dyrrsen may have for glorifying German "ruralism" in opposition to Roman "urbanity". Far from upholding the cause of a free peasantry against East Elbian latifundians and Junkers, he is not even quite genuinely an agent of feudal agrarian reaction; the latter is rather needed as a decoration, an ideological support, a pattern of anti-democratic social organization. The main issue is not "peasantry versus industrialism"; it is really drawn between the new type, now in evolution, of high industrial, technico-military "landscape" ruled by trust-lords and their fascist minions, and commercial, civilian town culture with its ineradicable liberal features. For all his pro-Bauer and anti-Bürger declamations, Dyrrsen does not say one word that could convey the faintest suggestion of a wish to reduce industrial
plants and technical equipments, or actually to return to a level of economy such as existed before the industrial revolution! He only talks of "re-agrarianization" in the sense of a tendency to repress the growth of towns (Entstädterung). In a way he is right in claiming to be a "revolutionary Socialist", since he is certainly the spokesman of highly "up-to-date" social developments, the prophet of undeniable future possibilities, the ideological artist of forms that are about to be born. Nor is he wrong to choose the agrarian militarism inherent in Prussian history, with its marked contrast to South and West European townsmanship, as a stock of traditions on which to graft the new growth, emerging from industrial technique and organization, of anti-urban, Prussian, militarist society. Dyrsen has also characterized German law (Recht) as not individualistic and "irenic", but pertinent to a "fighting community", and his watchwords of "soldierly peasants" versus "skilful merchants", "force" versus "wealth" only confirm our interpretation. In some measure, Dyrsen may be labelled a fantastic dreamer, but his dreams are by no means unrelated to the reality and the prospects of certain romantic, power-seeking oligarchic types in the present phase of Capitalism, especially German.

Darré, who is at present a member of the Reich's Government, appreciates peasantry in a fundamentally similar sense: not as a backbone of liberty, of "distributive" petty ownership, but as a pedestal and breeding-stock for the master set. A "new nobility out of blood and soil" is what he has in mind. Peasantry and nobility differ in degree only; peasantry is looked upon as "the Nordic race's source of life". Towns are a hotbed of parasitical existence; nobility cannot be derived from urban existence. "What matters is the sturdy genuineness (Wurzelhaftigkeit) of nobility". Peasant property must be protected by special measures against the injurious effects of economic liberalism and individualism such as dispersion, by inheritance or free saleability, of land property, without, however, instituting common landholding after the manner of the Russian mir; what must be aimed at is "familic" or rather clan property, the use and transference of which is regulated by a familic law of ownership and inheritance. Agrarian property must not be treated from "a purely economic point of view" but in respect
of its "moral functions". Even the agronomic use of land property ought not to be determined by economic rentability alone, but according to the principle of "the soil as a basis for the preservation and augmentation of good blood". Upon the peasant "basis", a privileged nobility is to be erected. State expropriation of great estates is out of the question, owing to the respect for the continuity of ownership; the State merely claims priority for the purchase of such land properties as are for sale, in order to promote the creation of inheritable peasant leaseholds (Erbhof, Hadelhof). In future the nobility shall form assemblies and councils; and its representatives may devote themselves to public affairs free from economic care. Similarly, according to Rosenberg, the new nobility will depend on both blood and service; it will be hereditary but capable of annulment as a result of disgraceful conduct or even inferior achievements. It will no longer be a caste, but an élite chosen from all classes; mainly, however, from the peasantry and the army (Bauern-und Schwertadel), in recognition of the dominating rule of physical fitness in these professions.

Feder used to be the party specialist in the ideologies of bogus anti-capitalism and the whimsicalities of non-structural "Socialism". Their practical significance is to be found in the justification provided for industrial trust capitalism, as well as in the promotion of the anti-Jewish campaign conducted on extra-economic grounds. Feder's leading idea, which may within reason be compared to Marx's theory of surplus value, is the distinction between the "creative spirit" and the "acquisitive spirit" in economic activity. English Socialists who are themselves fond of this formula must not expect to find views analogous to their own behind it; the euphonious distinction in its Nazi form, in which the terms are even made to rhyme with one another: schaffender Geist and raffender Geist, is based merely on the test of conspicuous participation in productive labour, and is closely and dogmatically attached to the assumed racial antithesis between lofty Germanic and vile Jewish character. Creative spirit is the mark of earth-bound toilers working on surrounding nature (Umwelt), entrepreneurs as well as humble workers; acquisitive spirit is proper to "nomadic profit-seekers", unconcerned with direct productive activity, merchants, hucksters, money-changers, etc. "Money in control of
work and blood (!)—this is the state of things bewailed by honest Feder, who most certainly never saw an economic problem (apart from the noisome figments of malignant Jewish demagogues) in the light of the proportion between the annual income of a Ruhr “coal Baron” and of one of his “sturdy German workers”, apparently of the same “blood”; but he is convinced that the incomes of a stock-exchange lounger or, worse still, an international faiseur, are beyond all doubt extorted with the assistance of the devil. The creative, blood-true spirit is of course “Aryan”; the acquisitive, speculative spirit, Jewish. Thus the prospect is opened up for a real, an intrinsic, a radical reform; the possession of capital must be made impossible for the Jews, a measure which is now methodically being put into execution; but let us have no socialization, no coarsely-handed “outward interference” with the machinery of economy! We must replace “profit economy” by “want-supplying economy”. Presumably “Profit economy” directed by merchants and bankers never had the slightest thing to do with the gratification of human needs! On the other hand, a German iron magnate, for instance, whose record is unsoiled by a Mosaic grandmother, knows no earthly pursuit other than that of providing German workers with iron bedsteads or of equipping Italian and Abyssinian warriors with iron guns, and lives in supreme indifference to the problems regarding his own supply of bread and meat and Rolls-Royce cars. To that end Feder, it is true, hints at the nationalization of the wholesale trade of goods of vital importance, as well as of banking. But this rather disquieting suggestion seems to be made more or less at random, and is not followed up to produce an impression of seriousness. (It goes without saying that the nationalization of functions of economic co-ordination embodied in high commerce and finance would by no means oust the problem of profit; nor, to make matters worse, would it be possible without establishing state control over “creative economy” too).

Finally, there is the famous Brechung der Zinsknechtschaft, “breaking the tyranny of interest”, which however, I grieve to say, ended by breaking the neck of Gottfried Feder, who seems to have stuck to the one concrete dogma of Nazi “Socialism” with more than advisable obstinacy. Nevertheless, even this “structural” dogma is firmly rooted in Nationalism,
in German resentment at the West’s greater richness in liquid capital. Zinsknechtschaft means the primarily ‘indebtedness of State and People to the supra-national powers of finance’; needless to say, ‘world-finance’ is interested in the ‘lasting encirclement of Germany’. This unpleasant situation has been brought about by the system of foreign loans, which, contrary to common opinion, was not dictated by necessity. Had it not been for the state’s bondage to Jewish financial agents, whose influence was secured by the vehicle of Weimar “democracy”, the economic organism of the nation could easily have been kept going by means of the issue of interest-free state exchequer bills, the institution of financing by a system of “assignats” without money, the refusal to pay any war indemnities, and the general abolition of capital interest. In defence of these proposals, which, made in 1924, found a partial response in the great German inflation, Feder points out that the state has a right to “direct creation of money”; that a sensible state finance management avails itself of the state’s rights of sovereignty; that the state should be, in place of high finance, master of monetary policy; that “money is what the state declares to be money”; that it is no advantage whatever to industry to pay interest; that steps of the proposed kind may safely be taken, irrespective of how the “great foreign nations” or the “civilized world” would react, for at bottom, their protest would be nothing beyond the furious gesticulation of the Jew Rothschild wounded in his honour, which is his pocket. No scientific criticism of this rubbish is needed, but I might observe, since it may amuse some readers, that Feder could have said with similar utopian `infantilism’: “Not the professors of philosophy, but the State should be master of the laws of logic’; or: “Truths (or values, or goods) are what the State declares to be truths (or values, or goods)”. As to the rest, I am not denying that a collectivist monetary policy with the state’s full economic “sovereignty” in its centre would be possible, and logical in itself; only it would require an indomitable determination to put up with dire privations during the period of revolutionary change, and probably to accept a considerable and permanent reduction of economic civilization as a matter of permanence; at any rate, “industry” would have little reason to rejoice in “paying no interest”, as the joy would be more than
neutralized by the sorrow due to "yielding no profits". As to the quip of refusing to pay interest to "Rothschild", it is doubtful whether a thief can be justified by the alleged materialism of his victim. The watchword that Feder, in a scathing imitation of Yiddish, attributes to "Rothschild": *Mey' Geld, mey' Ehr* (My money, my honour), may not characterize the very height of humanity; but it is certainly creditable in comparison to the reckless highwayman's code: "Your money, my honour". To sum up, in regard to Feder and several others: *Disregard of the common moral standards of capitalist society should not be confused with "Socialism".*

Some quotations from Rosenberg, whose genius is not primarily devoted to economic topics, may round off our review of Darré and Feder. Inner freedom has nothing to do with industrial Liberalism; rather are its roots in the soil. "With sword and plough for honour and freedom!" Such is the device both of Nationalism and of Socialism. World-trade economy deprives the masses of their character as a *Volk*. Nor does collectivist subjugation of the individual by the mass necessarily mean "Socialism" in object and results. True Socialism is represented by whatever serves the *Volk* in its totality and benefits "every German". (Is this kind of test too severe, or too vague, I wonder?) Whether a measure embodies true Socialism cannot be decided by its relation to a fixed pattern of policy, but only according to its practical consequences. All is well on condition that "protection of the *Volk* total from any exploitation whatsoever" and "protection of the individual from private greed of profit" are achieved. To this no righteous man is likely to object. Property "in its real, genuine sense" is crystallized labour; creative labour is bound up with an urge for accumulation, and is by its nature formative of property. However, property attached to sweating and fraud is a thing of evil. The German feeling of Right only approves "legitimate" property, property with an implication of duty. Inversely, the Marxist system, which dominates the late Liberal epoch, does not in truth hold that "property is theft" but acknowledges theft as lawful property. We must fight the "shameless tyranny of money", the obnoxious belief in "economy as an end in itself", and the "mania for gold". With us, Socialism is not merely a body of effective measures to
protect the people; it must be directly inspired by the supreme value of nationality founded on Blood (blutbedingtes Volkstum).

We are now entering into the dreamland of "Autarkie"—economic self-sufficiency, militarist economics, economy seen as a function of national power rather than a provision for human needs in general, than a sphere of interchangeable and calculable values in society. Wirsing succinctly defines "Autarkie" as the economic policy suitable for the Wehrstaat, the state bent on self-defence, the fighting state. "To pervade the entire state life with military ideas" expresses its meaning. The state sector of economy, and even more the "twilight zone" of private enterprise subject to regularized state intervention, must be extended. "The 'Total' State is knocking at the door." To replace export trade, an "organic extension of the German inner market" is imperative. Moreover, anti-capitalist (read: anti-liberal) Germany finds its appropriate complement in the anti-capitalist peasant countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Thus the present economic crisis (1982) will promote "space integration in the middle region of Europe". (To put it more intelligibly: it is an opportunity to set up economic theories which plain evidence shows to be pointing in the direction of the given aims of German continental imperialism.) The Pan-Europa plan must be foiled; it is to be hoped that France will abandon it for the sake of her own rentier "Autarkie" (?).

Liberal economy, the constitutional state, national democracy, and centralised administration, will perish together. The future belongs to a federal construction of economic zones, with Germany as its founder, and, naturally enough, its leading power. Germany is to achieve "a new social order and therewith, a new supra-national order". Indeed, underneath all the struggle against free trade and world economy lies a pretension to "organic" imperialism specially adjusted to the geographical and political position of Germany, and often enough disguised as a more peaceful and salutary form of expansion compared with the "world-wide" financial, spiritual and military imperialism of the Western national democracies. We shall hear about that in Chapter IX.

Zehrer, a member of the Tat group like Wirsing and Fried, wrote these words, to which any Marxian humanist could subscribe: "Economy is not an absolute category; it is but a
function of man and his thinking". Yes, but the autonomous categories of economy may, to a degree, represent precisely "man and his thinking" in an average, a universal, a logical sense; whereas "man" may occasionally stand for a most arbitrary system of purposes, determined by the "thinking" of some all too definite and assuming "man" or "men". Thus Zehrer challenges the apparent superiority of trade based on the international division of labour: "Such a German lace-kerchief (though less fine and dainty) is better than a French one, for the very difference in quality makes it more suitable for a German girl, the value of the quality itself being thoroughly relative." Very cleverly spoken; and yet there is a surreptitious imposition of the nationalist dogma on "man and his thinking". Undoubtedly one may prefer Westphalian pumpernickel to white French bread, though the former is "less light and fine"; for the difference in "quality", that is, peculiarity—may leave the question of values open. But the turning-point of the matter is precisely whether we should decree that pumpernickel is "more suitable for a German stomach" than white bread, foisting this truth on German brains by means, let us say, of high tariffs. Nor can likelihood be denied to the assumption that German beer is not only just different from, but positively better than, French beer, whereas the French show superiority in the art of dressing women. Do not let us, therefore, talk about a mystical suitableness for German girls, when we really mean—circumtous though the chain of thought may be—technical suitableness for the German Army. Do not let us meditate on value independent of quality, when we really mean power independent of value.

"The military formation of economy in its entirety into an efficient army for any national emergency"—such is the aim that Fried attributes to Japan but desires for Germany. Like so many of his fellow-Nazis, he not only lives for the war of tomorrow but also the war of yesterday. He praises its elevating effect: "By its every manifestation, the world firebrand has been leading from open intercourse to self-enclosure". Statics take the place of dynamics; capital loses its driving force and reveals itself more and more as an idol. (Fried writes, in his ecstasy, "als Idol und Götzte", which is as if we were to call Justice "the deity and the godhead" of decent people.) "The chances of ascent are obstructed". Hence we must be careful
not to raise the obstruction. True, the solution of returning to liberal world economy is also conceivable; it would involve a fall in prices, bankruptcy, destruction of countless livelihoods, since it would involve the restitution of free trade and the abolition by common consent of reparation payments. (This was written in 1981. It was not unnatural that the German people, including well-nigh the whole Left, should assign an exaggerated economic importance to the problem of reparations.) The alternative course implies a total breach with Capitalism (?) and Liberalism, destruction of the economic system (without “livelihoods” having to suffer?), “abandonment of the idea of world economy and the establishment of insulated national economic units”, cartels and trade-unions united under state management, and finally, “reparation payments not abolished but stopped (nicht abgeschafft, sondern eingestellt)”.

This defiant distinction, thrown out without further explanations, shows impressively that economic nationalism is nationalism above all. Fried is confident as regards the choice. “This is the road that will be taken, for it fits in well with the irrational movement of the peoples, all recent facts being signposts in its direction.” The pressure of foreign debts and interest payments is contingent on a country’s affiliation to world economy; as long as Germany needs colonial imports she will be obliged to pay reparations. (The obligation was soon shaken off without waiving colonial imports.) The State should place itself at the head of the counter-movements and institute “social measures” within, “national measures” for outside. State planning and surveillance shall supplant the free play of economic forces.

“Planning”, sovereignty, compulsion, not as a weapon to enforce social justice, but in response to an “irrational movement”, as a correlate of “national measures” and a systematic fostering of the war situation. “Planning” is here a travesty, a spectral counterfeit of “planning” in its genuine rational sense as conceived by Socialist thought; it has become a mere attribute of sullen Imperialism, both outward and inward, national and social. The latter aspect will be considered, on Jünger’s testimony, in the closing sections of this chapter.

For the moment, a few more words on the uproar against world economy may be added, both in view of its importance as a side-line of the negation of humanity and because the
indications lead to Sombart, the economic pundit of unofficial
“German Socialism”. On a previous occasion we heard that,
according to the teaching of Spann and his followers, “man-
kind” was only a “Whole” (Ganzheit) “rather in the sense of a
category of natural history”. Owing to this master stroke of
prevarication, the national Whole is saved from being absorbed
by a bigger Whole, which would otherwise have been the
inexorable result of the Spannian logic of “the whole and the
parts”, and the place of Supreme Totality becomes thus
reserved for a unit of organized power, conceivable in terms of
“high” and “low” members, of command and obedience, of
order and execution—the sole kind of community the reac-
tionary, fascist, militarist mind would recognize. As the
totalitarian State-Power occupies the highest place in the scale
effective social wholes, and economy is itself an instrumental
sub-whole of the totality of life (subservient to “men” only in
as far as they are represented, or comprised, by the masters of
totalitarian political will), National-Wirtschaft is also the alpha
and omega of economy. We may be aware of certain facts which
suggest the existence of a “world economy”, but Spann and
Longert set our minds at rest on that score by pointing out that
“world economy” is merely an anaemic ghost, whose “proper
life” (Eigenleben) is constitutionally a poor one. World economy
is only superior to national economy in a few single points;
taken all in all, it is hardly more than the synopsis of a number
of economic totalities. But all the unsound constructions of
humanitarian Liberalism are simply razed to the ground by the
trenchant distinction of Jung who decides that mankind and
world economy are only “collective ideas”, not “real unities”.
From the following economic reflections of Jung we may gather
that collective ideas can grow very nasty when they take to
behaving as though they were real unities, as, for instance, when
the motley crowd of the Allies fought Germany and her vassal
sub-wholes. “In the World War, money resorted to arms in
order to destroy the freedom of human work.” Is it possible,
speaking in earnest, that the War against the West, the war
against world-trade and the reality of mankind, should be
meant to protect “the freedom of human work”? At most,
the freedom of some local and “affinitive” taskmasters set above
“human work”!
Professor Sombart, an old man of settled temperament who is by no means unacquainted with economic realities, advocates economic sovereignty with moderation. He warns against complete isolation conveyed by the term "Autarkie" (self-sufficiency), proposing instead the formula "Autarchie" (self-mastery). Foreign trade has not to be wiped out, but subordinated to a strictly planned national policy, employing the methods of preferences, bilateral treaties, contingents, prohibitions, and exchange in natura. However, Sombart's "Autarchie" is nothing but "Autarkie" carried out in consideration of practical possibilities and necessities. The moral atmosphere is emphatically the same. Sombart writes Deutsche Volkswirtschaft with a capital D, showing that he, too, considers German National Economy a "totality" like the Nation itself. With fervid approval he repeats the words printed in a pamphlet on inner colonization: "We must, in fact, dig ourselves deep into the German soil if we want to hold our own in the welter of the world". The whole outlook is blatantly militaristic, without the Nazi counterpoise of völkisch mysticism. Thus policy concerning population (Sombart restores to life a fine old expression of French-fed Prussian statecraft: Peuplierung und Dopeuplie rung) "depends on the decision of the General Staff: they must determine how many men are necessary to shield the country against foreign aggression". Dealing with social ideals, Sombart confesses to scepticism about the value of "community", which cannot be "made at will" and permanently secured; after all, enthusiasm and psychic integration are "not so important". "The only thing that matters vitally is that the State be powerful and flourishing, and that its subjects lead a life worthy of men, without railing against their lot." In a very large part the function of economic policy is to be anti-economic policy. (For monopolistic quasi-fuedal capitalism is less anxious to enhance its gains than to raise a wall around its strongholds of power.) Technology must be tamed; the use of new inventions must be submitted to the most rigorous state supervision; a "board of culture" is to decide on the usefulness of industrial innovations; scientific enquiry must become "planned", must in fact be redeemed from the principle of private initiative. The importance attached to outward goods must be diminished. Already we crave for a "simple, natural mode of living",
which, however, must not be identified with levelling pauperism. Let us have no proletarian culture; let us keep to a proper scale of degrees in wealth, preserving an understanding for a cultivated prosperity confined to the few. Actual luxury should be the privilege of state dignitaries. For the “captains” of trusted “economy”, comparatively small in number, can easily be converted into Stand “leaders”. Sombart recommends the old Prussian monarchy as a paragon in economic “ethos”. He propounds the statement, perplexing to some of us, even though less ludicrous than it might appear at face value, that we are too well off. La matière nous dépasse. . . . “We are ‘too rich’, not merely a handful of plutocrats among us, but the people as a whole.” We consume too much meat, alcohol, tobacco, and require too much transportation.

Do we, all of us? Some vague rumours, though, are audible about a noticeable number of ill-fed children, dwellings described as slums, underpaid intellectual workers, unemployed of rather modest means, and similar examples of comparative scarcity. As for alcohol and tobacco, bluntly I should call a wholesale denial of needs of this kind a brute superstition; but, granted that many men are sufferers from an over-indulgence in drink and smoking, especially from drinking liquor of bad quality, and above all from the resulting shortage in means of gratifying prior needs, the blame may more conveniently be laid on human foolishness, sinfulness and ignorance than on humanity gorging on riches. Again it is the tendency, the changed strategy of upper-class apologetic philosophy, which arrests our attention. The old opponent of proletarian pretensions preached that we were altogether too poor and must become a good deal richer before a salutary levelling of standards could be debatable. Now the tables are turned. The modern spokesman of “cultivated prosperity confined to the few” argues that we are too rich, irrespective of individual differences, wherefore it can only be the effect of sheer naughtiness and wantonness if there are insatiable street-loungers who ask for more. The progress along the avenue of reaction is unmistakable. It is not the same thing to preach patience to the poor, as it is to preach self-abnegation to them; to bid them postpone their hopes, as to bid them feel comfortable in their hopelessness; to tell them that justice is not yet fully available, as to tell them justice is already meaningless.
It is the same as with fascism in general: class-rule no longer fights in the open but conceals itself behind a blurred veil of evasive mysticism; the Liberal attitudes of gross material pride and healthy discontent are both displaced by an objectless state of happiness by order, which consecrates moral and spiritual inertia even in the sphere of economy, although it is wrapped up in a deafeningly advertised fabric of technical "activities" chiefly directed to aims of military aggression or of theatrical trumpery.

Further details from Sombart, though they could likewise excite comment, must be enumerated a little more concisely. The new economic spirit requires the education of mass taste by the advice and admonishment of the élite. The concrete features of planned economy must be adjusted to the structure of each country and its various aspects, including its history. In any case, world economy is doomed; a restoration of international capitalism ("peace, free trade, goodwill") is out of the question. Industrial society, the element of motion and progress, may figure as an embellishment of the state rather than as its foundation. The big credit system, the prime materials and resources of the country, the transport services, the factories specially destined to outfit the army, and even other big factories of a public character, must come under state control. According to the "Fürher" principle capitalists must not be unlimited "masters in their own houses" but should be subject to the guidance of a supreme economic council. Competition must be severely restrained; draconian measures must be taken against advertising, that supreme plague of modern society. (It is enlightening to compare Sombart's infuriated, and, on many points, convincing criticism of modern business propaganda with his rather perfunctory advocacy of "structural" reform, of the nationalization of factories. He is yearning for a more dignified uncapitalist "style" of living, wanting it, however, to interfere as little as possible with the estates of class-rule.) The principle of profit, economy centred about a unitary value expressible in terms of money, rouses a burst of anger from Sombart, which he confesses to be fairly impotent. "Profit calculation is one of the basest inventions with which the devil has ever fooled man." Yet "all modern large-scale economy is grounded on profit calculation". Can we dispense with modern large-scale economy?
No, but we can somehow oppose the "want-supplying" principle to "profit" principle, and superimpose *volkswirtschaftlich* viewpoints on the sorcery of profit. Above all, we can supplant the tricky term "rentability" by the "good German word" *Wirtschaftlichkeit* (economy). Economic rationality will be freed from the snare of the profit principle. At any rate Sombart frees himself from the shackles of material problems, and resorts to the comforting use of "watchwords." He jubilantly re-discovers "the glorious watchword 'Common interests come before private interests'... also the starting-point and guiding light of our entire politics". After his doubtful skirmish with the Principle of Evil disguised as the principle of profit a happy ending is obtained. Further satisfaction, ennobled by a modicum of virile bitterness, is drawn from the idea that "common interests" call for a system of authoritarian tutelage. The question what common interest requires in a given case cannot be submitted to the judgment of the "individual", even if his subjective good faith deserves to be trusted; and anyhow, "the free resolutions of individuals are never absolutely reliable, for as a whole they are mere *canaille*". Naturally, it is only the "individuals" who are thus blotted out; not the masters, the *ex officio* guardians of the "public interest".

Our economic policy will be controlled by the endeavour "to give production stability and continuity. We care nothing for the 'progress' characteristic of the economic age and natural to capitalism, and which owes its existence to the ceaseless revolutionizing of the processes of production and sale". Nevertheless, to a certain degree, we cannot but keep pace with the foreign world, more particularly in the province of military technique and its associated branches.
5. THE SERVILE SOCIETY

"The 'Socialism' of Otto Strasser is pure Marxism. ... It is absurd that workers should interfere with the management of economic affairs. ... The entrepreneur carries responsibility and provides the workers with bread. They have no claim to a share in property. ... Labour co-ownership—and, therefore, co-determination—this is precisely Marxism, whereas I reserve the right to such an influence exclusively to the State administered by a higher set."

A. HITLER

(in an argument with O. Strasser, 1930: quoted by Heiden).

If "status capitalism" will be less typically "capitalistic" than was "contract capitalism", it will certainly contain in a high degree the traits of capitalism that are most odious to the democratic and humanitarian mind. It may possibly remedy the evils of unemployment and some minor drawbacks of unorganized or, rather, misorganized competition; but it will do so, if at all, at the price of reducing the workers afresh to a status of bondage and subjection. Economic security, the exclusion of rank starvation, is promised them in return for "securing" their service independent of free choice both individual and syndical, combined with a heavy reduction of their standard of living, and a wholesale renunciation of all claims to equality and responsible co-operative economy. The dual system of liberal capitalist society, with its already loosened structure of class-rule, dissolving, in a sense, into a general air of citizenship and democratic consciousness, gives way to a reappearance of hierarchic (ständisch) distinctions between free and unfree, ruling and serving classes. Just as modern industrial capitalism was not preceded by an idyllic valley of happiness where "the strong were still kept in check lest they should devour the weak", as some innocent or unreliable reactionary would argue (we may safely neglect here certain remarkable late medieval achievements in well-balanced social freedom), so it may quite conceivably be succeeded by social forms which are again inferior to it as regards liberty, justice, moral keenness and universality of thought. Some Liberals may hold, not without plausibility, that
Socialism itself, and especially Communism, are the milestones on this downward slope. More probably democratic Socialism, perhaps even with a more or less dictatorial interlude, offers the real alternative to it. For society as a covenant between equals, society as a representation of humanity, society as a community formed in rational freedom by all its members, is the indestructible central theme of all genuine socialism, however much it may be transformed and even deformed by class dialectics, revolutionary resentment, and the political distortions of spiritual perspective. But there is a real movement towards the ideal of a reversion to servility in the midst of modern industry and technology; nationalism, militarism, irrationalism, romanticism, moral relativism and "efficiency" for its own sake are its criteria; it is fathered by Fascism in general and by National Socialism in particular.

Socialism revolutionary and proletarian may clash with important values of personal freedom and leisurely culture; democratic Socialism built on a compromise between Liberal society and Labour movement may prove to be a half-caste or untenable; no kind of Socialism will solve the problem of harmonizing practical liberty with practical equality for all time; but "National Socialism" derived from an alliance between the captains of industry and state dictatorship, is essentially servile. Its "proletarian" airs and features merely express the consummation of proletarian bondage by means of an up-to-date adaptation of the upper classes of society to their task of acting as masters in that relationship of bondage. Such a process of militarist, anti-human, and in part ascetic, re-education may inflict severe pain on some factions of the bourgeoisie itself; nor is it incompatible, in the field of economy proper, with measures of "nationalization" as urged, for instance, by Sombart. This, and the latent trend towards such a development even in pre-war Prussian Germany, has been thoroughly understood by Mr. C. Hoover: "Some capitalists were able to envisage the permanent participation of government in industry upon the basis of capital obtained by taxation. . . . Only the government is able to accumulate large capital sums, for the government can do it by compulsion, namely by the use of the taxing power". To the typical Herr Direktor it makes little difference whether he gets his salary from the state or from a joint-stock company.
"Nationalization" need not mean an effective rise of the proletariat, an erosion of social privileges. "If the same classes control the state as control it now, this difficulty would not arise. There is, moreover, no reason why the class control of the state need be changed in any way by the fact that the state would be furnishing the capital for industry." In the aftermath of the war, the industrialists, heavily indebted to the state or to banks, turned to the Nazi movement as their salvation and hope, using the newly arisen economic opposition of the disinheritied middle classes and peasants who lacked a progressive social conception of their own as a battering-ram against the labour position, the fruit of the November revolution. For, to quote the American sociologist further, "the social and political system in Germany prior to the war was based upon the assumption of an almost biological inferiority of the working class", which was to obtain real advantages in respect to its social status by the overthrow of the old Imperial government. Indeed, Naziism and the Servile Society mean social as well as political counter-revolution, though they also mean a good deal more.

"The Nazi movement provides the Spiessbürger (the Philistine, the snobbish, prejudiced bourgeois) with a standesgemäss (fashionable, feudal, rectified) Socialism which at once allows him to rage without restraint against Marxism." If it be true that servile features must be attributed to the society of liberal capitalists, it is none the less true that "the Servile State of capitalism is likely to appear an idyll in comparison with the Servile State of National Socialism" (Murner, Nazispiegel).

Mowrer’s trenchant analysis of the facts under discussion, which unravels their most tangled intertwinements, meets with our wholehearted assent and admiration. It may be condensed in the statement that the inequalitarian pseudo-Socialism of Nazidom is the logical result of the un-liberal pseudo-Capitalism of the older Prussian tradition. Mowrer reminds us that in April, 1931, German industrial magnates on their return from a visit to Russia showed themselves "enthusiastic concerning the unlimited authority of the Bolsheviks over the workmen". (Not concerning its use—to avoid false conclusions.) The pseudo-capitalist system of industrial monopolies and state subsidies has always dominated Prusso-German economic development. In 1982 the protection of industrial monopolists
became the main object of the State. During the period of inflation the industrialists had made themselves independent of banks; swelled with a new feeling of freedom and power, they were henceforth determined to be their own financiers in cooperation with a suitably reformed state power, collecting "abnormal gain by abnormal methods". ("Defeated Germans naturally required a higher standard of living than victorious French and Belgians.") They drew assistance from irresponsible American bankers lending untold sums of money, and even more from the economic destruction of the middle classes. "This process the silly workers tolerated and often applauded, thinking it a magnificent step towards eventual socialism." As it was, the expropriated, instead of merging in the proletariat, "refused and kept their social identity", clinging doggedly to middle-class habits in spite of hardships and bereavements; and when unemployment began to spread, they turned "revolutionary" in order to recover their social position in the old social hierarchy, which meant revolution from the "Right". Social reaction spared no money in equipping them as a Nazi army of counter-revolution. From its victory, "pseudo-capitalism and unprofitable agriculture might hope for a new lease of life". The National Socialists, the men of new bündische militarism, were bent on "undoing the French Revolution", of forming a new iron "ruling class" consisting of themselves, the old aristocrats and the rich capitalists. Nazism is distinctly favourable to Big Business. "As in Italy" (where it was the first act of the fascist régime to reduce the inheritance tax on large fortunes) "the owners were to be allowed to purchase an absolute guarantee of nine-tenths of their present rights at the price of granting the remaining tenth to the militarized state." Class struggle is superseded, not by a frank avowal of class rule, but by the ständisch principle of a partnership (Gemeinschaft) of interests between employers and employed. "One of the most useful partnerships ever conceived"—says Mowrer—"was the one between the man and the horse. Only you must take care to be the man, not the horse." Certainly the Nazis were also a problem to the rich; some part of their adherents might, after crushing Marxism, take socialism seriously. I may add that this danger is probably not yet entirely eliminated; but an even more serious menace to the peace of mind of the wealthy bourgeoisie is the growing burden of their
obligation to keep up the fabric of Nazi militarism with its unproductive outlay and its damaging effects upon foreign trade relations. Fascism may cut a dash, but it is at best a risky business. (Mowrer's attractive picture of Prussianism, which would also fit in here—"a cult of efficiency, chiefly efficiency of a military type . . . discipline and servility standarized . . . organized arrogance and servility . . ."—will be given in Chapter IX.)

It will be understood that the Nazi authors, in their turn, do not advertise their own social conception as "servile", always with the exception of Hauser who is, as it were, too basic to be characteristic. Yet the irrational experience of Power which the Nazi intellectuals invoke in dealing with the problems of work and its organization is easily recognizable as an ideology destined to make the minds of workers fit to serve, with complete devotion, social aims beyond the reach of their understanding and deliberation. Again we meet with the poignant logic of "revolt against liberty". Fred Schmid ("The rising of youth", 1982) envisages the overcoming of capitalism by a process of inner transformation, instead of a direct onslaught. (For the "overcoming" must not involve any interfering with big ownership.) "New states of mind have made their appearance, which capitalism is unable to answer. We are not in a state of diametrical opposition to it" (no class conflict!); "our lives occupy a different plane. Individual property has lost its spell over our egos; it is a new gravitation in our essence that impels us to work. The work of the coming generation will result from the rediscovery of the daemonism of work as such. . . . Nobody can grasp the meaning of the new method of work who merely knows the two poles 'self-seeking' and 'selflessness'" (i.e., the rational self-interest of Liberalism and the mutual solidarity of Socialism.) "The new will to work is neither the one nor the other; it is a new, a hitherto unknown kind of will-to-power which has nothing to do with material success and is only comprehensible to those who share in the work." We recall the Nazi ideal of community: bündisch, tribal, closed, blind, worshipping the Führer as an incarnation of the We. At about the same time, Gregor Strasser, the spokesman of the "Socialist" wing (who afterwards fell into Hitler's bad graces and lost his life in June, 1934), wrote about the "anti-capitalist yearning" of the
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people, associated with the desire that "man should be measured and evaluated according to the degree of his mobilized output of work". The most splendid and pregnant formula for militarist pseudo-socialism! The test, he added, should be applied to high and low, directors and navvies alike. A familiar slogan for pseudo-equalitarian drudgery! The Servile Society, especially in the constructive phase, is not all honey for the masters themselves. The slave-holder is under the self-same severe obligation to be above all a slave-holder who imposes his servile condition on the slave.

A French observer judges that National Socialism brings all German values to the common denominator of the type called the Worker-Soldier. A classless society is not dreamed of; but class society is re-educated by a new discipline of "dictatorial dynamism". The supporters of the Bismarck Reich, monarchy, army, officialdom, in so far as they meet with censure, do so not for any fundamental reasons, but only for their "aloofness from the Volk". For the slave-holders must carefully watch over their contact with the slaves. The labour constitution of the "new Sparta" is expressive in terms of feudalism under state control. The worker is granted no "rights"; his factory-lord is ordained to "protect" him. The protection of workers is instituted with a view to "the functioning of the Whole", not in view of his personality. State and the economic sphere form a hierarchy of suzerains and vassals (Edmond Vermeil).

As we know, Ernst Jünger is the classical exponent of the metaphysics and chivalry of "labour soldiery", devoid of any moral meaning, humanitarian afterthoughts, or indeed any reasonable purpose beyond the "process of work" itself. The mere functional pleasure of disciplined social activity is indulged in, a religion of the Termites as it were, without any underlying conception of "good life", of a condition worth being fought for and preserved. In Der Arbeiter, Jünger describes the gist of the process in which we are engaged as the "substitution of the Worker type for the Civilian Individual". Faces are growing to resemble steely masks; the uniform becomes the standard dress; the working-kit is the adequate attire of the Type. Rid of inner problems and repressions, we set out to conquer and belabour the world. "Lebensraum (the room, or sphere, in which life can unfold) increases in transparency and self-evidence and with it increases the naïveté, the innocence of our movements in this
Life is magically intensified by the "death of the individual". Technology appears as the "method of mobilizing the world by the worker Type (Gestalt)". And "Herrschaft (mastery), that is, the conquest of anarchical spheres (Räume) by a new order, is only possible to-day as a representation of the Worker Type claiming a planetary validity". The new "democracy of work" recalls the Absolutist state in common contradistinction to the Liberal interval, the wasteful and disorderly paradise of civilian individuals playing with "abstract principles"; but again it differs from absolutism by "having such forces at its disposal as have been elicited and set afoot by the action of the abstract principles". The new social dictatorship, no matter whether it is labelled "collectivism" or the "rule of the strong hand", etc., is not arbitrary domination but an "organic construction" inspired by the "metaphysics of the working world". Ours is the period of "the replacement of Social Contracts by the Plan of Work". (The enslavement of all human personalities by one human system of power!) A most significant change affects the relationship between the people and the army. Compulsory service is in a sense both restricted and extended. Its democratic aspect dies away, its servile aspect is vastly increased. The army is re-made into a professional body; it ceases to be the people in arms. On the other hand, the people in their entirety are subject to compulsory work service on a military pattern! All grown men are no longer armed soldiers in the full sense, for a short period; but all people, men and women, adults and youths, are work-soldiers under military command for life. ("Total militarization . . . heeresartige Ordnung ganzer Bevölkerungen. . . .") We may put it briefly thus: democracy created a popular army, whereas Jünger's "new work-democracy" creates a militarized people. Penal servitude becomes a normal and universal mode of life. Some readers will probably be reminded of Communism, and Jünger, who is one of the so-called National Bolshevists, is likely to accept this kinship. But, in fact, the simile is completely misleading. For Communism the object of socio-economic equality is essential above all; its hard and inhuman methods of procedure, its militaristic organization, its use of proletarian class-privileges are throughout imbued with the dialectics of revolutionary transformation; it destroys the former master classes instead of adapting them into fit managers of a
more formidable mastery. Whether or not the sufferings and humiliations entailed by its methods are justified by its aims and achievements, Communism is bent on creating a rational society of free workers: whereas Jünger’s “Worker-Type”, the bearer of new Herrschaft, is in fact a new edition of the old masters, a compound of Prussian officers’ caste and officialdom, factory owners and higher engineers, placed above the workers as a personified Daemon of Work. The master man of high industrial Fascism makes himself the “Ideal Worker” like the thorough-going völkisch reactionary who uses rusticisms instead of normal literary language, or a lion-tamer who himself develops leonine traits in order to be fully qualified.

In his subsequent monograph on Total Mobilization, Jünger describes the Great War as a prelude to this stage of history, the occasion on which the task was first dimly perceived, and as yet inadequately dealt with. In the aftermath, Russia and Italy took the first steps towards its realization. The problem is not mainly technological but social; everything depends on the readiness to subordinate all forces and activities to state aims. “As early as in this war, what forced the issue was not the measure of military qualities as such; it was the susceptibility to total mobilization.” The Great War did no more than precipitate the epoch where “armaments as the very backbone, the vital nerve of society” were to become the supreme imperative. It brought about the conquest of extra-military provinces for military action and order, the “mobilization thrust upon us by the age”. An age characterized by the growth of nationalism in the place of patriotism, and—with what voluptuous tinsel Jünger paints it!—the “increasing abstractness and cruelty of conditions” . . . Germany was less well prepared for the task than was the West, and therefore succumbed for the time being; but even the immature “glowing of a subterranean Germany sufficed for an effort that shook the nation in all its fibres”. The war experience was more than a training, it was indeed creative of national re-birth: “there alone, in the face of death, was it possible that Teutonic innocence should keep itself unspoilt in the hearts of the best.” (As we have long been aware, “innocence” in the “Teutonic” vocabulary means being “untainted” by moral preoccupations, and thus being as “free” as any saint from twinges of conscience.)
In the same volume, “War and Warriors”, F. G. Jünger, who is naturally not quite as brilliant as his ingenious brother but otherwise worthy of him, also interprets the “First World War” as the inauguration of a new socio-economic pattern of mass life. Not all wars open up another historical era; but this war introduced a new “system of work”. Life has again become elementary, total, existential, ruthless, etc., and hence full of meaning. And—a treacherous exhibition of pseudo-Bolshevist intoxication with machinery—also “beyond the calculations of reason”. The “gigantic mine of the battlefields” developed into nothing more nor less than “the geographical and psychological landscape of industrious and inventive Western man”. How annoying that the evolution of our appropriate landscape was to be interrupted for a while! Let us hope that next time the Germans will recoup for the misadventure of 1918, but not within too short a time, lest the formation of our new Western society and landscape should be hampered by peace supervening prematurely.

It is by no means a digression to consult Gerhard Günther’s “History of German Warriorship” when dealing with the Nazi solution of the social problem. Indeed, that royal figure of National Socialist mythology, the Political Soldier, also carries totalitarian society and economy Atlas-like upon his shoulders. He, the man of chivalry, of positive enjoyment in fighting, and of un-bourgeois recklessness, at the same time the “heir to that soldierly obedience which is cultivated in the Prusso-German army”, the man “who carries out the order” but essentially carries out more than that, it is he who provides the solution which the abstruse formulas of Jewish Marxism have striven vainly to obtain. “... The Era of liberal civilian society is nearing its end. It will be superseded by the ‘workerdom’ (Arbeitertum) of nations which fight to obtain, each for itself, a constitution of soldierly socialism. Here, as in every soldierly system, the ego wanes before the ‘we’, the individual before the Whole.” Jünger recalls Nietzsche when he says that in future the workers should fare as well as do bourgeois, drawing a salary instead of mere wages, “but should have placed above them a higher caste; the rulers live more poorly and simply (?) but are in possession of power”. Günther closes his book with the lofty words: “Germany... is at present fulfilling the old duty
of her empire: to be a paragon for other nations by attacking
with soldierly valour the decisive problem of the age and thus
assuming the lead. The "workerdom" (Arbeitertum) of soldierly
constitution, creating a new Volk order in discipline, socialistic
comradeship and an active renunciation of bürgerlich craving
for security, will be the supporting and "ruling factor of the
new age".

After these modern spokesmen of Nazi military "workerdom",
I shall now turn to some minor lights so as to gain a
more comprehensive understanding of new servile conceptions.
Naturally Haiser, the only one, as far as I know, to advocate
the restoration of slavery in so many words, has an incontestable
claim to precedence.

Haiser urges "complete reversion and terrible harshness",
the sole thing that can still save the West; he demands a sharp
division of men into free-born and unfree. We must submit com-
pletely to the exigencies of biological morality, and accordingly
neglect the chimerical suggestion of other moralities. The bio-
logical code, for instance, knows no consideration of chastity in
the usual sense, but it condemns every marriage as immoral
which fails to conform with the "Law of rising life". Generally
speaking, biological morality will dismiss such unreal values as
universal franchise, universal education, conscription, the rights
of citizenship, penal and civil law applied in equality, and all
equal or universal rights. Conversely, biological morality is hotly
in favour of prohibitive and compulsory (!) matrimonial
measures, polygamy, castration, artificial elimination of progeny
tainted with infirmities; further, of eliminating the Jews, of
dictatorship, arbitrary legislation, and a planned construction
of a noble race. The régime must not deviate from ruthless
severity; the less it does so, the more will practical mildness be
applicable in single cases. The slaves may be treated benignly as
far as possible, but they must invariably be treated as slaves.
They must never more be fed on the illusions of liberty and
human rights as eventual fruits of evolution. Nothing can be
more harmful than universal school education, for it destroys
the "value tension" necessary for all culture: it is imperative
that the master should be cleverer than the serf. He must also
have the privilege of arms, for universal conscription is damnable
because it raises the masses too high; and finally, the privilege
of begetting additional progeny with servant concubines. *The capitalist system of wealth as the single principle of value tension does not suffice in the long run.* From the reactionary point of view a very sound statement! Capitalist society is precariously balanced; it must either accept the social and economic consequences of ethical and political democracy or decide upon the radical undoing of liberal and humanitarian civilization as a whole. Haiser, like Hitler, heartily espouses the latter alternative.

Only persons belonging to the ruling class, says Haiser, “sons of gentlemen”, must be allowed to study. They must, however, be kept from studying too much; it is desirable that they should have intervals for relaxation and biological rejuvenation. Even apart from that, a nucleus of master men must be spared completely the unnerving effects of mental work. We need an intact body of landed nobility, both great proprietors and Junkers: “a reserve of nobles exempt from heavy work, both bodily and mental”, an idle “stud” for the benefit of the *Volk*. Real Nordic people have never been labouring peasants! These have to be supplied by the Dinaric race. The Northmen, in their turn, are created to the office of masters, commanders, conquerors, warriors, great landlords. The urban ruling class must be refreshed from the ranks of rural nobility; the servant races of the towns must draw their supply from the peasantry. Haiser rightly sets great store by the National Socialist and Fascist movements; he fully approves of the riotous golden youth of counter-revolution in their campaign against capitalistic pseudomasters blighted with democratic corruption. But he, with less reason, I think, harbours suspicion against equalitarian and socialistic tendencies in the Swastika camp; he conjectures a schism between White and Red Nazis, and is eager to see the latter expelled (1926). We may hope that the events of the last years, particularly the secession of Otto Strasser and the gloomy fate of his brother Gregor, have made it possible for Haiser to be entirely unreserved in his adherence.

Is there any contradiction between hierarchic class differentiation and the *motif* of rigid tribal “primitivism”, between social servility and the discipline of military servitude? I do not think so. There is certainly a tension between the two aspects or styles, but the main substance, opposition to personality,
humanity and justice, is common to both. Social aristocracy need not degenerate into an easygoing individualism of complacent leisure, nor is there equality between the work-slaves and their taskmasters, however hard-working. Fascism both disciplines the traditional ruling class in order to make them efficient rulers in the full meaning of the term, and engenders a new socio-military hierarchy in close attachment to the old one. And the super-fascist Nazi ideology of Blood and Race spells a reversion to "primitive" tribal cohesion (the "soul of the Kind") and a new foundation for social inequality rooted in a diversity of anthropological "values" alike. Within the logic of this general complex, however, a divergence of accents is doubtless possible.

Dealing with the counter-revolutionary trend in modern mass psychology, Fülöp-Miller calls attention to the fact that "primitive" civilizations are not as a rule averse to the principle of hierarchic division. On the contrary, they often nurse a belief in the hierarchic articulation of Nature itself, in ständisch organization as a cosmic scale. We may recall here the magic dignity and omnipotence of the tribal chief, referred to in Chapter I. The Tongas in British New Guinea, for instance, attribute social distinctions to death itself; the noble's soul leaves his dead body by a different outlet than the common man's; immortality of the soul, in a strict sense at least, is reserved for the noble class.

Alfred Geiger, a Viennese scholar from Professor Spann's seminar, gives a favourable survey of the Indian caste system, which may well be considered at this point. It is not that Hindoo society was in any sense "primitive"; but it offers an invaluable example of intimate union between an elaborate social hierarchy and the principle of société close; tribalism, as it were, on a world scale. Besides, the German cult of "Aryan" race is scarcely uninfluenced by thoughts of Brahmin India. I shall quote from Geiger's dissertation what strikes me as most relevant for our present subject, familiar as the material must be for the average English reader. He explains that the system of castes is above all criticism of human reason; it is laid down in Dharma, the codified expression of Rīta, which is "the eternal, inalterable constitution of human existence". The lowest of the four principal castes, the Sudra, are forbidden to study the holy books
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(Veda), or even to be initiated into their teachings by members of higher castes! (Does our Haiser desire anything different?) The two ruling castes, the Brahmins (priests and scholars) and Kshatriyas (warriors and officials) are, according to Dharma, entitled to a much larger share of economic products than are the Vaisyas (the economic or bourgeois class); as Geiger approvingly declares, “the great fortunes are not formed in the capitalistic fashion, in the sphere of economy itself, but higher above it”. I wonder how many socialists are ignorant of this ABC fact, that “capitalism” in our sense is not the standard but rather the mildest form of socio-economic injustice! But there is an even sharper line of division between the Vaisya producers and the Sudra toilers. The latter are outside the sacral community: “With them no God was conceived”; “they are not worthy to receive sacraments” (Manu). They are made out of Brahma’s feet, the lowest material within the bounds of Hinduism. (An excellent piece of ständisch mythology, a genuine anticipation of Professor Spann!) Lowly as the Sudras may be, their position is distinctly enviable if compared with the Pariahs, whose very name—the “Untouchables”—suggests unspeakable horror. Roughly speaking, a Sudra is to a Pariah what a common German worker or little artisan of “Ostic” race (dark-haired, round-headed, flat-nosed) is to a Berlin or Cologne Catholic of half-Jewish descent who is a notorious sympathizer with Western democracy or Russian Bolshevism. “Their very proximity is polluting. . . .” The Pariahs are the “casteless”: direct or indirect products of illicit intermixture between members of different castes. In them, Dharma is completely destroyed even in the sense of potentiality. “Their existence is not foreseen as a necessary component of society, as is still the case with the Sudras.” Whereas the Sudras are still the lawful representatives of the material world, the Pariahs are no longer serfs proper; they are simply outside the system. Their very birth means a trespass on the foundations of social order, which cannot be measured in terms of personal guilt. “This is precisely the reason why the magic of the laws ordained to ward them off is imbued with a ruthless harshness that would be inconceivable but for the deep seriousness with which the religious and metaphysical roots of existence are regarded.” These words are well applied to the Hindoo caste system, but it would be equally useful to
consider them in order to gain a better understanding of the political religion of Naziism and the menace to Western civilization embodied in its depths.

Let us now consider the following statements, which are a masterpiece of sober and expert sociological analysis directly pertinent to our present topic. Professor Robert Michels, the great Germano-Italian explorer of contemporary socio-political phenomena, who is usually mentioned together with Sorel and Pareto, made his name before the War by his researches on the nature of political élites, and especially on the oligarchic tendencies in the socialist parties of various countries. Michels, like many other exponents of "value-free" sociological research, stout believers in the inevitable necessity of inequality and domination "under whatever guise", is as partial to fascism as he is fond of assuming an air of statistical and scholarly impartiality. In his instructive book on "Transformations in the ruling classes after the war", Michels concludes that in the sphere of counter-revolution and fascism, as opposed to Russia, the formation of new élites has taken place everywhere on the basis of confusion with the old ones. "In present-day Italy and Germany, the politico-energetic class" (we might as well call it "politico-military") "has secured control over the old intelligentsia and, without any intention of ruling them out, it also maintains a superiority over the purely economic upper classes. In comparison with the ruling class in countries like France, England, Belgium, or Holland, where democracy still survives, the ruling personnel of the fascist states is at once less plutocratic and less academic in character. This means neither an absence of academic elements in its ranks, nor a renunciation of private initiative in industry" (which means, of course, plutocracy). "It only means the strengthening of state-power." Though fascism has contributed vastly to the rise of certain strata of petty bourgeoisie, "it would be incorrect to call it 'kleinbürgerlich', a characterization flatly contradictory to many of its essential manifestations". We should condemn this rather widespread error even more emphatically than does Michels. A genuine and autonomous petty-bourgeois conception of society is most typically expressed by French Jacobins or Radicals, and to nothing is Naziism more diametrically opposed than to these paths of political thought. Certainly it has a strong
appeal to such groups of the lower middle-classes as do not aspire to political independence and social sovereignty, and are eager to place themselves under the tutelage of feudal, military and plutocratic masters, of whom they expect protection from the fate of proletarization. But a movement that profits by the servile instincts of a class is not for that reason a movement of that class, nor really expressive of its spirit. So far as Naziism merits the epithet kleinbürgerlich, it might as well be called "proletarian" or "revolutionary", since unemployed masses have figured largely among its dynamic factors, or even "Liberal", owing to its strained relations with the Catholic Church.

The vision of the Corporative State, as conceived by Spann and his disciples, amongst whom, in this connection, Heinrich ranks foremost, has recently been exposed in an impressive pamphlet by Leibbrandt. The ständisch ideal is by no means uncontested in the circles of more directly political and völkisch Naziism, but we may trust that the differences are verbal rather than essential; at most, there exists a slight diversity as to emphasis and favourite points of view. Generally speaking, the Corporative fascists are as far from denying the absolute superiority of the political master Stand as the devotees of "heroic realism" and Führerstaat are from defying the claims of great owners to economic mastery. Hauser's indignant exclamation that vocational Stände as such are no good, the thing that matters being the Herren-Stand, expresses the fundamental meaning of them all. There is certainly no danger either of a lapse into Guild Socialism, or of a deviation towards an economic democracy of yeoman warriors. The Spannian school delights to look back at the Middle Ages, but I am inclined to think that they stress only what is reactionary in its spirit. Thus Leibbrandt borrows from Thomas Aquinas the depressing fatalistic phrase: "God alone orders the professions". Ständisch differentiation is full of "spiritual" meaning because it is "deduced" from the "philosophical" concept of the Whole; on the other hand, the proletarian class, as envisaged by Marx, "does not mean something born of spiritual determination, merely a mass lacking inward organization, a category of purely economic process". Well we know these sublime giant-killers with their self-complacent "idealism", who develop great skill in putting "spiritual interpretations" on spoliation, bribery and aggrandizement,
whereas they are quick to denounce equity of distribution as a "stomach problem". Some prefer to account for the proletariat as a Sudra caste, derived from Brahma's feet; H. K. Günther, the apostle of Nordic race and re-agrarianization, defines it as "hatred of all higher value", but neither is it a bad method to "prove" that the proletariat, strictly speaking, is nothing at all, only an empty nomenclature for the more irrelevant lower strata of "estates economic". For all estates are not economic; as we have said, the Spannian Ständestaat is not a Guild State. The contrary is true: the Stand "State" in the closer sense, the estate of masters, the ruling set invested with overlordship (oberleitende Herrschgewalt) is the supreme estate (Höchststand); it comprises the "presence of all spiritual elements of life" (Spann). Again the most important partial estate (Teilstand) affiliated to it is what our fascist idyll-painters call the warrior estate (Kriegerstand). This has two main characteristics: firstly, a common system of "dignified uniformity of dress", and secondly, the "capacity, in case of war, to transfer the entire population onto a war basis". Leibbrandt takes pains to secure the institution of compulsory military service, but I can see no point-blank contradiction between his laudable patriotic care and the former plans of such keener Nazis as would reserve armed service proper to a privileged group. What matters above all is that state-supporting mastery (Staatsträgerschaft) is limited to a picked body, while compulsory service is universal. In this point, Leibbrandt ventures to improve a little on Plato, whose tripartite scheme of castes fails to obtain his unreserved approval. The third estate of producers (Nährstand) must not be excluded from the blessings of military service! Charitably Leibbrandt admits "a certain mutual representation among different estates" founded in the "interpenetration of the spheres of life". To follow up this trend of thought might have led the author to very surprising consequences, namely, to an understanding of democracy; but he prudently confines the direction of his sally to the securing of conscription.

The theory of Corporativism protests vigorously against being confused with the advocacy of state omnipotence, which, it maintains, is rather the ultimate consequence of Liberal individualism and levelling democracy. In point of fact, what the ständisch authors really repudiate is state omnipresence rather
than state omnipotence, the universal management of social affairs by the government rather than the illimitability of its political power. Ständisch liberties, in their sense, have nothing whatever to do with human or civic liberty, or with a new democratic technique different from the parliamentary one. They mean nothing except that the rich monopolists receive the rank of "leader" in the economic realm. Leibbrandt writes: "Economic self-government means that economy is managed by experts and thus watches over its inner vital necessities. In the second place, self-government also means that the state is disembaressed of all functions belonging to economy and social policy." According to Heinrich's programme of a Corporative-Authoritarian State (ständischer Führerstaat), "unconditional obedience" is due to the "state-supporting estate" (the State Führer together with his Führerkreis, ruling circle); the latter must be able to carry out the ruling designs even in opposition to the "momentary interests" of one or the other Stand. The programme includes the demand that "the Stände should be so weak as to be incapable of opposing any resistance to state overlordship". Within the economic "estate", again a severe principle of hierarchy and subordination is provided for. The formation of corporative will is effected on the basis of "competence", by the decisions of "leadership" and official organs, "not by primary election or any similar democratic-centralistic (?) proceedings".

Analogous, though perhaps less strictly fascist, are the views on Ständestaat held by the former Austrian Minister, Dobretsberger, a man of sound scientific reputation. He claims Ständestaat to be "authoritarian", not "totalitarian", meaning, first, that it does not place its power above all moral rules, and secondly, that it is not socialistic. Corporative autonomy, not a uniform bureaucracy. . . . The "Ständestaat alone embodies the self-government long demanded by economy". Again, whose self-management? Dobretsberger, it must be owned, writes that sovereign estates or ruling noble families (Herrschaftsstände, Geschlechter) are out of date. Still his definition has nothing to do with syndical or guild democracy; it is servile nomenclature rather than reality which he is anxious to eschew. Stände are defined as "spheres of social work"; the strange impersonality of the phrasing is interesting, and the highly significant division
into owners and workers within what is so innocently termed "spheres of social work" is glossed over. "As to how many, and which, groups are combined to form a 'Stand', these are secondary questions which can only be decided on practical consideration." At the same time, the Stände are "related to the State directly", without the "embroiling" interpolation of parties; which means that, apart from his professional position, man has no civic rights. In addition, the author quotes with approval Mussolini's adage "Politics come before economics". Thus he differs from Spann in not calling the master class an estate or a corporation; it is just a "sphere" of "authority". And within the domain of economics, class hierarchy is taken for granted rather than described with theoretical pleasure.

To approach the Prussian orbit again: from Stapel's book on Church and State (Autumn, 1938) the following formula of a comprehensive social ideal may aptly be quoted. "It is not the free personality but das Volk that represents the substance of life, by which are determined general homogeneity, the hierarchy of leadership, and state totality. Das Volk is differentiated into peasants, burghers, and workers..." Apparently the masters proper soar above that differentiation, and personify a more concentrated incarnation of the "substance of life". A gallant attack on Ständestaat ideology is delivered by Roessle, a political theorist of militant Naziism. He extols the Führer aspect and makes little of the element of social gradation. Contrary to Plato and Spann, he would acknowledge no vertical scale of Stände, but rather a hierarchy of actual service and achievement cutting across all vocations and social characters. The Stände themselves are mutually on a level, whereas the State soars above them to supreme heights. Spann's idyllic, static metaphysics, "Rule of the best", he would convert into a stressing of the "revolutionary" side of fascist counter-revolution: Those who rule determine what is best! In reality there is but a slight difference of emphasis. Spann is a little more of a preacher; Roessle is more directly a "political soldier", a storm-troop philosopher, a thinker wearing jack-boots and carrying grenades. They are of one accord as regards the ideal of a radical identification of Power with Value. Further, as Roessle points out, there is a far-reaching structural difference between the Italian system of corporations, of which the Austrian was almost an exact copy,
(for the Austrian co-operative movement had until 1988 preserved a modicum of real autonomy), and the German system of factory community. Unlike the Italian order of fascist owners’ and workers’ syndicates combined under state supervision and compulsory arbitration, the Third Reich recognises no class syndicates, however fascist and state-controlled, and has thrown overboard the principle of collective treaties. Hitler and Herr Ley, the Führer of the “Labour Front”, preferred to build on the far more romantic idea of Werkgemeinschaft, the “new ethic of factory relationship”, the factory as a “cell” of “organic economy”. The owner has become “plant leader” with the workers as his “retinue” or “henchmen” (Gefolgschaft). It is he, the Betriebsführer, who “issues” the order of work. “Thus the worker faces the employer without organized representation.” In a vague and unsystematic way (as the author himself admits) his power is counterbalanced by the influence of such public factors as, first, the “Trustee of Labour” appointed by the state; secondly, the council of trustees (Vertrauensrat: a set of persons “elected” from a list composed entirely of Nazis, with none of the powers of the old Betriebsrat); thirdly, the Chief of the National-Socialist Party organization in the factories; fourthly, the “social Courts of honour”. We see that on the one hand, the proletarian is more radically subjected to capitalist rule and expression of his class-will is more thoroughly suppressed than is the case even in Italian fascism. On the other hand, the state or rather the clique that controls the state seems, compared with Italy, to have a firmer grip on economy as a whole, and even on a great part of the capitalist class. And so their dream of a Servile Society is realized.

My distinguished friend and teacher, the Socialist writer Karl Polanyi, sees in the Spannian conception of the Corporative State a perfect charter for the Servile Society, and a programme which transcends mere state despotism or Hegel’s Total State (its chief parent) in its elimination of all chances of freedom. Polanyi is also keenly aware of anti-personal metaphysics and of Vitalism (especially of Klages’ brand) as the suitable correlate and substructure for Servile sociology. It was Spann’s sovereign idea to elaborate Hegel’s totalitarian doctrine after cleansing it of its semi-rationalism, state “personality” and historical dialectics with their revolutionary implications. In his “Essence
of Fascism”, Dr. Polanyi writes: “For even a slave-state is a State, and thus can become free. . . . State, for Hegel, is a ‘person’, and therefore never quite rid of the metaphysical substance of freedom, which is self-realization. . . . Spann eliminates the possibility of freedom by relegating the State to a modest place. . . . But a slave-society which was so perfectly organized that it could exist without the coercive power of the State (?) could never become free; it would lack the very machinery of self-emancipation. Thus, in spite of the use of the Hegelian method, the world of man is not a person; it is a helpless body devoid of consciousness. There is no freedom and there is no change. It may be doubted whether a more complete absence of self-determination in society was ever conceived”. (cf. the principle of Dharma, and the subsequent analysis of Race !) . . . “If the Mind Objective suggests a kind of consciousness in human individuals which does not link them up in personal relationships, Vitalism implies human beings with no rational consciousness whatever.” The fascist onslaught on democracy is destined to preserve the economic system of capitalism by transforming the underlying socio-political reality in a direction opposite to Socialism, which means the extension of democracy into a social and economic construction of personal beings regulating their mutual relationships on a basis of rational consciousness, supervision and responsibility, of initiative and discussion made real and universal. “After abolition of the democratic political sphere, only economic life remains (?) . . . the sociological content of Fascism is a structural order of society which rules out the dependence of the whole on the conscious will and purpose of the individuals constituting it. . . . The objection is not to the form of Democracy, but to its substance.” Economic “representation” in the ständisch world concerns men merely as functional units of production; it is “technical and impersonal”. A long period of transition is needed to bring about “another type of consciousness”; both Hitler and Mussolini are of the opinion that the present generation is not able to build up the Corporative State, and that political dictatorship and the extermination of democracy dominate the field for the present. I cannot endorse Polanyi’s choice of terms in every detail: I should perhaps speak of class hierarchy where he uses the word “economy”; and I not regard fascism in its final intentions as “un-political” or
aiming at a supersession of State by Society, but only as anti-
democratic and anti-republican, interpreting the State as Herr-
schaft rooted in Nature and Fate, without reference to a general
consciousness of public affairs. Society as an impersonal Whole
needs political rulers of the tribal, magic type no less than it
needs a "traditional" economic order raised above the criticism
of its "organs". It is unavoidable, Polanyi concludes, that the
fascist process should clash with Christianity, with the very soul
of our civilization: for "democratic and individualistic con-
sciousness cannot entirely pass from our world so long as we
conceive society as a relationship of persons".

To close this Chapter we may quote some of Ernst Jünger's
latest words taken from his excellent volume of miscellanea
(Blätter und Steine). "Service becomes the ruling fact of life." 
Education itself becomes corporative and adapted to the require-
ments of artisanship; the worship of free inquiry disappears;
"persuasions", "convictions", "confessions" are no longer
held in esteem; knowledge becomes "governable" and
"rationed", its prohibition according to need is as reasonable as
its dissemination. Or again, an aphorism of pathetic subjectivity,
which is astonishing in its implication of utter abandon: "The
sphere of supreme decision is not entered by the Will". Polanyi is
quite right in the final sense: Servile Society, at its highest,
means universal loss of freedom! And finally, let us discern the
hidden light in the fantastic twilight of this scurrilous, if per-
chance not meaningless, pleasantry of Jünger: "Death means
Total Amputation".

FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER VII

1 "Economic thought as such (das nurwirtschaftliche Denken) is immoral and
un-German, and a special characteristic of Jews"—so we read in F. Schulze's
"German ethics".

2 cf. in Steinbömer's work "Soldaten tüm und Kultur", "Soldierly thought
and life is no longer a thing apart from, still less apposed to, culture 'proper';
it is a natural and self-evident aspect of the culture of the new German man".
CHAPTER VIII

NATION AND RACE

"Now with the religious schism, it cannot be denied, a deeper and more inhuman division appeared. It was no longer a scrap between the followers of saints who were themselves at peace, but a war between the followers of gods who were themselves at war. That the great Spanish ships were named after St. Francis or St. Philip was already beginning to mean little to the new English; soon it was to mean something almost cosmically conflicting, as if they were named after Baal or Thor. . . . There entered with the religious wars the idea which modern science applies to racial wars; the idea of natural wars, not arising from a special quarrel but from the nature of the nations quarrelling. The shadow of racial fatalism first fell across our path. . . ."

G. K. CHESTERTON ("A Short History of England").

1. THE CREED OF NATIONALISM

"There are to be no more human beings in Germany, only Germans."

C. HOOVER—W. STEED.

"Our supreme object is national exclusiveness."

GEORG VON SCHÖNERER (Austrian Pan-German, in 1921).

"Mankind is coarse, savage, vindictive and vulgar. Whoever is intent on having anything in common with it, turns common himself. . . . The nations are the only political reality. And the nations hate one another, and each endeavours to have as much

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power as possible. The Politician knows this, and refuses to be duped by the babbling of the ideologists.”

H. Blüher.

Modern Tribal Nationalism, though historically presupposing the Western idea and reality of National Democracy, is yet fundamentally antithetic in outlook. It means, not a sectional materialization but a final splitting-up of mankind, not a manifestation of society, but its supersession by a supra-individual Body with a mystical Genius; not the liberty of man achieved by community with his fellows but his imprisonment in a closed system of unitarian Power, Spirit and Will. That is why Nationalism of this kind tends towards “Gentilism” and “Racialism”, passing from social and political to religious and anthropological categories. The totalitarian Tribe is not satisfied with exacting the individual’s “patriotism”; it demands his faith, his substance, his “Whence and Whither”. And this, too, as we pointed out on a previous occasion, explains the use of the equivocal term “National Socialism”. Society is swallowed up by the Nation as Mankind is submerged in the Tribe.

“Today the Nationalist must be a Socialist” says Rosenberg, meaning that the Nationalist must prove himself as such over the whole field of social life. His creed is to provide a solution for the “social question” which, according to Moeller-Bruck, depends on the solution of the “national question”. Variations of the same theme are abundant in Hitler’s speeches; we quote from Fischer: “In the final analysis, a truly national thought is also social. He who is ready to stand for his People so completely as to know no higher ideal whatsoever other than its welfare, he who has so absorbed our great song Deutschland, Deutschland über alles as to put nothing on earth above this Germany, Volk and country, country and Volk, is a Socialist!” For “true Socialism means the sternest fulfilment of duty”. Similarly Goebbels (quoted from Fischer): “Socialism is not a proletarian speciality but the task of everybody for whom the liberating of the German people from slavery forms the alpha and omega of present-day politics. Thus Socialism is to acquire its real shape through its unconditioned vassalage to the motoric energies of a newly awakening Nationalism. Without the latter, it remains a phantom, a sterile product of speculation, a bookish
theory. With Nationalism, it becomes everything: future, liberty, fatherland!" Or again: "It was the sin of Marxism to degrade Socialism to a matter of wages and belly-filling, thereby manoeuvring it into an opposition to the State and the struggle for national existence." We may safely dismiss the complaint of Blüher, who says that National Socialism cannot be the "true national movement", such a one being necessarily Conservative, not Socialist, as the ill-timed nagging due to the overstrung sensitiveness of an aristocratic soul which shudders at the mere word "socialism".

Nor does Fried, whose advocacy of "social Radicalism" in the camp of Nazi youth is beyond cavil, see in Socialism anything essential other than "the national principle winning ascendancy over the economic principle". The Nation of to-day, formed in the crucible of the German Revolution, is bent on intensity, inwardness, self-satisfaction. The interdependence of national economics vacates the field for a system of "mutual isolation of the nations, or Volk communities, each arranged harmoniously within itself". Here plastic expression is given to the first of tribal imperatives: There is no world for thee outside thy Tribe. It will, however, be seen later on (and this basic duality of aspects has already been revealed), that this form of allowing for the existence of "foreign Tribes" is but a provisional acquiescence of doubtful value, threatened by an inner tension and revealing a partial insincerity.

Let us now hear what Hitler has to say on the subject.

Mein Kampf preaches a gospel of massive, unyielding, unmitigated nationalism for the German people, paying little heed to what readers other than those to whom it is addressed might deduce for themselves. As far as I know, foreign translations adapted in usum Delphini are now in circulation. "The world is not there for cowardly nations." Only German pacifists are really "objective"; only German socialists are really "international". Such asseverations of "our" pacifists and socialists invariably belong to the grammar of the anti-humanitarian "We" in every country. In the "natural order of power", "the nations of a brutal will are bound to conquer". Such nations as acquiesce in self-limitation banish themselves from the contest. The "passion of self-preservation" will triumph "at last". "Mankind has grown great in eternal war, it would decay in eternal peace."
So far, all is scientific truth; if it can be supported by the testimony of unspoil'd instinct, why, so much the better. "The purest idealism unconsciously tallies with the deepest knowledge": "The same boy who listens to the tirades of a pacifist with no sign of understanding or sympathy, is ready to immolate his young life for the ideals of his nation (Volkstum)." Thus the right kind of education hardly meets with any difficulty; it has only to encourage good dispositions and foster the "suggestive power of absolute self-reliance". "The education and training of the young Volk comrade must be directed solely towards imbuing him with the persuasion that he is unconditionally superior to others... belief in the invincibility of all his race." Yet at the same time Hitler condemns the Jews for being "pastmasters in lying". None of those half-hearted, furtive distinctions between nationalism and chauvinism! "The apprehension felt for chauvinism in our age is a sign of impotence"; there is a shrinking before "overboiling force". As it is, the aims of Germany can only be attained by the "sharp-edged sword" wielded by "free State-power": "the task incumbent on the inner government of a nation is to forge this sword, whereas foreign policy has to shield the work of forging and to look out for comrades in arms". Even "abnormal strains imposed by military exigencies" must be put up with, much as they may impede the development of culture; for "no sacrifice can be too great to secure political freedom". That is, freedom for imperial expansion.

The philosophy of integral Nationalism has been clothed in set terms by Moeller-Bruck. The nations are the main realities; and they are irreconcilable realities at that. The will, he writes, of a powerful state-nation "is not called Conservatism to-day. It is called Nationalism. But it is willed to preserve whatsoever is worth preserving in Germany. It is willed to preserve Germany for Germany's sake. And it knows what it is willed to." Our very lives must be thoroughly suffused with the nationalist spirit. German language and German citizenship alone will not do, "Living in consciousness of one's nation means living in consciousness of its values." A nation is a community of values; Nationalism, a community of valuations. The Tribe is Our Universe. The proletariat must adjust its precious revolutionary dynamism to the iron truth that "on this earth, one nation is the other's natural enemy". There is no universal sphere of values and relationship
overhanging the nations except in the imagination of Democrats and Marxists. The proletariat should adopt for its social revolution the slogan: "We are not going to work to pay interest to other nations". Moeller-Bruck did not get so far as to profess ethnic Paganism: he makes allowance for a "supra-national" Christ, who has nothing to do with "international" points of view in worldly matters. In a word, it may be excusable to uphold a belief in fairness and charity; only we must hold it so high that it is prevented from affecting our lives and actions. What we must keep out at any cost is the formation of an International in which all differences are dissolved, a world-wide fraternity of the intelligentsias of all countries, of all scientific and, of course, moral authorities on earth". For this would mean Society instead of Volk, in fact, Mankind instead of the Tribe, and a leadership in tune with human reason and self-discipline instead of a leadership of magical incarnation.

H. O. Ziegler's study on the modern German idea of the nation, and its historical origins, helps us to gain some insight. In the older German usage, the word "nation" was very often applied to a "type of people" (Menschenschlag) rather than a People; in a passage from Goethe the word occurs: "We girls are a strange nation". The nineteenth century introduced a new idea of "collective spirits conceived as personalities", endowed with a unique individual character not to be repeated. This Ziegler calls the "Copernican turn in the philosophy of the nation". Western national democracy itself allowed an interpretation of the principle of popular sovereignty which pointed in the direction of an absolute, an anti-humanitarian Nationalism. The nation comes before everything else, said Sieyès; "her will is always lawful, she is law in herself. No matter what kind of will a nation has, it suffices that she has one; all forms are good, and her will is always supreme law". The more anonymous and collective the dominant will of the nation grows, the more it becomes absolute. The confirmation of dictatorship by plebiscite as well as the revolution in international relations—the will of nations comes before the will of states, monarchs, cabinets, the right of national self-determination overrides the validity of treaties—originate in this doctrine of popular sovereignty. The reader will realize, however, that the organization of mankind on a plan of justice and mutual understanding is still the pre-
The prevailing aspect here. At any rate, the process of becoming collective, of realizing democracy on a national scale, is bound to encumber democracy with un-liberal and possibly even irrational motives. Majorities may intrude on individual rights; the state is thrown upon the use of compulsory institutions in order to "mobilize" its citizens; traditional demands of liberty are deemed reactionary as opposed to the requirements of national efficiency; the claims to "liberty" for the organized national power (cf. Bodin's philosophy of absolutism: sovereign power for the supreme unit of decision) looms up. The principle of equality undergoes an important modification. "The place of an abstract equality of individuals is taken by a concrete equality or homogeneity (Gleichartigkeit) of the members of a nation."

The ideas of national assent, myth-community, unity of action, are so many loop-holes for irrationality. The nation "forming its own rule of living" develops a subjectivist consciousness of omnipotence and exclusiveness. At last, it drifts away from democratic methods, searching for more direct and comprehensive forms of identity between itself and its State leadership. The distress of our present-day society heralds a crisis of national democracy; not of the Nation.

However, if Ziegler succeeds in making the phenomenon of totalitarian, fascist, post-democratic Nationalism more transparent for Western eyes, he also demonstrates its special conditions of growth in the Central European, particularly the German, section of the Western world. For it is the Germanic theory of the "soul national and racial" (Volksgeist, Volksseele) which, radically foreign to the ideological armour of the French Revolution and the West in general, has the essential function of converting national Democracy (a limited realization of Mankind) into anti-democratic Nationalism (a tribal negation and defiance of Mankind). The national "will" of Western coinage, for all its presumption of neatly defined "sovereignty", is in itself predestined to come to a rational understanding with other national "wills" on the common ground of a universal nature of man. Wills at war are not a matter of ultimate importance if the spirit is disposed to be the same. Particularism of this kind, unruly and insolent as it may be, cannot entirely forget that it is "part" of a universal order with which it claims no identity. The pivot of the comparison is that, whereas the democratic
nationalism of France bases its claim to respect and sympathy on its being nearest to the common, the supra-national soul of Europe (and in a way, mankind), the romantic and fascist nationalism of Germany supports its claim to exceptional rank by the pretension of its being most peculiar and self-enclosed. The Volksgeist theory, writes Ziegler, widens and enriches our outlook on the national problem of Central Europe. This theory derives from the sources of "historical dignity" rather than from an original "equality of human rights". Hegel's identification of logic and history, his concentration of metaphysical value in concrete historical powers, must be first considered. In Hegel's system, the "State" unites ethical idea and ethical reality, subjectivity and generality of will. And the State means a concrete, a definite, an individual State, coordinate with a given nation which has its proper Volksgeist. The "Spirit" invariably acts in history as a "individual", a determined agent. The world of history is dramatized into a stage function of national spirits involved in dialectic tension, processes, alternations. "All general determinations repose in individual, historical, unique totalities", beyond the reach of empirical causation. It is not men who act; they are puppets in the play of "objectivized spirit". The State, being an objectivization of the Spirit, can never be subordinated to a higher instance on a universal scale; the latter would lack concreteness, the side of subjectivity which is proper to the "State" synthesis. Owing to its identification with the Spirit, every state as the case may arise (jeweils) is equipped with an incomparable force of obligation and legitimacy. As to the issue between these different incarnations of Weltgeist, its outcome must be left to the dialectical movements within the latter; its highest objectivization will be some particular State, no matter which, so that everybody is free, or rather obliged, to credit his (or, preferably, the Prussian ?) State as an unsurpassable embodiment of the World-Spirit. No longer are there any theoretical limits to a State deeming itself the expression of Weltgeist, not a mere organization of power or domain of princes. "Individual man is deprived of all responsibility"; the "collective individual" has come to precede human personality in metaphysical rank. Thus we serve world history, as well as the absolute Spirit, just by serving our nation and its expansion of power.
Still, as Ziegler rightly observes, there is also a rational and liberal undercurrent in Hegel's thought. In fact, he was in favour of constitutional monarchy, which he held to be more efficient in gathering up all the energies of the nation than arbitrary rule. A school of the Left too, with Feuerbach and Marx among others in its train, is derived from Hegel. Hegel's interest in logic, in a processional and so far, rationally approachable development of history, in a universal Absolute behind the contending totalities, prevented him from lapsing into the barbarian mysticism which now thrives among his successors. However, the German "historical school" of juridical and social philosophy, traceable more directly to Herder's fanciful theory of *Volksseele* and to the mythological naturalism of Schelling, marks a momentous change. Their thought is no longer centred on a logical kernel of history, the "unfolding of an idea"; rather does the story of a nation evoke in them the vision of "nature in organic unfolding", "an organic, plant-like blossoming of *Volksseele*". "There is a factor that causes a State to be life, an individual, itself; not a deduction from a more general thing," says Ranke. The State lives for its individual idea, and is not primarily an instrument for solving social problems or reconciling various interests. The individual soul of the national collective "maintains a peculiar world of forms around it"; it is the individual, original essence of the Nation that also "produces" State and Law "out of itself". Other conservative thinkers of nineteenth-century Germany, for instance Stahl, Treitschke, Frantz, must be distinguished from the historical school, notwithstanding important points of agreement. Treitschke's Hegelian, and Frantz's Catholic, traditions kept them from entire submersion in *Volk* irrationalism; the Christian personalism and commonsense Conservatism of Stahl has, as is generally known, much in common with Burke. Ziegler takes great pains to elucidate the structural dissimilarity between the Western and the typically German national idea. To conceive the nations, not as independent units of will, but as individual life totalities, each a "creator of its own world", is utterly un-Western; even though there is a French phrase *âme de la nation*, it is little more than a mere flower of speech; nation in the Western sense means above all a collective unit of deliberation and will. The French idea is that of a nation, united by common government, forming a common
subject of intelligence and decision; the German idea of nation implies an all-round union of life in a collective individual on the lines of biological monism. Trans-personal *Volksgeist* can also transcend state frontiers (Meinecke). We shall hear more of it shortly.

One of the semi-Nazis around Spann, the Viennese Professor Heinrich, has given an exposition of Hegelian state-worship in the ideology of Italian Fascism, as represented in the first place by the former minister, Gentile. Over and above all patriotism, chauvinism, imperialism, it seemed necessary to introduce a special "idea of *italianità*". "The nation, the fatherland Italy, forms the supreme community and the supreme idea." This Teutonized Italianism, however, remains a somewhat empty phrase, signifying hardly more than the idea, the nationalist idea, of the nation in general, applied to the country of Italy; for the step towards a material doctrine of racial qualities fails to follow. We are merely served with the commonplace *aperçu* that the Italian nation is "more than the sum" of the Italians alive at present; which is equally true (or untrue) in regard to, say, Sweden and her citizens. Furthermore, in the same tune: "Fascism and its State are the administrators of the immanent forces of the nation; the Fascist State is the historical instrument of the *völkisch* idea, the embodiment and reality of *italianità*". The sovereign Fascist State has its own object in addition to the interests of its single citizens, and of their joint interests too ... roots in the past, and claims upon the future ... spiritual essence ... *Volkheit* ... "the supreme community, commanding a meaningful self-sacrifice." This is merely Hegel, simplified into a more confirmed reactionary. The Germans themselves have got further than that; and the products of their own genius befit them better. I borrow this brief but grand sentence from a recently published book by Fülöp-Miller, the well-known author of *kultur-historisch* surveys (whose admiration of Naziism is less in question than his love for it): "whereas all nations heretofore have taken their supreme pride in competing with their fellow-nations on the ground of a unitarian mankind, Hitler renounces *all participation in such a concert.*" Here we have a feeling as though we were approaching what might be called "the centre of the vortex".

I add some further formulations of modern German Nation-
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alism by standard authors. According to Krieck, Germany as an inland country must be made an impregnable stronghold; the State is destined to be the exponent of a strong united nation, conscious of itself and its mission in the world—not, it should be understood, "in the cause of mankind"!—the State has the function of engendering and breeding Volk power, of being a "taskmaster and regent of the Volks as a whole," and a breeder of Race, etc. Social justice, hygiene, and culture, as has already been related, are also registered in the set of tools subservient to the aims of national power. After communion with Krieck, I develop, in due course, perhaps from force of habit, a longing for Bäumler, the other great exponent of national-politisch pedagogics; and he is distinctly the greater, or at least the finer, of the two. How elegantly he speaks: "There is no point of vision where one could stand above the fate of one's Volks and country." Nor is it mere attachment in a more technical sense of division and proximity which is meant thereby. The national unity does not stand under the sign of "words" (of terms translatable into other human languages); it is presided over by "symbols". The symbol (the Swastika flag) belongs to the community; it represents the "We" as a primal unity of existence, different from a mere assembly of individuals. If humanity means the virtual organization, political and social, of all human things, then we refuse to be pledged to humanity; for the symbol implies distinction, separation, exclusion, and it is only for those who understand it and are filled with enthusiasm by it. This does not entail indifference to "real, productive, plastic humanity." A nation is "human", not by admitting all races and yielding to all foreign influences, but "by sparing no efforts to breed itself into a great human form". The "Third Humanism", zoological perfectionism, naturalist nationalism on the highest level of spiritual earnestness!

The Nation evokes the concrete experience of community; its service provides the life of the individual with meaning (Inhalt): this is what Gründel emphasizes in cleverly chosen words, although we cannot help pitying a "meaning of life" of such meagreness and spiritual abjectness, just "belonging to" a given group and to no other. "The new type of man lives in conscious allegiance to the community, and at the same time in strict personal responsibility" (rather we should say, dispensibility!)
"He is not man 'in himself', no man bound to his class; he is man bound to his Volk, incorporated into a living Whole." We know that the Marxian "man as a class being" is meant to be a revolutionary transition towards "man in himself" finally realized. On the other hand, man as a Volk being corresponds to a static order of tribal particularism. The new nationalism is the first positive expression of our German Revolution. Every great revolution is at the beginning, and remains above all, a national affair; but in ours, the formation of national consciousness is also the main object. "The birth of a German Nation is the supreme meaning of the great German Revolution." (cf. Freyer's "Revolution from Right", and his "Pure Process"). "Our intentions are aimed at the German Nation only; but this we want in its totality." We have won a new, profound, intrinsic idea of nationality, destined to make the Christian community a living reality for men in their fallen state. "With our new idea of nation, the fundamental precept of Christianity becomes at last realizable for every man: for the first time, 'nation' in our sense shows to the average man the form of indirect fulfilment that is also accessible to him." Love of one's neighbour is called into being in the "holy service of the Nation, the higher community of all 'our neighbours' both at present and in the future". The meaning of the Christian virtue completely eludes the writer. Love of one's neighbour is not aimed more specifically at one's nation than at one's village, or family, or hunting company. It is an open and universal love, if it is anything. "Our neighbour" means neither our relatives, nor our co-nationals, nor any "living" social body; in its vivid concreteness, the term applies to anybody who, for any practical cause, happens to be in our neighbourhood (nearness) and thus acquires a special claim to our benevolence and solidarity for the Lord's sake. Christian love is well within the reach of "average men", howsoever simple and humble; to distort it into national service is certainly the safest way to bar all access to it.

Stapel exclaimed in 1928: "No power on earth, nor in heaven, shall cause me to waver from my unconditional and unlimited love for my German people, this suffering, downtrodden, humiliated, this profound, great, patient, noblest, this blissful, this unhappy nation!" "My" people, then, is "my" religion. On the same page, Stapel envisages that "truthfulness and
love . . . honest recognition of national differences . . . will prove the soundest guarantee for an ultimate supersession of the hatred of nations by reasonableness of nations". One of the numerous attempts to erect anarchic, pagan, pretentious nationalism into a workable plan for mankind. The formula is somehow this: "You may be as devout in your nationalism as I am in mine; it would help us to get on with each other; naturally, as I am so obsessed by my nation and can in the end only speak in my own name, I may be justified in expecting you to acknowledge my nation to be finest and grant it precedence according to its needs." By 1932, Stapel showed more of the Nazi tar-brush; then, in the standard work Der christliche Staatsmann, his voice rang firm. "Speaking of nations of honour, we must raise the question what honour means for a nation. Nature leaves us, who are Germans, no choice but to give a German answer to this question." A vague misgiving haunts us that in some situations non-Germans might object, exciting trouble in the "pre-established harmony" of "unlimited", if chivalrous, nationalisms. It hurts one to say so, but apparently not all nations are nations of honour. For as Stapel proceeds to say, our first item of honour is national "freedom", proper to such nations as, "like the beasts in the wilderness, are unwilling to bear control over them". By "control", Stapel means, not dictatorial rule, but international order. "A wild people despises a tamed one. The latter, in its turn, takes its revenge by morals." None of the various Western "hoaxes", including progress and the right to vote, is able to incense Stapel so much as the thought of morals. There is no such thing as general ethics, he insists again and again, which would appeal to all peoples; it follows that there can be no international obligations of a moral order. The League of Nations is a utilitarian, not a moral, business; "the Société des Nations is but a sign of decomposition in the bourgeois epoch of the Western Race, nothing else". Here I must confess I am not quite able to follow the train of thought. Are we still to desire mutual "reasonableness" instead of "hatred"? Will the common belief that there is no common standard of ethics suffice as a common standard for understanding? What about utility and decomposition? What if the different national codes of honour clash? Be that as it may, Stapel admits the expansion of a particular system of value judgments. This may happen in
two ways: the Moralistic Type, chiefly instanced by Judaism, fights with the weapons of creed, cult, intellect, discussion; the Imperial Type, as represented by the Germans and, before their time, the Romans, is only bent on imposing its political supremacy, with cultural conquest and unification as a secondary result. We can but hope that foreign pupils of Stapel will be reasonable enough to fathom the great truth that they are best serving their own nations "unconditionally and unlimtedly" by a hearty reception of the "political supremacy" of a truly Imperial nation with its "secondary results", as soon as the latter shows willingness to impose it.

Nationalism is a delightful thing; allegiance, loyalty, faithfulness, community, discipline, freedom, wholeness, charity, Christianity, life, youth, and whatever you like. The snag in it is the question of how we are to treat other peoples' nationalism, especially when we are not in the enviable position of fighting all the hotch-potch of them under the laconic and comprehensive label, "the others". There is an irreparable breach in the tribal mind; even when preferring truce with "the others", it cannot escape being at war with logic and reality. Neither can it sincerely and consistently ignore the world outside the Tribe, nor will it whole-heartedly take notice of the Tribe being in the midst of the world, which is larger and richer than it, and whose laws penetrate deeply into its own texture: it cherishes the dream of having somehow the world inside the Tribe. Thus we see our Nazis gaily, if sometimes with a touch of embarrassment, swinging to and fro between the poles of nationalism solipsistic and mutualistic, warlike and peace-loving, bullying and polite, hierarchic and relativistic, monistic and pluralistic. Yet even in the first case, a stable universal conception of mankind, even under "our" care and guidance, is impossible, since the Tribe postulates an unholy dark medium about it, an eternal presence of alien and insidious gods. And again, in the second case, men are still conceived as incarcerated in their respective nations, not as members of mankind, even though grouped in nations; they are only, as it were, allowed to remember on Sundays that foreigners are analogously ordained to merge in their nations, and that forcibly some sort of supra-national equilibrium sways this plurality of sovereign worlds, though the less said about this the better. We sometimes hear that men of honour are the first to
respect the honour of others, that nationalist soldiers of divers countries are likelier to understand one another than are liberal lawyers (Goebbels). But this can only mean either the coolest calculation of interests, dependent on the momentary configuration of events, or a frivolous attitude of aestheticism still less deserving of confidence. If men are taught and trained to consider their own nation as a sovereign deity, to disclaim any idea of spiritual community and moral order above and besides it, then all "understanding" between the "nations themselves" is doomed to futility and speciousness. We cannot build mankind with the negation of mankind as our foundations.

The philosophical ground-scheme has been ably outlined, among others, by E. Kaufmann, the pre-war jurist of radical Nationalism. There is no international law (Völkerrecht, jus gentium), he declares, except as a secondary co-ordination of state sovereignties, a mere supplement requisite for the individual nations in their mutual contact. They alone represent "vital aims"; for there is no such thing as a positive "goal of mankind", with a "Pope", as it were, at its head. In short, the nation is everything for itself; mankind there is none; but the divers nations will often find it expedient to traffic and make compacts with one another.

To return to our own days: Dyrssen generously allows "the number of Third Empires to be equal to the number of nations", which means that every nation may experience and work out its "national renewal" or "upheaval" proper to its unique character. This is rather on a level with Moeller-Bruck's myth of the "young nations", or Hielscher's metaphysics of the Reich with its wandering shapes and incarnations. And yet all this is meant to be a façade, a preamble, a decoration, for the one "Third Empire" which is the real and central one, and could never enter on terms of equality with the others. It may well please the King that some of his subjects are Barons with a touch of kingliness, emerging from the dull mass of burghers; but he cannot condescend himself merely to be one of his Barons. Besides, to a certain extent, he can make and even unmake them. E. Jung, criticizing the Western and Latin idea of nation as a mere populace stamped by the state, "un-organic", as contrasted to the "blood-made organism of a Volk", or Fichte's "original nations", the "nations with an inwardly unbroken
tradition", quite consistently proceeds to deny the nations analogous characters and rights. "The individualist principle of an equal right of all nations must retire in favour of the special mission of superior (hochwertig) nations within the society of nations." Well, is there necessarily agreement between the special mission of several superior nations? Perhaps when an issue between such nations comes to a head, it will be found that one of them, preferably "mine", is even superior to the others. Should it be hoped that the others, too, acknowledge it without jealousy, or would such an attitude, on the contrary, give the lie to their comparative nobleness? I, for one, feel unable to provide a satisfactory answer. At any rate, Hitler, dealing with the allegedly hostile and wicked policy of France towards Germany, volunteers the admission that he would follow the same lines, dictated by the instinct for national self-preservation, were he a Frenchman. Perhaps it is even he alone who would follow them, whereas the French do not really do so; but the problem becomes more and more complex. If I am at liberty to hate and despise the national rival, how can I question his right to behave like me, without implying that my own behaviour is objectionable? But if I grant him the right to treat me as I treat him, how can I prevent my pride and self-confidence from losing its appearance of objective justification?

In a lecture delivered in 1934, Rosenberg commends the neat formula of an understanding between nationalisms in contradistinction to the "crude internationalism" based on "business interests". It does not occur to him that some people also believe in an internationalism based on the unity of mankind; moreover, I am not sure that "business interests" do not coincide, in this case, more or less with human interests. In his main work, the eminent writer has offered rather more detailed and, above all, more discriminating views on the subject. He eschews an abstract and invariable propaganda of "nationalism" throughout the world: nationalism should only be encouraged in those countries where its effects are unlikely to menace German "lines of destiny, and irradiations." "Nationalist awakening" in foreign peoples is only approvable on condition that it furthers Teutonic, or more especially German, interests. Thus we divide the foreign world into our reliable satellites who may imitate us to a certain extent, and a mire of maimed bastards who provide a
flattering contract as well as an easily penetrable field of activity. Let us add once more that this creed of nationalism, with the ineradicable flaw in its logic and the inward necessity for casual and improvised solutions, is none the less taught to the people as an absolute dogma. The central idea of national honour, says Rosenberg, suffers no equivalent focus of power besides it; no matter whether it be Christian love, or Masonic humanitarianism, or Roman philosophy (!). The Nation is the First and the Last Thing to which everything else must offer its submission. Its authority descends from the ethnic substance (Volkheit), not from the function of government in society; instead of Staatsanwalt (Attorney-General) we ought to have Volksanwalt. There can be no doubt: the national variegation of mankind is neither a technical affair, a pre-condition of government, an insuperable imperfection, nor an exuberance of mankind’s qualities. Our nation is just a world. This may per chance enable us to understand that some other nation, in its turn, is likewise a world. Similarly it may per chance goad us into believing that other nations are naught; because mankind is naught, and because we need not respect anything outside the world, which is Our Nation.

Provision is made for the allaying of over-scrupulous Christian consciences. They must learn to distinguish the Christian from the Liberal idea of mankind (Pastor Fischer). In the Künsteth anthology of Lutheran divines, Wendland declares: “Mankind exists in the peoples exclusively . . . all peoples are materializations of the creation Man! . . . I am only ‘man’ as a member of my people (!) . . . . There is no ‘mankind’ as a scale of higher existence above the peoples. Mankind is in the peoples alone, and by virtue of their existence.” There is no equality of nations but for the fact of their being a common item of creation. Humanitarianism and pacifism are all wrong; and the cleavage in man (between his religious and his national self) appears to be healed. Künsteth himself denounces pacifism as a gross distortion of biblical Christianity. The peace of the Gospel and peace in history, the peace of God and peace in the world, have nothing to do one with the other. This age of struggle is death’s own; so much the better for the Kingdom to come. Who could shrink at war if he knew that “every war is a confirmation of the fact of human fallenness”? But a more positive access to its
understanding is emphasized too. The crucial question is never whether or not a decision by violence is commendable; rather have we to ask: "What is the actual will of God for a nation?" This, for once, is conclusive. Meddlesome critics might contend that a "scrap of paper" still ranks above strategical interests; but even they are unlikely to suggest that it should be ranked above the will of God.

Professor Sombart is the purest Nationalist in that he strives to keep the idea of Nation, for which he urges unlimited devotion, free from the naturalistic accents of Volk community. The political system of power, plus the human material under its sway, are sufficient for him; he can do without blood mysticism and "We" experience. For the objects the nation must pursue are set by the Creator; the sentimental adhesion of individuals can be dispensed with. Nation is not Volk but "the political Body in its teleology"; it is but a manifestation of the State, is invariably "state-nation". We need Nation as a comprehensive term, "unpleasant as this admission may be in view of the feminine gender (!) and the foreign origin of the word die Nation". Mankind has no direct relationship to man, it is no real body (Verband); it only means the nations counted together, the result of the coexistence of national individualities. Nation alone presents a concrete substance of a direct and vital power of action. Nations are not interchangeable; each has its peculiar "Nomos" (Stapel); they form a polyphony (Scheler). Sombart is bored by the silly talk about "good Europeans". Such a man would be the arithmetical mean of a German, a Frenchman and an Englishman, a shapeless muddle of types. Why, "supranational man" cannot even really be imagined, just as a tree must be an oak, a beech, a lime, etc., not just an abstract tree. I leave it to the reader to decide for himself about the cogency of the argument, and will go on to quote a similar outbreak from Spengler: "There is no such thing as man in himself, such as philosophers gabble about; there is only man attached to an epoch, a place, a race, a personal type, which prevails or succumbs in its struggle with a given world." And Lenz (under the immediate stimulus of the Great War, to be sure) wrote the ponderous words: "They talk of mankind as a whole being the pole-star of moral behaviour. But the best part of mankind arraigned themselves against us, or at least had taken sides with
our enemies. If mankind, in actual truth, was the goal of morality, have not we after all stood on the wrong side? " This ridiculous suggestion, merely voiced in order to lay bare the absurdity of the presupposition, is soon dispelled by the deafening roar of the grand conclusion: "Far be it that humanity should, in our minds, refute the War; nay, it is the War that refutes humanity".

2. THE SACRAMENT OF WAR

"Not a 'community of men of free will' but victorious war is the social ideal ... it is in war that the State displays its true nature."

Professor E. Kaufmann.

"The road bears the name of war: war of souls and bodies, of swords and thoughts."

F. Hielcher.

"War means the State in its most actual growth and rise: it means politics."

Professor M. Scheler.

"A universal organization in which there is no place for warlike preservation and destruction of human existence, would be neither a State nor an Empire: it would lose all political character."

Professor C. Schmitt.

"War means the highest intensification not of the material means only, but of all spiritual energies of an age as well; it means the utmost effort of the Volk's mental forces and the will of the State towards self-preservation and power, Spirit and Action linked together. Indeed, war provides the ground on which the human soul may manifest itself at its fullest height, in richer forms and surging from more profound wells than it
might in any scientific or artistic exploit as such. Nowhere else can the will, the achievements of a Race or a State rise into being thus integrally as in war. War is a purifying bath of steel breeding new impulses, and an infallible test of fitness."

Professor E. Banse.

All of us (except the pacifists) who stand for normal, rational, civilized methods of government and social organization, agree that war is in itself an evil, which in certain cases becomes a necessary evil, meaning that in such cases abstention from or non-participation in war would be even less bearable than conducting it. The nationalist attitude is different, though it need not imply a desire for perpetual or frequent warfare. It sees in war good rather than evil, even if it be a dangerous good, like an exceedingly heady wine that is best reserved for rare occasions of high festivity. Typical modern nationalism hardly deserves the charge of a penchant for frivolous enterprises of war. It may practically consider war rather as a dispensable good than as a necessary evil; but a good it remains all the same. Even when we shun actual war, seeing the disasters it involves and the doubtfulness of its outlook, we may well conceive and arrange national life and thought to be centred on the possibility of war, on military efficiency, on enmity with alien countries, on aims of conquest. "During the years of the so-called peace, politics—total politics—have only a meaning inasmuch as they prepare for total war"—says General Ludendorff in his recent book. Is there any distinctive feature in Naziism, as opposed to vulgar nationalism? I surmise National Socialism to be less warlike in the superficial but more warlike in the ultimate sense; less greedy of war but more religiously devoted to it; less optimistic about possible war issues but more deeply resolved to accept fate and find self-realization in tragedy; less covetous of immediate gain but more irrevocably wedded to a spirit of enmity resting on "existential" grounds. A certain pacific aspect cannot be denied to the creed of national isolation, of völkisch peculiarity, of racial purity and self-renewal; and we of the West, though it would be criminal folly on our part to lull ourselves into a mood of security on that score, must try to understand that pacific aspect, if only to attain more perfect comprehension of the bellicose aspect attached to it in the Plutonian dialectics of the
Nazi mind. “Intensive” nationalism is not unlikely to refrain from war in many cases where a Liberal imperialism would risk it. Racial nationalism can be expected to prefer, for a long period, undisturbed inner reconstruction, breeding and training, to the grasping of casual opportunities for successful feats of arms. Wholesale assimilation of foreign peoples by methods of force may not figure among its ideals. Nor should we be right in supposing that a nation enamoured of historical fate on a cosmic scale, and preparing for the “next World War”, would be eager to engage in premature conflicts. A man possessed by his love for a Beatrice will scarcely be in a hurry to waste his passion on trivial amorous adventures. However, the fire that drives him is not less but all the more powerful for that. Similarly, Naziism makes up for its temporary avoidance of war by the perpetual presence of war in an ideal sense, which is a highly real sense. Any politics of peace are more than counterbalanced by a religion of war. The Third Empire may come to terms with Poland; with France; with Russia; never with an independent Austria, let alone its favourites, Italy and England; it will never come to terms with mankind. It is ordained to fight mankind, whether in the shape of the above countries, or Switzerland, or Czechoslovakia, or Sweden, or the United States, or any group of them, as it does fight mankind perpetually in its own midst, in its own soul. It will fight the West, be it on the Danube or in the Ukrainian plains. The ideal of racial self-formation, the ideology of plant-like national growth, certainly involves a “limited shape” antagonistic to the plan of a homogeneous world empire. But the limits are subject to the growth; all laws other than the inner laws, the vital tendencies of the “plant” are meaningless; any foreign “shape” must either disappear or else conform whenever it comes within reach of our unfolding, for there is no compromise between “shapes”. If the Nazis endured a hundred years, and kept out of war during all that time, they would still abhor the idea of pacifism and lock up everyone voicing it; because it means the recognition of human commonsense and the universal standards of mankind. Yet it is this that makes so lasting a preservation of peace a prospect of considerable uncertainty.

Let us now turn to the tenets of the Creed of War.

I am of opinion that the motive powers of Naturalism and
Vitalism, of the worship of dark fate beyond rational control, transcend the ideal of stubborn militancy. War is appreciated as a mode of life rather than an inescapable possibility or a means of obtaining advantages. Selchow calls attention to the mystery of the "blood conceived" and the "blood sacrificed". There is a sort of magic, common, as it were, to the blood that is bred and the blood that is shed. "The gulf between the civilian and the heroic attitude is unbridgeable. The first draws its life-sap from peace; the second, from fighting." Rapturously, Hielscher hails war as the constructive principle of grand community: "We creative souls who are united by the same warriorship. . . ." We are still the children of the First World War, whose call is formative for decades and centuries. A fanaticism reminiscent rather of the Saracens than of Christian martyrs glows through these words: "The warlike heart is safe against confusing temporal preservation and divine immortality. It is above death, and enjoys temporal destruction as a pledge of its insuperable power". Wolters fiercely repudiates "modern" pacifist talk about the obsoleteness, lack of meaning, and barbarity, of the manly virtues of contest and the heroic type of man. Utterances to that effect defile the memory of the fallen, not to mention their dangerous imbecility; for war is as eternal as peace. Wolters is a pupil of Stefan George; it is equally to George and his poetical formula of the "First World War" (1921) that Werner Best refers, deriving "new Nationalism" from that date. Both varieties of pacifism, the one centred in moral idealism and the other placing its hopes in a utilitarian system of law of a coercive nature, are entirely fallacious; both are optimistic and platitudinous delusions out of touch with reality and the certain destiny of man. "Both bid fair to do the same: to obtain conditions satisfying the wishes of those to whom they appeal"; certainly they are worthy of unmitigated disdain. No suspicion of this kind can fall on the Nationalist mind, which in fact accepts the unrest and the continuous menace of the surrounding world, approves the everlasting dynamism of life, and deprecates "redemption". "It merely matters how, not for what object we fight", says Best in agreement with Jünger; we might do worse than fight on a forlorn hope. I feel inclined to subscribe to this; only I should think it is precisely the hope, however forlorn, that matters, not the aspect of fighting and sacrifice. "Good fighting
as such, not a ‘good cause’ or success, is the thing that turns the scale.”

After this curious example of a, so to speak, unselfish Satanism, a more concrete application of the motto “Everything in the service of war” may refresh the reader. Professor Haushofer, the eminent geographer, in his “Military Geo-Politics” (Wehr-Geopolitik, 1982), writes about the “transformation of defenceless into fortified, into war landscape (Abwehr-, Wehrlandschaft)”:

“Nothing could be more useful than the introduction of a uniform type of footwear, a national working-kit, well-adapted trappings (haversack), and the habit of carrying all the necessary implements of war. It would amount, after all, to nothing other than the actualisation of the dynamics of the natural landscape; whereas all habits or objects antagonistic to that armament cannot but create unnecessary friction, constituting a dead weight on the apparatus when in case of emergency they must be ousted and be replaced by substitutes (Ersatz)”.

The same chords are struck, though again in a more artistic manner, by Professor Freyer in his latest book. Speaking of “state-foundation”, or how a Volk, by ingenious dictatorship, is coined into an actual Polis, he says: “Every mobilization, and in any case this one, is total, if it is anything at all. It raises the natural accord of the various landscapes of a country to the level of a structure of provinces, safeguarding the rational organization of recruiting, co-ordination and defence. . . . Now the symphony of the country’s natural riches will be systematically exploited, vigorously controlled, and even modified according to political requirements. A remote corner becomes a strategical outpost; a picturesque moor, a trap for the enemy; a lovely valley-side, a sacred line of resistance; the heart of the country, its bridge of command. The concrescence of boroughs into towns is scarcely more than a symbol. In truth, the whole country is condensed into a functional system. Artificial frontier-marks spring up on its natural boundaries. It becomes smaller, surveyed by the watchful eyes of the Goddess”.

In Chapter III we discussed C. Schmitt’s smart and sensational philosophy of Friendship and Enmity (Freund und Feind) as the constitutive phenomenon of politics and state life. War is the test, the meaning, the formative factor of a political community; foreign politics are politics proper; the supreme point
of view is not a moral order of society but a highly developed faculty of decision in racially consanguineous (arteigen) leadership. The society of liberal democracy is a picture of distressing confusion where "a chronic condition of unceasing competition and unceasing discussion takes the place of a clear distinction between the two opposite states, war and peace". Apart from the strange confusion, in this sentence, of the spheres of foreign and domestic politics, it might analogously be inferred that people ought not to pursue workaday activities in order to earn their living, but should occasionally perpetrate highway robberies and in the meantime indulge in a "clearly distinguished condition" of undisturbed idleness. Never rebuke anybody, or censure him, or sue him in court; either slay him or just leave him alone. What we call a normal political life, the solution of controversies by the civilized methods of discussion, legal jurisdiction, arbitration and treaty, Schmitt disdainfully calls an arrangement of "denatured" conflicts by a "parasitic", a "caricature" form of politics; "party politics" making use of "tactical and practical" tricks, with the consideration of "ultimate emergency" (Ermäßigung) shamefully falling into desuetude. The right to make war (jus belli) is the distinctive mark of the state; a world organization disposing of war would mean the suppression of State as well. It appears, as yet, to be a long way from that, thank the Lord! The only aspect of domestic politics Schmitt condescends to take seriously is the possibility of civil war or at least, a willingness on the part of the ruling authority to "identify the enemy within the state". We, of course, are more pleased with using our powers of discrimination to distinguish between "enmity" and "opposition"; but then, Schmitt really lives in another world from ours, and his truculent dissection of social surroundings into two disconnected camps is fairly applicable to himself and honest-to-God mankind.

Here a passage from Freyer's new book ("Pallas Athene") may be inserted, which I consider to have an illustrative value equal to its perfection as a piece of literature. It will help us greatly in understanding, not merely the conception of war as the nerve of state life, but also the apparent paradox of an "intensive", self-centred, isolationist and yet warlike Nationalism. Freyer writes: "Just as the unity of the People Politic is born out of violence and war, and cannot be obtained at any lower
price, the state from the first moment of its existence takes its stand in the sphere of war, committing itself to violence; although the craft of its kings and the favour of the gods may preserve its outward peace for a lifetime. War is not only the most complete form of state activity, it is the very element in which the state is embedded; war delayed, prevented, disguised, avoided must of course be included under the term. The erection of a Polis also imparts a political character to the surrounding world with the same necessity as the heart’s sorrow spells a gloomy day, or a higher meaning in man’s soul conjures up a fate full of meaning. A high-relief with raised centre determines an outward descent (Gefälle). A being that draws itself in round its own core, creates, even unintentionally, the boundary-line. And the frontier—even though it be unintentionally—creates the enemy. That is why lawgivers are invariably also setters of frontiers”.

We hear it again and again: “The People Political is to the People Natural what a people at war is to a people at peace”. Politics and war are by no means identical, but war is at least a symbolic expression of political existence. The political élite of the state has its origin in the “set of masters over slaves” which is a “vanguard in war”. Peaceful association never enters the sphere of history; it never attains a political level of tension. And the militant state is neither the biological organism of an original ethnic stock, nor a utilitarian mechanism in the service of peaceful “society”, not a sword hanging over it; the law of the State Politic is “the shape assumed by a Volk roused to activity; the existence which it has embarked upon for good and evil, which shall aver or falsify its pretension”. “Volk Politic is the metamorphosis of Volk Natural; the State is a venture, not a snail-shell, of life”. “The Goddess intended that we should stand upon the ramparts of the City in danger, not sit behind them in peace”. The reason why the portfolio of Ares must needs be foisted on poor Pallas Athene is far from evident; at any rate, such a re-distribution of office accords with the tendency to construct the very core of life out of the substance of militarism. The thing is unnatural: ultimately as envisaged by an enduring logic and by the ordinary run of men, it is the ramparts that are made to protect the temple and the marketplace, the theatre and the stock-exchange, the bedrooms and the
studies, not all the latter to provide a nondescript secondary background for the ramparts. But I should like the reader to find Freyer's brazen description of the warlike "edge" of social existence as fascinating as the exceptional gifts of our author deserve; perhaps never has there been a more competent, more serious, more brilliant, more alluring, a livelier, a better-equipped, indeed, a more spiritual philosopher of barbarism—or of a dark, hopeless, choking blind-alley of civilization. It causes me veritable pain to turn away from Freyer. Perhaps this chapter can still support one more classic and scintillating passage: "A manly, a bold tone prevails in history. He who has the grip has the booty. He who makes a faulty move is done for. He who rants earns ranting. And he who wishes to hit his mark must know how to shoot. Retrospectively, it would appear to be necessity and shape. For the actor it was all venture, alertness and bliss. From the souls, as though they were taut sinews, the actions fly. Clear-eyed and flawlessly armed, the will breaks out of the Universe's fatherly wisdom: young as a flame, pure as a maiden, earnest as a god."

Here is some further material concerning the appreciation of war. According to Spann, a great statesman must *ex definitione* be also a great warrior; Prince Metternich, for instance, was not a really great statesman owing to his lack of soldierly traits. Not all wars are good, only such as express a deep-rooted tendency in national life; on the other hand, the justification of a war has nothing to do with its being a war of defence or aggression. For all his pseudo-scientific fuss about a dictatorial system of *Weltanschauung*, Spann is a dull fellow; Haiser, though he overdoes things a little, is so much more entertaining. He, too, is eager to point out that a soldier class merely intended for defence produces a poor sort of warriorship. "What counts more for an aristocratic man, his being trained as a mere guardian or as an attacker as well? If we are to defend ourselves, then there must also be aggressors; and if so, why should not we be the aggressors ourselves?"

Hommes, the interpreter of "völkisch and Catholic tasks", observes with some dejection that, because of the weakness of human nature, tainted by original sin, the tendency is generally or at least potentially present, to trespass on the vital rights of others in the manner of beasts of prey, beyond legitimate self-
interest. Does he proceed to infer that such habits, codes and institutions as are apt to curb that lust of transgression must be established and encouraged with all the energy we can muster? Nothing of the kind. Instead, immediately after his gloomy preamble, he writes: "Therefore (!) the order of human relationships on earth cannot be kept up except by the struggle, tragic in its fundamental character, of sound (!) egoisms bent on self-assertion". We become aware of the puzzling fact that apparently some Christians cling to their faith lest, deprived of its support, they might yield to the temptation of repressing a little the "beast of prey" factor in the human mind. We are also confronted by the impressive argument that axiomatic pacifism, meaning peace at the price of self-surrender (?), is immoral; nay, the very name of this heresy must have an odious ring for schooled ears, as it pollutes the holy word pax. To mention a holy thing, then, is tantamount to polluting it? Well, perhaps it is only too holy to be dragged into politics. This domain is best reserved for the tragedy of sound egoisms; peace and equity on earth might easily offend heaven. We are haunted by the grim foreboding that Herr Rosenberg or Herr Ludendorff, who make no point of being good Christians, might sooner or later become a party to the ignominy of pacifism. As regards the struggle between sound egoisms, Bäumler couches the same thought in more elegant wording: History is not filled by a duel between good and evil, it forms the "battle-ground upon which various powers, each with a relative justification, are fighting one another". Bäumler has at least the honesty to steer clear of moral unction.

Edgar Jung again finds pacifism guilty of the charge of immorality. Pacifism repudiates all belligerence even in the face of injustice and offended dignity; pacifism is calculated to hamper sacrifice for the sake of the community. To put it differently, we must bring ourselves to kill in order to be killed in our turn. But some of us may like what Jung says about readiness to fight against injustice. It is, however, a great pity that he makes no sign of applying the test of justice in a more concrete and sustained manner to problems of war; nor does he show much fervour in urging a universal and continuous imposition of justice by, say, a League of Nation's army at the disposal of an international Tribunal. His thoughts stray in entirely different
regions: "Humanitarianism, the idea of mankind, and Pacifism, are no regulators of history. They disregard value". But were those most active regulators of history who in the dramatic summer of 1934 so sweepingly disregarded Jung’s value, humanitarians, or pacifists?

This may sound rather colourless. But our well-tried friend Stapel will not leave us in the lurch. In his “Christian Statesman”, he distinguishes three great types of public personalities: the Father, the Warrior and the Saint. Every good statesman must also have in him a bit of the warrior; and it seems as though this bit were to comprise what is most important in his character. For the three basic principles of state existence are enumerated in the following order: (1) Enmity and struggle; (2) Paternal authority; (3) Law in the spirit of Judaism and Christianity on a Jewish pattern. It is easy to perceive that the paternal principle is meant to assist the warlike principle by its congenial complementary relationship to the peaceable side of life, and to discard as far as possible the rationalistic degeneration implied in the Law principle. The “father” may place a bridle on the “warrior’s” vehemence; the “lawyer” might think of making him essentially superfluous. To crave security, to dissolve divine revelations in ascertainable rules, to substitute cerebral egoism for passional crime, these are the abominable heresies to which our world is so much given. God appears to be rationalized: His will is supposed to be no longer the “crowning of kings”, but “unhampered banking business”. He is degraded into a humane pedagogue presiding over a body of docile, if priggish, students of citizenship. “That is how God, a clever teacher, is guiding men, along the road of progress, ‘nearer to God’” (ironically quoted in English). “For, you see, old Mr. Kellogg is a ‘good’ man; but we who should be ready to burn the entire world to ashes, if only by doing so we could make Germany free (!), we are ‘wicked’ people. Yet what if we would sooner be in hell with Stein, Arndt, and Bismarck, than in heaven with the repellent horde of Puritan moralists”? If I may say a word on the latter’s behalf, I do not object to this assignment of our future dwellings. The trouble is: what is to happen on earth?

Two additions dating from the time of the Great War may be of interest: one by a very stupid and one by a supremely
ingenious man, both now dead, both Catholics of a sort, neither of them the pure German Nationalist type. Richard Kralik, the Austrian Romantic and clerical reactionary, a per fervid German owing to his Bohemian (Sudetendeutsch) extraction and Czech name, the author of a vast quantity of written material dealing with every conceivable topic and every form of art, the more admirable for his sturdiness and assiduity in view of his complete lack of talent, was the most rapid and resonant mouthpiece of a double-headed Pan-German imperialism, urging the subjugation of the world by the two allied Kaisers. These he invested with a claim to such a solution because of their "higher morality" and "sounder spiritual value". Thus did Kralik dispel all importunate objections of pacifist busybodies to war: "War, like culture, comprehends everything. Life in its entirety is war, war just or unjust, holy or unholy, war waged with iron, blood and fire or else with spiritual weapons". It is a far cry from here to Professor Max Scheler, one of the most subtle and powerful thinkers in history, perhaps the greatest of his time. In many important respects, Scheler stood for truths and methods diametrically opposed to Naziism in all its varieties: he was generally deemed a Catholic, and during the last years of his life became more and more Left in his views; his greatest achievement was the foundation of objectivist ethics on the lines pursued by St. Augustine, the School, Pascal, Brentano, and Husserl's phenomenology. Yet an undercurrent of anarchical vitalism and amorality, of "Nordic" aversion to order and limits, of Titanism as it were, was always present as well. He never quite freed himself from the influence of Nietzsche; his personal character was probably far more Nietzschean than that of the poor ascetical prophet of life-estasy himself. Anyhow, during the war, Professor Scheler, who also acted for a time as adviser to the German military authorities in Brussels, set himself the task of producing philosophical ammunition for war-enthusiasm and the belief in Germany's cause; it is collected, chiefly, in his work "The Genius of war, and the German War" (1915). In conformity with the sentiments then prevailing in Germany, and also with his own genuine hatred of the Calvinist and Puritan mind, Scheler upheld an attitude of hostility towards England more basic than towards France and Russia, violently disclaiming any idea of a "Teutonic" union of the
English and German peoples. It was only logical for Scheler to renounce shallow attempts at moral self-justification, as advocated by so many academical and literary Sergeants of Kultur. These harped on Germany’s right to ward off the menace of French "vindictiveness" or "hysteria" allied to "voracious Muscovite barbarism", not to mention the abundance of pig-sties and scarcity of civilized lavatories in Serbia, the "treacherous egoism" of Italy, and Belgium’s long-premeditated betrayal of her own neutrality. But Scheler’s arguments were consistently and ruthlessly intellectual, and have a right to figure in the mental panorama of Nazi Germany. Power, he writes, is also a spiritual manifestation; war springs from spiritual sources. The justice of war does not depend on its defensive character: wherever a fatal collision occurs between different plans of power construction, each comparatively justified in itself, the conflict may have its legitimate result in war. Economical interests only lead to war when they closely affect national consciousness of value and power. (This is, I think, true beyond doubt). It is not that our international treaty system is imperfect; there are essential limits set to regulation by treaty law as such. Every state is a being in formation and growth. . . . History is made up of action and life, not of diplomatic examples of calculation. . . . War, in its outcome, is not only decisive for economic policy but also for population policy, with regard to biological "quality". . . . The reader may find this callous naturalism hackneyed rather than ingenious; but more elegant things are to follow. There is a highly moral consideration that forbids us to contemplate the banishment of war: "the maximization of general welfare", resulting from the disappearance of the evils of war, might entail a diminution in the total quantity of love on earth"! Even in a direct sense, the ethics of love show an "exact identity of style" with the ethics of war. Noblesse and chivalry are the standards of war as well as of Christian morality, the love of human personality independent of situations and institutions. Pacifism is a corollary of Darwinism, Spencerism, utilitarianism in general; an egoistic demand for comfortable security. The Christian ethics of love, on the other hand, urge us to stand the test of personal integrity and devotion in the midst of danger, enmity and bloodshed. Then why not abolish, on the same head, medicine, legal justice, and
every other "impersonal" contrivance that helps to make life bearable without an actual intervention of love impulses? Scheler shudders at the thought of universal peace maintained by the solidarity of interests and a régime of treaties; it would be the consummated kingdom of Satan. Why? Apparently he means that opportunities for disinterested self-sacrifice would be wiped out; which is obviously nonsense. Perhaps he also supposes that the mutual hatred of men would grow the more venomous if they were invariably prevented from smashing one another's skulls. A vast but soulless fabric of interdependent interests would supersede the more intense though infinitely narrower fellowship which war creates. *A nation at war attains full consciousness of itself*, its analogy to the Mystical Body of Christ. Nor is that all. War is also an instrument of divine justice; it measures values; it provides a national examination (*Treitschke*); it separates genuine from sham qualities. The contestants are ultimately right in calling, each for his own side, on God's assistance; the naïve and presumptuous appropriation of God by the single nation is certainly unwarrantable, but what the invocation of God in these cases really means is a readiness to submit one's cause to the decision of the heavenly Throne. (?) Nor could the divine judgment be analysed or anticipated by rational process and argument: for God is not primarily a Judge who happens also to be omnipotent; His might is as original as His justice, and the latter cannot be materialized in disconnection with the former. Is, then, God beyond good and evil, or is the good cause always triumphant? There are cases when a diplomatic quarrel instead of honest fighting is actually sinful. People talk of war encouraging the ugly side of mankind; but these "dim floods" are only brought to the surface, not created, by war. The justice or injustice of war is not determined either by the juridical position of the litigant parties, or by the rôle of aggressor or defender. We must not confuse the causes of war with the causes of a declaration of war; the second problem alone lends itself to juridical routine treatment. . . . What the justice of war really depends upon is firstly, the genuineness of motive, the vital importance of the matter in dispute, and secondly, the will to war being rooted in the nation's mind, the volonté générale, not merely in a desire of the military party. Now what kind of quarrel has the dignity
of supporting a claim to war? The existence of a state, or at least such interests as may effect that existence, or the honour of a state, being at stake; or else, a menace to the circumscribed concrete rights of a state, provided that they are backed by a proportional amount of actual power. Otherwise, defence is purposeless, and therefore devoid of justice. The tendency implied in this sinister statement is only too evident. It had to suggest the inference that Germany's war against Belgium was a just war, whereas Belgium's war against Germany was an unjust war! There is nothing more serviceable than philosophy, after all. Let us hope that Divine Justice will soon correct the ridiculous mistake it committed in awarding victory to Belgium, whose cause was unjust because, to believe Scheler, it had "no bearing on vital interests whatsoever". Finally, a conclusive proof against pacifism is offered: the fatality of war, for which pacifism endeavours to substitute regulation by human reason. Yet to refuse belief in fate is bold, unholy presumption. The reader will admit that it has been no wanton act to set Professor Scheler in the pastures of Nazi thought. Both Scheler's chief theoretical works and his personal presence conveyed an impression of rare spiritual grandeur; his work contains eternal values. I felt it to be an unhappy duty to deal in such a perspective with him, whom I know to have repented of his war books as much as of his other sins in life; but a duty it was, for the greater the adversary the more imperative it is for us to face him.

From the war of the past, let us now turn to the war of the future; from the sophisticated pre-Nazi metaphysician to the boyish and rather downright military geographer gaily swimming in the Nazi flood. Nothing could be more natural than to keep Banse for a climax. As far as my information goes, his book *Wehrwissenschaft* had already aroused some attention in the West and was subsequently withdrawn from public sale by order of the Imperial authorities.

Banse is writing for "a nation that is fully aware that its life belongs to the State, to the State alone, to the State once more and again and again". He proposes that the science of war be taught in the schools. Nor should the science of war be restricted to technical knowledge of military and adjacent matters alone; rather should it be widened out into a system of "National Philosophy" and "National Ethics". Every national group
with its own state has a claim to self-defence against other groups; the maintenance of its particular status is the "supreme duty". "The problems of war are first and foremost of a psychological, moral and spiritual order; in the second place only do they extend to the field of bodily force and movement". It must be added, however, that there are warlike and peace-loving races. As is almost everywhere the case in the groves of Nationalism, here, too, the aspects of fairness towards every national subject and of demonstrating one's right to a privilege are intermingled. I may behave as a ferocious, cunning beast, with no law over me but my own nature and will, because you may do so on your part; but on further reflection the outlines of a higher divine order come into sight, indicating that one of those relative Absolutes must be, after all, more legitimate and full of meaning than the other; and we quite naturally slip into understanding that it will be mine, not yours. The amplification and increasing totality of war requires a proper science of war. "The creation of a uniform will for war and victory is an indispensable condition of national independence". The science of war is designed to foster a "belief in the high ethical value and the deeper meaning of war". "It will be well to conceive racial character (Volkheit), state, culture and war as so many storeys of one and the same house for men, none of which can hold out without the others". The science of war is to develop into a more universal national science and ethic. "The branches of scientific knowledge, with their upper strata practicable for national needs, join the common body of National Philosophy, which thus becomes a touchstone of national and un-national ingredients in each science as well as in the minds of its cultivators".

So much for the science of war; now some details on its object. The phenomenon of the frontier, a "contact between different, nay, even always opposite essences which clash here", fascinates Banse hardly less than it does Freyer. Only Banse's language is a little more rough-hewn. "A frontier lacks proper military value unless it enables a state to smite out across it in case of emergency, bringing down its fist in the evil neighbour's neck". The perfect frontier, I fancy, must be one that allows both neighbours to act thus in turn. An obsequious innkeeper once addressed a party of guests engaged in a game of cards: "The
gentlemen are winning, I hope?" But I could not be certain. At any rate, the Franco-Italian frontier, says Banse, is favourable to the French, seeing that they have the Alpine passes, and apart from that, the Italian army is of inferior value owing to their national character. (Will that suit Mussolini?) Nor can I persuade myself to suppress the following sentence, irrelevant though it is to our line of research: "As providers of nourishment, living rations of meat on foot as it were, beasts are the best victuals for the troops." It will hardly surprise us that Banse, too, has a low estimate of pacifists. After having registered the "Nordic" and "Dinaric" races as the proper material for attack, and the "Vaelic" spirit of defence which often embodies equal valour, he passes to the "Ostic" type, tainted, as a rule, by a sadly deficient taste for fighting. Man of this kind, the "pacifist", "does not count at all as regards attack, and has also but little inclination for defence. For him, life is a mere biological mode of existence. He looks at it purely from an economical, not an ideal point of view. His only object of work and thought is to ensure his being alive, indifferent to freedom or bondage; he would not risk his life in order to gain it". It is out of such stuff that are made the pseudo-soldiers of inferior value, an easy prey for destructive propaganda, the predestined shouters of "No more war".

Wehrpsychologie and psychotechnical tests on fitness for war, writes Banse, have to form part of the education of youth. Very soon the young men must be initiated into the "ideals of German-Teutonic ambition and achievement", and exhorted to "stand relentlessly for what has to be their idea and ideal".

It is outside the scope of this book to convey to the English public even the faintest idea of the enormous output of military literature in the Third Empire. I propose to conclude the present section with a forceful formula quoted from the monthly review Deutsche Wehr (German Defence), December, 1985: "War is the secret master of our century; peace has merely the function of a simple armistice between two wars".
8. THE ETHNIC IDOL

As I am confident that most readers have appreciated Banse as a rare treat, I feel I should prolong our interview with him for a moment or two. Broaching the subject of religious life from the standpoint of the science of war, Banse writes: “The soul’s deepest and inmost part is attached to God and seeks for communion with God. Perhaps even God is nothing but a very intensely sensed national substance (stärkst erfühlte Volkheit), the supreme elevation of thought, intention and belief made credible” (The sentence is worse in German: eine Glaubbarmachung dieser höchsten Aufschwingbarkeit, etc.). Another passage in Banse runs: “God lives in the soul of a Volk, and in the shape affinitive (artgemäss) to that soul. A Volk living in conformity with its deepest mental impulse (or compulsion, Müssen) fulfils the will of God. To assist and carry out the latter, military force (Wehr) is the primal and ultimate means of power. And to prepare this the task of the science of war”.

We must now turn away from the science of war and take a closer look at the legendary Volk, a far less interesting and more elusive topic. What exactly is a Volk? Most Nazi and semi-Nazi pundits are excessively fond of using the term; Sombart stands alone with his crisp Prussian dislike of it. At first sight, “Volk” appears to cover “folk” or the more standard expression “people”; however, the English plural so often attributed to these nouns already betrays the individualist deviation. In the neo-German usage, Volk designates something that is more “one” than is even an individual. Volk, in this sense, has also a different note than people, the latter being faintly reminiscent of Catholic parties which in France and Czechoslovakia, and formerly in Hungary and Italy, have called themselves “popular” parties. Volk is an efflorescence of nature rather than a political mob; an individual rather than a company of individuals; Ethnos rather than Demos (to use a distinction much stressed by Giddings), in the sense of having more to do with ethnology than with democracy. Volk is the inner side of a nation; a nation not in that it is organized and moulded by state-power, but by virtue of its racial substance. Yet, compared with race, it is still more of an actual personality, a unity of
will (though not of decision). When the neo-German thinker speaks of Volk, the Englishman would sometimes use the word "people", but more frequently either "nation" or "race". As to Volksstum or Volkheit, we may render it as "national substance", "nation-hood", "racial genius", etc. Sometimes it would be most topical to give Volk as "tribe", völkisch as "tribal". The German Stamm ("tribe", "clan", gens) mostly means a sub-branch of an ethnological nation; the "Nether Saxons" or the "Alemannians" are "Stämme" of the German "Volk". Taken all in all, Volk is more or less the equivalent of nation, the stress being laid, not on national consciousness or opinion or effort, but on the nation's soul, its feeling of self, of unity, of a common character. The Volk principle is grounded in the isolationist, the naturalist, the "feminine" side of Nationalism, as opposed to the imperialist, the voluntarist, the "masculine" side. We are aware, however, that the "maternal", the "blood and soil", the introspective aspect is calculated to supplement rather than to counterweigh the "virile", the "fascist", the "bellicose" aspect. Volk, in other words, is the twilight sphere entre chien et loup, between Nation and Race. Nation designates the political unit of action; Race, the anthropological material of construction; Volk, the link between the two, nature waking to self-consciousness and activity, essence assuming its primal form. Volk is less directly a principle of values than is Race, and less directly a principle of stringency in duty than is Nation, but it is more emphatically a principle of religious determination for the individual's standing and affinity than are either.

Frau Ludendorf-Kemnitz proclaims the emancipation of mankind from the unnatural yoke of Christianity as an "emancipation of peoples: Redemption from Jesus Christ; reversion to the holy laws of racial purity; reintegration into the living community of fate for good and evil, into the Volk of common blood; intimate union with the Tribe (Sippe)". The same stock-in-trade, but with a pseudo-Christian, a semi-Lutheran varnish, is displayed by Stapel: To be truly "man", one must be affiliated to a definite Volk; being Volk-less entails "being godless, nay, enmity towards God". Volk marks the primary assignment, the original location of man (here Stapel refers to Fichte); Volk is prior to Man, is a real totality, not an assembled group of men;
otherwise there could be no such thing as *Völker* in their distinctness and their imperative claims on the individual. Nor do the Catholic trustees of Naziism stand back, though they must rack their brains to find the right formulas. With obsequious verbiage Stonner pushes the merits of the Church in encouraging ethnological self-knowledge to the fore, and offers his co-operation in “exploring the character of Germandom”. Church life, after all, is an integral part of Volk life! Who could dissemble popular devotion from folklore? Did the Saviour not advise His followers to go and teach all peoples, and to become all things to all men? No doubt but that He meant them to become good Nazis and good Ku Klux Klan men according to need; but good Nazis above all, perhaps, for the “symbiosis between Christian and Teutonic essence” is calculated to arouse our special interest. With truly apostolic solicitude Stonner then expatiates on the difficulties that stand in the way of “reawakening Volk customs”. There are a few Catholics, though, who are concerned with “difficulties” of a widely different nature within the precincts of the Third Empire. And Hommes praises the “law of rhythm in Nature” by which men are set in “ethnic orders of life” (*Volksordnungen*) victoriously overflowing the “rationalistic caprices of the individual”. “Strong ethnic individualities” harmonize with creation; strong *Volksindividualitäten* in the richest meaning of the term, including even a special outlook on the things that matter most—each Volk to have its own *Weltanschauung*. Being Catholics, however, we must believe in one ultimately true *Weltanschauung* above ethnic varieties in thought, but, somehow or other, this does not interfere with the “particular *Weltanschauungen* of the single nations and races, in which God himself ordained men to grow, because in such variegations alone were they able to coin valid forms of human nature”. The author most annoyingly omits to draw a concrete line of demarcation between the invariable One True *Weltanschauung* and the Special Valid *Weltanschauungen* optional for the Volk but obligatory for the affiliated individual. For the latter aspect is formally erected into a religious duty. “The loss of its heritage of *Weltanschauung* means for a Volk the destruction of its supporting mode of life and its very rootedness in God.” Moreover, internationalism is also the death of a “true community between *Völker*”. Thus all good things are happily
aligned on the "Catholic Völkisch" side, against all bad things combined on the side of "weakly Humanitarianism".

Schmaus, another Catholic consecrator of "naturhafte Ordnungen", published a book under the modest but promising title: "Points of contact between Catholic Christianity and the National Socialist outlook on Life". In that book we read that Volk, mainly reposing in "blood" and the "secret of inheritance", deserves full credit even in a religious respect, with no prejudice to the universal dogmatic truth: "The Latin has a vision of God which is different to the Teuton's." Community of descent results in community of fate. Man as such does not exist; everybody is French or Japanese or German or a member of some other nationality." Why not a "Latin" or a "Teuton"? Why not man or woman, Catholic or Buddhist, an "athletic" or an "asthenic" type? "A German is a perfect man in that he is a perfect German." Here is one of those plain truths the reverse of which could equally well be wrapped in a false glamour of self-evidence. "Volk is the naturally and historically assigned sphere (Raum) where everybody finds everything required for his life and development." It sounds like a piece of sociology delivered in the course of Prussian military instruction! "Every German has to feel himself a German first, not a politician, an official, an industrial, or a peasant." Much could be said, though, in support of the opposite order of preference.

Lenz, with whom we are already acquainted, was the inventor of the excellent term Gentilism, a watchword that certainly deserves a wider range of currency. He adds himself the explanatory remark that English Jews are wont to call the "Goyim", the Non-Jews, "the Gentiles". Lenz gives a succinct racial interpretation of Volk. Moral community, he points out, resides neither in universal mankind nor in groups whose principle of union is identity of language; a man's mother tongue can be the language of a people whose soul is nevertheless quite foreign to him. "History has a consonance for us only inasmuch as we are the descendants of our forefathers." "It is Race that bears everything: Personality, State, Volk." Nor should we be insensible to the force inherent in this monumental statement of pagan nationalism: "Volk as an organism is our moral object". Livelier, on the other hand, are the images conjured up by the poetic phantasy of Selchow. He actually proposes to substitute
for "Burger" the new term Völker; which is as though we were to be no longer "citizens" but "tribesmen". The kernel of the Nazi tendency seems to be thus fairly adequately rendered; we can only regret that "Volker", owing perhaps to its somewhat ugly sound, has as yet attained no popularity. The "Volker" is defined as a man "who feels himself a member of his Volk, a leaf on the branch that is doomed to decay and loss of meaning when torn from the tree". His membership of the Volk is not effected by a haphazard fixation of boundaries, far less by an "arbitrary act of adhesion, a vicious offence against destiny"; it means his being "embedded in the stream of common blood". Instead of "Demos", Society, Covenant—Ethnos, Tribe, Race! The qualitative inwardness of the völkisch mind, in addition to the imperialist grammar of power, is also reflected by the remark of Rosenberg that "glowing nationalism" is directed to-day towards "race-bound nationhood (artgebundene Volkheit) itself". Apart from both grandeur and goodness, prosperity and expansion, "we" are at very great pains to be very much "we", very much "this kind" of people. Irrational "individuality" of the Tribe versus an accountable order of society consisting of individuals bound together by reason.

Here are some further variations of ethnic ideology. Volk is a natural growth, a primary and most outstanding item in divine Creation, with its indomitable particularity; there are individuals as well as individual nations, but no such thing as "Man", as a general "human kind" (Menschengattung): this is what Professor Schulze-Soelde believes. The Volk's soul is at first plunged in unconsciousness, buried in the rhythm of the blood; in all of us who are attached to the same soil an identical Volk's spirit is at work. The entire Volk thinking in unique consciousness, as One person, marks the goal of a lengthy evolution. Volk, not mankind, is the objective of history (Count Reventlow). And the Volk can only develop "out of itself". Besides, in an indirect sense, mankind will be the beneficiary of this wisdom. The higher the levels attained by each single nation, the higher mankind will rise as a whole. We, of course, should prefer it to exist before "rising". Neither are we quite sure that a number of "Volks", each "developing out of itself", will ever proceed so idyllically to "climb to higher levels" each beside the others. Professor Bruno Bauch, the pride of neo-Kantian ethics, elegantly marshals
the old idealistic philosophy of values, once choked by empty
formalism, towards the tumultuous heights of Nazi vitality:
"Now the concrete, living sphere of this realization of values is
indicated to us by our Volksstum". Or again, a saying of Joseph
Wittig (a heretical ex-priest who was beloved in youth-movement
circles, even of the Left): "Volk is the only room that can house
Man in his entirety". We beg to differ: this attribute is due
to Mankind.

It is, to all intents and purposes, a stiff task to impart to the
Western mind, which cannot help thinking in terms of National
Democracy, even when leaning towards Conservatism or Im-
perialism, an adequate notion of the anti-democratic and anti-
humanitarian tenor of the Volk ideology. The bulky and instruc-
tive monograph of Max Boehm on "Volk in its proper stand-
ing" (Das eigenständige Volk, 1982; the author is a völkisch
Conservative, not a Nazi: neither racist nor fascist), may give
us some advice. In attempting to define "Volk" in its truest
sense, relative to the adjective volkhaft (of the people, as it were),
Boehm proceeds to set it apart from the spheres of biological
race (völkisch: "folkish"), of nation and state (national), of
society in its common workaday life (volklich: "popular",
"concerned with the people"), of the political mob with its
transitory activities. What remains for "Volk proper" is mainly
the idea of a particular individuality, soul, or genius, of Volk.
This means that, even when reference to the biological categories
of racial determination is omitted or reduced to a secondary
footing, and the central factors of society are supposed to
originate in the "spiritual" field, human association and
character appear to be swayed by cosmic principles of irrational
uniqueness, beyond both general human nature and conscious
personal behaviour. In Boehm's formula of an "ethnopathetic"
attitude as opposed to state-seeking "ethnocratic" nationalism,
the "feminine" aspect of placid self-submersion rises to strange
heights; Ziegler, whose book we have discussed a few pages
above, calls forth Herder's vision of an "organic, plant-like un-
folding of Volksseele", a vision far more liable to explode the
edifice of Mankind than any Jingo dream of brutal conquest and
expansive domination. In the same book, Ziegler gives an idea
of the concrete consequences. He observes that the French con-
ception of national democracy is in some way handicapped by
the undefined ubiquity of its cherished "national will". The formation of will as such is necessarily an unpredictable event; a peculiar national "quality" that governs the "will" has no place in the system. Equally, the political applications of the thesis of self-determination might at any time produce a "new nation". It seems to Ziegler that, at any rate for the Central European complex of nations, the German Volksgeist idea of nationhood provides a more flexible and effective instrument of regulation. The status of nationalities can be founded more solidly on their "historical dignity" than on the alleged "equality of human rights". The Volk right of national minorities should be treated as such, as a problem between two given nations, instead of being subsumed under the rights of citizenship within a nation (a "state"). This theory has lately been making great headway among the Germans of Czechoslovakia (the "Sudetendeutsches Volk", as the Henlein Party is fond of calling itself); and the patriotic people of the Republic hear all too well the menacing undercurrent beneath the utterances in spite of the rather equivocal harmlessness and mask of loyalty. Much the same ideology is exposed by Hördt, a pedagogue following the lead of Krieck, whose book (1982) has the inimitably characteristic title, almost untranslatable: "Der Durchbruch der Volkheit und die Schule". The French idea of state-nation lacks the sense of "grown shape"; the compulsory use of a standard national language was invented in the French Revolution. We, on the other hand, are loath to suppress any Volkstum, by any methods; we consider national rights of language, religion, customs, history, etc., not as a joint application of individual rights but as direct attributes of the Volk personality.

To guileless readers this may sound as a rather inoffensive professorial hair-splitting, German in the old-world sense of the word. As things are, however, a number of non-German nations, in spite of all assurances regarding the protection of their ethnic peculiarity, may well develop an uneasy feeling at this theory being applied to them. It does make a difference, both as regards more immediate and more distant consequences, whether the German minorities in Central and East European countries are just minorities formed of German-speaking people, or are limbs and materialization of the "German Volk". Anyhow, it is
significant enough when Hördt exclaims: “Our objects are—
Volk and Reich!”

Some corollaries and interpretations of the ethnic principle
must still be added. We begin with a glamorous synopsis of
Haverbeck (in his study “The rising—Aufbruch—of the young
nation”, N. S. Monatshefte, 1982): “The myth of the Young
Volk requires a new image of the world: Struggle is the father
of all things. God manifests himself in Conscience dependent
on Blood. Volkstum on a racial basis is the supreme expression
of human community”. Further, this is how Helbing proposes
to put into words his “heroic Humanism”: “The National
State... is the only sphere in which the individual may
attain a shape, if at all; it must not be conceived in ac-
cordance with an arbitrary foundation of society for economic
motives, far more as a vital necessity pertinent to man like
the Body to the Soul, and accordingly determining his
duties”.

Notwithstanding its fascist creed favourable to state totality
and omnipotence, typical Nazi thought insists on placing the
Volk above the State. This has, of course, nothing to do with
democracy, save in the sense of its more complete elimination.
State-power soaring above the people may, in a dialectical
manner, call into play the complementary term of popular
control; state-power as an apparatus instrumental to Volk
genius will upset beforehand any aspirations to interference from
the people. The more popular the state poses to be in its mystical,
uncontrollable “substance”, the less popular need it be in its
actual structure. This is why Moeller-Bruck, contrasting his
Nationalism with politics centred on a primary appreciation of
state functions, reviles the intelligent though in some way
irrationalist Conservatism of Stahl for its “intellectual”,
“bureaucratic”, “half-caste” character, its dynastic and un-
national tendencies. He also associates belief in the State with
sober objectivity, Nationalism with ardent zeal. We might put it
thus: the Völkisch State is apt to be more full-blooded, more
pretentious, more absolute, and to have a greater impetus, than,
say, a Hegelian State or the absolutism of a Christian Prince,
exposing their claims and legitimacy overtly on the plane of
universal understanding. The Völkisch State, being meta-
fascist, is not un-fascist but super-fascist, though, like the
Austrian Corporative State, it doubtless includes non-fascists in the number of its adherents. We had better consult Hitler himself on the subject. He writes in *Mein Kampf* that *Volkstum* should be considered in preference to the State. “Race gifted for the creation of culture”, not the state, is the real force that generates culture. The Teutonic impulses which have created medieval civilization were not conditioned by the working of the Roman state-order: the Teutons had never been averse to culture, only hampered by an unfriendly climate; in the South they would have created culture without the assistance of the ancient world. I hardly feel prepared either to assent or to challenge the thesis. The state, Hitler follows up the trail, is merely a means to an end, which is the “preservation and furthering of a community of live beings (!) homogeneous in physique and soul”. Nay, the supreme purpose within that purpose is the breeding of racial archetypes creative of culture. This is labelled the “Aryan conception of the State”. The goodness of a state is neither to be tested by cultural height as such, nor by its range of power “within the system of the foreign world” : the quality of *Volkstum* it supports and breeds is the real touchstone. However, to infer that a given *Volkstum* (even apart from democratic liberties in the form of individual rights) should just be allowed to have its own way, that political leadership is to encourage an ethnic idyll, would be a grave mistake. Hitler has always been well aware of the great paradoxical truth which is most strikingly expounded in Freyer’s latest work: that the unique and exquisite ethnic character can only be brought into full shape through being violated in some way (naturally, by its true-born and competent representatives). Hitler, true statesman that he is, great in his ruthless simplicity, found a rather un-völkisch way of expressing himself in the Nürnberg speech of September 16th, 1935: “There are many who object to the intolerance of the National Socialist party; they argue that such ways are not in keeping with German ways. But everything turns merely on what is useful to our people, whether or not it is in keeping with German ways”. In a more recent address the Chancellor again touched on the passive part of the people and the Government’s mystical communion with the soul of the *Volk*. “We refuse to have discussions with the people. We cannot make our decisions depend on a bundle of
irresponsible opinions. But the people will always know exactly why we have acted in a given manner and not in another." The last sentence would presumably never have been uttered by such non-

völkisch fascists as the Italians; the first, perhaps never with this harshness by fascists with Catholic and remotely Liberal accents such as the Austrians.

A few final additions of the Gentilist mind complete the picture. E. Jung entrusts philosophy with "unravelling the conception of the essence and destination of man as it lives in the feeling of a Volk". So the foppish old trickery of "idealistic" philosophy, "The world is my representation", has degenerated into the far more gravely subjectivist monstrosity, "The world is my Tribe's representation". Here we beg to repeat a previous quotation from Darré, his re-modelled Categorical Imperative: "Always act as a German so that thy Volk comrades may choose thee as an example!" Pembaur, an Austrian writer of the so-called "emphatically Nationals" (betont Nationale), obviously a man of kind intentions but small acumen, says in his "Nationalism and Ethics": "The peoples are plants of natural growth that drain their sap from the boundless wells of life. What is added by human handiwork is external form". The Volk as a Whole also represents "supreme ethical value, for whatever breathes life has moral importance as well (1) and can be raised to a moral value".

We have reviewed in other contexts the theory of arteigen (affinitive, or racially congenial) leadership and the substitution of national and dictatorial for liberal and humanitarian principles of Law. A few leading ideas of Carl Schmitt may aptly come in here. He, as one of many, declared that henceforth Law must have in the centre of its system, not the idea of "man" but "this concrete German people". In fact, German jurisprudence is progressing towards a stage where it will operate with the term "man" as little as with the term "witch". "All Recht (Law; Right) is the Recht of a definite people." Man is fully implicated "in the reality of this affinity of Volk and Race". Hence any claim to objectivity, any pretence at understanding a foreign Kind, are utterly false. Moreover, a good juridical practice will not in the first place depend on there being good laws, on the appropriateness of abstract statutes, but on the judicial offices being held by well-trained Nazis exuding Volk
essence: “quis judicabit” . . . “Let us have a reform of jurists rather than of jurisprudence” (Freisler).

Erik Wolf, discoursing on “The right Law (richtiges Recht) in the Nazi State”, writes sententiously but forcefully enough: “Volk in the National Socialist sense is the Body (regimented in corporations) of those of German extraction, in whose horizon there are various rights (Rechte) and duties, but only one Law (Recht). According to National Socialist feeling, Volk by no means applies to an indefinite number of men subject to one sovereignty of government behaving in an indefinite mode; it designates a union developed essentially in one manner and in no other, standing under one historical fate. . . . In a broader sense, it also includes those of German extraction living on foreign territories”.

Departing from Nationalism, we pass through Gentilism, approaching the outskirts of Race in a process of descent into more and more unfathomable depths. Patriotism turns racial in penetrating its own depths, says Schemann following in the steps of Arndt, the Pan-German prophet of the Napoleonic age of unrest and dreams.

4. THE SECRET OF RACE

“Ultimate knowledge . . . consists in an understanding of instinct reasons. . . . Man must not think himself to have assumed control over Nature: he must understand the fundamental necessity of the proceedings of Nature, and sense the validity of these laws of eternal struggle and ambitious strife for his own existence.”

HITLER.

“Whatever on this earth is not good race, is mere chaff.”

HITLER.

“The State must place racial value in the centre of general life.”

HITLER.
There is only one human right, the Führer also declares: "to ensure the preservation of pure blood, thereby protecting the best kind of men and creating the possibility of a nobler evolution for these beings". We must put a check on the process of bastardization and renew the meaning of marriage, in order to uproot "racial disgrace" and to cause "images of the Lord, not hybrids between man and ape, to be engendered".

What, then, is Race, and how does it come by its importance for Teutonic Gentile Nationalists and Nazi Fascists? Obviously we are in no way concerned with the anthropological subject of human races or racial fitness as such, only with the neo-German emphasis attached to race for political, social and philosophical reasons. Is it a magic decoration and a scientific justification of idiosyncratic nationalism, or of pretentious imperialism, or of aristocratic class-rule, or of dictatorial interference in private life, or of an atavistic hatred of Jews, which is the supreme object? Again, if all those motives were to be thought of as united, in what sense could the formula of Race be supposed to provide the key of union, to indicate the common background?

We may as well say it at once and in a summary fashion: The principle of Race, raised to the apex of public consciousness, "placed in the centre of general life", is meant to embody and express the utter negation of human freedom, the denial of equal rights, a challenge in the face of mankind, a declaration of war against personality and Christian Ethics, and a claim to erase any idea of progress towards a rational order of society. Racialism is destined to oppose Liberty by Fate, individual consciousness by the compelling urge of the Blood beyond control and argument. It replaces the object before man’s eyes by the force behind his back, and the Code of human behaviour by a Canon of "human shape". The effort of man to improve the conditions of his existence must yield to the submission of man to having his germ-substance improved by the stewards-in-power of his peculiar Kind. Ultimately, what we are called upon to witness here is the gigantic issue between man’s submersion in nature and his spiritual affirmation: the battle of Armageddon that is still going on between Vitalism and Humanitarianism; the image of the Demi-god and the evidence of the Statute; the community of "Eros" and the community of the Covenant; the rhythm of Identity and Hostility and the Kingdom of Justice and Kind-
ness; tribalism and civilization; Paganism and Christianity; the Master Man and Progressive Democracy.

We must not allow this basic orientation, this guiding perspective, to be blurred by apparent contradictions and interconnections. Neither the conservative and aristocratic implications of Church interests and policies (nay, of religious quietism as such), nor the lapses of Left-wing thought into atheistic materialism, "eugenic" servility and superstition, or hedonistic amoralism, must be suffered to obscure the fundamental line of division, to conceal from our eyes the highest plane of decision where the Light of Liberty and the Power of Mystery, where Christ and Baal face each other in unalloyed purity. All human manifestations reflect human nature, not merely in fortuitous details, but even in their typical character; there is paganism in our Christian world, there is presumption and treachery in the hosts of progress; on the other hand, social conservativism has a relationship to sobriety and awareness of grim truths, and even the fascist systems of power are not without all rational meaning in that they answer certain needs and deal with certain alternatives. However, with the racial creed, a stage of maximum tension between spiritual conceptions of ultimate significance is attained. For here political counter-revolution sets out to get an iron hold over the very essence of Man.

But it is high time to descend to a more empirical field of research. Crudely speaking, the term "Race" can suggest either of the following, more direct, meanings and connotations:

(1) Generally, a "type" or "kind" of man (Menschenschlag). "Schlag" corresponds to the Greek τός, a coinage, as it were, "beaten" or "dubbed", a "shape" (Gestalt), a Platonic "concrete idea", an "embodiment of value", in the sense that the value could not be grasped or defined without reference to the embodiment. Men are universally fond of such historical and traditional incarnations, and could certainly never wholly dispense with them. The English or the Japanese "gentleman", the French democratic "Jacobin", the Prussian "official", the Russian Communist "Comrade", and so forth, all represent, in a way, such concrete "value types", contrary to the "abstract" ideals of, say, "veracity", "clemency", "chivalry", "justice", "knowledge", "efficiency", etc., implied in the former in various manners and proportions. The reader might
well recall here the Rosenbergian doctrine of "Myth and Type", the irrational worship of a "peculiar shape", the "We" experience, the Bund principle, the sacredness and privileges attributed to arteigen (congenial, affinitive) leadership.

(2) There is a tendency to have the Type or Shape identified with or symbolized by "blood". Man in his concrete peculiarity, man envisaged in his determination by fate and his automatic dispositions rather than in his liberty and rationality, his moral relationships, his tasks and pursuits, etc., man seen from "within" or rather "behind", is likely to be referred to especially under the aspect of his physique. Both his bodily characteristic and the fact of his descent are thereby indicated. Here the idea of nobility in a broader sense covers the idea of race in a broader sense. A strictly "materialistic" conception is by no means necessarily involved; the "soul" is imagined as an indwelling twin brother, a reflection, a corresponding partner rather than a mere function of the body. Certainly the bodily circumstances have the advantage of being more visible and verifiable; on the other hand, the body itself is thought of as an image of the deeper "essence", a manifestation of the "blood" rather than its own master in the sovereignty of its needs.

(3) Dealing with race in the sense of the well-known anthropological classification, popularly expressed by the colour of the skin, means entering (or approaching) the realm of natural science. This most basic and most obvious side of the racial phenomenon occupies the Nazi mind for the purpose of stressing "inferiority" of the Black race, which is adapted as an argument against the French who receive Negroes into their national community. It is also used to solicit the sympathy of American racial nationalists.

(4) A similar meaning of race, but applied to a smaller scale and thereby modified in other directions as well, relates to various racial materials and features within the great Races, particularly within the White or Caucasian Race inhabiting Europe. Günther and Clauss, with some pretensions to impartial research and with the object of providing a "natural" substructure for German nationalism, have classified such "races" as are still supposed to have definite and elemental distinctive properties, both anatomical and psychological. Their names are:
“Nordic” (the noblest one), with its stocky variation Daelic or Vaelic; “Westic” or Mediterranean; “Ostic” or Alpine or Turanian (the most vulgar and most inclined to pettiness), with its robust Northern variation “Ost-Baltic”; Dinaric or Balkanic; Oriental (in some ways an Eastern pendant of the slim “Westic”); Pre-Asiatic or Alarodic (in some ways an inferior counterfeit of the Dinaric); this compound being further seasoned with Mongoloid and especially Negroid ingredients.

The Teutons are endowed with a Nordic, the Latins with a “Westic” élite; the Dinaric element is common among Bavarians, Austrians, Croats; the “Ost-Baltic” are at home in the North-East; Jews have a high ratio of “Pre-Asiatic” substance, to which is added the finer “Oriental” and occasionally the “Negroid” type; the “Ostic” rank and file abound in most regions, not in the Teutonic North, but to a large degree in France.

(5) Certain ethnological prototypes, fixed at primitive or rather semi-primitive stages of civilization, have given rise to much theorizing, particularly by the “Zones of Culture” School (Kulturkreislehre) founded by the monastic community of St. Gabriel near Vienna (the Professors W. Schmidt and W. Koppers). The three ethnological prototypes of culture, which term embraces the organization of family, the method of providing for food, religion, mental characteristics, etc., are not called “races” proper, and overlap racial divisions. Yet it is hard to overlook a common ideological tendency between racialism and the Kulturkreis theory. The latter, too, makes a point of disproving any scheme of a unitarian evolution of mankind, although it derives the three types from a common ancestral form (rather “superior”) and allows for important intermediate forms. The patriarchal master type, once associated with pasturage, endogamic marriage and great families, monarchical mythology, a taste for organic hierarchy, etc., is prevalent among the Teutons; it is the nearest to the “normal” original form of God-fearing mankind. The matriarchal feministic type (cf. peaceable disposition, primitive agriculture, mother goddesses and pantheistic tendencies), has contributed to the formation of the Slavs. The “totemistic” type (cf. exogamic marriage, securing food by hunting, religious self-identification with totem animals, and a leaning towards materialism, mechanism, artificial patterns, town civilization, rigid individualism)
is largely present in the Latin world; naturally it is most liable to cause trouble. (Consult Seifert’s book on “World revolutionaries”.)

(6) In some contexts, race means just the racial character of the *Volk*; *Volkstum* (or, more neatly defined, *Volkheit*, nationhood) seen in its suffusion by a peculiar composition of “blood”. It is this signification which people have in mind when speaking of “German race”, “Jewish race”, and the latter’s alleged poisonousness for the former. Thus may Germano-Jewish intermarriage or erotic intercourse be dubbed “racial disgrace”. Here “race” corresponds to *Art* (Kind) proper to an ethno-national unity, with a view to its supposed dependence on racial “blood” factors.

(7) Categories like “Aryan” and “Semitic” are not racial in the more exact ethnological use of that term. They rest on a compound of linguistic, historical, racial, religious and political data and correlations. The Nazi mind bears little grudge against the Magyars and even the Japanese for not being “Aryans”; it bears no ill-will to the Arabs for being “Semites”. It is almost the sole purpose of these polemic doctrines to give an air of scientific validity to the disqualification of Jews, in the second place of Negroes, and occasionally of Christian orthodoxy. The metaphysical poetry created by the “Indo-Aryan” imagination is sometimes contrasted with the furious formalism and dogmatism ascribed to the “Semitic” mind. The motif of the one-time subjugation of the original inhabitants of India by the racially superior Aryan “master men” may play some further part.

(8) Important from the racial point of view is the idea of *biological fitness* guaranteed by the soundness of germ substance, and the rationality, reasonableness and justification of eugenic schemes and measures. The knowledge of race as the fundamental factor of human and national life points the way to considerations and measures in the service of the nation’s biological qualities. Here the aspect of a universally arguable system of values and qualifications takes precedence of the aspect of “peculiarity”. Undeniably there is a point of contact with the Left-wing ideologies of naturalism, socialism, and eugenics: man is made an object of breeding, of biological planning, of hygienic regulation and a policy of rational direction. Naturally, these tendencies flow with the tide of nationalism, militarism, servil-
ism and racial mysticism. The guiding conception is not to make man the master of his fate (an idea which is questionable enough in its general scientific and very largely pseudo-scientific manifestations), but to cajole Fate into making one set of men the master of the world.

(9) The desideratum of racial purity belongs mainly to the mystical side. It subserves the creed of human inequality, of the disruption of mankind, and of an isolated existence of nations as particular “Wholes”. Even though the standard of purity prompts its believer to respect a “pure” race other than his own, and to prefer entire “strangers” to “half-castes”, it forms a dialectical preamble (in so far as it reflects the denial of humanity) to the establishment of qualitative degrees in the scale of races. There is no reason why one “pure” race should necessarily be like another in value, whether or not this be due to the comparative degree of purity in its final crystallization.

(10) Racial hierarchy, both as a natural phenomenon and an ideological directing rule for national policy, marks the culmination of racialist thought, the very raison d’être of the introduction of race into politics. Mystical, fatal, unanalysable, God-willed “superiority of substance” provides the ultimate and unchallengeable argument for imperialistic and dictatorial claims in their mutual connection. Racial hierarchy means a spiritual imposition on mankind of its very negation; it means the rejection of universal standards in the sense of “ourselves” being substituted for them. This actual extension of the tribal scope, this interpretation of the “Universe of the Particular” as a Universe embracing all those outside “us”, certainly has its dangers, for it is liable to provoke a demand for objective test and discussion. Any hint of “our” superiority in regard to any universally appreciated principle of value may be turned into an acknowledgment of such principles in general, and rouse the desire to inquire whether “our” superiority on that point, and other points, too, is really beyond doubt. Yet the grand thing is precisely to elevate “ourselves” into an obligatory standard for all, in the sense of a daemonic spell; “our” virtues and achievements, as far as they are expressible in terms of universal value-concepts, are merely signs, not criteria, of the essential and evident superiority that belong to “us” directly, independent of any demonstrable spheres in which “we” may excel.
The following Nazi utterances are chosen to illustrate above all the general attention paid to Race, the aspect of Type comprising the essence of man in its entirety. We shall then have to turn to the dominant special themes of purity, hierarchy, breeding, and the Jewish counter-race.

Two "loyal" Catholics open the proceedings. Stonner, declaring that German character rests on the racial stock, calls Professor W. Schmidt (the Austrian priest-explorer) as a witness to the fact that "a solid science of race and a special care for race" are urgent matters. We must be anxious to have the "right and sound ancestral heritage". Stonner is nothing if not thorough; he would not rest until he proved the importance of race to be the gospel truth in the literal sense of the word. He shows that Christ, when enacting Incarnation, did not overlook racial aspects: "the Son of God deliberately incorporated Himself into the blood-inheritance of His Volk", keeping up full participation in this Volk's life. The logic of Rosenberg, for instance, has a slightly different turn; he would not so easily compare Jewish with German "blood" and "Volk", and he bestows considerably less sympathy upon the Saviour's racial connections. Another of our Catholic victims, Taeschner, emphasizing the racial basis of national character, asserts that the quality of man is determined by his blood and the quality in its turn determines his spiritual world as well as the laws governing his will. "Thus it is that identity of blood results in identity of intellectual and moral notions." Unity of blood vouches for the unity of persuasions which is needed by a nation.

Race comprises human type, character, quality, coinage, etc., as an insoluble complex: such is the outlook painted by Professor Krieck. A "racial style of the conduct of life", extending even to standard and style of living, must be our objective. "Personal character, too, rests on the racial mode of valuation in regard to everything man is anxious to avoid and to fight." What we call race is the typical attitude prevailing in a given specimen of humanity in its entirety, an attitude directed towards certain values and tied to certain constant and hereditary features. In other words, it means "the total type of the mode of existence and conduct in a man". Racial community is more than a correspondence of such qualities in a multitude of men; it amounts to a "confirmed circle of kinship", a "superior unit
of life"). Moreover, the philosophic creed of Race has a claim

to a sort of primeval, religious dignity, by no means dependent
on corroboration by scientific research with its chancy and
changing results. "How far the science of race has already pro-
gressed in accounting for the reality and importance of race is not
a question of decisive order." A statement of exquisite out-
spokenness and a dangerous admission, but with Krieseck and
some of his most intelligent fellow-partisans I believe that the
main tenor of the Nazi idea of race does not stand or fall with
the concomitant biological speculations pretending to "scien-
tific exactitude". It is the principle of anti-humanitarian
Gentilism, of anti-Liberal Fatalism, of anti-Christian Naturalism,
of anti-rational Inequality that matters, not the magic of cranial
ciphers which at their very best may serve as secondary indices of
racial distinctions. "Correctness" in the racial sense will require
men to acknowledge the value of such indices rather than to possess
physically the preferred ones. I am only giving here the gist of
a shrewd observation of Dingrâve: the corporeal signs of racial
quality are of unquestionable value, but it is men's "inner
assent" to them, tested and tried, rather than their physical
application which is the criterion of their fitness. We may also
say that Naziism is primarily an affair of believers in race, and
only secondarily an affair of bearers of race.

Man's spirit is ennobled by the "constitution of his blood"
(Darré). Whereas Italian fascist nationalism chiefly turns on the
Roman ideas of state-power and discipline, French nationalism
on the mystery of la terre (?), English nationalism on the self-
sovereignty of "society", German nationalism is specially
centred in the idea and the feeling of Blood (Rosenberg). "Soul"
is nothing but race, seen from within; and "race" merely the
outward aspect of the soul. Racial history embodies at once
natural history and the mystery of the soul. . . . "The history of
the religion of Blood . . . the world-story of the ups and downs
of nations, of their heroes and thinkers, of their inventors and
artists." The issue between Blood and its environment, between
Blood and Blood, is the ultimate phenomenon reached by our
understanding, with no accessible background to inquire into.
"Man's beliefs are moulded in the image of man's nature."
Professor Schulze-Soelde pretends to borrow the idea of a secret
union between the character of blood and the character of
thought and emotion from Heraclitus. “We,” alone, he says, can really understand “ourselves”; a foreigner may study us in a more unprejudiced manner, but his vision necessarily remains alien, for he is alien. A real inner perception demands a “subjective, existential participation in the object of vision”; only a “nation-bound outlook on life” is really full of meaning. (Man is dissolved and locked up in the tribal Self!)

Spengler, the Prussian Caesarist, holds himself aloof from the tenets of racial orthodoxy. For him, race is just “grand form” in the sense of sporting achievements; his view on the subject is best rendered by the English pun that Race quite properly reveals itself in racing. The race one has is the password of distinction; the race one “belongs to” is a mere label of zoological classification. Still, none can doubt the fundamental similarity on hearing words like these: “There is no such thing as Man pure and simple, an object for the ranting of philosophers; there are only men of a time, a place, a race, a personal character, fighting a given world to conquer or to succumb.” The tradition of noble race is stored up in kingship, aristocracy, and the military caste. Grandeur of attitude, particularly when holding a forlorn hope, is tantamount to “having race.” Real, “lived” race is also conditioned by hard selection owing to the adversities of life, disaster, illness, war. As we see, Spengler remains faithful to the “beast-of-prey” aspect of Naturalism, and is farthest removed from the “feminine”, as it were the “botanical”, pole.

There are more protests raised against racial “materialism” by authors who otherwise swim with the Neo-German tide. Thus Hielscher, the ecstatic visionary of the Reich of Power and Inwardness, condemns as “entirely materialistic” the racial doctrine in its whole purport, including the element of “mental criteria”; nay, it is mere sawdust from the “Western” machinery of thought, lacking the “Imperial” faith. “Lineage is not a question of descent but of mental attitude.” We would not, however, be wrong in supposing Hielscher to be an eccentric rather than a real heretic of the racial creed; he is so much in love with the grand shape and the unique Empire that all stress laid on their more technical paraphernalia jars on his nerves. The divergence does not affect the essential meaning; it seems to be inherent in the distance between separate functions sub-
servient to the same cause. The aesthete, walking in the clouds, sneers at the practical necessity for political discrimination, pseudo-scientific thumb-rules, and demagogic exhortations. Yet his own existence ranks among the practical necessities of the “total” movement; one must build castles in Spain that a hundred may build barracks in Prussia and studs to provide for to-morrow’s barracks. The same reflection applies to Stefan George, who, sad to relate, died dissatisfied with the beginnings of the Third Empire, or to Nietzsche who actually disliked his co-nationals and whose torture in Hell may be supposed to consist only of incessant contemplation of the surprisingly rich crops borne by his seed. In fact, I know Stefan Georgean and “youthist” German emigrants who violently detest Naziism and yet share more in its substance than the great mass of its admirers and toadies.

Professor Voegelin, a fascist savant of rare acumen and coolness, though he views the great “drift” towards race with a keen interest suffused with sympathy, also laments the “lapse into materialism” which marks the present-day theory of race. He even scourges the latter with the most odious of all accusations, reproaching it for being a “mass ideology analogous to Liberalism and Socialism”. Even if it no longer believes in the fallacy of an equality of all men, it still believes in the hardly less fallacious dogma of an “equality between all bearers of a certain complex of bodily properties”. Even a race-bound democracy of this kind threatens to “deprive the State of historical meaning and surrender it to the mass, to destroy both historical substance and the Paragon Man in his force as a creator of community”. We may trust Voegelin’s pessimism to be ungrounded; the bulk of the Nazis certainly do not dream of an equality between racial fellows. However, the author does useful cleansing work in his own camp. The fetish-worship of anatomic “indices” is mercilessly scattered by a master stroke like this: “An ‘empirical science’ which would, as it were, explain to us that the Mind is not what it reveals itself to be in our direct experience of it, is not a completion of our knowledge of the Mind but a collection of erroneous judgments at variance with our everyday experience of spiritual reality”. This will finally dispose of the crudest forms of racial superstition; it does not interfere in the slightest degree with the
central meaning of racial religion. Voegelin proves to be, not an opponent, but a censorious pedagogue of the "Nordic" racial movement. He comments upon the inexactitude of racial formulae stated in terms of "natural science", their uselessness for concrete social and historical orientation; but he is far from rejecting the central idea of man's spiritual essence being embodied in his vital nature and qualities. He is ready to endorse the "new experience of harmonic unity between Leib, Seele, Geist", symbolized in the consciousness of "blood", an idea incompatible, as he rightly remarks, with the Western ideas of national societies which are due to a process of differentiation and secularization undergone by the Christian idea of spiritual community. The Germanic world, he says, has never developed an analogous example of "man political"; the racial conception, with its roots stretching back far into the past century, is essentially the organ of a German mental revolt against the Western order of human life and fellowship. If Voegelin is too much aloof to set down the preferability of the Neo-German Leib-Seele conception in so many words, he at any rate claims legitimacy for "several prototypic modes of vision", "several standard images of man", thus giving to the racial Wende (crisis, turning, new phase) at least a relative justification from a Germanic, non-Western, non-Christian point of view. There is no point in enforcing an "objective" decision; the "evidence of vision" is everything. This seemingly impartial position well-nigh involves a tacit leaning towards the racial side! The reason is that, whereas the Christian standpoint in the broadest sense of the term postulates a spiritual unity of mankind, a universal validity of spiritual standards (the "secularized" nations being still built upon an emphatic reference to a unitarian spiritual world of mankind), the pagan Leib-Ideen affirm from the outset a diversity of human types qua diversity of natural forms, including all mental aspects, without the background of a common spiritual charter of mankind; hence they are fully in tune with the author's own relativistic and pluralistic position. Besides, Voegelin by no means unwisely holds that the principles of community are generally in need of some kind of concrete tokens, Leibideen: consider the idea of Incarnation and of the Mystical Body of Christ in the Christian religion. But he is no less right in adding that "the idea of the Mystical Body"
(arising not from an experience of various natural shapes but from the credence in Our Lord as a living point of intersection between the supernatural Spirit and terrestrial mankind) "could not be further removed from any of the biological and organic doctrines of community professed in our time". This differentiation applies equally to Spann's semi-Hegelian fascist "deduction" of national society from the notion of the "organic Whole", and to the racial Leibideen of Gebliti (blood constitution).

As to Spann’s own appreciation of race, which will hardly overcome the confirmed distrust of Nazi orthodoxy, his words on race as a "purity of style in the manifested image", a "spiritual concept", an "ever-present example" are quoted as a non-materialistic possibility by Voegelin. However, the genuine Nazis may not be entirely on the wrong track in being suspicious of Spann’s cheap contempt for matter and the barren ubiquity of his totalitarian construction. On the other hand, Kurt Hildebrandt (in "State and Race"), a Stefan Georgean aesthete and student of Plato, shows great resolution in warding off the accusation of "materialism". The mind is not a mere function of bodily configuration; but in envisaging man as a concrete and typical reality we must also, besides "Spirit", take account of his body, the "palpable bearer of spiritual qualities" and of "Blood", as the other pole of the formative inner tension, man being also the "noblest animal" according to Plato. Some lovers of ancient Greece will presumably protest that Plato is misquoted here, or misinterpreted, or at least interpreted with a false accent; I should prefer to admit that on this issue I disagree with Plato. For the rest, not only am I inclined to believe that what is really essential in man is infinitely far removed from animal nature, however noble, but I am also very much in doubt whether man, inasmuch as he is an animal, is or is destined to be the "noblest".

In its final result, we feel inclined to see in the new Gospel of Race a new appeal to man for obedience to those secrets and necessities of biological nature that stand over and above the schemings of his intellect, beyond the presumptuous reach of his reason. Thus racialism extends the line of counter-revolution far down into regions below politics proper; it fixes firmly the fundamental meaning of fascism in the substructure of human
nature underlying the edifice of society. This has been signally understood by Fülöp-Miller, a literary rather than politically minded observer, impartial rather than unimpassioned, whose vision scarcely pretends to exactness but by no means lacks perspicacity: "Nature protects her last secret by the inviolable seal of Race, which can never be forced by the unnerving action of Reason"... Race, a mystical, super-individual principle. ... "To regain contact with this secret of form, which Nature herself has set up, to reconstruct Nation and State on the foundation of this very secret, such is the design of the men in Germany who stood up against the unity of mankind proclaimed by Reason, and countered the ideal of a universal 'humanity' with the new ideal of Gloria Sanguinis." We often meet with the principle of "respect for Fate" in Nazi, indeed, in Nationalist and Conservative literature of the more thorough and philosophical kind. Spengler is more than infatuated with Nietzsche's Amor Fati. The catchword of "heroic realism" demands from us strenuous activity at the behest of national "life-will", a destiny of greatness and, possibly, death, against which there is no appeal. Moeller-Bruck wants national problems to be envisaged in awareness of "tragic fatality", cleansed of the shallow optimism underlying utilitarian arguments for progress. Even Scheler, in pleading for the cause of war, did not omit to mention that war was an imposition of fate, and that "to disregard fate was futile impertinence".

The great standard neo-German expert on Race and its national meaning, however, is Schemann, a writer of great learning who deals with his subject with almost touching piety and care. He is free from the fascist affection of blustering and malignant recklessness; a man to whom only a heartless and small-minded adversary would deny respect, nay, chivalrous appreciation.

Schemann frankly reveals the indelible antagonism between the spirit of racial hierarchy and the Christian mind. Christianity addressed the pagan world with a democratic and cosmopolitan appeal; indeed, it was probably "racial exhaustion" that called forth such spiritual movements, centring in the praise of unworldliness and renunciation, as were Buddhism, the Stoa and Christianity alike (?) . The West was led to adopt the Charter of the Christian faith: Mankind is of one blood; every man is of
divine breed. St. Augustine, too, laid stress on the unity and universal affinity of all human beings, the comparative irrelevance of national diversities. The Fathers still followed the Roman usage of apostrophizing the Teutons as "barbarians"; they were unaware of "the gold that flowed through Teutonic veins," and also of the fact that the Roman civilization had itself been the product of a nobler blood that, by the time they came to live, had ceased to exist. Nevertheless, the message of Christ could not alter the racial heterogeneity of the world, and therefore failed to lay the foundations of a universal Empire Spiritual. On the contrary, the life of the Church soon began to develop signs of racial differentiation; the Latin, Byzantine and Nordic branches of Christendom are traceable to different racial stocks, nor could Church leaders resist the necessity of compromising with racial claims of seclusion and aristocracy. The pagan opponents of Christianity were wont to fight its universalist tendencies; thus Julian the Apostate connected up the worship of national deities with the belief in national inequality and particular human varieties of an eternal character, originating in as many ancestors.

Race is thus defined by Schemann: "By race we mean a definite psycho-physical type which is common to a larger—national (Volks-) or tribal (Stammes-) circle of men, and maintains itself by hereditary descent". The racial point of view may preferably be applied either to the aspect of ancestry, or to the aspect of the future. Racial orientation requires a trained intuitive sense; Arndt spoke of Rassenspürsinn (sense of racial "scenting"). Racial consciousness is strongest where race and nationality still cover each other; in other circumstances the national feeling frequently does duty for an obscured consciousness of race (!). The Germans as a rule have but little of both (?); it is a consolation that those who do possess them do so in a very high degree. Schemann is inclined to acknowledge the spiritual and even the subjective factors. He honestly admits that it is doubtful whether a hierarchy of races can be established by science; but the idea as an emotional force must be left to the individual. . . . (And what if the "individual" happens to read this?) "One is in possession of as much race as one is conscious of". The consciousness, of course, may also embrace, among its objects, the current bodily characteristics. Races are
endowed with "personality". It is hardly possible to pursue racial policies except on a national basis; indeed, the racial idea is destined "to revive the aristocratic instincts of peoples". Still, Schemann is far from advocating the belief in corporeal race as a conscious trick of deceptive tactics; he has great trust in the joint presence of psychological and physical raciness. "Laws natural and laws spiritual cannot, after all, be too much at variance with one another". The same fundamental forms of vision apply to the knowledge of nature and the knowledge of the mind. We may see in a race a means of interlacement between the two. "Man as a spiritual being can only be comprehended on the ground of a previous comprehension of his racial and natural roots". The current accusation of "materialism" should be addressed to Providence itself (Schemann writes Weltordnung), which is responsible for man having a double nature. On the whole, mental processes and intellectual achievements are attuned to the Blood. It is the Blood that provides a measuring-rod for the classification, the grading, the appreciation as it were, of the individuals. This high significance of blood does not detract (?) from man's moral and mental dignity; we must till the soil of matter in order to force our supreme spiritual harvest. After such exhausting reflections Schemann ventures to set down the grand article of faith: "Race is the alpha and omega of the life of nations in its entirety". An unswerving admirer of Count Gobineau, he recalls this most suggestive picture of civilization given by Boisjolins, one of the latter's pupils: "Series de formules inégaless dont chacune est due à la tendance innée d’une race". To which we find added: "Chaque race est véritablement une nouvelle humanité". Further, "race is to civilization what the brain is to thought". It is true that Gobineau, who was a Catholic, stuck to a clausula for the benefit of libre arbitre (free will), and so did Tocqueville, even more energetically; here Schemann feels bound to disagree. In his view, races and nations, like individuals, are subject to determinism without reserve.
5. RACIAL PURITY

“Ye shall not pollute your bodies
With women of an alien order.”

Stefan George.

The dialectics of tribal pride imply tribal exclusiveness, and that very exclusiveness is also likely to produce a false sense of magnanimous fairness. The original distinction of masters and slaves is open to the danger of becoming functional: masters and slaves might appear to be organic limbs of a comprehensive community residing in the slaves as well as in the masters, and therefore portending a gradual assimilation of the slaves to the masters. Through the very fact of sensing and acknowledging the superiority of the higher type, the lower type achieves a step upwards, and an unpleasant odour of equality begins to mingle with the atmosphere enveloping them both. To stress the aspect of basic dissimilarity and isolation, even though fraught with the opposite danger of introducing equality on the strength of mutual alienness, may provide a healthy counter-blast to such an evolution. The sterile equality of incommensurable “worlds”, of disconnected “races”, each with its own “purity”, may again be upset at will, if need be, by the dominant ideologies of racial hierarchy and the Nation as a subjective “Absolute” which is binding for every individual. Endeavouring to confirm men in their pride at not being swine, in their resolution to rule and exploit swine without relaxing into any association of fusion with them, we may even concede the swine a correlative pride in not being men. For the most part, the doctrine of “purity” is inextricably bound up with a determination to exalt “Teutons” or “Aryans” or any such “races” whose gain may indirectly score for the Germans, but occasionally the “aliens” are characterized as “different” rather than inferior, value being placed in the abstract fact of racial selfhood rather than in a given race held to be preferable.

Houston Stewart Chamberlain, the Englishman whose ghost, together with the shadows of the Frenchman Gobineau, the half-Pole Nietzsche, the Rhenish “Roman” Stefan George and the Jewish prigs around him, and of Baltic Rosenberg and
Austrian Hitler fed on Mussolinian glories, has shaped the Third Empire, sees in history a struggle between light and darkness, meaning the struggle between "racial individuality" and "racial chaos". The absence of an organic order of race involves moral and spiritual dissolution. For, the reader may recall our description of racial fatalism versus rational and forward-looking thought, "he who comes from nowhere is also bound for no goal". A nation is only a real nation by dint of a racial coinage; otherwise, it is a mere crowd of men artificially united. "Shape" and "heap" are the great terms of contradiction. The racial chaos of the Roman Empire was challenged by the racial genius of the Teutons, with whom disorder was merely a superficial feature limited to political conditions. The emergence of separate nations from the whirlpool of the Middle Ages, where the golden flow of Teutonism had been so completely swamped beneath the débris of the Roman pig-sty, marks the victorious dawn of a new day. Blood community carries in it the genuine community of creed, which is also fostered by common memories, but cannot be superseded by an imposition of "mere abstract ideals". For a real creed, formative of man, has nothing to do with personal captice; it is inherent in a demonstrable law of nature. The character of personality itself is determined by race.

The Jews occupy a special position in the scale of racial purity and impurity. They cause a systematic difficulty, true to their general habit, which must be met by a special theory. On the one hand, they are of the greatest importance as an unceasing and omnipresent antagonist of the Aryan race; they could not very well be dispensed with. Moreover, it would really appear that they persevered rigidly throughout the ages as a religious duty and a human "type". According to thesis, no Jewish religion could exist and with such constancy at that, if there were not also a Jewish nation. Thus the Jews cannot simply be classed under the phenomenon of racial chaos; the less so because they actually observe "laws of the blood". Even so far as they intermarry with "Goyim", they only sacrifice their daughters (!). On the other hand, it would be funny if the Jews turned out to be just as fine a race as the Aryans or the Teutons, representing side by side with them racial exclusiveness and crystallization against racial chaos and mongrelism. Let me hasten to free the
reader from suspense by adumbrating Chamberlain's masterly solution of the difficulty. The Jews are a permanent race; yet, at the same time they are definitely bastardized through the admixture of aboriginal racial elements far too distant and heterogeneous, mainly Bedouins and Syrians. This permanent racial breach, as permanently conserved by the stubborn vitality of the bastard type, also accounts for the Jewish stigma of a guilty conscience, which has invariably invaded Christian theology. The Jewish consciousness of sin relates to a very real fact: the "shame of blood" embodied in the historical event of tribal bastardization. In German, Blutschande is nearly always used metaphorically in the sense of incestuous union. It is the physical impurity of the type produced by improper mixture that is reflected in the religious complex of original sin. As to the reader's reaction, he will in fairness agree that, if so many German minds are tainted with madness, there is no reason why English ones should all be immune from it. Nor must we ever forget to look for a purposeful meaning, and even for scraps of truth or at least of sound analysis behind the dramatic evolutions of the neo-German heresy, even though they verge on manifest madness. The religion of the divine Race needs a chief adversary, a racial devil, the vigorous caricature of a race, to meet it on its own level and yet not on its own; there is sense in selecting the Jews for that honour (we shall hear a little more about that soon); there is certainly sense in inquiring into the thorny problem of the Jewish race or people (or whatever it is); there is even sense in the supposition that Judaism reveals a new and keener experience of moral conscience which may hang together, for all I know, with a weakening of biological self-security without a parallel evanescence of biological strength.

Chamberlain was a mellow Englishman tainted by noxious Germanic influences, and came to a great extent under the fraudulent spell of that considerable but unclean genius, Wagner; he was a true son of the mid-Victorian age, never really inhuman and seldom quite genuine; he was not only a personal friend of Kaiser Wilhelm II but had also something of the latter's watery semi-barbarism and unconvincing rage; behind him lingers the shade of the cultured and humane (if reactionary and effete) French aristocrat who was doomed by a cruel fate to forge some of the most effective spiritual weapons.
for megalomaniac German plebeians bent on destroying the greatness of his country. Haiser has a different mental style. He, for one, no longer flounders in the dregs of the “European” outlook or humanitarian tradition. He even deprecates talent for languages other than one’s own, for he considers them incompatible with what he calls “style” and “hardness”. Unlike Chamberlain, he condemns racial intermixture unconditionally; mix two different races of supreme nobility, and a nondescript mongrel will result. Aversion to alien races is as inherent in nature, and as justified, as is aversion to contaminated meat. May we interpose a question: Does contaminated meat reciprocate the aversion? One final utterance which needs no comment: “Thou shalt treat alien blood, no matter if it speaks thy tongue and has adopted thy religion, as outside the bonds of Good and Evil; thou shalt not practise tolerance, lest thou be disgraced in thy honour.”

Passing to Hitler does not imply leaving this mental world. He, too, praises the “generally valid instinct of racial purity in nature”; we may vividly conjure the image of his grim smile when writing down the exemplary truth that “foxes are hardly subject to fits of humaneness in dealing with geese”. True! By the way, has the author ever heard of foxes caught in snares? Hitler, however, is an impatient politician who has no time for scientific niceties and pseudo-objective decency. For him, “different” races come directly under the aspect of “higher” and “nether” ones; nor does he seem to take the trouble to distinguish what is “higher” from what is just “stronger”. The guiding view-point “We who are out to beat, to scatter, to enslave them” is so transparent in these speculations about race as to acquire a trace of touching innocence. We are told that “Nature wishes” no mating between “weaker” and “stronger” individuals, “much less” a fusion of “higher” with “lower” races, lest “the work of breeding higher types, which has cost thousands of years, should be undone again at a blow”. All racial crossing results in lowering the level of the higher race, both as to bodily and mental qualities. The bastard progeny of such a wedlock will “stand between” the two levels, but the purist would place him even lower than the inferior parent, and he will finally succumb “in the struggle with this higher element”. Tall, sandy, brawny Scot, do not stoop to marry a
little, black, nervy Welshwoman in defiance of the instinct of nature, whatever be the sinister enticement urging you to do so! But if you do, be sure that the offspring of your unlucky match will be himself little better than the inferior object of your choice; finally, he will succumb in the struggle—be it a hand-to-hand fight for life or an inheritance suit—with the unalloyed young Highlanders of your original family. At any rate, your apparent hopes of creating a precedent for turning the Welsh into Scots by the rosy weapons of love will be cruelly deceived. "Such a combination is contrary to Nature's will to breed out superior life." What, then, is agreeable to her will? "It is not the union of superiors with inferiors, it is the complete victory of the former, that forms the necessary condition. . . . The stronger One must rule (herrschen), he must by no means merge together with the weaker One, thus sacrificing his own greatness." Such are the laws of "upward evolution"; the weakling alone may deem them cruel.

The aspect of relativism, mutual estrangement, and a vegetative pacifism (as it were) is carried furthest by L. F. Clauss, the artistic visionary of "racial souls" on the basis of Günther's earthlier anthropological studies. Clauss nearly intoxicates himself with the idea of mutual "non-understanding" between races. A Nordic and an "Ostic" ("Turanic") partner may, according to certain whimsical laws of heredity, beget in marriage a Nordic boy and a Turanic girl who, despite being brother and sister, will be absolute strangers to each other; one will not understand a single thought or emotion of the other. "Around each soul, a different world. . . ." Nay, the racial cleavage may also split across one and the same soul. Or again, there are "blonde, lithe souls" in an alien frame, souls which cry for a "blonde, lithe body, too". Perhaps Herr Goebbels is alluded to, who is very swarthy and thin rather than lithe. Undeniably Clauss takes great pains to find out the specific values of the non-Nordic races, and he strictly refuses to acknowledge typical Nordic estimates as obligatory for all mankind. And yet, this strictness has a flaw, as we shall see in a moment, and I must confess, it is an excitingly interesting, in some way again a touching sight to see the way in which this aesthetic relativism tilts over into pan-Nordic imperialism, tossed helplessly on the horns of the logical dilemma. Be that as it may, it
would be unfair to call Clauss dishonest when he depicts, besides the Nordic virtues of heroism, activism, extroversion, constructivism, service, conquest, etc., the "Turanic" qualities of "living in the things", "absorption", contemplative wisdom, selfless communion, or the "Westic" (Mediterranean) ambition of clarity and perfection, or the "Dinaric" race's fighting stubbornness, or even the "Pre-Asiatic" ("Aradotic") desire for redemption and salvation. The Teuton, he says, is today searching for the boundaries of his essence though not of his power. An unselective reception of alien elements causes our own essence to fall into splinters. The particles no longer understand one another. "Where understanding dwindles, community also disappears, and where community is dead, there can be no culture either." "Research work on the boundaries of the soul is today an historical vocation." We realize that here a very different meaning is attached to "boundaries" than the one to which we are accustomed. Our liberal and humanitarian thought, in its Christian as well as in its Bolshevist branch, and even in some of its Imperialist transmodifications, approves of boundaries within the sphere of "understanding"; racial metaphysics envision boundaries as Chinese walls marking down the line where "understanding" ends. We love boundaries in their function of district frontiers, lines of subdivision; they love boundaries in the sense of the outlines of a "living shape." (Rosenberg). Respect for such boundaries depends exclusively and unilaterally on the "inner laws of development" of the "living organism" which is an Absolute for itself (cf. the following references to Clauss).

We know that Professor Voegelin, that shrewd thinker of a counter-revolutionary society whose greatness is only partially due to his stupendous erudition, has two supports for his construction: he always stays at a certain refined distance from passionate partisanship. This may be the inner reason for his external choice of Austrian fascism in preference to the Nazi Empire. Voegelin remains faithful to the relativist version. He disagrees with any evaluation of races according to their "capacity for culture." Certainly Hitler would feel snubbed when reading this. "He is spiritually gifted for this culture", in reference to the "Nordic" theories that "Nordic" man is "specially gifted for culture." (The italics are in the original.)
We can merely call the non-Nordic elements more or less gifted, or entirely ungifted, for the Nordic type of civilization; that the Nordic race is the most gifted for its own culture is hardly more than a tautology. Now, if this condemns Voegelin in Hitler’s eyes, it does not by any means acquit him in ours. He insists on a scientific position, but he leaves no doubt that he is the scientific interpreter of racial metaphysics, in opposition to Christian and rationalist humanism. The very last words we have just quoted prove it. In so far as he is on bad terms with official Naziism, he is not the only man to incur such misfortune through stating Nazi Weltanschauung too intelligently. Of course, he is an academic aristocrat, with unmistakable signs of an Anglo-Saxon training, and is in some sense “above” racial subjectivity; but he is by no means above racial subjectivism and the spirit of mutually alien “cultures”. In an academic seminary, he would object to establishing “Nordic values” as an absolute; but his whole diction proves that he would hardly object to imbuing the “Nordic” masses with what he, on the plane of science, dismisses as a deception.

Rosenberg is positive about the unshakable connection between racial character and the definite ideal in which men believe. Only pure-bred man can be relied upon to possess a characteristic and living morality; “man’s creed is like man himself”. Peoples endowed with a sound constitution of blood are exempt from the nebulous illusions of individualism and universalism. Thus racial breeding is supposed to determine even the content of man’s emotions and beliefs. Different races must have different morals, but it seems as though these different moralities had a most important and valuable element in common, if only the formal conditions of racial “purity” and “soundness” are secured.

It surprises us more—and yet it has a deeper foundation—that Klages, the philosopher of “biocentric” emotionalism, feminism and anti-rationalism, should have given such poignant expression to racial convictions long before they became fashionable and profitable. The “Letter on Ethics”, first published in 1918, comments upon the deterioration of mankind owing to “racial intermixture at an ever increasing rate”, accompanied by the necessary triumph of the worse side. “The slave type comes into existence everywhere through racial
mixture and blood deterioration; and the criminal type arises as its natural supplement." Though such views do not fit Klages's system of general "Life" philosophy directly, the general susceptibility of the German mind to this malady certainly does not exhaust their explanation. The hatred of reason, progress, and civilization with a spiritual order of humanity underlying it, may quite conceivably induce a mind to accept *types of biological nobility as distinctive value principles*, bewailing the assumed decay of those types resulting from the strides of "logocentric" civilization.

In the present context, Schemann refers to ancient Greece. He cannot fully approve the "one-sidedness" of the "Spartan ideal": the wholesale prohibition of marrying foreign women. "Wed nobles, and engender a noble breed!" Leonidas is reported to have said. On the whole, the psychological duality of the Greeks, for instance, the alternating victory of patriotic and treasonable instincts, "can be explained from their racial mixture"; roughly, we can distinguish something like "Aryan and Semitic Greeks" (?). Naturally, the cosmopolitan culture of Hellenism put an end to the perpetuation of racial character. Schemann indulges in a racial pessimism and scepticism that cannot but discourage his readers from too eager participation in the Nazi hopes. "Pure race", the point of departure for Mankind (?), the prize of glory, the Palladium of nations, has become rather an illusion, a fictitious attribute, in the manifold vicissitudes of history. Woltmann most intelligently defines the "feeling of racial purity" as an "effectual means of breeding, and a power of political efficacy". Happy times of "our youth", when the Romans admired the Teutons for being *tantum similes*, "so much like themselves", which is the sign of racial purity. Schemann heaves a melancholy sigh: "Often has pure race been claimed and sought after, but seldom confirmed". "In Spain, the absence of Jewish and Moorish blood in a man's veins amounted to a title of nobility." A mystical link is supposed to connect *nobility with purity*. The very word "caste", *gente casta* in Portuguese, suggests the idea of chastity. To-day (Schemann wrote this in 1928) racial feeling is only alive in the special group of "racial thinkers" and their circle of adherents, apart from a section of the aristocracy. Pure race is an "ideal of radiant glamour", but "difficult to realize in practice" At
the same time, the magnificent pageant of "nations creative of civilization" (Kulturvölker) was a sequel of "favourable crossings". Thus the concept of purity melts into the uncertainties now of "hierarchy", now of "breeding".

As has been said, a gloomy outlook prevails in Schemann's work. He is haunted by the spectacle of diminishing Aryans, and the approaching prospect of a mere remnant of "higher culture", a "museum piece". The coloured races are continually advancing. ... Nay, in the midst of all peoples an urge for "world-wide uniformity" seems to be at work. ... A vision painfully contradicting Hitler's "natural instinct of racial purity". Even amongst our scientists there are suicidal madcaps, like Ratzel (a noted geographer), who hasten ruin by proclaiming intolerably "the fusion of all mankind into a unity, as a goal, a task, an ideal, a hope". Others, like Rocholl, are sensible enough to fear levelling as an extinction of culture impulses. May the lovers of racial promiscuity cast a glance at the refuse born of racial crossing in Naples! This harping on the dark sides of a great Mediterranean seaport, which is said to have certain virtues, too, is, of course, astounding nonsense. In the same manner, the "lovers of promiscuity" could triumphantly point to incest and cretinism in endogamic Alpine countrysides.

6. RACIAL HIERARCHY

"Bad race can be known by its endeavour to raise itself through comparison with others, and to depress others through comparison with itself."

**Ernst Jünger** (1934)
(a great though disillusioned Nazi writer).

The birth of civilization (Kultur) is thus outlined by the vigorous pencil of Hitler:

Aryan tribes, after having subdued foreign populations, are inspired to construct a new social world, both under the stimulating influence of the new landscape and "favoured by the quantity of energy to hand supplied by inferior human material".
But for this "employment of men of a lower order", together with beasts of burden, the Aryan could never have laid the foundations for a higher culture to come. "It was not before the enslavement of subjected races that a similar status was also imposed on animals; to suppose an inverse order is erroneous. The plough was first drawn by conquered man, and he was succeeded by the horse." The Aryan "as a conqueror, subjugated inferior men, and subsequently regulated their practical activities under his own command, in conformity with his will and his purpose". Needless to say, the conquered fared well by such a course; they found themselves in a situation preferable to their previous "freedom". Then it came to pass that the Aryan abandoned the purity of his blood. . . . Decay, in manifold shapes, was the inevitable result. . . . However, what if a meddlesome reader raised the question: In what exactly did the "superiority" of the Aryan consist? Simply in being endowed with more bodily prowess, or more effective arms? By no means. Hitler does not baulk at the question; he has even a progressive answer in store for it. In fact, the Aryan's ancestral virtues were neither more nor less than a superior talent for citizenship. He practised "self-sacrifice for the community's sake"; "the fulfilment of his duties"; "public service in the place of self-sufficiency". "The fundamental persuasion that gives rise to such a type of action is called Idealism, as opposed to egoism or self-seeking. By that term we understand "the individual's capacity for sacrificing himself for the sake of the Whole, of his fellows". As we have seen in Chapter IV, such an "Idealism" in its deepest essence "suits the very intentions of Nature".

Whether this picture of early civilization and its underlying motive powers is reliable from the point of view of anthropological and historical truth, may be answered by competent authorities on the subject; my own unconcealed ignorance may be judged with clemency in view of the fact that it would scarcely be prudent of me to emulate Hitler in dealing with topics so far beyond the understanding of either. If I am rightly informed, his theory has met with criticism in the English world of science. But I may not be greatly mistaken if I say that we had better envisage the Hitlerian conception with our eye on the future rather than the past.

Anyhow, the Führer's story of Aryan civilization is fully en-
endorsed by Rosenberg. The eminent author of the “Myth” supports with Greek and especially Doric examples the theory about “harsh masters and warriors” who, having subjugated the original population, make them the servile instruments of their “creative spirit”. Nor must we leave Haiser’s apotheosis of “Slavery” out of account. We read there that the organization of labour, and civilization in general, is the product of a symbiosis between the “Nordic race of heroic character” as a ruling set, and the people of inferior race. The Noble type (Edeling) needs the Mean type (Gemeinling) as a performer of menial labours. The Noble himself is liable to degeneration, and should therefore submit to stern discipline (Sparta I); but work is not his appointed task. With remarkable swiftness Haiser projects the vision into the sphere of the political programme. We ought to think more of social aristocracy based on racial excellence, and less of national jealousies. Penitence and self-abnegation must be encouraged more than is the case at present, but—contrary to Christianity—not generally, only for the use of the mass; conversely, the super-man must develop increased self-consciousness. Let us create a new noblesse, thrusting back a large amount of undeserved prosperity into poverty and humiliation. Not a bad exposition of “social revolution” in its fascist sense! “I am out to extirpate and enslave the worthless, and to bring about the victory of the Nordic race.” The master man’s mode of living must be methodically transformed so as to make him fitter to exercise his mastery. “A generation is bound to come which will be cool in love, drink and business, but hot in hatred. Christianity, women, money and beer render the master man soft and cowardly.” Again and again, we gain the impression that there is ore in Haiser’s mine. The real and full meaning of the movement is best comprehended in his eccentric formulations.

A widely different spirit, and yet directed to the same end is revealed in the ethnological school, founded by monastic scholars such as Professors Schmidt and Koppers near Vienna, and commonly called Kulturkreislehre (theory of “Zones of civilization”), which has already been referred to in this chapter. Race as a biological fatality is not accepted. At the same time, much emphasis is laid on the fundamental divergence of mankind into three distinct “types”, originally derived from
acute and painstaking ethnographical descriptions, but soon betraying the features of "human typology" in general, indeed, a tripartite "racial" constitution of mankind, containing obvious analogies with the basic aspects and possibilities of human nature and social existence. We give some characteristics inherent in each of the three Types from *Völker und Kulturen* by Schmidt and Koppers: (1) *Patriarchal-endogamic Zone*. (The "zones" (*Kreise*), do not mean massive and constant geographic districts but rather social formations based, of course, on geographic differentiation.) The married sons keep within the paternal family clan. Pasturage as the main source of livelihood. Importance of virginity stressed—Monogamic and moderately polygamic relationships. Paternal powers. Privileges of first-born sons. Male superiority connected with the settler's mode of life. Justice expressed by direct retaliation. *Division of rich and poor* according to the number of cattle owned; *political inequality*; the endogamic marriage system corresponds to care given to *keeping the blood pure*. (2) *Matriarchal Zone*, with more and less exogamic varieties. Securing nourishment from agriculture. Maternal or avuncular headship of family. Real matriarchy prevails in the beginning; later on, a tendency to debase womanhood may get the upper hand. Agricultural activities introduced by woman; her predominance connected with the origins of rural property. Rites of initiation among adolescent girls; even male societies (*Männerbünde*) as in Type 8, depending on the exogamic structure of family. Rites tending to absurdity: *cowade* ("male pregnancy" ceremonies). (3) *Exogamic-Totemistic Zone*, the family being patriarchal but of diminished importance. Food provided by hunting. Society is dominated by the totemistic Clan, a community whose members are united by a worship like awe of a certain animal which must not be killed or consumed by them. The totem animal is a symbol of common ancestry. Intermarriage is forbidden within the Clan. Magic, masks, badges are en vogue; magicians as chieftains. Proneness to *rational and artificial constructions*; *democratic equality of rights*; atomistic and analytic way of thinking. Emancipation of man from family, distance between the sexes; age classes and bachelors' houses. Sex mainly looked upon from the physical side. *Morality frequently a kind of conventional hypocrisy*. 

These three forms are preceded by a common stock of primary
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culture (Urkultur), which is represented in rosy colours, in keeping with Catholic ideas of the best possible character of pre-Christian pagan mankind. We have there monogamy, monotheistic notions, a respected tribal chief whose power is limited by the “seniors’” authority, and no slaves. The Patriarchal-Endogamic Type, though in some way not exempt from the decay that has tainted aboriginal mankind, continues more directly than the other two faithful to the values that existed before the schism. It has obviously a bearing on an underlying conception of normality. On the other hand, though the authors are aware of the function of exogamy as a counterweight to the exaggerated absorption of man in the family, they insist that the Matriarchal and Totemistic types were by no means “necessary” stages of evolution. It is again beyond all doubt that the last mentioned type, which appears to harbour the germs of democratic society, has to bear the brunt of an adverse evaluation. We see that the political meaning of Kulturkreislehre, notwithstanding very great differences in the general human outlook, fairly well covers the main tendency of orthodox racialism: to trace Democracy, together with all the Liberal and Socialist implications of equality, back to a substratum of anthropological meanness; to idolize aristocratic class-rule by locating it in an historical and supra-historical scale of values beyond the reach of universal human insight and influence.

In his work on “World revolutionaries”, J. L. Seifert, a more directly politically minded pupil of Schmidt and Koppers, undertook the task of adapting the reactionary treasure of the theory for the use of the public. The book combines some impressive passages with a great deal of arbitrary gossip; anyhow, it must be conceded that Seifert, too, has the moderation proper to most sincere Catholics, and undoubtedly avoids an unlimited approval and admiration of what he calls the “Paternal” or rather, in its more modern appearance, the “Master” Type. However, he is firm in maintaining a general judgment in favour of the latter’s moral and political qualifications, and rejoices in drawing a vividly repellent portrait of the “Totemist” line. He sees in it mainly an “animal”, as in the “Matriarchal” type a “vegetable”, trend of deviation. Besides, on the whole, he is not in favour of considering these three types as three “primary races”. The “Master” type takes shape in the aristocratic
classes, as well as in the Teutonic stock of European peoples. In some non-German countries the nobility is of Teutonic descent; in Germany itself the lower classes are in part of Slavic origin. The Arian heresy and the Lutheran movement gave utterance to aristocratic impulses of "freedom", equally, Nominalism and Voluntarism in philosophy (Duns Scotus's arbitrary God), along with certain shades of amoralism. Zwingli and Calvin mark the transition to urbane civilization, patrician rule, Deism and rationalism. Calvin, though a "master nature", was a social upstart. The "master" idea that the ruler stands above moral law is common to Luther and Hegel; the latter believed the Prussian State—originally, a colonial dominion of the Teutonic Knights—to embody the perfection of human culture. The Teutonic Master type is conservative, averse to utopian visions of the future; by "freedom" he understands the unfolding of his own nature, the victorious imposition of his will. Free birth and princely prerogatives are alike honoured. In North Germany, the social figure of the "gentleman farmer" (Adelsbauer) is a striking representative of the type. The State as an instrument of mastery is appreciated and even treated with religious respect. "Arianism", which in the closing period of Christian antiquity rallied the Teutonic North and West, especially the ruling set, against the core of the Roman world, bore the religious meaning that Jesus Christ was only a man resembling God, since Man was in no need of a divine Mediator between God and himself. Personally, I indulge in the belief that the conception of Jesus as a quasi-divine Man—homoiousios—suited the Teutonic taste for "heroic" or "daemonic" human grandeur. But what a strange coincidence of sounds, the heresy of Arius and the cult of the "Aryan" race! The Paternal-Endogamic type, writes Seifert, preserves the "culture of the original phase" in its least corrupted form. It is mostly represented by nomads (mobile herdsmen); racially, by Indo-aryans (Indogermanen) besides Semitic (Arab), Hamitic and Ural-Altaic elements. Perfection in weapons of war is striven for. Extensive, imperial forms of state construction prevail in this branch of mankind. The feudal order of state, with a monarchical head, is typical. Frequently the master class associates with the upper bourgeoisie, and thus becomes suffused with the ideals, "totemistic" in origin, of town civilization. By its struggle against the
Church, which aims at the spoliation of her coveted property, the nobility prepares its own degradation. The Master type is not nationalistic but rather partial to a supra-national Empire; it disclaims a national absorption of the subjected populations, if only for the sake of maintaining the distance.

The “Matriarchal” or “Planter” type is (or was) at home in the Malayan zone, South China, Peru and Mexico, etc.; in Europe, it is attached to the Slavic—just as the Masters to the Teutonic, and the Townsmen to the Latin—sector. Characteristic of these people are lunar mythology, animism, men’s associations outside the family, rather primitive weapons. They represent village civilization as distinct from the manorial type of the Masters and the urban type of the “Totemists”. They incline to pacifism, to chiliastic dreams of brotherhood, which is their way of experiencing freedom, and occasionally to peasant rebellions. They exhibit signs of the inferiority complex; they exalt the element of humility in the Christian faith. They are often hostile to Town and State; political organization easily becomes superfluous in their eyes; they approve of custom rather than law. We see that Seifert treats this “feminine” society with quiet—if slightly contemptuous—distance, as a more or less tolerable deviation. Obviously it is the “Totemistic-Exogamic-Urban” type that has to play the part of arch enemy, comparable to the Jewish anti-race in Nazism; in fact, he appoints the Jew chief bearer of Totemistic culture in Europe apart from its Roman West and South. The Totemists are hunters, and later on, craftsmen; they are addicted to town life; they are characterized by age classes, non-familial clans, syndicates, a summative conception of society, individualism. They know solar worship, pantheism, atheism, and have a carnal idea of love. Commercial civilization, the great cities as a melting-pot of human “kinds” and standards, bürgerlich—and, mainly, proletarian—revolution, liberty stated in terms of equality, are offsprings of the “Totemistic” genius. So is democracy, but also centralized dictatorship even, though alloyed with a rising of “Master” elements as in Italian Fascism; further on, rationalism, personalism, free will, the doctrine of individual salvation, juridical thought. That is, the French Revolution, the Jews, and the victorious side in the Great War; generally speaking, the hated antagonist in the great drama of mankind, the actors of which are
conceived, not in a language of abstract standpoints, but in terms of anthropological, and what may well be called racial, types.

The religious and theocratic origins, as well as the social corollaries, of the idea of racial superiority are also observed by Schemann. Naturally, here the Christian varnish is dispensed with which has been utilized so often and in so many ways to make the instincts of reactionary paganism in Europe palatable to her rudimentary but hardly extinguishable Christian consciousness. Schemann gives a most fruitful exposition of the racial roots of the caste system in Aryo-Indian society, contending that "natural" inequality lays the foundation for social inequality. This is the reason why the repositories and beneficiaries of social inequality are apt, from time to time, to rise to an intuitive appreciation of racial inequality. The Aryan ideal and the racial counter-principle are symbolized respectively by sublime whiteness and baneful blackness of skin. The very name of the king and hero Aryuna refers to the notion "white"; and the Brahmins are obliged to preserve their white colour by select marriage as well as by their personal mode of living. They follow a truly aristocratic code of sexual morality, destined to ward off an influx of inferior blood into the upper castes. Promiscuity and adultery (especially among women) entail severe punishment; but the men of higher castes are free to keep inferior concubines. I do not regard this as an absolutely unessential concession. In the first place, it may serve to refresh the generative forces of the "master man"; the inferiors are thus exploited even for the breeding, apart from the technical and economic service, of the racial-social elite. Analogous liberties could not be granted to the noble women as well, for, "contaminated", they would produce bastards in the ranks of their castes. But another reason for aristocratic male polygamy seems to have a deeper meaning. Such an institution is calculated to invigorate the principle of group mastery by doing away with the pernicious principle of group symmetry. In other words, racial hierarchy prevails over racial purity. The "servants'" class must not form a structure analogous to that of the "masters'" class, lest they should develop into an antagonistic class rebelling against their situation as servants, which position has become obviously illogical in that they have a jealously guarded group purity of their own. Inequality is compelled to penetrate into the sphere of morals, of the
ultimate categories of human life, in order to escape being over­
run by the suggestion of equality which emanates from them.
Irrationality and inequality lean upon one another.

"Racial theory", we hear from Schemann, exists as the core of
a grand "world-picture" of historical vision since Gobineau;
and the principle of inequality is the key to that philosophy of
history. The Indo-Aryan ("Nordic") Race is at the top of the
scale; within it, again, the Teutons (Germanen) occupy a superior
place above the Latins and Slavs. We must think of the original
"Teutonic" noblesse of non-German nations. The proportion of
superior racial substance in the amalgam forms a test of value;
sad to say, there is a deterioration owing to the consumption of
Nordic blood. This pessimistic outlook is fully shared by
Lapouge, who bewails the substitution of plutocracy for real
aristocracy, and the plague of urbanization; inversely, Ammon
appreciates the work of racial selection produced by the self­
assertion of the wealthy and well-bred upper-classes even in
modern capitalistic society. All such controversies over details
are unable to shake the general agreement on the essential unity
between racial and politico-social inequality. The common
formula might be set down thus: It is necessary and desirable,
and in conformity with the order of Nature, that there should be
masters and slaves beyond a mere technical distinction between
the governing and governed. The purely zoological, or qualita­
tive, inequality of "types", "kinds" and "varieties" has to
provide a matrix for the hierarchical inequality of masters and
slaves, as it were, of anthropological "estates".

This is no deviation from Schemann. In full accord with
Günter, he judges the problem of Nobility and the problem of
Race to be identical. "Nobility has to bring about noble works,
but then it must also surge from noble substance. . . . The
principle of nobility is the very principle of race, in quantitative
restriction and qualitative enhancement. To return again to "our­selves": he who, "on the strength of faculties inherent in his
blood, is able to feel in a genuine German manner and at the
same time to understand race as a whole, cannot have the
slightest doubt that, except from our Teutonic elements, nothing
salutary will ever come to us." In the sequel we read that culture
cannot dispense with the Maccenatic services of the nobility
which, on the other hand, seem to originate in the latter's
racially determined needs, and by no means simply in the opportunity for refinement provided by leisure. For the Aryans alone are really creative, artistic, poetical, endowed with a profound religious sense. . . . The great achievements of Christianity are at bottom racial, that is, inseparable from Teutonic-Occidental genius. The national transformations of the Christian faith, the very feats of conquest and conversion—"triumph over alien gods"—prove it. Schemann is not far wrong in that historical Christianity is indeed shot through with tribal paganism. The Aryans alone have moral pith in their concept of godhead (!). They have overcome the "rigid" monotheism of the Semites, with their image of God as an outward "Creator" of nature. All great Aryan minds, the mystics, Kant in his "Critiques", Herder, Schleiermacher, Lagarde, Chamberlain, Fritzsch, have fought the Jewish ingredients (!) in Christianity. The only really pluri-racial religion is the barren Islam. . . . Aryan religious thought, with an original dualism of metaphysical forces as its hallmark, has crystallized out into three great cultures: the Teutonic-Nordic; the Indian; the Iranian. Thus it is not specially confined to Christianity, but is the real parent of Christian values. Princes and Heroes are destined to embody noble race in a condensed form; their far-reaching family relationships are one aspect of this meaning. Again, the idea of tribal (gentile) kingship expresses in the person of the Prince the consummation of the ancestral series as well as living co-nationals. Hero-worship in a generation of epigoni reveals a yearning for racial treasures. . . . Apart from princes and heroes, the Genius, too, stands on the pinnacle of race, blood and family. An abundance of Stammesbegabungen (talents expressive of the tribal genius, the gentile soul and soil, as it were) is a specifically Teutonic feature.

This is a turn of argument which demonstrates peculiarly well the perversion of spiritual standards inherent in the racial fallacy. Not only is a spurious explanation offered for the "arising" of genius; the very noblest meaning of genius, the miraculous piercing of the barriers of birth, the superb transgression of the limits set by biological and geographical facts, the high privilege of the spirit that "bloweth where it listeth", is converted into its opposite.

Schemann is a man of intellectual probity; he is not impervious to doubt, and sometimes feels the unpleasant urge towards
objectivity; he appreciates foreign witnesses for his cause. Thus he quotes Letourneau's word of an "ordering of races in terms of nobility", or the remark of Quatrefages on human races revealing "potential equality but factual inequality", which conveys a slightly different meaning. The "savage" races also show considerable inequalities among themselves, which, naturally, confirms the paramount law of "potential equality" (!) The coloured—particularly the Yellow and the Indian—may even think of themselves as superior to the White. Value judgments can only be trusted to be objective on condition that their author places himself at a distance. Very true, and greatly at variance with the Nazi outlook! But Schemann speedily reverts to type; he calms himself with the number of testimonies in favour of the Indo-Aryans, particularly as regards their superiority over the Semites. For this is the point of ultimate importance on which we must remain inflexible throughout. Here jests and relaxations are out of place, seeing that "the struggle between Semitism and Aryanism is the gist (das Fazit) of all history up to the present" (!). Another time, the author identifies this dualism with the antagonism, seemingly located on a different plane, between racial and non-racial thought. Race stands for Hierarchy and Aristocracy, versus Democracy, Progress, Liberalism—and Judaism. Even otherwise meritorious racial thought becomes hybrid and useless by being tinged with democratic ideas of equality and general brotherhood, as is the case with Virchow or Schallmeyer. Two integrally opposite ways of thinking are engaged in a gigantic contest. "Perhaps it would be saying too much to state bluntly that racial thinkers build on facts and observations, whereas their opponents rely upon fantasies and constructions." Decidedly, it would be saying too much; here caution was more than ever a sign of wisdom. Still, Schemann controls his hesitancy far enough to call the two types of thought, which fight tooth and nail, the Concrete and the Abstract Type. This is better, because it refers to the intentional direction rather than to the question of seriousness and trustworthiness. But, provided that the terms are rightly interpreted, the jump is bigger than Schemann would have it. It rather involves a jumping to the opposite side. We mean, of course, that the anti-humanitarian and counter-revolutionary idea (common to racialism, nationalism, fascism, with their underlying tribal
pattern) of raising "concrete" types into sovereign and "totalitarian" value principles is precisely the one which implies an abandonment of contact with reality as it is, and a reliance "upon fantasies and constructions".

Voegelin accounts for the rise of racial ideology in our time by the need for a new justification of inequality. Since, for mass consciousness, the "natural law" behind social inequality can no longer be traced to the inscrutable will of God, Race must step in as a natural factor of inequality residing in the secret of the Body (Leib). The Nordic idea is not nationalist in essence (cf. also Gobineau, Chamberlain and Haiser); it points towards the formation of a European élite. Hildebrandt, who takes his stand between racialism proper and the Stefan Georgian fascist "Spiritualism", attempts to reconcile Hierarchy with Purity by hinting that, though the "Nordic" (or, with a more historical denomination, "Aryan") race has a self-evident claim to leadership, other races are also valuable "in themselves". Thus extermination of the Negroes in Africa would not add to the perfection of the world. Nor is the purity of the Nordic race, in the strictest sense, an invariable ideal: the crossing of kindred races need not cause deterioration. Here Hildebrandt adopts the milder views of Chamberlain as opposed to Gobineau's and Schemann's pessimistic rigour. The main reason he adduces is the mixed racial character of the German nation, and particularly of many among her great men. The German nation is inclining towards a new amalgam, the "German race". (Chamberlain likewise admits of a national coining of racial characters: the Spartans, the English, the Prussians.) However, it is imperative to exclude a number of possible factors from contribution. None of the other main races, the coloured ones, must be admitted; the prohibition also touches the French, because they are busy admitting Negro blood into their veins. Immigration from the East is similarly undesirable, for the Eastern races are on an average more Mongoloid than are the "Ostic" elements in the South of Germany. Thus the English reader, unless he be a Jew, may dismiss personal apprehensions.

I referred above to the attempt of Clauss to cope with the antinomy between separate racial "universes" and the Nordic claim to pre-eminence and predominance. Poor Clauss honestly tries to find a solution; and the result of his efforts, if
hardly satisfactory, does not strike us as dull or meaningless by any means. He may fall short of his real aim, but he succeeds in giving a rare insight into the insolubility of the problem inherent in the dogmas of racialism. The reader may still remember that Nordic man is described as essentially expansive, aggressive, bent on activity and conquest. He lives in the attitude of Ausgriff (arms outstretched to grip objects and work on them), in the centrifugal movement, in an ambition to achieve world-wide creation. He cannot help it; it is just his nature. The "Viking" needs no house to live in. Hence the Nordic style of life compels men to expand, to penetrate, to subordinate all foreign things to one system. All sources and raw materials of the earth are to be opened, seized, exploited. Another side to the process is that Nordic man becomes a "bearer of civilization", imposing its blessing on others even against their own will. It must be understood, therefore, that the Nordic man is only obeying the racial law peculiar to him when he pursues his dreams of a Nordicised world. The attitude itself cannot be blamed, for there is no moral authority over and above the racial imperative; but to systematize it into an ideology of universal validity results in failure. "No enthusiasm for Nordic grandeur must blind us to the truth that Nordic universal imperialism (Weltumspannung), though a necessary sequel to the Nordic law of type (Artgesetz), means, if viewed from the angle of other racial laws, falsification and destruction." We must say that, if such be the case, the situation is nothing if not tragic. This impression will scarcely be weakened by reading the sequel: "The Teutonic swarms... shattered the crumbling empires of the South—and for what reason? Why, for the fun of it!—impelled by the urge of the sword. Their gleaming force gave them a right to do so. To blame them is as senseless as it is to blame the hawk for slaying the dove. To praise them is our right, is sensible for us, because we feel in their powerful courses the throbbing of our own blood. But to set them up as saviours—no! By that we would wrong them. They exhausted themselves, to be sure; they scattered themselves; but it was for the sake of their own world, not of the others".

Words with much appeal in them, and very enlightening; but what follows? The establishment of a durable "Nordic" World-Empire hardly seems to be the result of such an outlook. Perhaps
racial wisdom ultimately means accepting the world as the eternal scene of senseless devastation, of a dismal ebb and flow. Perhaps the “Northmen”, if they vigorously follow their tradition outlined here, will be likely to come to a bad end. In this case, according to the premises, the world would suffer from a prevalence of apathy and paltriness. Such are the practical prospects. As for the theory, I see some difficulties as well. How does Nordic Clauss manage in his vision so resolutely to transgress Nordic Artgesetz? And if supra-Nordic truth is thus attainable, why not apply it a little more steadily to a reasonable settlement of questions? What a tired and timid thing counter-revolutionary science is, below the surface! No, Clauss has increased our mistrust, but he has not appeased the hunger of our minds. Most probably he would answer that he would gladly sacrifice his supra-racial glimpse of races for a moment of Nordic “throbbing” in his veins! And this will close the debate.

However, some further information about the Nordic soul may not come amiss: Nordic man loves strife even without hope of victory. Nay, he prefers the exalted moments which precede victory to victory itself; and he is not insensible to the charms of “grandeur in perishing” (Hochgezeit im Untergange: the unusual word “Hochgezeit” means “high tide”; “Hochzeit”, “nuptials”). He combines outward coolness with glowing passion. “It belongs to the nature of Nordic nobility that a woman may deliver herself—outside marriage—unreservedly into the hands of a man, without injuring her dignity: she can trust him.” I am not quoting this strange admission in order to rouse prudish resentments; Clauss does not suggest that German women are more “licentious” than their Latin or Slav sisters, and would most probably be wrong if he did. But there is something specially repugnant—to me, at least—about the attitude expressed in these lines: a spineless subjectivism, and a pathetic sentimentalism that adheres to ethical “purity” and self-awareness without acknowledging hard-and-fast moral obligations. Without being an admirer of immorality in any form, I prefer the sight of a less “unreserved” liaison, and in general, moral failings less associated with the vice of pride. Then, Nordic man is essentially taciturn; he does not believe in “communion” with God, for the soul is always ultimately locked up in solitude. Class pride frequently occurs; but it is a distortion, not a genuine
manifestation, of the Nordic souls. Nordic man is primarily an "activist" (unternehmend) character rather than a peasant type; the latter belongs to his Daelic or Vaelic variety (the valley man, Talmensch) who is also more ponderous, more wrapped up in himself than the main Nordic type, and even more chary of self-expression. The furor teutonicus, the "Berserk rage", is a Daelic mood; the Northman proper is possessed by a lighter and more permanent impulse of aggression, a jaunty "hyper-courage" ("Ueber-Mut"; Uebermut signifies exuberance, gay and exaggerated self-confidence.)

A more naive treatment—and yet perhaps even more trenchant in its abruptness—of the dilemma between the axiom of racial Absolutes and the principle of Aryan supremacy can be found in Langbehn, that curious pre-Nazi of Nietzsche's epoch. He exhorts the "Aryan" to fight for his blood; the pure individual blood of one's race alone is worthy to have blood shed for it. "Life is self-defence; one's own blood (das eigene Blut—whose?) strives to overwhelm strange blood; thus too will Aryan blood be bent on, and succeed in, carrying the field against any alien blood." Race means art (Kunst) within, and war abroad. . . . Perhaps what is really meant is that the inferior races, just because they are so very inferior, can never hope to become alive to Aryan superiority. Or, perhaps, what is meant is that since there is no such thing as an objective hierarchy, there is no reason which should prevent us from setting up a hierarchy where our own race is pre-eminent. Or again, let us impose Aryan—and in its core, German—superiority as a universal law, but at the same time avail ourselves of the advantages of a reckless, fighting racial self-seeking which the "others", on their side, may exhibit as well.

According to Houston Stewart Chamberlain, the word "Aryan" signifies "affinitive", "belonging to our friends", distinct from the "alien" element which (the author quotes here a verse from Goethe) "ye must not suffer". Thus we find a surprising harmony between the poles of Naziism, diametrically opposed in appearance: the creed of racial qualities and Carl Schmitt's brutal logic of Freund und Feind in all its grand simplicity! The tension between the two aspects enters into racial theory itself (Is the "Aryan" "best", or is he "ours"?), nor can it be overcome by any formula, however ingenious; but
the dialectical unity is also manifest. Our phrase "the tribal universe of the Particular" may indicate the central meaning of the complex. We had now better add a few remarks on Aryans, or Northmen, or Teutons, made by the misguided English genius. For Chamberlain cares little about meticulous distinctions between them; what use have we for Aryans where they have nothing to do with Germans? The Southern cultures of antiquity were themselves in some way founded on "Teutonic" substance; when, flooded over by inferior racial chaos and left to their own devices, they had passed into a state of disintegration and anarchy, and at last yielded to the "pure-bred Northern European", the Homo Europaeus of Lapouge, or tout court the Teuton. The latter has been the only creative power of our civilization and culture since 1500. Whatever was noble in Italy, Spain, etc., is of Teutonic origin. Slavs and Celts are but secondary products of a common substance of Teutonism along different lines of development. That old Germanic barbarian who, rushing out of his Northern swamps, invaded the orbit of Roman civilization, was the lawful heir of the Greeks (!) and did nothing but recapture his own from foreign hands. Again, the Reformation was not, above all, a theological or clerical issue; it voiced the protest of Nordic nature against alien rule, the revolt of the Teutonic soul against un-Teutonic mental oppression. As characteristic facets of the Teutonic nature, Chamberlain observes the love of roaming, of war, and of song.

Rosenberg, less contemplative and more political than his master, the English Wagnerite, lays particular stress on the Aryan and Teutonic conception of activity. For the Aryan, outward action means an expression of his inward essence, a manifestation of his soul; a lofty contrast to the Jew who is so mean as to intend his actions to subserve his mundane and bodily purposes. But, even within the Aryan precincts, the Teuton ranks above his noble cousin, the Indian. Whereas the latter shuns action in awareness of its inevitable sequel of suffering, Nordic man decides for action and takes its tragic accompaniment upon himself. The Jew reposes whenever outward circumstances make the interruption of business appear more advantageous; the Chinese and the Indian abandon themselves to overcoming action and life; Nordic rest is but an inner gathering before action. Equally forceful in Nordic man are his mystical
and his active manifestations. He concentrates and expands in an organic, creative rhythm determined by inner conditions.

The following quotation from Rosenberg may be rightly assessed as a pearl without price; it shows how the dialectical process of racial anthropology hardens out into a direct combative tool of fascist politics. We have already been taught by Schemann that the belief in physical tests of race was of more practical consequence than their actual fulfilment. Rosenberg conceives an analogous idea which has more concrete bearing on the problem of a Party which is meant to be an embodiment of fighting Race. The men of the Crusade for the Empire to come, the N.S.D.A.P., he writes (1930), constitute the kernel of a new nobility. About 80 per cent. possess an obviously Nordic outward type of appearance. In any case, the Baltic émigré was in a position to broach the subject with an easy conscience. "As regards the rest..." (Lord! what an egregious rest! "As regards the rest, their type of inheritance (Erbbild) prevails over their type of personal appearance (persönliches Erscheinungsbild) and this ultimately will assert itself by virtue of their achievements." (The italics are in the original.) But if the "type of personal appearance" can thus elude direct visibility, why not generally judge people by their conduct rather than their racial class-characteristics? And yet Rosenberg's construction of ideas is not wholly illogical. "The remaining 20 per cent." are only admitted to the test of "achievements" on the strength of their being politically linked up with the alleged 80 per cent. who have an impeccable Nordic exterior; they lean on the evident racial legitimacy of their comrades whose anthropological fitness is above suspicion. Conversely, a Marxist party which—to make a ridiculous supposition—happened to consist exclusively of flaxen-haired, blue-eyed giants, would still form a most inappropriate kernel for a new racial nobility. Thus in the concrete reality of the Nazi movement, racial beauty and political soundness and valour mutually support each other in spite of an occasional absence of personal union between them; together they provide an unassailable guarantee of thoroughgoing racial superiority which neither of them alone could safeguard. From this we see how the racial creed is utilized (and violated) in the service of racial counter-revolution; but we also see how seriously that counter-revolution is meant, how far it exceeds any aim at
mere restoration, how expressly it points towards a recreation rather than a mere restitution of a world of masters and serfs.

There is a passage in the main work of Houston Stewart Chamberlain (quoted by Rosenberg) where we find an anticipation of this political turn of racialism. That passage runs: “Even if there happened to be no proof for the existence of an Aryan race in the past, we want one to exist in future (!), which is the essential thing with men of action.” This sounds rather eccentric: Why should we care, say, for a Basque “future” if there had never been such a thing as Basques? But this is merely an extreme caricature of counter-revolutionary activism.

The fact that several pioneers of the new Germany are distinctly averse to the Nordic racial self-worship must not be withheld. Such are found among pure Fascists (some of Stefan George’s adepts; to some extent, Spann), Prussian imperialists and reactionaries (Spengler, Sombart), the so-called National Bolsheviks (cf. the motto borrowed from Jünger), Nietzscheans, Youth Movement people and so forth. Thus Benz, whose relation to Nazism is one of love rather than blunt adherence, feels compelled to turn a critical eye on the fighter who, despising his adversary as a lower type, is liable to divinize himself. It is too simple to philosophize on race, seeing all conceivable values in one’s own and drawing a correspondingly derogatory picture of a chosen “counter-race”. Voegelin, too, is rather sceptical of this method. Everything great, good, prepossessing, etc., is labelled “German”, “Teutonic”, “Nordic”, “Aryan”; all inferior, repulsive or uncanny features are foisted on a supposed “Jewish”, “Syrian”, “Etruscan”, “Pre-Asiatic”, “African” character. The absurdity of the racial myth is proven by the simple fact that no world-wide rallying of all “blond” peoples against all “dark” types is dreamed of. “The racial idea is merely an expression of the longing for genuine Germanhood.” Yes, but we who do not long so fervently for genuine Germanhood are also less disposed to have the problem of Teutonic racialism made unduly harmless. There is a little more in it than mere commonplace or idealistic nationalism.

Sombart quite sensibly remarks that our panorama of values is not borrowed from the life of Nature, and blood can never be a pledge for human qualities. But let us terminate this rather annoying account of insane (though not irrelevant) theories born
of pride, pagan ecstasy and greed for power, with a modest but conclusive piece of British good sense. Wickham Steed, pronouncing his verdict of "nonsense" on the belief in "chosen races", submits a saying often heard in his East Anglian country: "Handsome is as handsome does", adding "and this, I think, sums up my creed on racial problems". No doubt he is right; and it is our grievous task to plumb the depths of the distorted minds of those who are not.

7. BREEDING THE NATION

"History is passing through a stage of mutation; and a nation is engaged in breeding itself... a new vision of the birth of man... he who intends to make it real must breed it...

GOTTFRIED BENN.

"We ghosts who are dead, we are huger hosts
Than you on the uplands, than you on the coasts.

The core of our thoughts, and the roar of our deeds
The tune of your murmuring fountains feeds.
Abideth our love, and our hatred remains:
They are throbbing above in the mortals' veins.
To what we've endured and secured and found,
The lives of the living forever are bound."

CONRAD FERDINAND MEYER
("Chor der Toten" quoted by Schemann).

"... Care for the nobles!... As for the masses, it would be all the more hopeless to care for them when all were absorbed in the mass."

SCHEMANN.

The idea of stockbreeding as a guiding principle for human society has many and various aspects and implications. Such aspects are (a) the promotion of racial purity; (b) the preference
for a given—for example, "Nordic"—racial variety; (c) planning of the nation's human material by its political leadership; (d) selection for biological and medical ends; and though certainly separable one from the other, they are inter-related in various ways. It may be noticed at once that we are by no means dealing simply with a reactionary bias; in fact, it seems as though the breeding ideal were in no small degree assimilated to the Socialist claim to conscious self-determination on a collective scale as well as with the eugenic ambitions of Left-wing nationalism and rationalism. The Roman Church, protesting against Nazi schemes of sterilization or Nazi estimates of sexual morality on eugenic standards, does so in strict fidelity to her ingrained distrust of a large body of "progressive" aspirations. Nothing, however, commits us to the belief that progressive designs have been universally sound and acceptable or that eugenic and socialist intentions really prevail in the völkisch vision of national breeding. The truth is that the ideal of human self-determination conceived in terms of control over human substance itself (instead of the ordering of inter-human relationships) has an ambiguous bearing on liberty and rationality alike; and an even more evident truth is that whatever humanistic and rational meaning eugenics may embody in general, it is swamped by the overtones of superstitious "Teutonic" tribalism and fascistic arbitrariness in the Nazi formula.

It is not for us to discuss the problem of eugenics as a whole; but I think it opportune, for the understanding of our special subject, to indicate briefly the moral drawbacks which, apart from all Nazi embellishments, are inherent in eugenic schemes. Roughly speaking, they seem to come under four heads. (1) The breeding of human material by biological methods may easily entail the danger of an anti-Christian and un-ethical naturalism. Attention is withdrawn from the structural problems of social co-operation, from the adjustment of social conditions to standards of justice and equity which may enlighten, govern and unite the minds of the persons involved; in an exaggerated measure it is devoted to the task of guaranteeing the mental and bodily "soundness" of persons who are not yet even alive. Thus eugenics carry in them a sort of temptation to skip the ineluctable spiritual problems of our existence, supplanting a real effort to grapple with them by a pretension to produce new and better-
equipped bearers of existence. Yet the problem, for instance, of building a complicated bridge is not solved by pointing out the necessity of having well-fed engineers with a good night’s rest behind them; still less does such a method help us when the question at stake is whether or not we ought to have the bridge at all. (2) As is so often the case with misapplied attempts at rationalization, here, too, the latter may turn out to be a creation of false rationality, a thaumaturgic, rather than rational, performance. The apparent “exactness” of “scientific” formulae may, more rapidly than anything else, drive people down the slippery path of rank—but seductive—superstition. Medicine itself offers distressing instances of this contingency; but in the case of eugenics the outlook is greatly changed for the worse, for both the chances and the tests of control vanish here into a labyrinth of uncertainty. That we are rather at a loss how to arrange our own lives satisfactorily is far from proving us equal to the task of providing a satisfactory order for the life of future generations; that we fall short of that eminently human function, to ensure a good management of our present affairs, hardly entitles us to the divine office of creation. I should not be too positive about prevention being better than cure; I should prefer to have my cancer cured, should such an infirmity befall me, than to spend my whole life in escaping from cancer, as well as a legion of similar evils. But certainly the proverb has sense, given a certain limitation of its scope; supposing that a harmless vaccination is potent enough to prevent my catching a contagious disease, it is clearly worth more than the best treatment; supposing that a temperate regimen, among many other advantages, also protects the organism against tubercular infection, why, it is all the more commendable for that. However, the more the scope of prevention is enlarged, the more its very idea becomes spurious and futile. We can only deal with the future inasmuch as it is still an organic part of the present. New diseases will probably spring up when those that infest us now are disposed of; which is not an argument against fighting the present ones but rather an argument against the deceptive belief that we are “precluding” the future ones. The case deteriorates when positive ideals are dragged in. Perhaps we may completely liberate the next, or next but one, generation from syphilitic virus, and it is hardly likely that they will condemn us for it.
But any positive conceptions of a "good life" that may prevail among us to-day are just as likely to lose their attraction to-morrow; we may "breed" a future race endowed with strong muscles or powerful brains, which will set its heart entirely on religious or erotic experience. Thus the meaning of "foresight" is not very extensive. (8) Furthermore, eugenic rationality is a typical instance of alien rationality. It seems to submit the lives of men to regulation by human thought; but it is essentially the thought of other people, not their own. The situation is vastly different from the one found in authoritarian or socialist systems of state omnipotence. For even a dictatorial and arrogant state power is by no means wholly independent of its subjects' way of feeling; but even the most liberal and generous state power is unable to sense the tastes and preferences of the babe unborn. Hence the eugenic determination of man is the extreme case of what Professor Mannheim ingeniously calls "functional rationalization" as distinct from "substantial rationalization". Beyond certain limits, the attempt to make men behave along the lines of a predetermined scheme interferes increasingly with their behaving on the basis of thinking. Thus the objections of G. K. Chesterton to eugenics as an efflux of servile aspirations obtain reinforcement from the side of modern sociology more or less beyond the suspicion of a Catholic bias. It is not at all the same thing whether we mean to enable men to order their lives by thinking, or to impose on them the results and (in part, remote) effects of such other men's thoughts as happen to be in power. Now the men who governed before I was born are, even though blameless democrats and humanitarians, always merely "such as happen to be in power", seen from my angle; for there is no imaginable shadow of a mutual, a co-responsive, relationship between us. (4) A further consequence points towards the danger of fundamental inequality inherent in the "planning" of men by men. The dogmas of personality and equality are inseparable from an ultimate "givenness" of human existences claiming absolute respect and unquestioned recognition. Men form the primary data; their organizations and institutions represent the field of arrangement and adjustment. Human "material", be it in the statistical, political, military, educational, economic or any other sense, is but a relative term applicable only to certain functional issues. No sooner is this axiom abandoned than
democracy appears to be thoroughly unhinged. English thought, fostered by an indigenous and precocious industrial civilization, has developed an early knowledge of this side of the problem. Among its more recent manifestations may be mentioned Aldous Huxley’s appalling utopia of a scientifically “produced” hierarchy of anthropological classes. It is the sovereign creatorship and fatherhood of God, beyond the reach of human intervention in essential points, that make men “equal”, that is to say, sharing identical categories of life and entitled to equal consideration; both old-world despots and modern fascists can but trespass upon the outskirts of this “inalienable”—though manifoldly warped and obscured—equality. But as soon as we are free to “breed” men, it is no more than logical that we should breed them in varieties like wool-sheep and meat-sheep, or pet-dogs and watch-dogs, or race-horses and cattle, some of them destined to serve the needs of the others as expediency demands.

Naturally, these unattractive implications of misdirected social “rationalization” and “planning” become the centre of interest, when, instead of mere abstract fancies and schemes, they are inserted into a system of state-power founded on an irrational creed of political mastery and racial discrimination. If arrogant madness is a danger in itself, if the hunger for rational control (uncontrolled, in its turn, by commonsense and a tinge of healthy scepticism) is itself liable to work itself out in madness, then truly the original madman wielding the engines of high technical rationality portends embroilments of no little significance. The great English poetical genius whose recent death has been a great blow to us all, hardly suspected the entire truth of the unsurpassed lines he wrote at the beginning of the “First World War”:

“Through learned and laborious years
They set themselves to find
Fresh terrors and undreamed-of fears
To heap upon mankind.”

(KIPLING, “The Outlaws”).

In fact, the “eugenic” and the “Nordic” point of view appear simply to be welded into one. Schemann, by no means an
irresponsible hotspur, declares that the cleavage between "personalities" and "herd-people" in Germany is of a racial order; the "un-German victims of Juda and Rome" comprise the "non-Nordic" elements. Compliance with the requirements of racial hygiene will at the same time have "Nordizing" effects; for the fostering of whatever is noble, the "breeding of eagles", is of the essence of the service of Nordic nobility. It is doubtful whether the author intends this to be a universal rôle or limits it to the German scene, dependent on the presence of a specific Nordic stock. In his survey of the history of racial thought, Schemann naturally refers to Plato's "State", where the point is made that sexual intercourse should not be "disorderly", but should combine the "best" men and women, the "Guardians'" class (φίλακτος) supervising both mating and procreation.

Obviously the reference to Plato is in the main correct, and should not be countered by trifling malice of the kind that "the meaning of Plato was different from Hitler's". No doubt it was, but scarcely in the essential tendency; the differences are rather pertinent to historical and personal situations than to the fundamental issues. Similar differences may have obtained between Ignatius of Loyola and Jesus, or even Washington and Rousseau. We must not subscribe to the praise of a great dreamer, and at the same time refuse to give credit to anybody who takes his dreams seriously and claims to put them into practice. The same consideration applies to Nietzsche and Stefan George as progenitors of the Third Empire. The only correct answer is not to flout Hitler's dilettantism and demagogy, or even Schemann's own occasional slips and vagaries, but to note that Plato, for all his grandeur and his stimulating influences, stood mainly for that pagan and oppressive (and to my understanding, wholly un-Socratic) principle which we are engaged in fighting: the fiction of a universal and uni-linear hierarchy of values, an "ideal" identity between heights of value spiritual, biological, personal, and social. He was all too sublime in loving the "good" and despising the "bad"; but he was not sublime enough to see that an officialdom mating "good" men with "good" women was infinitely worse than the "worst" man or woman could possibly be, and his or her union with any other.

To return to Schemann—his outlook was scarcely cheerful (1928-1981; perhaps it has altered since the National Upheaval).
He cannot pardon Chamberlain’s hopes of racial regeneration, contrary to the asseverations of Gobineau and Woltmann. International chaos is in its heyday; racial character is on the decrease; the infamy of Versailles and the maiming of Germany have contributed decisively to darken the prospects. The plans of a unification of Europe under German lead have been worsted; the French have refused to join the Germans in resisting English and Jewish world supremacy; “the fate of the West is sealed”. It is not an evident axiom but obviously an historical truth that nations must eventually die. The decay of humanity has often been envisioned, among others even by a vital character like Goethe; perhaps it is mankind’s lot to die out and reappear in many cycles on earth. Be that as it may, “we are witnessing the agony of the nobles . . . low natures have become the chief actors”. (A somewhat ambiguous suggestion!) It is with disillusioned eyes that Schemann looks upon the possibilities of high-aimed eugenic action. The difficulties are enormous . . . if our measures are to be really effective, they must be hard and bold in a manner unheard-of. . . . We can scarcely count upon the succour of “natural selection”; by “fitness” man and nature understand two different things. This is prima facie true, though Hitler is fond of relying on the survival of the “strongest”. However, success or no success, “racial hygiene is the only thing for which we may have any use”. We can still hope for the formation and maintenance of single Nordic cells, tiny but precious islands of noblesse. The racial idea ranks higher than sheer biology. . . . “Care for the noble. . . .” Here once again the religion of race crystallizes out into an attitude reminiscent of those well-known forms of bigotry blended with scepticism where there is more belief in the church than in God: the socio-political dictatorship of believers in Race comes before conformity with the truths conveyed by racial knowledge, either scientific or intuitive. Hildebrandt writes with estimable frankness: “Racial hygiene requires from man a readiness for sacrifice, not merely of comfort but even of nobler spiritual goods. It is impossible to demand so great a sacrifice on behalf of abstract ethical claims”. But the request is justified by the vision of racial glory manifesting itself in corporeal beauty.

The aspect of tragic and rabid naturalism, of “struggle-for-life” selectivism, is fully present in Spengler, who has no liking
for the aesthetic fragrance of "Nordic" and "Doric" fancies. The "race" to which he gives his blessing must embrace iron physique, inflexible will-to-power and inexorable cruelty. With lusty pen he dwells on the racial usefulness of merciless selection, disease and war. Happily it is not for us to arbitrate between the racial ideal of eliminating diseases and the racial fear to eliminate them too much; we should encourage the fight against them on humanitarian, not on racial, grounds. Our mind may further be eased by the thought that both varieties of racial paganism are likely to agree on a contemptuous and inhuman treatment of the weak and ill, and in general of the poor and such elements as are of little use for warlike purposes. They only disagree on the question as to whether the "inferiors" could, and should, ultimately disappear, or whether their oppression and extermination is to go on as a permanent characteristic, an interminable enjoyment of this grim life. The former view underlies the sentimental utopias of a Nordic Paradise to come; the alternative view, though distorting realism into a satanic myth, has certainly a firmer hold on actual life.

Our review of Nazi racialism commenced with a passage from Hitler, which stated that the sole human right was to care for the preservation of pure blood and thereby to provide for an upward evolution in mankind. The racial point of view has to become the pole-star of state activities. On the negative side, stern practical measures are immediately feasible. "Whoever is in any way visibly ill or tainted by a hereditary blot . . . must be pronounced unfit for procreation; and the judgment must also be validated in practice." It will be the symbol of a nobler age that the devotion of men will no longer be primarily directed to ennobling the breeds of dogs, horses and cats, but to ennobling the breed of man himself. In a word, non-racial public opinion is engaged to-day in canine, equine and feline affairs, viciously neglecting human needs and pursuits; but a nobler age will succeed in raising man to the level (nay, well above the level) of high-bred domestic animals! After the shock of this revelation it will hardly surprise us to hear that bodily training must figure highest in the educational designs of the state, seeing that a "less cultured, but robust fellow" is worth a lot of "intellectual weaklings". I must honestly admit, though this may expose me to the charge of Byzantinism, that I do not
dream of considering the *Führer* either as an intellectual, a weakling, or weak in intellect; but many Nazis will secretly agree with my suggestion that a doctrinal adherent of the philosophizings of *Mein Kampf*, whether robust or not, will certainly be astoundingly, indeed painfully, far removed from intellectual over-refinement. Grave injustice, however, would be done to Hitler's own Movement by assuming that its ascendancy has been due to excessive muscle power free from spiritual biases. No! A victory was gained over the Mind, but not without using, in a manner both novel and pithy, its own weapons.

An illustrious place among the "intellectual" heretics of human stockbreeding is naturally held by Professor Voegelin. It is not that Voegelin has any objection to the anti-Christian and anti-democratic ideals of Leib and Shape; only, the lineal heir to the Platonic vision, he stresses the "spiritual" aspect of *Naturalism itself*—for the perfect naturalism is not the one which ignores but the one which absorbs the spirit!—and at the same time he fears any possible democratic implications of the belief in a mechanical mass breeding of a "valuable" Nordic race. He is less interested in a master nation than in socio-spiritual oligarchy conceived in more direct terms. Thus he refuses to endorse biological breeding devices. Pretentious theories of descent have met with failure; the alleged laws of heredity fail to explain how forms arise, they merely account for the reappearance of forms in given circumstances. Individuals are essentially living units, not, as considered by genetics, a "puzzle" (the English word is used) of hereditary factors; the spontaneous mutation of kinds is no less a given fact of nature than is their constancy. It is a fatal blunder to suppose that "historical substance could be forged at will by sedulous associations for the breeding of pure-bred bodies." Racial quality is not determined by the quantitative proportion of standard ingredients. Nor can man's sure instinct to place another man "as friendly or dangerous to his kind" be replaced by arithmetical criteria of "exact" science. "The way of looking, speech and gestures" will always remain data superior to "cranial measurements" and "cephalic indices". The reader will notice that this criticism, too, is not really hostile to the system of racial dictatorship; rather is it intended to protect the latter from being discredited by the inevitable failure of the naïve illusions
attached to a mechanical conception of race and breeding. The holders of power, at least, are taught to understand clearly the meaning of their own mastery; to believe in their ideology of fascist aristocracy rather than in the mysticism of palpable and multiple racial tokens. At this juncture, we may recall the strange phraseology used by Blüher: the "Primary and Secondary Race", meaning nothing but the upper minority of mankind which "counts", and the numberless masses whose sole destination is to provide a nondescript and impersonal basis for the significant lives of the "Primarians". Incidentally, Blüher is of opinion that the Primary Race can be "bred" in its bulk, namely, as a governing class, but evades all possible schemes of planned production or reconstitution in so far as its very highest representative, the genius, is concerned. The Primary Race as a whole suffers from a tragic lack of sexual self-sufficiency. A system of scientific marriages substitutes an artificial "race" for the real one. The "charismatic" bündisch hero, the half-god of "man-to-man Eros", will always soar above the normal—though "Primary"—set of ruling officials and plutocrats.

Some further passages from the racial speculations of Houston Stewart Chamberlain, not wholly consistent but very characteristic, may be apt here. To Chamberlain's mind a racial prerogative seems to be assigned to actual physique, and yet psychological mysticism has to enter whenever corporeal data fail to provide sufficient "orientation". As mechanical materialism is actually centred on the attention of the mind to the functions and needs of the body, so racialism ultimately stresses the mind's belief in holy "Shape", in a "value pattern" and an intrinsic nobility of the body.

Unadulterated "instinct" is the canon by which you may judge "Race", writes Chamberlain. "He who questions Nature with a pure mind" will receive a true answer. "The possession of 'Race' in one's own consciousness carries direct conviction rather than anything else. . . . He who belongs to a neatly circumscribed, pure race, feels it daily (?). The τύχη (presiding genius, guardian angel) of his tribe (Stamm) never quits his presence." Race, as well as the Nation capable of racial ascent, also contains a high moral meaning: the sacred laws of the formation of man. "Physical quality is the foundation for all processes of ennoblement." Generally speaking, the breeding of
noble race is conditioned by five technical principles: (1) The original quality of the material in question, (2) endogamy (*Inzucht*: mating within the circle), (3) some kind of planned selection, (4) some degree of crossing, (5) an appropriate limitation of crossings both in the material of choice and in time. The adoption of asceticism by noble elements is pernicious to good race, it effects a veritable counter-selection; Jesus Christ opposed it without doubt. But, notwithstanding the supreme importance of the physical foundation, race is more than a mere biological class of division... it also means an "intense form of life" which owes its existence to deliberate breeding and several other factors. We are aware that, even in Chamberlain, racialism—up to the point of breeding on biological lines—appears to act as a mystical and semi-religious substructure for ambitious nationalism.

The racial suggestions of Professor Bergmann, that strange apostle of feminine naturalism and "Germano-religion", also demand a hearing. He it is, perhaps, who marks the most purely biological position on the vast area of National Socialist thought. For him biological naturalism is a cherished object even apart from its direct suitability to drive the car of oligarchic counter-revolution, military efficiency, national arrogance and tribal infatuation. Bergmann musters up sufficient courage openly to break away from the traditions of what he calls "idealist German Geistes-Philosophie", which has education for the attainment of a higher humanity as its guiding principle. Our philosophy must be a philosophy of life; our education, comprehensive breeding rather than conceptual edification. Body, nature and soul form an indissoluble unity; the body, pure and divine nature, "is in fact one with the soul". In this case we see distinctly more of the body than of the soul. Presenting an agreeable contrast to most German "homoerotic" fascists, for "body" Bergmann even uses—with a friendly note—the "materialistic" term *Körper*, instead of the rotund and mystical *Leib*. Now the perennial fate of this indivisible body-soul is wielded by the "Norne" of Teutonic mythology, which in modern parlance means "the enduring power of hereditary disposition". What we require is the firm security in this sense, lent by a sound disposition, not a general training in "lip service" to the phrases of high-mindedness. Our "image of new
humanity "is governed by the threefold imperative: "Seclusion, discrimination, selection". (In the original: Abriegelung, bolting, barring, locking up of our realm; Ausmerze, weeding out of undesirable material; Auslese.) Post-war Germany was misused as a "refuge of international human rubbish"; and the Centre (the Catholic Party) "systematically prevented the rise of Luther's country (des Lutherlandes)". Who is prompted to oppose most persistently the sterilization of persons tainted by inferior dispositions? Naturally, the lieutenants of Rome on German soil; for instance, Cardinal Faulhaber of Munich, who in his speech on February 12th, 1933, stormed against eugenic and racial policy, claiming "the individual's right to avoid mutilation by the state". "Worlds separate us from such a creed." In detail, what separates us from it are (1) our conception of Volk, unknown to one of Romish mind (Römling); (2) our conception of "pre-natal humaneness"; (3) our notion of a real Saviour: he must be a doctor, a protector of mankind, "who helps the mother to bear children in the right way". For post-natal humaneness, in whose name the right to sterilization is challenged, is a thing of doubtful value, even though it may be imposed on us; whereas pre-natal humaneness is "the restitution of the order of nature which human society has criminally neglected". Bergmann would not entirely subscribe to the bolder projects of Dupré, a Berlin physician, though he quotes them with unconcealed sympathy. Dupré proposes a "Breeding State" (Züchtungsstaat), in which procreation and the rearing of children are withdrawn from the competence of individual decision and submitted to public regulation. "Fruitful temporary marriage" must take the place of monogamous marriage for life, the greatest obstacle to a planned breeding of men. The elite set of women endowed with the highest hereditary qualifications will select their respective partners from a list of men tendered to them by a racial "Aldermen's Council". The average duration of such a "fruitful" mating will be two years; as to men unworthy of generation, their sexual needs may be ministered to in the form of "temporary marriage accompanied by enforced sterility". Plans of this kind may not be endorsed by Nazi racialists in general; many of them would be too directly conservative or even clerical for that. But such schemes certainly lie in the future for an anti-individualist and anti-
Christian State with racialism and militarism as its governing creed. Its advocates, when possessed with any clarity of thought, must from their angle consider the Christian (both Catholic and secularized) conception of monogamy and personal love-union as a despicable expression of anarchy and disorder, much in the same manner as orthodox Christians consider unrestrained profligacy.

Actually, Darré (now a Minister of the Reich) goes rather far in making provisions for the racial excellence of those strata of society which are calculated to be the precious core of the nation: in particular, the quasi-noble peasantry are under special protection and special restrictions (*Hegehof-Bauern*). Whoever aspires to hereditary farm-holding must observe certain selective conditions in mating. The bride must possess certain minimal mental and physical requisites. The sons themselves must satisfy a certain standard to pass as confirmed heirs to *Hegehof* holders. “Inferior *Hegehof* successors must not be born.” A new type of professional man, distinct from doctors, must be called into being: the *Zuchtwart*, in English, the *Breeding Expert*. The object of breeding is to be a compound of soundness and racial character. We are faced with the task of obtaining a German “paragon of selection.” It will be extracted from (1) scientific experience; (2) the German past; (3) empirical observations outside the realm of scientific research. Darré lays weight on “preserving the blood of Nordic Race”, but he also borrows from the Platonico-Georgian aesthetics of Hildebrandt: “Love of the Shape... Shape envisioned becomes the guiding angle (*Richte*) of all action, the standard of all beauty”. The German girls will be grouped in four classes in relation to their racial and eugenic fitness for marriage, including the factor of fitness for child-bearing; pretenders to *Hegehöfe* must choose their mates amongst the first two classes, the second having to stand severer tests. In a later publication, Darré introduces another new type of functionary, the “*Assistant Generator*” (*Zeugungshelfer*): he “has to provide for progeny in the place of a husband who, by reason of illness or owing to any other cause, proves to be incapable of generation”.

A special matrimonial legislation, embodying the ordering of prospective brides into classes and the institution of Breeding
Experts, has since been enacted for members of the Party aristocracy, particularly, the S.S. In a recent report ("Zeitschrift der Akademie für Neues Recht", quoted in the Frankfurter Zeitung, January 26th, 1936), racial and eugenic legislation imposed until now is summarized under the following headings:


Were the question raised once more whether Nazi racial policy, in its aims at least, means that man by rational self-determination assumes a higher power of liberty, we should plead for a strictly negative answer. The pretension of tribal chiefs to interfere with their subjects' private lives and exercise an influence on the coming generation has nothing to do with human liberty, unless it be in an unfavourable sense. On the contrary, man is made an unconscious and passive toy of despotic vagaries, exposed to various encroachments, and the masters with whom these exceptional powers rest are acting on behalf of extra-moral Nature, in the name of irrational Fate.

8. THE MEANING OF ANTI-JUDAISM

"The Jews are neither a race nor a people. . . . They are the unique example of a purely parasitic product of decay."

Houston Stewart Chamberlain.

"The Jews are not a real race, only a counter-race. . . . Their essential activity is a carping at all manifestations of the Aryan soul."

A. Rosenberg.

"Race-consciousness and race-breeding have since all times been weapons most proper to the Jews."

L. Schemann.
"The Jews are carrying out a deliberate attempt to lower the racial level of non-Jewish mankind through a permanent poisoning of its individual members... They brought the Negroes into the Rhineland... For hours the black-haired young Jew, with satanic joy in his face, lies in wait for the guileless Aryan girl whom he taints with his blood, thereby stealing her from her people."

A. Hitler.

"High over noises that deafen and cover us,
Rang the Deliverer's voice out over us.
Stand thou still, thou sun upon Gibeon,
Stand thou, moon, in the valley of Ajalon!
Shout thou, people, a cry like thunder,
For the kings of the earth are broken asunder.
Now we have said as the thunder says it,
Something is stronger than strength and slays it.
Now we have written for all time later,
Five kings are great, yet a law is greater.
Stare, O Sun! in thine own great glory,
This is the turn of the whole world's story.

Stab with the javelin, crash with the car!
Cry! for we know not the thing that we are.
Stand, O Sun! that in horrible patience
Smiled on the smoke and the slaughter of nations.
Thou shalt grow sad for a little crying,
Thou shalt be darkened for one man's dying—
Stand thou still, thou sun of Gibeon,
Stand thou, moon, in the valley of Ajalon!"

G. K. Chesterton
(“The Ballad of the Battle of Gibeon”).

Victor Hugo begins his poem on Joshua's conquest of Jericho by trumpet calls with the beautiful line: "Sonnez, sonnez toujours, clairons de la pensée".

I believe that this is the first and foremost answer which must be given to the manifestations of reactionary Anti-Semitism.
Among the numerous other problems of mankind, a Jewish problem may also exist; the Jews, like all kinds and nations and races and types of men, may have inferior and objectionable qualities which are peculiar to them; but political anti-Judaism can be described mainly as a corollary of the insistence on shutting off the "walls of Jericho" against the "clarions of Thought". Rightly or not, Jews may be hated for many things; but as far as the hatred of them is fostered and exploited by socio-political reaction, it is a hatred of the people who, owing to divers religious and historical factors, are supposed to be making violent and obstinate attacks on the pillars of unjustified power and unreasonable inequality, and on the prejudices destined to their protection. The "Christian" who persecutes the Jew is in reality the Gentile who persecutes the Christian in his own midst. Even though he stresses Christian tenets of faith and is bent on augmenting the power of the Church, he watches jealously lest "secularized" demands of Christian morality and thoughtfulness should invade the texture of his customary political and socio-economic life. But National Socialism has the inestimable merit of dispensing with a number of contradictory compromises; thus it has also broken up the "Christian" setting of anti-Jewish paganism. Apart from some individual neo-German thinkers like Blüher and Stapel, who blaspheme the name of Our Lord by pretending to adhere to his teachings, the Jew is no longer combated on "Christian" but on racial, on völkisch, on truly Gentile grounds. At the same time, the more radical and daring elements of Naziism are also engaging in a great warfare against Rome, against Protestant Christianity, against the Christian metaphysics of personality and the ethic of mercy as well. Their logic in doing so deserves credit. Anti-Judaism (as a spiritual and political creed) entails hostility to Christianity, and its meaning emerges all the more clearly when it is openly seconded by direct hostility towards the Christian faith and Christian churches.

Before examining the Nazi authors' own account of their stand against the Jewish peril, another preliminary remark may not be out of place. It is this: we must guard against both overrating and underrating the importance of the anti-Semitic bias in the ideological complex of Nazidom. Many Jews (and perhaps many of their "Aryan" friends too), who have no particular objection
to fascism, for instance Italian fascism, indulge in hysterical vituperation of Hitlerism just because it dislikes Jews and applies measures to eliminate them from German life. These Central European Jews, who pray that they may live to see the French and allied troops enter Berlin in triumph, could, during the War (in their great majority) hardly await the Kaiser’s entry into conquered Paris, and they have some right to indignation at such an inadequate reward for their boisterous and aggressive patriotism. Though I am myself of Jewish extraction, I disclaim all solidarity with such an attitude; our judgment of the new Nazi Germany must be determined above all by its negation of mankind and its intrinsic enmity to Western democratic society, and not by its special ill-will against Jews. On the other hand, we must also refuse to be blind to the symbolic purport of the Nazi discrimination against Jews, and (here, again, my Jewish descent cannot impose an ill-conceived duty of “modesty” on me, which would be no less subjective and self-conscious) we must bear witness to the peculiar barbarism of the Nürnberg legislation and the mentality underlying it. This mentality is wholly in tune with the general line of fascism; but it embodies an essential forward step, an undeniable novelty within the common field of creation. The significance of the fact that in Italy or Austria “Aryan” girls have never been pilloried in the streets or in newspapers for having encouraged the courtship of Jewish lads must on no account be ignored. A new and horrible perspective of tribal inhumanity, injustice and superstition has been opened up by Naziism, and it has a full claim to special attention apart from “mere” fascism, though the decisive truth remains that such a thing could not have happened except on fascist soil.

Incidentally, Steed rightly points out the element of black ingratitude in the neo-German treatment of Jews. Even now, the German chauvinism of certain Jewish circles is not wholly extinguished. The following anecdote is not quite authentic, but it reveals a sort of perverse high-mindedness which is undoubtedly present in some Jewish characters. An old German Jew who had served several months in a concentration camp, who had been turned out of his profession, and whose son had been shot “in flight”, ultimately escaped to Austria. Wandering through the streets of Vienna with a co-religionist, he came
across a troop of *Heimwehr*; both the *tenue* and the equipment of these brave agrarian fascists seemed to lack the final touch of perfection. With disdainful pride the visitor exclaimed: “Eh!... You just ought to see our S.A.!”

But it is now high time to hear non-Jewish, anti-Jewish, speakers. Let us commence our task with Blüher, who, though somewhat unorthodox, is none the less clever. Blüher sees an antagonistic factor in the Jews because, among other things, they are not a *Volk*: the aspect of intimate male friendship, “man-to-man Eros”, male society, is hopelessly atrophied in them, they are merely a “race” organized in families under paternal authority instead of real leadership. It is only natural that they should act as a ferment of dissolution wherever they permeate foreign national societies. Furthermore, the Jews are condemned on the charge of believing in law, morals, and the possibility of a rational and satisfactory social order on earth. It is the fundamental category of Jewish thought that “to obey the law is good, to transgress the law is evil. They are brought to a harmony by reconciliation with God. Whoever believes this, is *essentially* a Jew, even in default of being it by race. He who believes that the story of mankind, even though with many interruptions, is somehow bound to move upwards and lead in the upshot to a happy solution, is a Jew in religion”. Christianity differs from Judaism in its belief that the original sin, on a general scale at least, is irredeemable. St. Paul and Luther are prophets of this intuition. The world is continually hovering on the brink of nothingness, only held in “suspension” by the Father. Creative genius has always been a prey to that “grand melancholy” which responds to this knowledge. “The superior ones, above all, are initiated into the secret of sin.” The process of salvation is “simply given”, unconnected with any moral efforts or material improvements; it consists in the “mere presence of the Lord”. Christianity and Progress are terms of strict opposition. The “religion of mankind” is merely a branch, a secularized current, of Judaism. Similar views are exhibited in Stapel’s book on Anti-Semitism. The Jews believe in the promise of heaven on earth; they are insensible to the negative sides of “civilization”; they consider every war as “evil”. “Terrestrial justice is the basic notion of all Jewish ethics.”

Post-Christian Judaism, says Blüher, is a *counter-enterprise* to
Christianity. It can neither be simply defined in terms of "religion" nor of race, for in this case the two are mutually interlocked; it is their indissoluble union which makes Judaism a highly potent historical power of unique character. The Jewish God and His People are joined to one another like two sides of the same coin. The latent Kingdom of Judah is religiously determined, a kingdom ruled by high priests; physical community of blood alone would in no wise explain its indestructible cohesion, especially as the Jews do not use outward means of power except such as are of a more or less volatile character. On the other hand, the racial type as such resists alteration through the influence of time and crossings; it is recognizable to-day in the ghettos of Bremen or Hanover as well as in the compact Jewries of Poland. The vulgar sort of racial Anti-Semitism, with its noisy and obscene demagogy, fails to grasp the real meaning of its adversary; however, allowance must be made for it as an historical necessity. The alleged Jewish plan of "universal domination" may never have materialized into a concrete project, or entered into the full light of Jewish consciousness; documents like the "Protocols of the Elders of Zion", etc., may, for all Blüher knows, exist as forgeries only, but the question of their authenticity is irrelevant. Their essential purport is genuine: "for Judaism has acted along their lines". But in all probability, this is only understood by the superior section of Judaism: the Primary Race within the Jewish Body: the Pontifical Tribe (Levi) and the Royal Tribe (Judah). For, although the manifest philosophy for which Judaism stands in our world is signally Secondarian (rationalistic, democratic, etc.), the Jews have their Primarians as well as other peoples; nay, seeing that in the mass they are more strongly Secondary than the rest of Secondary mankind, their Primarians definitely show signs of "superior" degeneration. A special, unparalleled hatred is at work within the Jewish world, which springs from the antagonism between the Ten Damned Tribes and the Two Holy Tribes (Levi, Judah). In spite of this corrosive inner hatred and the public espousal of the Secondarian cause, all Jews among themselves hold the Primarian's prerogative in awe. "In every-day life we have to deal with the Ten Damned, while the two Holy Tribes conduct the Judaic Empire's warfare against us from the background" (Blüher).
The destiny of Judaism is a unique mixture of self-preserving toughness and tragic frustration. Jewish behaviour, in a secular sense, is ruled by the law of a dual alternative; either Jesus was God's Son and Messiah, then we who crucified him are lost, and allied to the powers of Hell; or He was not, in which case we are the legitimate pretenders to the Messiahship and universal sway. Both aspects are united in the work of preserving the Jewish stock unalloyed. Assimilation may gain a genuine victory in individual cases; in the main, the Ghetto prevails, eternal and eternally doomed. The "tiredness of their old blood" of which the Jews talk so much is only a self-flattering euphemism for the Curse which has hung over them since the Crucifixion; it has no bearing on biological constancy. The gradual "watering-down" of Jewish blood is nonsense; the crossing with Aryan women only brings about a brief interlude of dissimulation which is soon followed by a reappearance of the pure Jewish type. "Judaism gathers its children once more from the wombs of Teutonic women." Often enough, Jews mate with Aryan women in order to escape from the Curse; they hope, in good faith, that they will merge in Christian mankind. Yet good will is far from being substance; it cannot cope with Fate. Anti-Semites and enthusiasts of the "Nordic Race" are not infrequently a first generation of Jewish bastards; later on, the Jewish substance will recover its own. "The Empire of Jehuda again takes hold of the great-grandson." (?) The bastardized lineage will in due course reproduce pure Jewish features. "All nations will pass; but Israel will live for ever." This distressing outlook is, to a certain degree, softened by the original curse— inherent in the rejection and crucifixion of the Messiah—and its consequences. The mere mention of these historical events causes Jewish blood to boil. Jews are remarkably eager to change their names, as though a particle of their own curse were attached to them; nay, the very word "Jew" has an anti-Semitic ring, the only designation of nationality which is in itself a term of abuse. The division and hatred among the Jews themselves is another reflection of the curse. Moreover, the Jewish designs ultimately portend danger to their own authors: the "rights of man" work out in terrible eruptions of the non-Jewish masses; in Russia the synagogues are destroyed as well as the churches. But, alas! this curse is a double-edged sword.
Those who join in inflicting the curse, who make its working effective, fall themselves under its spell. . . . Anti-Semites frequently assume Jewish traits. . . . The Jewish curse is liable to draw the peoples which harbour Jews into its circle. Anti-Semitism incites Aryans to pogroms; abusive language in regard to Jews is itself inchoate pogrom; and pogrom creates martyrdom, the token of future vengeance. The Jews may well rejoice whenever "the Goyims once more forget to examine themselves and to revise the book of history". Again, the doctrine of biological racialism is grist for the mill of the Jews, because it saps the strength of Christianity, thus disarming the religious antagonist of Judah, whose own aims lie unmistakably on the religious plane.

Nevertheless, Blüher himself is not innocent of petty anti-Semitic abuse. He shows the utmost irritation at the thought of Jewish gynaecologists treating German women. "The absurdity of the idea that the Jew may stand at the life-gate of the Teutonic race could hardly be exaggerated."

This was written in recent years (1931). Some few theses may be supplied from Blüher's main work on Christianity (1922). Anti-Judaism pure and absolute is nonsense: the Jews are no mere "Chandalas"; they also have their Primary race; they are often less vulgar than their assimilated or bastardized descendants. But they are "the Tribe stigmatized by heavy inner blows of fate". Their defectiveness can be read in their eyes, their voice, their gait, as well as in their unfitness for male friendship. They know no man-to-man relation other than the one between father and son; they have lost Eros paidikos and developed a bottomless inner hatred amongst men; subjects of a barren personal God of law, they neither know "gods" for which to live nor the mystical experience of an identity with God. Jesus Christ was certainly and essentially a Jew, but this is precisely the reason why He is nothing to the Jews: except for a small remnant He has "ravished their substance", leaving them a chorus of ghosts. The situation of Judaism in the world is desperate. Yet he who sheds Jewish blood subserves the aims of Jewish propaganda. "Woe betide the nation which is caught in this most dangerous of all snares!" Jewish blood must be spared, not on humanitarian grounds but "in view of the accursed sorcery of the ritual". The closing remarks, printed in capital
letters, contain an additional warning to the Germans in rather obscure terms: they should avoid mixing with Jews, but might learn a lot of things from them, and should, in their own interests, abstain from persecuting them. So far Blüher.

Even such a pronounced champion of racial Anti-Judaism as Houston Stewart Chamberlain stresses the religious roots of Aryo-Jewish antagonism. Though the Jews represent a specific type and medium of racial bastardization, it is the fundamental religious position which keeps that type together as a fixture, and provides a vehicle for its virulence throughout non-Jewish social surroundings. The Jewish problem lies in the fact that the Jews, unlike the “Aryans” who believe in an interpenetrating duality of cosmic powers, are Theists in a grossly palpable sense, believers in a neatly separable personal Deity who acts as a “lawgiver” for His creatures. For this very reason do they so easily become atheists: their intrinsically “godless” world continues to go round even though its protruding “Head” is chopped off. The Aryan, whose world is overgrown with divine forces and built on an imperceptible approach to God, is less liable to lose the contact: thus it is the Semitic elements of Christianity itself which pave the way for atheistic Rationalism and Materialism in the Aryan mind. In a way, Chamberlain seems to assume that the Jews are suited to play the part of a destructive counter-race precisely because they are not a primary racial formation like other constant historical units; not an “organically grown” race like the Teutons, but an artificial product comparable to the Jesuits. This is what enables them to carry on the work of racial decomposition, to form the “Roman” system, the second great power of hybridizing Universalism, to engender the poisonous racial chaos of modern great cities, without being swallowed up themselves, without losing their own identity. Thus they must be looked upon as a racially fixed religious power in the broader sense of the word, which means a radically irreligious power in its proper sense. For Jewish religion, with its tough and aggressive psychology, is not genuine religion; its underlying attitude is not “piety”. Genuine religion is first and foremost “emotional”, but that word renders the German original inadequately. What Chamberlain actually says is that it springs from Gemüt, which signifies emotion or feeling, but with a peculiarly Germanic connotation of
indistinctness, sentimentality, mood (in some cases it can be rendered by "humour"), intellectual irresponsibility. Real piety, clemency, meditation, the idea of holiness, are foreign to the Jewish mind; its conception both of religion and morality exhausts itself in the idea of Law, a contract between the celestial Lord and His human servants, a ritual order of juridical formalism. Jewish religion means an egotistical arrangement with God, whose menacing power makes it advisable to live on good terms with Him. Thus Right is only a codification of Might (Spinoza). Given this, as well as the Teuton's lack of juridical gifts, the judicial influence of the Jews is in a large measure a matter for anxiety; men of Jewish blood should not be allowed to fill the posts of judges in Teutonic countries. Apart from the entirely distorted and even contradictory picture of Jewish "legalism" (the deduction from "egoism" is quite insufficient and leaves all the main questions open) the reader is struck by the tragic and helpless sense of inferiority. It is a common attitude, either open or disguised, in the contemptuous polemics against Judaism. This conviction of the devilish superiority of the Jews is scarcely founded on reality; it must have a different meaning. I rather think it can be explained by the psychology of a declining aristocratic class, which associates all idea of a rational reorganization of society with a kind of uncanny witchcraft practised by a gang of alien conspirators, and which indulges in reassuring images of their own subject-people, representing them as naïve, inert, unpractical, and in need of an authoritarian "protection".

Haiser's book on the "Jewish question" proves as enlightening and to the point as we could expect. He propounds three divisions in "Anti-Semitism", two of which he deprecates as faulty or insufficient. Anti-Semitism on ethical or Christian grounds deserves no credit at all; we cannot effectively fight the Jew on a battleground chosen by himself. It does not even make much sense to call him "morally evil"; our dominant points of view are different. The second form of Anti-Semitism, the pure völkisch attitude of "racial struggle", is certainly justified in itself; it is our stringent task to remove the "microbe which invades our organism". But this conception is still too shallow, since it fails to dispose of the debilities that provide entrances for the microbe, of the secret affinity of our body for its destructive
venom. The conclusive method of settling the Jewish question consists in extirpating Democracy as a whole and restoring a master ethic, a master race, and a master caste within our own Germanic-Nordic people. It is no use evicting the Jews, even though they do embody the most destructive mongrel element, and are born instigators and profiteers of revolution, if at the same time we cherish the puerile illusion of a homogeneously "Nordic" population fit for a system of democratic equality. Nor will it do to make our people "völkisch" and Jew-free; unless the purge is carried out on a vast international scale, it will only induce Judah to entrench himself the more securely in such places as are safe for him. From these outposts he will continue to endanger "our" isolated counter-revolution. Hence we are bound to undertake the creation of a supra-national Counter-Freemasonry in the service of "Right-wing culture", directed against Judaism, Democracy and Bolshevism alike, not to forget the Jesuits! (Perhaps Stalin and the Pope will not quite see the point of being thus flung into a mutual brother- 
hood; and yet this household joke of anti-Left and anti-Roman deutschvölkisch authors is not without a modicum of spiritual 
meaning.)

A grand, though scurrilous, philosophy of Judaism is proffered in the Führer’s "Mein Kampf". Hitler shows himself absolutely dependent on the "racial antagonist"; he needs the Jew as the hungry man needs bread and the thirsty man water. The Jew is equated to the enemy, the historical and universal counterpart of the "Aryan". Owing to this construction and the various ends which it can be made to serve, Hitler has secured for himself a powerful weapon of political psychology; on the other hand, he cannot escape the resultant logical difficulties which make his position as a debater unenviable. Seeing that the Jew is a thus persistent and virulent adversary, he must be strong; but—as we remember—Hitler has broadly identified strength with nobility, and with the right to rule; if both the Aryan conqueror and the Jewish fiend are strong, what difference is there between them? Why is it "natural" or in any sense preferable that the Aryan, and not the Jew, should be master? Or is it a sufficient reason that "we" happen to belong to the Aryan side? And why is collective solidarity laudable in the Aryan but blameworthy in the Jew? The reader will notice that
it is again the old tribal dilemma which is harassing our Popular Thinker. "Our" tribe sets itself up as morally self-sufficient, defying mankind and universal norms or categories; at the same time, it cannot do without them and is driven to seek for universal recognition and approval. But for that, the German nationalist would never have launched the desperate attempt to exploit the "Aryan" idol for his pretensions.

Thus Hitler attributes the "strongest urge of self-preservation" to the Jewish community. It is easily proved by the "simple fact of the survival of this race". (From this gloomy and treacherous remark of their present-day Scourge, the Jews may draw some hope for the future. Perhaps their "urge for self-preservation" will even help them to survive the Third Reich. It has been said that "The Jews have stood by the graves of all their persecutors".) The said race is characterized by an "infinitely tough will to live and to preserve its kind". But is that not right? In what does it differ from "idealism", the "Aryan" mark of self-sacrifice for the community's sake? To call "tough" in one case what we call "self-sacrificing" in another is merely a verbal expression of different degrees of our favour for them, without any real reference to the objects. We shall now see that Hitler himself felt the difficulty and tried to overcome it. He insinuates that Jewish vigour is of a parasitic, not a primary and genuine, character. For instance, the Jewish intellect did not reach its actual height through spontaneous development but through "borrowing from other people's experiences". (This I am not prepared to disprove at a moment's notice.) Now at last the analysis of Jewish collective "toughness", which we were rash enough to compare with Aryan "idealism" or "community-feeling", appears. The Jewish quality of racial self-preservation is merely a compound of "barren egoism" and a "primitive herd-instinct". After all, it was not in vain that God bestowed upon us the gift of language! Aryan "idealism" we expound in the phraseology of patriotic text-books for schoolboys; to Jewish "herd-instinct" we apply the analytic terminology of Darwin, Freud and MacDougall. Jewish cohesion, says Hitler, only works in the face of common danger; as soon as common danger or the chance of a common booty is out of sight, the Jews turn into a "pack of rats truculently at loggerhead". What strong, irate language!
Germans quarrel among themselves, we hear of "unhappy party strife" or the "Teutonic curse of eternal disunion", as a result of exaggerated nobleness so frequently in the way of practical necessities. But Jews, "tough" and "primitive" when of one mind, are "rats" when they disagree with one another. True, Hitler points out a real speciality of Jewish existence. The naked egoism of individuals precludes Jewish state-life on a limited territory. They have no sense of sacrifice and therefore cannot confine themselves to a definite sphere of sovereignty. For the "territorial conception of the state" is dependent on an "idealistic attitude of the state-creative race, and particularly a right conception of work". The longer we meditate on this statement, the more boldly optimistic we must find it. But apart from that, the solution that the Jews are scattered all over the earth by individual egoism and yet linked together by primitive herd-instinct may not carry conviction with all of us. Hitler then tells how the Jews, obeying the injunctions of their religious doctrine, watch over the preservation of the purity of their own blood. He does not seem to notice the weird fascination of the phenomenon that such impure vermin, who can scarcely suffer one another's proximity, should so jealously protect the purity of their blood. And the suggestion that we noble Teutons should imitate their racial policy! At the same time, the Jew is intent on corrupting non-Jewish races with his blood. He makes a sport of illicit intercourse with Aryan girls; and he foists his daughters, in lawful marriage, on influential but less wealthy Aryans. In the progress of modern European history, he first succeeded in trapping princes who were short of money (type of the Court Jew); monarchy being sufficiently undermined, he by virtue of money and demagogy made himself a mass leader (type of the Popular Jew); in fine, he openly assumes control. The Marxist Proletarian movement is in reality destined to enslave and destroy all non-Jewish nations. (The tendency that underlies this seemingly insensate calumny is obvious. When the class-struggle, together with its political implications, is translated from the categories of constructive argument into terms of a dispute between "our Volk" and the "alien blood", the proletarian or democratic cause loses its inherent moral superiority.) In the final triumph of the Jewish campaign, the subjugated people—as is now the case with Russia—falls under the
tyranny of "a handful of Jewish men of letters and stock-exchange bandits". I hardly think there is, or ever was, a single stock-exchange figure in the ranks of the Russian bolsheviks; certainly the latter dealt exceedingly roughly with the stock-exchange. Hitler might as well have put in "Jewish sextons" or, perhaps with more reason, "Jewish innkeepers". But presumably it eased his heart to make a holocaust of what he most disliked. Blood purity, he continues—meaning, the exclusion of Jewish blood—is the thing of supreme importance, the reservoir of freedom: "once it is lost, man is undone forever". In the days when Mein Kampf was written, Germany had very nearly reached this lugubrious state. . . . The great rally in August, 1914, was but a "last flickering-up of the national urge for self-preservation". The inner enemy, the Jew, was not discovered. This blunder led to the unfavourable result: "Providence refused its prize to the victorious sword, and followed the law of eternal requital".

I cannot sufficiently emphasize the fact that this book is not intended to be read instead of, but rather to invite the reading of, Mein Kampf in the original. The bombast and vulgarity of the German original, which yet does not lack certain touches of force and sincerity, deserves more direct and extensive appreciation. Nor should the absurdities in its author's thought and style goad the writer into an attitude of cheap disdain. Whether or not Hitler is a really clever statesman, I cannot pretend to know; perhaps the question in this form is not well applied to him; to deny him political grandeur only proves a fatal lack of understanding on the critic's part.

Both the great Austrian politicians whose example schooled Hitler during his Viennese years of learning, the "christlich-sozial" Lueger and the "all-deutsch" Schönerer, were stubborn sponsors of political Anti-Judaism; but Schönerer was the more unrelenting. It was from Lueger that Hitler drew the idea of mass propaganda in fighting Liberalism and Marxism, of a popular movement in the service of reactionary aims; but he espoused Schönerer's Teutonic Gentilism as ardently as he refused allegiance to Lueger's demagogic clericalism and Hapsburg patriotism. We quote some passages from Schönerer's speeches (published in 1896): The Jews as a rule are filthy exploiters of the people. Characteristics suited to such a function
are common with them, whereas they are an exception in the Christians (!). Allowance may be made for "exceptions among Jews"; but they have no more relevancy than have exceptions among, say, cannibal tribes. The Jews are strangers to us, both as regards blood, race, descent, national morality and mentality. On the anti-Jewish front we must even engage the help of Slavs and Latins, whom Schönener would otherwise fain have reduced to a state of servitude under German rule in the Austrian provinces. "It is the Jewish problem that lies at the core of the social problem... The Jews and their vassals (!) have destroyed the foundations of the old society, and thus created the social problem." Nor can we be national Germans without dealing with the Jewish problem. Emancipation must be revoked. For we must love our People above everything else on earth, and accord equal rights to others as far only as it does not damage our own People. As is too often the case with prophets, Schönener did not live to see his dream realized, emancipation revoked (at least in the Reich) very thoroughly indeed. Modern Nazi racialism, of course, bothers rather less about the "bad qualities" of the Jews, and makes more of their alien hostility. Thus D. Klagges, the socio-economical expert who led the Nazi administration in Braunschweig in the agonizing years of the Weimar Republic, sees in the gradual expulsion or expropriation of Jewish owners an integral part of the Nationalist reform of society: for to leave control over capital reserves in Jewish hands is like having our army under the enemy's command. It may also be of some interest to cite Professor Sombart, the Prussian "Conservative" semi-Nazi who is sceptical about biological Race. Sombart insists on "fighting the Jewish spirit", which is all too largely manifest in men of non-Jewish lineage as well. (One hardly need explain that the "Jewish spirit" embraces whatever may contravene the Prussian spirit.) Sombart is not remiss in denying the Jews equality of rights; he does so from general love of inequality rather than from racial convictions. Are the Jews really entitled, he asks, to equal rights in the distribution of higher posts, regardless of what they are in mind and character, of what respect they deserve as men? A most incautious formulation: for to apply such standards, and such alone, is precisely the demand of Liberalism, the expression of justice and equal rights. Perhaps Sombart interprets the claim
to equal rights in the sense that one-third of the Cabinet Ministers must be chosen from the Jews, even if all the Jews in the country happen to be illiterate bullies. More light is shed again by the significant statement, referring to a practical discrimination of Jews: "We decline to endorse any abstract principle of justice, in whose name such an idea could be condemned ".

Schemann voices the opinion that the Jewish question proceeds from what may be termed the "aggressive exclusiveness" of the Jews. The Hindoos, too, set high store by racial purity; but they abide in a purely defensive self-enclosure, even placing the "alien" and "inferior" complement to their superior race within their own people. Contrary to them, the Jews seek to create social justice at home, and are out to expand abroad without respecting any limits. Blood and faith are in complete co-ordination; the principle of inbreeding (Inzucht) rests on religious grounds. Together with circumcision and food ritual, it ensures the separation of Judaism from common humanity; the latter, however, is not to be left alone but used for Jewish interests. The Jews are an overbearing people with a fatal inclination to overreach themselves: they are bent on obtaining fame and leading positions, though their creative power is insignificant if compared with Sumerians, Egyptians, Indians, Persians, Hellenes and Teutons. "Everywhere this repellent race has sowed the wind to gather the tempest at last" (Gobineau). This is a stiff-necked race, which never really gave up being a people, but tried to set foot everywhere among foreign nations (Gumplowicz, an Austrian sociologist, about 1900). To believe Schemann (1928), Judah is now nearer to its object than it ever was before, and it would not dream of renouncing its nationality. We have a tenuous chance that perhaps the Aryan world in its entirety will some time combine against its tormentor. . . . (Which would be all the more attractive because leadership might naturally fall to Berlin, where the necessity for such a combination was first recognized.) At any rate, "the persecution of Jews means the repudiation of Jewish supremacy". We have already commented on this curious complex of fear in the mental compound of Anti-Judaism. This psychological observation is also made by Voegelin, when dealing with the part, assigned to the Jews, of being a Counter-Race to the Germans. Schemann
lays emphasis on the distressing fact that the Jews are able to
draw such moral profit from the alleged perfection of their God.
This consideration entails reservations from, though not a
wholesale breach with, Christianity. Jesus, though incontestably
a Jewish patriot, had something Aryan about Him; His non-
Jewish origin is not open to scientific proof, but He has "nothing
of Jewish essence" (Chamberlain). There were forcible conver-
sions, and a great number of nominal Jews, in Galilee. . . . (Let
us place our hopes herein!) Certainly Jesus "Aryanized" the
Jewish idea of God. (Schemann probably thinks here of such
features as communion, love, grace, incarnation, etc., as opposed
to the rigid law and obedience principles.) But the Sermon on the
Mount, with its unattainable heights, is radically "un-Aryan"; and
so is the preference for the weak, briefly called "Miserabil-
ism" by Schemann.

We may take Anton Orel, the Austrian clerical and "social
reformer"—of the type that combines a specious "anti-
capitalism" and "social radicalism" with extreme political
reaction—as a characteristic protagonist of Right-wing Catholic
Anti-Judaism bordering on the racial and pagan variety but
couched in an overstrung kind of religious fanaticism. In his book
"Judaism, the historical antipode of Christianity" (1934) Orel
rightly proposes to substitute the term "Anti-Judaism" for
"Anti-Semitism". The Jewish character is primarily the pro-
duct of religious persuasion, not of race; so far as it also implies
a racial type, the latter itself is due to the formative influence of
that religious attitude on an original compound of races. Even
in the pre-Messianic era, the evil current of "Judaism" had cut
itself off from "Israel"; its course was finally determined by the
act of refusing allegiance to the true God, the treason and murder
perpetrated on the Messiah. Judaism means eating of the fruit of
knowledge with an impure heart; a worldly and sensual de-
geneneration of the Messianic idea; the materialistic and Liberal
conception of humanity. The faction we must fight against are
the "Judaists", originally of Jewish stock, but including a
multitude of accessory elements; for Judaism is a contagion
transferable to non-Jewish races. The "Christians", too, are of
Jewish origin; they begin with the small circle of Israelites who
committed themselves to the Messiah. Judaism rejects the
Redeemer; it rejects original sin; it professes to an unnatural
worldly optimism, embodying a *perverse usurpation of religious concepts*, which is far *worse than the natural corruption of the Gentiles*. (This, I think, conveys the dominant note.) Judaism, with its self-complacent morality and its tenacious ambitions, serves the Devil, not the Father; its mission among the peoples of the earth is to subvert social order and moral equilibrium, to elevate money to disproportionate heights (the Talmud enjoins the practice of usury on its devotees), to incite rebellion, to poison and disintegrate the nations. The "Chosen People" regards other peoples as its born slaves. . . . Those Jews who desert their faith usually turn to Heathenism; few of them mean to become real Christians, and even they should be received with great caution, and, on their part, behave with modesty and humility: for they cannot help carrying dangerous hereditary dispositions. In a word: the Jews are odious inasmuch as they are bearers of the bacilli of liberty and progress, and so are non-Jews tainted by the same infection; but Jews are always more susceptible to it.

So, too, speaks Seifert, the popular exploiter of "Culture Zones Theory": The "Jewish spirit", against which the anti-Semitic movement is directed, is the urban—and originally, "totemistic"—spirit of materialism (?) and individualism: "the spirit of the French Revolution, which won a new victory in the World War". (We should think, though, that a little too much honour is done here to Jewish merits.) The more the world falls a victim to this spirit, the mightier the Jew will grow. Money is his chief weapon, and his own misdirected craving for redemption his chief incentive. Anti-Semitism has no reasonable content unless it combats this spirit. (Certainly its purpose, be it reasonable or not, consists in combating the spirit of rational self-government and equality.) The "totemistic" tradition of the Jew makes him revolutionary in relation to foreign national bodies of a closed and hierarchic character; he looks for support in the "rootless elements of the great cities" i.e., the proletariat. On the other hand: "In the Western countries where the standards of urbane civilization have already risen to omnipotence, the Jew is smoothly assimilated and there is no longer any need for Anti-Semitism". This, I suppose, is very near the truth, and it flatly contradicts the above-quoted statement about the increase of Jewish power in the progress of democratic civilization.
To dispose of "Jewish power" in this fashion appears to me the only kind of Anti-Semitism with a "reasonable content", and one to which we could safely subscribe.

O. Menghin, Professor of prehistoric science at the University of Vienna, a Catholic Nazi (now an Austrian "Minister"), is interested in the practical rather than in the tragic side of "self-defence against Jewish ascendancy". The Jews, like other nations (how different from Chamberlain!), present a specific racial mixture: a compound of certain racial elements in definite proportions. It is mainly composed of the "Oriental" (Semitic, Arabic) and the "Pre-Asiatic" race, with an addition of Mediterranean ("Westic"), Nordic and, in no negligible degree, Negroid. The Southern European seldom feels racially antagonized by this mixture; and the "Oriental" component scarcely antagonizes anybody at all. But "the Northern Central European naturally has a feeling of strangeness towards pure Pre-Asiatic and still more towards Negroid types; what displeases him most are certain mixed types, because they seem to reflect, in a way, a caricature of his own appearance". "However, the central problem touches the spiritual side." During their many centuries of ghetto life, the Jews have acquired a "Levantine" psychology that is bound to make them objectionable in other peoples' eyes. Their attempt to lead a peaceful town life, continually on their guard against the oppressive actions of warlike master classes, has generated in them an over-development of the acquisitive instincts as well as of intellectual inclinations. Acumen, wariness, adaptability, submissiveness, dissimulation, yearning for power, cruelty (?), etc., were developed to neutralize the dangers inherent in their physical lack of defence. These features provide at least a partial explanation of modern Jewish psychology; and the not infrequent Jewish denial of any difference between Germans and German-speaking Jews is only another proof for the validity of this very table of qualities.

Even if many Jews are hotly in favour of assimilation: as long as Jewish religion and hence a body of Judaism—Jewish Volkstum—exists at all, we shall not be in a position to desist from regarding individual Jews as representatives of Judaism, and from treating them accordingly. But a special relationship between Jewry and Germandom must not be overlooked either. It is of a double nature. (1) The German Volk still preserves a characteristic
strain of peasantdom; and Teutonic peasantry was rather military in nature (Kriegerbauerntum): thus there is a much stronger division between Germans and Jews than there is between the Jews and the Western urbane civilizations. (2) The lingual Germanization of Eastern Jews makes the latter particularly apt to penetrate into German society with a pretence of figuring at once as "Germans"; and these Eastern Jews are precisely the least desirable fraction of Jewry at that. Therefore we have ample reason to keep the Jews (in their bulk at least) out of the German national body. "As conditions are on both sides, the reception of the Jews into Germanhood would indubitably entail the danger of an alteration of German Volk character"—a danger which it is our moral duty (!) as a nation to ward off. If the English or French find the assimilation of Jews to be wholesome for them, well, that is their own business with which we have no intention to interfere.

From these arguments, which betray no sign of savageness or fanaticism, we may gather once more that the anti-Jewish obsession of present-day Germany mainly goes back to the fatal tension between Germany and the West. Anti-Jewish action belongs to the system of operations by which Teutonic Counter-Revolution combats Christian, Roman and Democratic Western Civilization.

The German Jew is never committed thus "existentially" to Germandom as is the real German; he does not lose his Jewish substance; therefore he is far more ready to assume a pacifist or "moral" pose; Jewish interests have a natural affinity to the "international interests of humanity"—writes Stapel, thus disclosing once again the real meaning of the "boom" in Anti-Semitism. Turning to our own side, let us recall the words of Mowrer: "Nazi propaganda made the German people Jew-conscious at the price of their natural sanity. . . . The Jews, with the free-trade peoples, actually dared to preach internationalism, the peaceful settlement of international disputes and the end of war! . . . Anti-Semitism is an Aryan, not a Jewish, problem."

What they are engaged in persecuting is not so much the Jews as the Jewish spirit, and not so much the Jewish spirit as the Spirit. They have severely injured Judaism, but with the same action they also "thrust greatness upon it": for they have made Judaism—no matter how far the Jews intrinsically
deserved such an honour—the symbol of persecuted Liberty, Reason and Justice. And since these actually exist as a power on earth, can we despair of their victory? "No covenant is possible with the Jew," writes Hitler, "nothing except the hard law of Either-Or". Who knows which way the alternative will work!

Again I am haunted by the memory of Victor Hugo's poem, the trumpets of Joshua (clai rons de la pensée) so cheerfully flouted by the fierce defenders of the walls of Jericho.

"A la septième fois, les murailles tombèrent."

FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER VIII

A charming co-ordination between political and racial types in modern Germany is suggested by Stühle. Genuine Nazis comprise the Nordics proper; non-Nazis, in one sense or another, are mostly "nether-racial". Devout Protestants, skinflints, selfish critics and democrats are Ostic (Alpine). Devout Catholics, lovers of ritual, are Westic (Mediterranean). Cantankerous fault-finders are Dinaric (or Daelio—second-rate Nordics). "Left" Nazis, really clandestine Bolsheviks, are, of course, Ost-Baltic! What creates civilization, argues Günther, is never racial mixing but "racial stratification", meaning a society of conquerors and slaves.

1 A somewhat free (but essentially faithful) translation of B. von Selchow's neat verses may be excused:

"The hearts of all who are born of German mothers
In Germanism must be totally enfurled.
First comes my Volk, and then the many others:
My country first, and then the world!"

2 The Protestant theologian Althaus puts the problem in the following manner: "We cannot think of our nationhood without thanking God. In the national division of mankind we recognize the abundance of His creative power. But neither can we speak of our nation and the nations without also thinking of antagonism in history, of struggle and death. . . . The formation of das Volk also demands wrathful separation from others. . . . Nobody in human history can stand faithfully to his nation without also being obliged to conform to the stern, dark ruthless law 'Nation against nation.' . . . Thus full of contradiction must our speech of the Nation be'.

3 Another Lutheran author, Althaus, teaches that "Volk and Volkstum are creations and gifts of God"; indeed the "sanctity" of Volk belongs to the "aboriginal knowledge" of Christians, not "specially emphasized" but "presupposed" in the Gospels. He defines as the task of the Church to "preach the word of God to man possessed by the reality of Volkstum".

4 A well-known older völkisch author, Th. Fritsch, writes: "Psychological characteristics are more enduring than the physical tokens of Race. Racial kinship can be supposed to exist between all those who feel a mutual affinity, who think in the same fashion and are animated by the same ideals". From Staemmler we learn that "a Nordic exterior can hide a non-Nordic soul, and inversely".

5 On "Virtue" represented by bodily prowess, the "agonistic" ideal of Greek nobility, see W. Jaeger's "Paideia" (pp. 274 et seq.). Here too "Body and Soul" are considered as "One"; the notion of "strictly corporeal" qualities, says Jaeger, is an "empty intellectualistic abstraction".
In conformity with the strengthening of the Italo-German fascist conspiracy against mankind, the ideologists of Italian Fascism now seem to take a friendlier view even of "Nordic" racialism. A recently published book on Racialism by G. Cogni (condemned by the Papal See) attempts a systematic interpretation of Roman history in terms of a "dolichocephalic" Romano-Teuton "Master Race". He writes: "The light of the antique Nordic (Aryan) blood begins to brighten the world anew. Fascism and National Socialism already represent this light".
CHAPTER IX

THE GERMAN CLAIM

"It is the German people’s providential mission to re-build the Occident. . . . The Epoch of the Germans. . . . The nation that will crush the humanitarian lie of Europe and hoist the banner of true Order will automatically become the head of a new European organism."

E. JUNG.

1. THE CATEGORY OF "GERMANHOOD"

"Un-German liberty is not liberty."

HOUStON STrEWART CHAMBERLAIN.

"Let us avow ourselves: when once the peoples around us will understand what German art and poetry are, they will hate these just as much as German militarism. To-day they still nurse illusions about it; they talk of Goethe, meaning the hours when they dreamed about in his writings. . . . There is no contradiction between German reality and the German spirit."

L. D. FROST (1914).

"The ‘military’ spirit is akin to the spirit of ‘art’. . . . How the hearts of our poets were immediately ablaze, once war was declared! . . . German militarism is the manifestation of German morality. . . . After a German defeat German ‘militarism’ would leave Europe no rest until Germany should have reconquered her old position. . . . That German nature is painfully problematic, who would deny it! . . . The militarism inherent in the German soul, its ethical conservativism, its soldier-like morality—an element of daemonism and heroism:
this is it what refuses to recognize the civilian spirit as a final ideal of mankind.”

Th. Mann (1914).

The term Deutsch has a special ring for German ears. It is more than a mere analogy to other national designations, and more than a mere geographical, linguistic or administrative counterpart to “English” or “British”, “American”, “French”, “Italian”, “Bulgarian”, etc. Rather could the significance which a German nationalist attaches to Deutsch be compared with the emotional stress laid on the term “Slav” by a Slavophile in Tsarist Russia; or again, with what an educated British, French or Dutch citizen understands by “human”. Deutsch expresses a peculiar essence and status as well as a mere national unit among others; it claims to be a comprehensive description, more than mere definition. Nay, Deutsch even hints at a peculiar scale of values, a metaphysical principle invested with sovereignty over and above common human standards. This phenomenon of tribal logic is not completely absent from other national psychologies: the English sometimes denounce things or modes of behaviour they dislike as “un-English”, and speak slightly disparagingly of “foreigners”; the French occasionally snub les étrangers and use the phrase ce n’est pas français as a formula of repudiation; the small but proud Magyar nation has formed the quaint idea of a “Hungarian Globe”; and my Viennese fellow-citizens would be just as loath to define a multitude of themselves as “thousands of men” (instead of “thousands of Wiener”) as other people would be to describe a human crowd as “thousands of mammals”. But all these things are comparatively harmless relics of a tribal past, or examples of mass weakness of no real importance. The animosities prevailing, for instance, between the English, French, and Americans, are rather comparable to the feelings of hatred between a group of young men of the upper middle-class in London who all happen to be in love with the same pretty girl. The German nationalist, on the other hand, looks upon “the others” somehow in the way that an average English middle-class amoroso would look upon a sinister gang of daemonic dukes, homosexual artists, promiscuous proletarians, and (worst of all) ascetical monks. The German nationalist’s objections to
the Western and Slav world are not of a national but a religious, a metaphysical, or to put it even more exactly, an anthropological order. German nationalism does not mean above all the service of German interests; it rather means one’s interest being absorbed in German selfhood—Deutschtum, Germanhood—as a theme.

Thus the idea of “Germanhood” emphasizes the integral, categorical character of the struggle for hegemony between the German “Empire” and—the other side. For the salient feature of the situation is precisely that this “other side” is not itself an empire or a nation, however much one is accustomed to represent it by France; the part of France in the antagonism is indeed representative but by no means necessarily predominant, let alone exclusive. Germanhood is not a nation opposed to another nation within a common world: it means a nation which is also a world for itself, and is opposed to another world, made up of a society of nations; and yet the two worlds, unlike, for instance, the spheres of the “White” and the “Yellow” race, are again merged in a higher historical unit which may roughly be called the “Occident” (Abendland). “Germanhood”, in this particular and qualified sense, is as deeply opposed to the West and to Slavdom as it is inseparably tied up and interwoven with them. The Germanic opposition to “Europe”—to use again an inexact but handy term—has to some extent the appearance of a class-struggle stated in tribal terms: a revolution (or counter-revolution) whose forces are aligned according to data of racial, religious, geographical and historical differentiation. Of course, the so-called “German protest” is neither a revolt of slaves nor a chastisement of rebellious Pariahs; still less, however, can it be conceived in terms of mere national rivalry. The attitude of “Germanhood” has a curious touch of doubt and clumsy self-consciousness; its arrogance is closely akin to “over-compensated” insecurity. Still, there could be no more pitiable mistake than to give a wholesale “explanation” of that attitude by intrinsic weakness, “inferiority”, or even backwardness. Such an interpretation would not only do grave injustice to the great merits and achievements of humanitarian Germandom, but also fall short of understanding the tragic aspects of Nazi Germany itself—which, alas! is a very German Germany indeed. Generally speaking, it may be added that even in individual life, insecurity and lack of poise are less likely to be
the signs of weakness and paltriness than of disproportion between one's forces and of the presence of certain inner conflicts not yet overcome.

Benz, a sober and reflective German patriot, in commenting on the present topic, expresses uneasiness. He sees an almost "grotesque" trait in the specifically German phenomenon of the Nation itself serving as an "idea". The conscious overstressing of the national motif, which is the hallmark of the contemporary German mind, betrays incompleteness on this point. The cleavage of the German people into a nationalist and an internationalist camp (this was written before the latter section was outlawed) constitutes a far more fatal and painful disruption than does any class-war. The "Right" is entirely concentrated on Power and Blood; the Mind is monopolized by the "Left"—but it is not a German Mind (nicht deutscher Geist). . . . Thus Benz himself was unable to find his way out of the vicious circle. He was certainly right in declining to see in that momentous division between Deutsch and Undeutsch Germans a mere reflection of class warfare. Professor Bergmann, whose ideas on Deutschreligion were described in Chapter V, is also much concerned with the great breach in the German soul; he derives it from racial heterogeneity (the plurality of the German Stämme) and, in particular, from the disruption in the Church due to the only partial success of the Reformation.

We quote from an Austrian survey (in "Berichte") of French authors, especially Hermant: The German character yearns for isolation from the rest of the world. It despises moderation; it lacks a sense of harmony; it finds the necessity of co-ordination with a foreign world oppressive. It has little liking for boundaries; the German devotion to an "organic collectivity" hampers any understanding of such factors as are beyond its borders. The German obsession of "constant creative activity" generates contempt for a static international order with its apparently "sterile" juridical rules. The national consciousness of peculiarity and racial excellence is particularly hostile towards the French ideas of homogeneous culture on a purely intellectual basis, as well as of civilisation essentially accessible to all mankind. Speaking of foreign critics, let us add some words of Mowrer which are very much to the point: "German self-esteem has always had a peculiar colour. . . . They have a
half-coherent philosophy, a systematic teaching concerning their
world mission”). Mowrer supplies a brief sketch of its evolution
from Schiller and Fichte, via Hegel up to Moeller-Bruck; Lagarde
appears to have been the first to use the distinctive epithet Herrenvolk
for the Germans. Thus if, in the world
situation subsequent to the treaty of Versailles, “Germany
cannot consent to remain a second-class nation” (Mowrer), the
underlying assumption is not that it is worth as much as any of
the first-class nations, but that it is worth more—indeed, forms a
“first class” for itself. English public opinion will still have to
learn that the mere removal of “injustices” and discriminations
is far from touching on the core of the German problem, and the
farthest possible from unseating National Socialism.

Deutsch must needs be conceived as an essential category, by
no means a simple designation or indication. The French claim of
providing the world with a directly imitable example of human
civilization pure and simple is as strange to the “national”, the
“representative” German mind as is the blend of proud sim-
licity and noble modesty in the English usage of calling
England “this country”. The Western reader will have some
difficulty in making head or tail of Hitler’s charge against the
German Left which he accuses of debasing Germany into a
“mere commercial firm registered as ‘Germany’”, or the
analogous complaint of Blüher: “German Volk, as understood
by Socialism, means only a ‘crowd of people’ (Volksmenge) with
the postal address ‘Germany’”. A chapter in Jung’s book is
inscribed “Culture; Soul; German Culture”. Anything of this
kind would be quite inconceivable in any other language,
but—though of course very bad style in German, too—it is a
quite common occurrence in the wonderland of German nation-
alism. Mowrer is guilty of no exaggeration when speaking of
“the use of the adjective ‘German’ to the point of mania in all
public nomenclature”.

“Whenever at first sight we fail to understand Wagner”,
writes Houston Stewart Chamberlain in his monograph on
Richard Wagner, “we shall be well advised in putting the query:
What would be here the quite specifically and characteristically,
distinctively and particularly German view—in the deepest and
truest meaning of the word?” Indeed, the much-discussed
Dresden speech of Wagner, made in 1848, contains the monu-
mental statement: "What is the German thing?—This must also be the right thing". An admirably succinct and revealing formula! Needless to say that the right formula for any sound and reasonable patriotism is the exact opposite. Any good Brazilian citizen, say, in full possession of his senses, can only follow the device: "What is the right thing?—This must also be the Brazilian thing".

The Germans, however, are excessively interested in themselves. "The proper study of the German is the German". German nationalist literature, bulky as it is, is so monological and self-reflexive as to arouse in us the nightmare vision of a Shakespeare whose main dramatic character would invariably be William Shakespeare, a George Bernard Shaw whose long life would have been spent exclusively in writing a hundred volumes about G. B. Shaw, a G. K. Chesterton whose essays would never have been consecrated to any subject other than the problem of what was, or was not, deeply and genuinely Chestertonian. "Who are we?" "Whither do we tend?" "Our mission in the world"—and so on, are standing topics of German speculation. Whereas an English nationalist will rejoice in adding a pound to British national wealth a German nationalist who is busy enriching his country by a mark, may easily fall a prey to doubts as to whether "mark" is really a deeply German denomination.

We shall tarry with Houston Stewart Chamberlain for a while (making allowance, to be sure, for his national inferiority complex due to his English descent and, to make bad worse, his partly French education). Chamberlain manages to bring all things under the sun to the level of German excellence and self-preoccupation. Luther, for instance, was not a great religious thinker, however religious his basic experiences may have been; his theology was little more than diluted Catholicism; above all, he was a "political man of German patriotism" who fought the "political system" called Rome. In general, what matters is the forcible identification of Germanhood with Value. To that end, Chamberlain deftly exploits the self-esteem of European and Occidental man; nor does he hesitate to practise a certain amount of juggling. The Occidentals or Slavo-Celti-Teutons are indubitably the salt of the earth; now the Teutonic is their characteristic common stock (Germanen); but surely it is the Germans who are the typical Teutons. As the first step,
the Teutons are to be taken “in a broad sense”; correspondingly, it is more adequate to speak of a “Teutonic” than—how colourless and unsubstantial!—of a “European” culture. Later, a further specification seems to commend itself. “Certainly the process of history has caused Germany—or Gernandom—to become the seat of genuine Teutonic consciousness.” Hence the most important Europeans are, after all, Germans in the proper sense. Gernandom is “the epitome of Teutonic racial essence”. We must be careful to understand it rightly: it is not that the Germans, judged by any obvious standards of human virtues and achievements, happen to be the finest nation—which might be quite conceivable and a rather harmless supposition in itself—what is really meant is that they incarnate human value and could as little be evaluated by any universal criteria as God could be held to account by an assembly of curates.

“Is there a German idea?”—asks G. Gründel in his book on the new generation (1982). Of course there is. Up to the present, however, no “deutsche Weltidee” has emerged; but now its contours are just beginning to be visible. The “Manifesto of German Revolution” refers to a “dethronement of Lucifer”, i.e., “horizontal” principles (meaning rationality and equality), and the restoration of “vertical” ones (rank and mastery); further, to a substitution of “the duties of man” for his abused “rights”, of “living man” for “merchant omnipotence”, “idealism”, etc. Incidentally, here is a characteristic instance of the manner in which German nationalism appraises and utilizes the pacifist activities of the French Left: Günther mentions the request put forth about 1928 by 80,000 French schoolmasters (the traditional Left body in France!) to have French education purged of the Chauvinist spirit, “which—with its unmeasured and irresponsible anti-German propaganda, at last appeared to be a barbaric disgrace even to them”. The truth is that German school-books, even before 1933, easily beat their French rivals in the field of Chauvinism.

Once there was a reputable philosophical review, published in Heidelberg, which bore the dignified name of Logos. And during the Weimarian “seed-time” of the Third Empire, nationalist Professors (among others, Hermann Schwarz and Spann) founded a new philosophical paper called “Blätter für deutsche Philosophie”. Soon after Hitler had seized the reins of govern-
ment, this was found to be an unsatisfactory state of things; poor "Logos" ceased to appear and was supplanted by a periodical similar in form, christened "Zeitschrift für deutsche Kulturphilosophie". (We beg the reader to notice that there is no question of special research in the history of German philosophy: surely it is quite conceivable that an English circle of scholars should devote themselves to the history of English thought.) In the first issue of the new paper, Professor Glockner examines "German philosophy" in general, or rather, interprets it as a manifestation of the incomparable "German soul". We hear that "German philosophy is, to a higher degree than any other, a product of the Volk and bound up with the Volk". "German philosophy rests on the disharmony of the German soul", which is partly a peasant's and partly a soldier's soul, each with its characteristic contribution to philosophical aspects. "German philosophy rests on the Zusammengezogenheit (concentration, inwardness, introversion) of German Gemüt (soul, character, emotivity)". (Poor Leibniz, Kant, Brentano, who still bothered with commonplace problems of logic, metaphysics and ethics, without enquiring about the distinctive traits of German thought! Fichte was certainly ahead of them). But more definite revelations are to follow. "German philosophy rests on the unconditionality of German will". It is always absolute, bearing on the "Whole"... "Durchhalten! German philosophers know what this word means". (Many Englishmen, without being philosophers, may know it, too. It means "to hold out", or "to stick to it", and it was the watchword of the German annexationists during the War. Durchhalten is written in italics in the original. "German philosophers", it appears, have become a regiment like the Coldstream Guards or Welsh Guards.) "German philosophers" must be prepared to fight: "We shall have to fight the un-German spirit which, unfortunately, has infiltrated our philosophy in the last decades".

Throughout the annals of history, no great nation has ever mentally debased herself more horribly.

Sombart, the inventor of "German Socialism", raises the classical question: "What is German?" (When will Mr. Cole, Mr. Hobhouse or Mr. Keynes, at last stop to ask: "What is English?"?) Well, what is German? Sombart is a methodical spirit who opens the enquiry with circumspect caution. He puts
forward the appreciable discovery that German man (der Deutsche) has certain features in common with other people: thus (a) with all human beings; (b) with all men of White race (including the Jews), and so on. No wonder that a full-blown Nazi looks askance at Herr Sombart. However, patient labour leads him on to more discriminating statements. "Apart from small nations, the Germans are the only nation that has always had a keen sense of the value and importance of foreign nationhood." (Then, I fear, we approach a dilemma analogous to that of the Cretan who said that all Cretans were liars: is it not undeutsch to talk so much about Deutsch?) Further, the German tends to Sachlichkeit (objectivity, matter-of-factness) as against hero-worship. The instances given are: "Bismarck, not Napoleon! Hitler, not Mussolini!" There is no denying that "we Germans" are a little mysterious: the French cannot be blamed for speaking of l'enigme allemande. We are rich in contradictions—and in chances. "The German is not, he is becoming (ist nicht, er wird)", said Nietzsche. How pleasant it is for the German Professor to rejoice in the slightly sinister opacity of his racial soul! Subsequently he complicates matters by stating that "German essence" includes what "should" or "ought to" (soll) be German. The German is a fine specimen of man, but he is not as yet German enough. Our cosmopolitanism, our love of foreign things, must be combated. Sombart exhorts his nation: "Become what you are". He preaches an activist gospel: "The German Volk should (soll) be: a Volk of the Spirit, a Volk of Action, a Volk of Manifoldness", but above all of Action following the axiom of Fichte: "Act! act!" Never mind if ill-wishers call us "barbarians"; it may help us to be barbarians in a certain sense of the word: to remain young and ready for everything.

Rosenberg in his "Crisis of Europe" (1934) writes that National Socialism is engaged in turning the German nation into "one huge block of seventy millions suffused with the same blood". Given the success of this endeavour, the "practical conclusion" results that "this creed of blood, this outlook on the world; is the only right one for Germany". Bergmann, however, has still more dumbfounding revelations to offer, along the same lines. Resolutely he takes up Fichte's suggestions as to the spiritual priority and purity of Germanhood. "Spiritual
Teutonia (Germanien)”, he wrote some months after Hitler took office, “is the cradle of that mode of thinking which aims at the elevation of mankind”. “German educational idealism (Bildungsidealismus), which may also be called educational imperialism, has scarcely a parallel in the rest of the world”. Particularly is the glory of Germany’s disciplined revolutions, even the ignoble one of 1918, above comparison. Hitler’s manoeuvre of bringing a system independent of majorities into power by means of successive majority decisions “was only possible in a Kulturvolk of the type of Germany”. This, we believe, might also be admitted by some of the observers whose admiration is less wholehearted. National Socialist revolution, Bergmann continues, is not merely a glorious feat of the German nation but, to apply Fichte’s words on the Reformation, a “perfect world-deed (Welttat) of the German spirit”. We may leave it at that, since an attempt at criticism would stir up a far too complicated problem of values; but let us add the simple and unshakable fact—it may or may not be deemed a “glory”—that certainly no Kulturvolk in “the rest of the world” has produced as yet philosophers who coined categories analogous to Bergmann’s: Deutschgläube, Deutschreligion, Deutschethik.

Nor does Bergmann stand alone: for Schemann offers the somewhat less striking, but at bottom similar, neologism Deutschdenker. By that name we are not, by any means, to understand simply a German thinker, even though he be beyond all suspicion of “alien blood”. It is not the thinker but the thought itself—nay, the object of the thought—that must be German to justify the use of that forceful epithet. Deutschdenker—like Arndt, Görres, Jahn, Lagarde, etc., and in the main, also Carlyle—are men of various interests and professions who, however, “converge on the one centre of Germanhood.”. Speaking of Schemann, we may at once complete the picture by mentioning that he, amongst others, is an example of that peculiarly repellent expression of nationalism (and above all, German nationalism), which consists in sentimental self-praise under a threadbare cloak of ostensibly relentless self-criticism. “I was obliged . . . to utter harsh and bitter truths about my people.” By their very virtues, the Germans have greatly furthered their racial deterioration. . . . They have been far too indulgent, too meek, too charitable, too genuinely Christian. . . .
"It is a cruel law of the world that Volk and Race have claims on us widely different from those raised by ethics and religion." We hopefully assume that Schemann is willing to regard Hitler's régime as a perceptible step towards improved conditions and a diminished necessity for "harsh and bitter truths about his people".

Professor Breysig's poetical examination of "German spirit and its nature", though far removed from the Nazi trend of thought, deserves some attention as an instance of the fatal and torturing self-reflexiveness of the German mind, and of its exaltation at its own obscurity. "Intent on acquiring an understanding of himself, the German must gain an image not only of himself, the German of to-day, but also an image of himself, the German eternal!" Breysig, an adept—if I am rightly informed—of the Stefan George circle, indulges in shadowy and swollen expressions. The formulas by which he tries to describe the "German soul" are rather difficult to translate. How can we find an English equivalent for the tortuous substantive "das Regelfeindlich-Bindungslose"? Let us attempt a feeble rendering by "the component hostile to rules and intolerant of fetters". Then there is the element of passionate urge—the principle of Plus ultra. And now again a hard nut to crack: "das Traumstarke and das Dunkel-Tiefe". Mellifluous words for German ears! Dreamful strength and obscure depths. . . . (I should put it in French: éléonirique—et la profondeur des ténèbres.) Further: anti-rationalism, and yet Sachlichkeit (objectivity; being true to the material); however, the latter covers a loving approach to Nature. How far does Germandom mark the zenith of mankind? Breysig further asks. In philosophy and music, at least, it is not equalled by any other culture. Then it has a very deep understanding of war, which it experiences as an "adventure of the soul". Taken all in all, the ancient Greeks and the Germans—they are in some respect twins, and complement one another—rank above all their fellow-nations, albeit, Michelangelo and Shakespeare are excelled by none, the English surpass the Germans in statesmanship (it was before Hitler that Breysig wrote this) and the ancient Greeks may be said to surpass them in spiritual creativeness. In any case, the French—in spite of occasional grandeur—are without representation on the highest levels; and the Germans are the Greeks of the new era.
We must on no account here pass over Moeller-Bruck, the great apostle of the policy to turn the German revolution into a German (counter) revolution. In his "Third Reich"—using the term "Conservative" for counter-revolutionary "dynamism" flirting with "proletarian" interests—he writes of the nationalistic determination of domestic policies: "Conservative man has a clear insight into the fact that henceforward it is the German cause alone that is to be considered". In Moeller's essays collected under the title "The Right of the Young Nations", we again meet with the strange infantile pleasure in one's own strangeness and abnormality. Strangest of all, English common-sense is summoned to reckon with that character and show consideration for its bearer. "We are an enigmatic people. Our fate has forced us to be quite enigmatic in politics, and to declare overtly that we are so. England would no longer be England if her idea of adaptation were not to include an attempt at adapting herself even to the enigmatic". For the equipoise of the Continent depends on Germany, and England is interested in that equipoise. Leaving aside this amicable appeal (seasoned by a slight hint of blackmail), in general the writer is in favour of an integral anti-Western attitude and a subversive alliance with Soviet Russia—though again on the condition that the latter "accepts German peculiarity". (In a word, Bolshevik revolution may be good enough to be used as a tool against Western democracy so long as it is chaotic and inefficient enough to be unable to endanger German counter-revolution and Prussian militarism.) Moeller-Bruck is glad that Germany was defeated in the War, and especially that such harsh treatment was meted out to her at Versailles. For these facts prevented her from spiritual submersion in the pool of Western civilization. Mowrer: "Thus did the German ruling class react on the imposition of military terms of armistice contrary to the hopes held out by Wilson: 'Thank God! For in that case we shall overcome the revolution and secure our national freedom so much the sooner'". "Our annihilation", says Moeller, that is, the imposition on us of a situation which we feel to be intolerable, has proved to be "the foundation of German strength and uncanniness". For, whereas meaner races content themselves with happiness, with wealth and knowledge, order and liberty, etc., the Germans (or rather, the men of "Germanhood") cannot feel happy without
exuding *Unheimlichkeit*, uncanniness. Moeller-Bruck proclaims triumphantly: "Our adversaries have condemned themselves to live in uncertainty". But we do not seem to be satisfied with terror for others; we also crave terror for ourselves. "Men need compulsion. Germans need it doubly". Other people need danger; "the Germans need peril, the threat of destruction" (*Untergang*). We are faced here with that immoral speculation *à la baisse* which attempts to derive power from acceptance of catastrophe as a normality instead of merely preparing for it as for an emergency. It is not the manner of unruly inferiors or revolutionary proletarians, but rather of *diespossessed overlords*. The alleged disunity and "individualism" of German people also serves to justify the claim to nationalist dictatorship. "We are the nation of contrasts"; the contrasts stand by one another in unrelieved tension; which is one more reason for the necessity of higher integration "on a third level".

Whether or not it is true that the German people are split among themselves, there is certainly a dialectical cleavage in the ideology of "specific" German nationalism. Its direct motivation, which in our judgment is the more intelligent and open-hearted one, is based on the assumption that the Germans are better than other people and by their very nature destined to stand above them. We have had some glimpses of this pretension, and shall see more of it soon. But there is another train of thought, which runs counter to it; in dealing with Schemann, we have alluded to this argument of inferiority and its questionable sincerity. Crudely speaking, it is sometimes hinted that the Germans have a right, or rather the duty, to cultivate their nationalism with particular ardour and narrowness just because they have got so little of it. They are told to behave with deliberate ferocity because they are so excessively tame. Thus Pembaur, an Austrian "Nationaler" who is not exactly a genius, but none the less characteristic for that, writes: "Above all, it would be madness in our days to preach desertion from the national idea, hoping, maybe, to attain by that means a universal brotherhood of mankind: such an enterprise might possibly rouse the expected echo in the German people (!), just as the peace-pipe of Wilson found an all too ready hearing among them. The others (!) would hardly place a stronger check on their national egoism; nay, they would be eager to
grasp the opportunity to fall upon (l) one who, out of altruism, renounced his own rights. The time is not ripe enough. "... Let "the others" look to their consciences! As for German nationalism, it "has at all times set the honour and liberty of the German nation above any desire for power or for ruling others". Germany is the "central country" (cf. Section 8); whether she will be able to attend peacefully to that function, depends on the calming down of the "nationalism, overheated to the point of madness, of the hostile nations (Feindvölker)". The desire for justice in the question of war guilt is "only at home in Germany"—declares General Seeckt with astounding simplicity and without a trace of justification or proof. Likewise, according to Hitler, the German pacifist is the only one to regard the interests of his nation with "genuine objectivity"; only German Socialists are really "international"; others, for instance, Jews (!) or Czechs, never forget their own national interests. (!) Three cheers for the Jews and Czechs; fie on the "objective", the "impractical" Germans, even outside the ranks of professional pacifists and their direct victims! The Germans, we gather, have not even been honestly "objective" (which would have been sinful enough) but simply self-haters; callow "objectivity" would have sufficed to perceive that war-guilt was entirely on the enemy's side. Literally, Hitler writes in his criticism of German public opinion during the War: "The guilt problem ought not to have been discussed 'objectively' at all: the right course would have been to throw all guilt exclusively on the enemy, even if this would not have covered the exact truth, as it actually did". These significant words are printed on page 200 of Mein Kampf. On page 105 of the same volume our eyes are caught by phrases which may easily throw a different light on the problem of war-guilt: phrases like "Human right breaks state-right", or "The world is not there for timid nations". On page 201, the Germans are once more blamed for their morbid penchant (Fimmel) for "objectivity". Yes, the right course would have been so and so even if this would not have covered the exact truth. ... And on page 153, the Jews are rather unlovingly censured for being "pastmasters in the art of lying". Thus Hitler sees no difficulty in despising the Jews for their alleged untruthfulness, and at the same time reproaching his own "racial fellows" for their alleged lack of that quality.
2. **THE PRUSSIAN DRIVE**

"And I knew what Spirit had passed who
is vast beyond meaning or measure,
The blank in the brain of the whirlwind,
the hollow, the hungry thing,
The Nothing that swells and desires, the
void that devours and dismembers,
In the hearts of barbarian armies or the
idle hours of a King."

**G. K. Chesterton**
("The Queen of Seven Swords.")

"The Prussian theory and practice is quite simple and logical."

"Modern Prussian mind . . . is tainted with a kind of madness
which is the nemesis of a divorce from instinctive morals."

"Prussia is hardly to be called a nation. It is rather an
institution animated by a certain spirit, and a certain creed."

"... A series of rulers obeyed in turn by a more or less servile
population. That population was of mongrel Slavonic stock
originally ruled by a small German aristocracy. The Faith
reached Prussia later than it reached Russia or Norway, and
never penetrated deep."

"Besides, the possession of a huge army and the subjection
of the civil population by means of that army, though a necessary
part of the Prussian system, is not the root of that system. Its
root, as is the case with all human creations, will be found in a
philosophy. That philosophy is Atheist. . . The real Atheist is a
man without God; not a man who cannot satisfy himself as to
the intellectual proposition that there is a God, but a man for
whom God does not exist, for whom there is no Righteous
Judge of Creation whose judgments are consciously or uncon-
sciously accepted; for whom the only test of human action is
material success. Such a man may not profess Atheism. He may
even personify the material forces of the Universe, of which
THE GERMAN CLAIM

alone he is conscious and in which alone he believes, and call
them ‘ God ’. This, one may guess, is what the German Emperor
does. . . .”

CECIL CHESTERTON
(“The Prussian hath said in his heart.”)

A year or so before the sunrise of the Third Empire, Joseph
Goebbels proclaimed in a speech: “National Socialism is the
ture survival and continuation of Prussiandom”. Perhaps he
would have been nearer the truth if he had called National
Socialism the lawful heir of Prussiandom; for, by bringing the
Prussian mission to accomplishment, it will at once dissolve the
aboriginal substance of Prussiandom as an historical entity. In
fact, the most representative factors—social, ecclesiastic, and in
part, military—of the old Prussian tradition are to-day lined up
in opposition (mostly mild, however) against the Nazi régime,
which is not slow in persecuting them (rather fiercely sometimes).
Implicity, however, Goebbels was right: for the typical remnants
of a grand but worn-out system are not always those which have
preserved most intact and vital the spirit, the afflatus, the
impetus which animated that system. Fascists, and with good
reason, may upbraid royalty for not being autocratic enough;
Nazis may legitimately snatch the flag of Prussiandom from
ossified Junkers, from Judaized “ sons of gentlemen ” (Burschen-
schaften, students’ associations), from all too bureaucratic officials
or even officers. Old Prussiandom meant an impregnable East
Elbian nucleus with its half-servile agrarian constitution, its
militaristic scale of values and honours, its barbarous but solid
dynastic and pseudo-Christian tradition, its imposing—and in
some points, all but attractive—ideology of service, discipline,
efficiency, and jejune simplicity; uncontested Prussian hege-
mony in the Germanic world; and a fairly aggressive contempt
for the extra-Germanic world and its subtler moral standards
which, be they Catholic, Puritan or Quaker, Masonic, or Socialist,
were mainly assessed as a jumble of cowardice, selfishness and
hypocrisy. New Prussianism means absolute fusion of the body
of Germandom with the Prussian spirit; the transference of
Prussian principles to new (especially, industrial) objects and
designs; stress laid on expansion, not preservation; a “ totali-
tarian ” swallowing-up of alien elements instead of the cautious
establishment of mere Prussian preponderance; and the expansion of Prussian pretensions on a planetary scale. A rejuvenation and extension of this kind inevitably involves a considerable loss of substance. In another sense, however, it also means a reversion to pristine values and attitudes. “National Socialism is the embodiment of primal Prussiandom” (Dyrssen). In this sense, Goebbels is indeed more Prussian, perhaps more Frederician, than was Bismarck with his occasional touch of sanity and moderation, his almost Liberal knack for compromise. The secret of Prussian greatness is inseparable from a tendency to unorganic growth, a religious imperative of conquest, a hunger for military and political unfolding on civilized soil which is quite out of proportion to the national substratum as regards mental and material civilization. The original form in which Prussiandom existed is best described as a League (Bund) of militant Masters expanding into the Void, over barren plains inhabited by a strictly inferior conquered populace. This flat country is poor, but well adapted to the purpose of building up a large-scale and mobile military organization. This Void invites swift and ruthless action, but it is by no means simply an outlying fringe of the Oecumene; with more justification can it be said to lie in the heart of Europe. Thus Prussiandom itself re-introduces the state of Teutonic conquest throughout the sphere of Roman civilization. Its distinctive character is dynamic rather than conservative, aggressive rather than concentrated on mere organization. To conceive society in terms of a subjection of inferiors, dilated into a subjection of others, too, of peoples imbued with an older and more settled civilization, as though they were inferiors, is inherent in the Prussian genius. Here again we touch the vital point; the problems relating to the adjustment and maladjustment of more or less pagan Teutonism to the world of Christian civilization, particularly in its periods of decay or in a crisis mistaken for final downfall. The “Prussian drive”, fed on the historical pattern of German bündisch Knights (Deutschherren) subduing Slav toilers in the moorlands and other dreary plains of the European Middle East, reflects and reshapes the Teutonic longing, not without an element of tragedy, to conquer and subject “inferior”, “weaker”, “despised” tribes and nations whom they yet consider or surmise to be “superior” in the sense of having a sneaking admiration for their standards in
spite of their difference. The Teuton as a “Rebellion Superman” still lurks behind the Prussian façade of “Disciplined Daemonism”. Be that as it may, the one sure thing is that the Prussian Drive, that sharp edge driven into the body of Europe, has gone over entirely to National Socialism, and is more powerful and more menacing to mankind than it ever was before.

What do the Prussians themselves intimate about their Prussia?

Moeller-Bruck is anxious to rehabilitate Prussia in German as well as in foreign eyes; for most nationalists, and the Germans perhaps more than others, find it impossible to be honestly indifferent to foreign opinions. Thus Moeller appraises Prussia as a factor of sober orderliness amidst the wild, chaotic, un-political, and in some sense “barbarous”, fabric of German impulses and aspirations. There is no need to speak at length about France, which least of all has cause for complaint about Prussian aggressiveness. “Prussian militarism has always served constructive aims (Aufbau), whereas French militarism was always an instrument of conquest.” I am inclined to endorse this bold statement, if rightly interpreted; it is quite true that militarism has always been a principle of social order in Prussia, and an instrument of political aims in freedom-loving, if sometimes unreasonable, France. But Moeller himself gives a somewhat strange interpretation to his apology for Prussiandom. “No state has ever pursued more scrupulous and correct policies than did the Prussian leaders in their classic periods. This did not prevent them from being also ingenious; never perfidious, to be sure, but daemonic (!) in their grand devotion to the State.” They provided “daemonic” solutions for political entanglements: thus General York, Baron Stein, and Bismarck when “availing himself” of the Ems telegram. Moeller avoids the obvious term “falsification”; nor does he gratify our avid curiosity to learn what the exact difference is between “perfidious” and “daemonic” methods. We rather fear that it is a merely aesthetic one: a “perfidious” politician who scorns to insist eloquently on his commonplace honesty rises to “daemonic” heights. In another connection, Moeller-Bruck advances the view that the colonizing enterprise of Prussian state-founders has endowed German national life with a new impetus of youth.

G. Günther, in his fascinating history of German warriorship,
gives a brief sketch of the evolution of Prussia in its early stages. That "State" formation on the eastern margin of the Germanies meant in fact the Dominion of the Order of Knights (ritterlicher Ordensstaat) based on severe discipline to which the conquerors themselves were also committed. In addition to the Knights and the indigenous populace, there was a more or less continuous supply of German soldiers, peasants and craftsmen; the number of the ruling Knights themselves did not as a rule exceed a few hundred. Here, I think, we have touched the roots of Prussian tradition: the ruling class is a small isolated body, designed to practise an abstract system of power rather than to beget a national community; and that ruling class, even in relation to its own individual members, is suffused with an ideal of permanent camp life and rigorous service rather than of liberty and humanistic perfection. Fried equates Prussianism to the principles of "service", "order", "corporative obligation", as opposed to the Western preference for revolutionary democracy, moneyed interests, urban life, rational centralization. (In fact, the classical bureaucratic centralism enforced by the great Prussian Kings was largely modelled on French examples.) "The idea of civilized mankind is Western; commitment to Nation and Volk is Prussian." Although the second half of the proposition suffers from vagueness, the antithesis as such commands our full approval. Similarly Bäcker, whose small but uncommonly suggestive book on "Germany and the Occident" should be known to all active minds of Anglo-Saxon and Latin civilization, sees the essence of Prussiaism in an attitude of Service permeating the whole man. It is most striking and by no means ungrounded that he should even look upon Luther's Reformation as a rebellion of this Prussian "attitude of service" (Diensthaltung) against the South-Western world. (For the other side of Luther's anti-dogmatic and anti-Popish religious "individualism" is the elimination of all belief in spiritual objectivities from personal consciousness, and the divinization of "natural authorities". cf. also Heinz Marr who says that Prussia and Rome are "secular antagonists"; the "Peasant Princes" of Prussia are champions of a "Germanic (deutschgemäss !) and ascetical Protestantism".) The following profession of "Nordic" faith by Bäcker needs no commentary: "Everyone is a servant (Dienstmann) according to his function. But every right servant
is essentially a king in his sphere, however small that sphere may be (!). Everyone, in relation to his place in the whole, is a single being. But—and this is justly noticed by friend and foe alike—we as active beings (Wirkende) are all essentially enrolled in a service, we are all essentially members of a military organization (Heeresgliederung). The Army, the embodiment of historical Prussia, thus becomes (as far as the aspect of action goes) an essential expression of our Prusso-German nature—Nordic and state-bound. We fight in the Army. We March in the Army. We take rest in the Army: jointly, but also individually”.

Stapel, who published a pamphlet under the title “Prussia must be”, has cleverly found out that Prussia is in need of Nazi overhauling by the völkisch principle of Blood, the comparative absence of which made it open to a certain degree to corruptive liberal influences. For want of an explicity racial foundation, the Prussian “Nomos” has ever since tended towards a one-sided emphasis on formal lawfulness and administrative regulation; this entailed a dangerous leaning towards equality in the face of the law and further concessions to Liberalism. Thereby, in later evolution, the instinct of rank, mastery and command, which had from the outset been formative to Prussian existence, was caused to wear thin. The enervating effects of financial wealth and the desire for security made their appearance: acquisition overgrew conquest. “The ramparts of military camps were turned into ramparts of life. Instead of the Prussians existing, body and soul, for their King, the King was supposed to exist for the ”citizens” — a grievously un-Prussian neologism for subjects! Obviously a mere restoration of Bismarckian Prussia would be an unavailing act of sterile “reaction”; Naziism is compelled to re-Prussianize Prussia first in order to Prussianize the world.

We are already familiar with the phrase “Prussian Socialism”; the latter word, of course, is simply meant to suggest military anti-individualism charged with an emotional content of Spartan austerity, with technical efficiency, and a parsimonious Junker ruralism. There has even been such a thing as “Prussian Bolshevism”, reported and recommended in Erich Müllers “National Bolshevism” (1988), a political trend—reduced to impotence for the time being—which consists in the advocacy of a Nationalist alliance with Soviet Russia, and possibly
with German desperadoes of the Left, in order to fight the Western powers. As to its ideology, Prussian Bolshevism is more or less closely related to Jünger, Dyrssen, Bäcker, Count Reventlow, Moeller-Bruck, Fried and the "Tat" Circle, as well as—in a lesser degree—to Stapel and A. E. Günther; it was also the political creed of one serious and highly gifted statesman: Count Brockdorf-Rantzau, the father of the Rapallo Treaty. Finally, Niekisch and his "Widerstand" (resistance) Circle must be mentioned. Niekisch was a former Social Democrat of the Right wing (Alt-Sozialist Party in Saxony), obsessed with rancour against the West, who regarded Bolshevism as an "annihilation of the West with its own weapons", and proposed a "synthesis between Potsdam and Moscow". The practicability of the match was based on the fact of a certain resemblance between Soviet Russia and the Early Prussian monarchy: both states were ruled absolutely and both starved heroically in pursuit of future greatness (sich grosshungern). The "Prussian Bolsheviks" set themselves the task—doomed to failure from the start—of "militarizing and Prussianizing the German communists". Hielscher shares, to some extent, the same point of view.

Spengler's "Prussian Socialism" (1919) is chiefly an apology for Prussian militarism and servilism, as opposed to the English Liberal society of so-called "Viking Individualism" (cf. Chapters III, VII). Its watchwords are service, self-sacrifice for the sake of the Whole, corps discipline, and tribal exclusiveness: "nobody can understand it who does not belong to it". Another passage in the same book contains the formula, perhaps the most revealing of all, that the Prussian "idea of Socialism in its deepest significance" is tantamount to "will-to-power, struggle for the happiness of the Whole, not of the individual". We had better forbear from too punctilious investigation into the nature of this kind of "happiness"; its facile alignment, by means of an elegant little comma, with "will-to-power" tells us everything we could wish to know. In his recent work ("The years of Decision") Spengler shows himself more truculently hostile to Labour: he has grown honest enough to relinquish the misleading term "socialism". He keeps, however, his real stock-in-trade "Prussianism" which he determines as an "aristocratic order of life based on achievements". It also postulates the supreme importance of foreign, as against domestic politics: the
"achievements (Leistung) of a state in the world of states" will prove the decisive point of departure for the final suppression of "world revolution". The resurrection of a Prussia, brighter than ever before, will also imply an evolution of Fascism into unequivocal Caesarism: the supersession of mass parties (however "Right") by armies as the direct supporters of political power.

Many admirers of Prussia (among them, Spengler) attempt to endow the Prussian system with a magic flower of "inner freedom" as a costly offset to its requisite of harsh outward discipline. So, for instance, did Thomas Mann in a delightfully written book ("Betachtungen eines Unpolitischen"), fiercely reactionary and anti-Western, which appeared towards the end of the War. Rosenberg, again, denounces the injurious error of likening Prussiandom to Jesuitism, a target for his sharpest arrows: in truth, the two are "polar opposites" within the circle of the Mannerbund. Jesuitism, considerably milder as regards outward liberties, is bent on an intrinsic stifling of free enquiry, personality and human (male: Männer) dignity; on the other hand, Prussiandom, though imposing severe demands of subordination, leaves man’s inmost soul free. What is meant by this mystery of "inner freedom"? Mainly, indifference to religious dogmatism. Probably, in addition to that, the incontestable fact that all rigid military organization, by virtue of its very impersonality and insistence on what is characteristically called the "discharge" of one’s duties, involves a certain exoneration of the inside of man’s soul from social considerations and responsibilities. The very briskness and dryness of military command has a touch of redeeming harmlessness and chastity. Which of us has never experienced that a woman's tenderness, a mother's care, a child in need of protection, a friend in need of advice, a problem of spiritual or vital import, etc., can be incomparably more enslaving than is being ordered about by a bawling sergeant or an inhuman martinet? (The same amenity is also largely proper to monastic orders, which, to be sure, may have one or two spiritual advantages over the Prussian army.) On the whole, there is little reason to suppose that that "inner freedom" extended singularly far in the Prussian army, save for the circumstance that it was a good army from a technical and disciplinarian point of view. But, concretely speaking, the "inner freedom" of East Elbian peasant lads under the whip of their
dreaded Corporals and their equally well-known Junker officers offers little material for the imagination. And it is precisely the dry and sachlich aspect of Prussiandom, its quality of emotional thrift and barren sobriety (it has, I confess, some appeal to me), which seems ruthlessly to have been thrown overboard by Nazi fascist neo-Prussianism. Hitler has hardly anything in common with genuine Prussians, either Bismarckian or pre-Frederician, although Viennese court etiquette is just as little his strong suit. Rather similar considerations apply to some of his more egregious assistants. But certainly Prussiandom is indebted to Naziism for invaluable assistance in reviving its military, servile and aggressive traditions. Hielscher, the visionary of “Empire”, the metaphysician of “Power one with Inwardness”, interprets Prussia in little less than religious terms. According to his philosophy of history, the ravages of the Thirty Years’ War with its exasperating consequences for Germany were “well ordained”, because they inculcated in souls become empty and desperate a new receptiveness for liberty, a new craving for order, a new “hunger for command”. The Prussian army was to develop from the anarchical Landsknecht hordes. “The menace feared by the West has sprung into flower: its name is Prussia.” Prussia is not the work of a Germanic branch, it is the product of a Will deriving from all racial sections of Germandom. “There are no Prussians but Prussians by choice.” The Reich alone provides the substance: Prussia, the principle of organization: a body of men of all Germanic breeds, bound in discipline, who act as trustees of the Reich’s will-to-power. The Hohenzollern after Frederick are no longer Prussians, but Bismarck again is genuine. The “Prussian State” as such is not necessarily “Prussian” in character. Prussia means a forming of the unformed, a setting of boundaries; it means discipline from richness, obedience from power. Will-to-power necessarily brings with it a will for concentration, and thereby for delimitation. Western elements of political form are absorbed and utilized in order to mould the Prussian will into shape: this explains the borrowing from the French system by Frederick the Great. Prussia and Frederick are synonymous. Prussia, like Frederician thought, presupposes “inwardness” and a voluntary decision for service. The scope of its power aims are limitless, even though its manifestations cannot be without a
demarcation of limits. (Here our path is again crossed by the all-important Nazi idea of limits: they are not conceived as means of organization and communication within the moral Universe of Mankind but, so to speak, as "biological" hedge-lines—extensible at will—around a totalitarian living unit, the "Universe of the Particular"). "Duty means subservience to the power of the Empire. . . . The Man of Empire is lord over the Limitless, and therefore a master of his limits." Order rests upon the "fully displayed inwardness" of the Empire. "It rallies those obsessed by will-to-power to joint action." Frederick was manipulator of Western material but by no means a believer in Western outlooks. His ironical scepticism covers an undisputedly religious attitude towards Prussia and the Reich. "By the polite 'Perhaps' with which he comments the self-confident rationalism of the West he indicates that his own emotional outlook can pass without justification." In a word, the Prussian Herr may submit himself (and, particularly, his subalterns) to self-control, discipline and limitation according to the requirements of his display of power; but the inane world outside the Reich can have no such claim on him. We are further apprised by Hielscher that Frederick was no philanthropist: he, like Bismarck, served the State, not the people; he was a pure Machiavellian, except that Machiavelli was ignorant of the aim to which men must be made subservient. The aim or destination (das Wozu) is a "matter of obsession, not of reason". Frederick devoted himself "to duty, not to justice". Achievement, service, work, State, are everything; man and his personality (even the ruler's, in this sense) are nothing. The repudiation of Western baroque splendour by Frederick's Spartan father means a depreciation of egoism, of "the temper that lays emphasis on human welfare". The Roi Soleil with his cheerful theatricals—l'État c'est moi—all humanism and utilitarianism, and even the family automatism of hereditary monarchy, are thoroughly un-Prussian. Taut military activism, incessantly alive, is the inmost law of Prussian-dom. Prussian officers form an "Order of honour" analogous to the Jesuits of "Rome" or the Assassins of "Arabia". An abstract justice of independent standing is repugnant to this spirit. "Judicial power is a mere means, because the human beings whose relationships are subject to its regulations are mere means themselves; it therefore has to obey. Frederick was
entirely justified in bending the Cameral Court into obedience. *For Might is Right."

We read in Mowrer's standard work: "Back to Prussianandom" is the war-cry of German counter-revolution. "In its simplest form, Prussianandom is blind submission. It is a philosophy of a military Order that sought primarily to maintain its position against the possible revolt of the conquered. . . . Predominance of a single will—leadership in the narrowest sense. Therefore it is a cult of efficiency, chiefly efficiency of a military type." Society is split into "masters" and "men"; the former are divinely intended to rule over the latter by means of standardized discipline and servility. The classic Prussian situation is that of the German Knights who were to maintain themselves against a largely "hostile" foreign population—a system too primitive for regions suffused with ancient culture. Briefly, Prussianism can be summed up as "organized arrogance and servility". Its original sin, in Mowrer's words, is "a fundamental and philosophical minimizing of the individual and his rights, for the sake of natural myths and the privileges of an oligarch".

Here are some words of Goebbels (1982), rendered by Mowrer: "Breeding, order, service to society, iron discipline, unconditional authority, political leadership, a strong army, a solid, incorruptible bureaucracy, national prosperity produced by the tenacious energy of its inhabitants and the iron thrift of its princes, popular Christian and patriotic education, and beside the individual's attachment to law a generosity of spirits, a liberalism of opinion (!!), a religious tolerance found nowhere else—that together is Prussia". The Prussian official and officer, adds Mowrer, are superhuman, but poorly paid. "Their real recompense lay in the 'honour' they enjoyed in being privileged to serve the public spirit." They were *ipso facto* superior beings, first-class members of society. By 1982, Germany is again "Potsdamized". The very economic ideal now become fashionable: *Autarkie*—"All Germans must share the comparative poverty necessary to political and economic independence"—is consciously retraced to Prussian tradition.

Although Cecil Chesterton's luminous pen may be mistaken on some points (for instance, as regards the exaggeration of Frederick the Great's personal wickedness), his main proposition that Prussianism is essentially an anti-Christian religion of Power
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invested in the self-elected Master Man is expounded with no
less truth than brilliancy. What he wrote in 1914 is certainly
worth re-reading to-day:

"The Fool of the Holy Scripture, it should be remembered,
was he who said, not in Hyde Park but in his heart, that there
was no God. That fool has directed the public policy of Prussia
for more than a hundred and fifty years. There has often seemed
not a little of wisdom in his folly. But as sure as God lives and
judges the earth, a Fool he was and a Fool he is to-day. ' I myself
have seen the ungodly in great power: and flourishing like a
green bay tree. I went by, and lo, he was gone: I sought him,
but his place could nowhere be found.'"

8. THE CENTRAL NATION

We must, in all fairness, guard against a gratuitous nagging
at the peculiar features of German nationalism, against an easy
condemnation, in terms of sheer moral rebuke, of what can only
fully be understood by reference to the geographical position of
Germany in the midst of other nations. On the other hand,
human conduct, be it individual or national, can never un-
equivocally and cogently be "deduced" from the exterior
elements of a given situation. The human agent and the situation
in which he is placed are mutual products of each other; the
same geographical position could, according to mental and
historical antecedents, work out in vastly different directions;
a situation inspires certain virtues and it tempts to certain vices,
but it does not forcibly determine them. To read the German
mind it is necessary to consider that Germany is the
dominant nation of Central Europe, hemmed in between the
South-Western (or Anglo-Latin) and the Slav world; that the
territory settled by Germans has no natural frontiers; that con-
siderable Germanic bodies are outside the bonds of the Empire,
in part dispersed amongst other nations; that Germany is con-
finned to a comparatively small area and lacks the yet unexploited
territorial possibilities that are at the disposition of other leading
Western nations. However, it is inevitable that certain dubious
points should complicate this review. What does it mean to be a "dominant" nation? Is the geo-political entanglement not due (partly, at least) to the inherent German tradition of controlling non-German peoples in the more or less direct neighbourhood of Germandom? In so far as the Germans are "surrounded by enemies", is "enmity" simply involved in the fact of contiguity added to dissimilarity? The position of Germany is not central in every sense; it is central in relation to the European continent, but to some extent peripheral if viewed from the angle of Western civilization itself, with its Roman and Mediterranean roots, with its colonial and Transatlantic extension. Is not Germany's European situation better indicated by describing her as being very much in mediis rebus, and yet essentially estranged? The Germans live in the middle of Europe; they flood Europe; and yet nobody knows with certainty how far they really belong to Europe. The difficulty of the situation is founded in this duplicity: our world wavers between regarding the Germans as the inmost nucleus, the natural leaders of Europe, and as the natural antagonists, deserters and destroyers of Europe. The problem of whether the Russians, for instance, are "really Western", is less important and, particularly, has less meaning, because that vast empire manifestly forms a marginal part of the West, and a natural transition to other zones. No one questions, further, the absolute Europeanness of the Scandinavians, Czechoslovakia and Poles, though geographically they are more outlying peoples of Europe than are the Germans. But the trouble with the latter is that they somehow seem to set up a "rival centre" outside the Western core of the White man's culture. Why are the German frontiers throughout Europe so perplexingly open and formless? Why have the German people so belatedly and incompletely attained national integration and demarcation? Is it not that, with them, the idea of national society is peculiarly overshadowed by pretensions to racial superiority and imperial uniqueness? This, again, is by no means a censorious judgment, nor idle cavilling; nor do I attempt to extract religious and metaphysical preferences and decisions from what we could assume to be elementary data of a geographical and historical order.

It would be unjust to ask the Germans either to renounce the assets of their central location in Europe, with the rich contacts
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it involves, and of their numbers, talents, and energy, or to atone for the liabilities attached to their comparative distance from the Mediterranean and Atlantic cradles of our Roman and Western world. But neither must we shut our eyes to the dangers inherent in the German situation—"situation" taken in its full meaning, embracing the habitual direction of the German will, and the weight of all the inheritances with which the German soul is loaded. I cannot agree with Vernon Bartlett that Western people are startled by German neo-nationalism merely because it exhibits a German type of behaviour and endeavour analogous to their own. It is possible that the National Socialist rule will ultimately lead up to the formation of "Germany" as a "normally" centralized and unified nation of Western type, fairly reconciled to the loss of certain Germanic populations abroad; but even then it will do so unwittingly, by its unintentional consequences rather than by its plans and ideologies. What Naziism really has in mind is not a normal (if naturally eminent) position of Germany in the society of human (or Western) nations: it is rather the metaphysics of Germany as the "central nation", meaning a primordial, a superior, a lordly as well as a surrounded, hated, isolated and persecuted nation. This attitude, consciously fostered and developed, can justly be laid to the charge, not of "the Germans" indiscriminately, but of German nationalists, of whom the Nazis are the most dogmatic, ruthless, and blind to any alleviating insight.

Naturally it is in the forefront of metaphysical speculations on "centrality" that we perceive Hilscher. The Thing distinguishable from other great mundane Powers as the "Empire" (Reich), is succinctly defined as the "Centre" (Mitte). At the same time, Reich does not mean an abstract belief or axiom of conduct; without being strictly and invariably identified with actual Germany, it is bound by indissoluble bonds to the German sphere of life, taking shape in the "grey army of Germany". It embodies the Centre to which all other powers are "mysteriously attached", and which even "transforms all other powers". The following vision of Hilscher's must certainly be regarded as the raving of an unbalanced genius rather than as an authoritative utterance of Nazi beliefs; but for all its irresponsibility it does convey the flavour of the mental world from which it comes. "The inwardness of Reich fuses
with its power. Dismissed Bismarck and mad Nietzsche marshal their people into the World War. They have indeed invoked that War. Nietzsche’s ‘No’ shattered the spirit of the age. Bismarck’s firm refusal compelled this spirit to destroy itself. . . . In the crucible of the World War, the inwardness and power of the Reich coalesced. The Reich has called up and transformed the forces of the earth. Following Hellas, Israel, Byzantium, Rome, and the West, Africa, Egypt, Arabia, Russia, India, China, and Japan are now tied to the Reich. The fate of Reich has become manifest as the fate of the earth.”

The “dynamic” aspects of an unfulfilled centrality, a drifting existence amidst more solid and crystallized cultures, are strikingly outlined by Professor Krieck in his “State of Germanic man”. The Teutons are born nomads. “It is pan-Teutonic heredity which breeds the restlessness of the blood, the longing for far-away places and for a shape which Teutonic nature cannot hope to attain on its own strength.” The Northern Teutons were accustomed to roaming about “in warlike hordes and companies, the lags . . . without ever exchanging continual ‘becoming’ (Werden) for a firm existence, a solid Centre . . . we have been oscillating between East and West, without actually knowing to which we belonged . . . the urge for an ultimate meaning, and an infinite scope . . . subjectivism properly German . . . becoming, not being . . .”

Fried, too, the fascist champion of a soi-disant “anti-capitalism”, stresses the ability of German “centrality” to give a fillip to its imperialistic “dynamism”: Germany, a debtor state as a result of Versailles, must take the lead in transforming the political and economic system of Europe—and of the world. “To Germany, being the country that has been exposed to the strongest irradiations of the Western spirit, the greatest task—perhaps leadership—will fall in the coming readjustment of world politics.” Around a Germany enlarged by Austria, the “Central European space” will be formed: a zone comprising Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Yugoslavia, Roumania, Bulgaria, perhaps Greece, in the South bordering on Turkey and Persia (Fried, a glutton for liberty, anticipates the latter as the “bridge connecting with an independent India”), in the North abutting on the Baltic Union, in the East having Russia as a “rear-guard”. The “remaining” segments of Europe—chiefly, France
and England, whose loss of dominions in Africa and India will only be a question of time—will sink into comparative insignificance suited to their eccentric position and their sponsoring of "rationalist capitalism". Thus spiritual superiority and geographical predestination have happily linked hands once more! The union of central site and "existential" thought (to use a favourite term of neo-German philosophy) will surely not fail to erect an indestructible edifice of "natural" hegemony.

Long before the close of the last century, Langbehn had visualized the idea of Germany as the "basic nation" of Europe (and, additionally, the world): Germandom, being the noble substratum as well as the all-embracing synthesis, of culture in its manifoldness, is "naturally" fitted for universal leadership. Langbehn's main work was entitled "Rembrandt as an educator"; this happy choice earned him the quaint surname Der Rembrandtdeutsche. It cannot be denied that the author does justice, and more than justice, to his hero: he calls Rembrandt "the most individual German (!) artist". Nor is his treatment of Shakespeare less generous: upon him is bestowed the title of "the greatest German artist who ever lived". These peaceful acts of appreciative annexation amply indicate the general trend. Or again, listen to a formulation like this: "The significance of German art, and of art altogether, lies in what is typical, national, local, and personal". An understanding of "German art" embodies a "central" understanding of art as such; an additional reference to the subsidiary phenomenon of non-German art may be appended for the sake of conscientiousness. It is the office of Rembrandt to teach us "faithfulness to ourselves, to Germandom". Further, if all good and beautiful things emerge out of Germandom, they also converge in Germandom, which by its very structure means "harmony developed out of disharmony". The National Socialist attitude of tribal expansiveness is marvellously anticipated in Langbehn's formula of "German world-power" (deutsche Weltherrschaft) vested in a "Volk concentrated upon itself, and prevailing over the others". Germany has no place in the European concert of states as one among many! It "must either dominate or be dominated". Needless to add, European politics are again but a centte of "planetary" politics. Germany is destined to be the princess of all nations. She is the born claimant for leadership: for all
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European monarchs are directly or indirectly of German descent. "The German, as an aristocrat, controls Europe; as a democrat, controls America; as a man, it will not take him long to control the world." It might enter our minds to decentralize the Germanic sphere dividing it into a Nether German (Northern) and an Upper German (Southern) sector; given Nether Germany as a proper unit, it would probably be more to Denmark's taste to fuse with the Germanic community. We are aware that the innocent cloudy "idealism" of German philosophers glorying in their sublime aloofness is not so wholly unrelated to more concrete political covetings.

Let me now introduce Professor Hans Eibl, a Viennese Catholic Nationalist thinker of great gifts and vast learning, a disciple of that barren but fanatically "productive" man of letters, Richard Kralik, and an inspired visionary of the renewal of a Germano-Roman Empire. Eibl is one of the saturnine nationalists who hail the hated Versailles "dictation of peace" as a precious boon to Germany. The fact that the Allies could only win the war by dint of false promises which they were unable to fulfil afterwards was a splendid triumph for the Central Empires' military stubbornness; it will in due course turn out to be a great asset to Germandom (written in 1918). "The Germans are not the conquered party either in a military, a moral, or in a political sense." The peace treaties, even though righting some wrongs as regards the fate of certain smaller European nations, have brought about an "enslavement of seventy million Germans". (Here, too, the basic ideology is treacherously laid bare. Any restrictions placed on the German political will are denounced as an "enslaving", as though "seventy million Germans" were always to be ruled by French military governors; in "German liberty" the liberty of imperialist expansion is always implicit. "Germany's oppression consisted in having to submit to war treaties, pay reparations and refrain from annexing Austria. . . . What the Germans meant by insecurity was simply lack of power to force a revision of the peace treaties"—writes Mowrer.) However, the fine Catholic humanist does not vindicate German rights with any fierce gesture or sullen afterthought "May Europe go to pieces; who cares?"; he is not one of those enraged and subversive heathen idolaters of war who hurl their defiance at Christian
Culture from the awful Prussian plains! His argument is based entirely on the assumption that there is no Europe without a German presidency. Thus the English and the French conception of peace run counter to each other, "for it is impossible for England to control the sea if France has the upper hand on the continent, and is able to threaten England therefrom by the engine of chemical warfare". The astute Professor, it must be owned, has seen through the real reason for the uneasiness of British statesmen. . . (cf. the sagacious words of Mowrer on the subject of German "insecurity": "Nobody in the world was going to attack Germany . . . as long as Germany remained quiet. Canada in this sense is dangerously insecure against the United States. This fact gives the Canadians no sleepless nights".) Can anyone tell us what France is? Well, Eibl puts us right about that in no uncertain terms: unlucky France is "the outpost of Africa marching on against Europe". (Thus our anxious surmise that the French President is no longer anything but a degraded puppet in the hands of the Senegalese rulers appears to be sadly verified.) Nor is this all. "The danger of depopulation will only be banished when Germany is again able to live; with her, the Western world will revive as a whole." The careworn features of Eibl brooding over the prospects of a deserted "West" must be a heartrending sight. Woe upon France! It has become "the enemy of the Christian West, the centre of which, geographically alone, is Germany". France, by using Africa as a support, unmask's herself as a rebel in arms against Europe. The French writers contrasting Latin clarity, humanism, culture, settledness, etc., to Teutonic chaos, disorder, subjectivism, pantheism, communism, barbarism, dynamism, etc., create a specious fabric of irrelevant speculations. The core of the controversy lies elsewhere. It is indeed contained in the familiar older formulas:—Democracy versus Militarism; free citizenship versus warlike discipline; licence versus the restraints of nobility (!); in a word, the mischievous revolt against the Teutonic Age (das germanische Weltalter). This is, at least, plain speaking, which commits the student of these tangled problems to a measure of gratitude. The French opposition to Germany, continues Eibl, springs from the individualistic and democratic revolution of 1789, directed against the medieval and feudal order of society. (This is true in part, nor is there any need for
France to be ashamed of it; but it is well to remember that the
deeper roots of the antagonism, which are certainly not ade-
quately expressible in terms of class struggle or governmental
systems, can be traced right back to the Middle Ages itself.
Western and German feudalism were not exactly the same.) The
French rally signifies a "rising of peripheral Europe against the
centre of the West". This concise way of putting it is again
invaluable; with due respect, however, we question the validity
of such opinions. Perhaps Eibl is some centuries behind his
time; perhaps even his views on the original "centre" of the
"West" lack empirical substantiation. The vital and spiritual
centre of Western civilization need not necessarily be one with
the racial settlement that occupies the geometrical middle of the
European Continent outside Russia. Eibl's logic is largely
founded on such an assumption being taken for granted. It fails
when the confusion is discovered. His further statement: "The
Western frontier of Germany is not the boundary-line between
Latin culture and Eastern chaos; it separates European men-
tality from the onrush of Africa" can hardly be regarded as
anything but intentional self-mockery. Yet Eibl is willing to
accept the West, provided that it agrees to remorseful sub-
mission. Asia under the sign of Russian Bolshevism is the chief
enemy; the issue between it and Europe will determine the
features of the age to come. He proposes that the West join
Germany against Asia; once this is done, preponderance will
automatically devolve on the Germans, because it is they who
keep to their traditions. This pleasant conclusion is not reached
by magic. It is simply anticipated in the premise that a German
spokesman invites the West to undergo an inner conversion and
"join" Germany—instead of Germany being urged to "join"
the West. Materially, the appeal is aided by stressing the con-
sideration that it is the "central nation" which, owing to its
position, is predestined to take the lead in the anticipated struggle
against Soviet Russia. On another occasion, Eibl pretends that
"surrounded" Germany has more reason than anybody else to
be anxious about her safety (see Mowrer above), whereas the
French feeling of insecurity is either a political fake, a pretext
for military hegemony, or a symptom of mental illness. "In
either case, we cannot help feeling psychologically and morally
superior." I should say that this triumphant inference merely
voices the author's first principle, which is in truth independent of any empirical test or observation. As to Kralik's grand pre-Eiblian metaphysics of the Central Empires—which were bound to win because their culture was "more full of inner weight"—we refer to the section "Nation or Empire".

In Nazi and parallel thought the idea frequently appears that German hegemony, in contraposition to French preponderance which thrives in the political climate of the West, is closely allied to socio-political mastery as such—the relegation of power to natural rulers, a race predestined to mastery. France, the ridiculous trustee of equalitarian mankind (a nonsensical chimera of masonic plotters) is driven to acts of aggressive violence, because it lacks innate fitness for leadership; whereas German overlordship would be in conformance with the laws of nature. Thus Blüher contends that the "economic solidarity of civilized mankind" and the domain of State life are confirmed antipodes: humanité is incompatible with the spirit of the State, which is of necessity a "royal spirit". Correspondingly, in the sphere of concrete facts, humanitarians and democrats are tools of the brute power of France (Niekisch). The phraseology of liberty and humanity subserves the aim of securing the assent of non-Frenchmen to French encroachment. The post-war system of Europe, morally based on the fiction that the Great War had to be the "last war", has been devised to maintain universal peace by keeping Germany under supervision. (Niekisch overlooks the fact that in raising this very accusation he notifies that Germany is the only, or chief, danger to that peace. If this be so, the fault must obviously lie with Germany rather than with all "the others"). To destroy the Republican system in Germany will amount to a destruction of the outposts of France within our own nation (Niekisch). For Weimar is nothing but the executive organ of Versailles (Krieck). The Republic is merely a "slave-plantation of the foreign powers" (Skavenkolonie des Auslandes), which has no use for free citizens (!), and whose "national flag" is but a commercial trade-mark, wrote Hitler in Mein Kampf; a decade later he succeeded in restoring free "citizenship".

Similarly Hielscher contends that the German nation must look upon the Weimar state as a hostile power (Feindmacht) in Western pay. He not only urges Germany to bring about a
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combination of all peoples "oppressed" by the West in order to combat the latter, but even demands a deliberate aggravation of economic distress so that political disorder may increase to the point of a general collapse. This meritorious work must be carried on not only with unrelenting energy but also with patient endurance. Not to mention the Communists, who do not fight the West at all except for their endeavour to alter slightly to its detriment the distribution of property, Hielscher is even dissatisfied with the National Socialist party hierarchy, which in his eye is also bent on "maintaining to-day's values".

The present chapter is headed by the proud and unequivocal declaration of Edgar Jung, that paradoxical martyr of a tyranny incapable even of the slightest practice of toleration: "The nation that crushes the humanitarian lie of Europe and hoists the banner of true Order will automatically become the head of a new European organism".

It is, however, not only desirable, but also natural that this nation should be Germany: precisely because it happens to be the central nation. Germany, says Jung, lies in the centre; it is the "middle country (Kerngebiet, kernel territory), to whose requirements the juridical order of a European combination of states must be adjusted". (False modesty would not be a relevant reproach here.) The German "Volk", the "rump" German State, we read further, forms the inmost cell of coming reconstruction; our attention is then drawn to the fact that Germany "particularly lies open to attacks, and is equally able to launch attacks". (However, it is not always the best policy to let the most troublesome factor have its way. On some occasions, stern opposition yields more enduring fruits.) All peoples, argues Jung, are not invariably adaptable to the formation of national states; he votes in favour of the inequality of nations. It is for the German nation to stand for the "rule of superior beings" in inner and outward relations alike. Germany is the prophet as well as the leader of a new Europe... hers is the office of "directing" a league of "free" nations. "This leadership will establish new zones of power and culture." Obviously Jung resembles God in that he, too, is able to foretell the result of other people's "free" actions. In other respects he rather resembles Eibl, with whose point of view the following words are in perfect harmony: "How long peace will be preserved does not depend on
the German Empire's decision. In any event, the German disability in the West actually tempts our neighbours to invasion". (What efforts must it have cost Holland, for instance, to resist the temptation!) The unnatural "hegemony" of France, says Jung in perfect accord with Eibl, is founded on black support; it inevitably endangers the hegemony of the white race. . . .

With no little esprit, scornful Moeller-Bruck vociferates against the French "counter-centre": "France will very soon be politically isolated. France is already spiritually isolated today". (This was written about 1920.) "Criticizing France means criticizing Liberal rationalism. The War was said to be waged for the sake of human rights. But now they who concluded this peace are called to account by the nations to say what spirit of law they were obeying. The belief in progress no longer finds any followers among the nations." What about the Francophils in Germany? These abject creatures are fascinated by the fact that France has preceded Germany in entering the sphere of Roman civilization, the Roman church, and English enlightenment. They are anxious not to miss the train of that evolution. Yet Europe does not originate in Gaul; the Teutonic forests are its real birthplace! (May I beg the reader to have patience for a little while longer. We cannot afford to neglect a thorough enquiry into the other's mind.) None of the great feats in the spiritual history of the West: Mystique, Reformation, classical philosophy, Italian Renaissance, etc., is of French authorship. France never did anything but accompany the course of history! "France is the profiteer of history; to-day, of the World-War"—it may mitigate our judgment of the Prussian braggart to know that he presumably wrote this (shortly before his death) in a state of incipient lunacy—and "the Francophils are the profiteers of France". Subsequently Moeller gives the definition: "Whoever believes in earnest that (after what has happened during these two thousand years) a reconciliation between France and Germany is compatible with the laws of world history, is a Francophil". How may Moeller-Bruck feel in his grave, now that Nazi chiefs are loudly talking about such an "historically impossible" reconciliation? He might only assume for their benefit that perhaps they do not believe it "in earnest", and thus escape the lurid charge of "Francophilism". The
above quotations are from the author's posthumous collection of essays; let us add from "Das dritte Reich" the further information that the French—who in their predatory pursuits employ their coloured fellow-citizens and who are fond of living in Paris, enjoying there the admiration of foreigners—are no colonizers, no imperialists, only despoilers and "enslavers wherever they happen to have the power". And to such human rabble did the Führer stretch out a friendly hand! However, are Moeller’s opinions binding for Hitler? Perhaps not; but what about his own? Did he not write in "Mein Kampf" that France was first and foremost tied to Jewish stock-exchange power? Undoubtedly he did, and more than that. Judaized and negro-tainted France perseveres in its "national statecraft of Chauvinistic designs". (Chauvinism—what a dishonourable vice!) "France, spurred on by her own thirst for revenge, cunningly directed by the Jew..." But, let us turn from that disheartening sight back to the Central Nation.

Moeller-Bruck takes a spiritualized view of it: he places more trust in dynamics than in geometry. "The centre of the world will always be found where men develop consciousness of being that centre." Nevertheless, in what kind of men can such a consciousness arise? What if the men of divers other nations were also to find themselves disposed to it? Happily, some solid prejudices exist in favour of Germany. Moeller utters the redeeming words: "We are a peculiar nation amongst the nations". For we are a large-scale nation (Grossvolk) by ourselves alone, and yet we also "bear a zone of foreign country in us". A very elegant way of putting it, which almost X-rays the structure of German imperialism—identical with the racial-fascist idea of "affinitive" leadership. The master does not by any means oppress the slave; he "embodies" him. The ruler does not owe his position either to naked violence or to governmental talents (tested either by experiment or by democratic election): he simply "incarnates" the soul of the ruled. It is through German sovereignty that Non-Germans rise to existence; the peripheral nations owe their actual birth to their envelopment in the central nation.

In the name of the "young generation", Gründel glorifies "Germany as the world’s new centre of gravity". Some may be inclined to think that he overstates his case a trifle when he
writes bluntly: "Since the World War, everything of importance has happened in Germany". We also learn from Gründel that, during the disgraceful Weimar period, Germany played the part of the Lamb of God that takes on it the sins of the world: all the "powers of destruction of the 'Luciferan' —materialistic epoch, which reached its height during the War, concentrated in the German 'space'". But—an all-pervading belief common to most Nazi thinkers—just because all those humiliations and sufferings were heaped upon her, Germany's essential centrality emerged the more resplendent; defeat and republican revolution were but preparatory events which dialectically forecast the forthcoming glory (to put it in Jung's words) of inward and outward "rule of the superiors".

The specific situation of Germany, which precludes its incorporation into an international order on equal footing with "the others", has found a keen advocate in Stapel. Pacifism and internationalism are improper "for Germany", because "they would mean servitude and vital inhibition for it". "We desire a peaceful life for the nations, but we want to contribute to it as a free nation with self-sovereignty." This proviso may sound harmless enough; but the "but" as well as the general context prove beyond doubt that German "self-determination" is meant to have a rather wider range than, say, French, or Danish, or Polish self-determination. In some cases "self-determination" may only appear really complete on condition that it includes a fair amount of determination of others, too, which—for all Stapel knows or cares—may conveniently be achieved by methods of peaceful suasion. In his grand theory of Imperium Teutonicum given in "The Christian Statesman", Stapel insists on the tenet of an essential inequality between Germans and non-Germans. The French are their inferiors as masters; and their Eastern neighbours, the Slavs, are simply slaves. The formal equality of rights between Germany and her partners is ineffective, seeing that Germany is under the disadvantage of a one-sided disarmament (1932). "But we do not therefore raise a moral charge; nor do we 'request' an 'equality of rights' for Germany. It is we ourselves who refuse to concede any equality of rights. There can be no equality of rights. But there shall be truth and honour." Truth and honour, in their turn, consist in recognizing the absurdity of urging "the
great and noble German Volk—with its incomparable record of Empire...wars...songs...proud monuments...scientific conquests...ships and aeroplanes...fountain of vital energy...—to co-ordinate itself to any populace of the East...just because the latter is also a nation”. The Eastern (Slavic) nations may keep their culture, nor is there any reason for despising it; but to place them on a par with Germany? For shame! We must not be misled by formal analogies! The Germans are a nation; the Poles are also a nation...but! Or again, an even more sternly ironical exemplification: Hindenburg is a President; Herr Masaryk is also a President...but! I may say that on this point I am deeply impressed by Stapel’s reasoning, though perhaps not exactly in the intended sense. However, let us exercise the virtue of self-control, and pass on to more direct Stapelian approaches to the theme of “centrality”. The condition of Europe, the author writes, is leading inevitably to integration; union has become a question of power rather than of intellectual conviction. “One nation must tighten its authority over the others; one nation must set up an Imperial Recht (Right, or Law), and establish a European Nomos (concrete moral code). Nationalism, the offspring of the French Revolution, must be overcome by a new Imperialism. The German nation alone can be the bearer of that new Imperialism.” France, being a too strictly demarcated nation, is unfit to rule other nations. On the other hand, a nation with open frontiers—such as Germany, and most signally, Prussia—is naturally induced to develop universal relations. Frontier Germanism is the most vital part of Germanism as a whole. (Recall Moeller’s “zone of foreign country contained” in the German soul!) “This is the reason why we Germans are more interested than any other nation in a supra-national order of European nations.” Why, then, are pacifism and internationalism so “improper for Germany”, instead of being even more proper for her than for others? Well, the slight disagreement between Stapel’s “supra-nationalism” and ours is not difficult to put into words. For us, supra-nationalism means a Law above the nations; for him, it means the Law of a Super-Nation.

Stapel, too, sees Franco-German rivalry in an ideological light. The conflict is not of a national, it is of an imperial purport. Hegemony in Europe is at stake; “the rights of man” and the
principle of national democracy are flag-posts of the French Empire (whereas Germany’s Imperial pretension has its roots in natural pressure on the surrounding nations interwoven with the marginal settlements of the German people). The idea of a Franco-German “accord” is but an empty dream which has no bearing on the real problems underlying that secular controversy. Our efforts can only be directed to the aim that once again the German side should emerge victorious from the strife. An “understanding” on Pan-European lines, recognition of the claims of Liberal economy, an easy life and the maximum of “civilized co-operation”, would actually imply the acknowledgment of French hegemony. Such a course might indeed suit the private interests of un-political Germans best. The total output of the various kinds of enjoyable goods would very likely increase by it. But such points of view are irrelevant: over and above all these matters of a secondary order the ineluctable problem remains as to whom preponderance in Europe is due. We are surprised to hear the reason why it is due to the Germans: they are better qualified to “guide” other peoples because “they recognize others, whereas the French oppress them”. “The Frenchman suppresses (hält nieder), the German governs by management (waltet).” What does Stapel mean, I wonder? Why do the rather numerous allies of France prefer French oppression to suave German supervision? Some pages above, Stapel himself issued the annihilating avowal that Germany must reject the normal and reasonable methods of civilized society (even though her own citizens would enjoy their benefits and prosper by them), because such methods would smack of French spirit and automatically confirm French leadership. Where does “oppression”, as opposed to German leniency, come in? Europe, he continues, is at present—or rather in accordance with its current conception as a union of nations—“an empire after the French fashion”. Stapel himself refrains from saying “a French empire”. He can hardly pretend to mean that such an “empire” would be held together in any way by the oppressive violence of the French military engine. Now I think what Stapel means is this. French culture is better adapted than German culture to dissemination as a uniform medium; the French “impose” their own patterns where the Germans are satisfied with having their supremacy “accepted.”
Were France to annex, say, a slice of Northern Spain, her crude mechanical mind would be prone to look upon those Spaniards or Catalans as freshly-made "Frenchmen", simply receiving them into the network of departmental administration. Germany on the contrary, might very well control Eastern Europe without insisting on calling all that welter of Czechs, Poles, Ukrainians, White Russians, etc., "Germans". The German system would allow more generously for stratification and decentralization. It would bountifully (though not, if necessary, without wholesome severity) confirm the inferior toilers in their proper character, never thinking of imposing a new stamp of German master-humanity upon them. Perhaps there is still another side to this comparison. We have seen that Germany's claim to control is founded on its geographical position in relation to that of its neighbours (together with a dense population), whereas French ideas, as at one time French bayonets, invaded Europe. Alliance with France springs from a conscious act of decision, whereas vassalship to Germany is something into which a neighbour country must "grow". The French scheme is "artificial": it is pertinent to society proper. The German scheme is "organic": a weaker Volk in the shadow of the strong Volk comes to subserve the latter. Thus may the French be termed "oppressors" (denaturants) whereas the Germans, being lords by their very geographical position, need not "oppress" at all, but control their inferiors by "understanding" them in that capacity.

"This", declared Stapel, "is why, to our mind, German preponderance alone can endure." Union does not mean a renunciation of the struggle for hegemony; it can only be called into being by that struggle itself. "It will have to be decided whose type of vital consciousness and whose historical conception shall direct the policies of the newly united states." Stapel's own answer is: there must be real overlordship, which means German overlordship. . . . We, however, should distinctly prefer moral universalism, juridical organization, and democratic co-operation, agreeing that if one country is foremost in championing that line of solution, it is certainly so much better for that country. There is no point in "equality" in the sense of a demand that Rumania should no more imitate France than be, herself, a teacher of France. But of course Stapel—we recall his anti-moral doctrines exposed earlier—is fully convinced, not
only that might comes before right, but that there is more right in might than there is in right. "By 'peace' the Frenchman understands a consolidation of his present superiority" (the truth is that he regrets the dwindling of that "superiority" because he sees no means of securing his peace); "the German, the possibility of economic and cultural evolution." (How discreet a circumlocution!) "The Frenchman expects peace to preserve the given conditions." (Which is usually an object rather consonant with peace.) "The German expects peace to open the road for an alteration of present conditions." (Which task, in older traditions, was more often entrusted to war.)

In a similar manner (if not even more impressively) Wolters, the able political descendant of Stefan George, has exposed French ambitions as a slave-riot against superior mankind. Not only had the "subterranean machinations" of France, combined with "British spite and Belgian jealousy (!) of our flourishing economy" brought about an "encirclement" and conjured up a huge war, but the hysteria of French enmity surged up to the point of clamoung for a partition of German provinces and an extirpation (!) of the entire nation of German "barbarians". Wolters puts the word in quotation-marks to convey his disgust, but he soon finds it convenient to return the compliment without resort to quotation-marks. "Only children and fools can be blind to the depth and baseness of the French hatred; only neutral and German fools can believe even to-day that it was merely some wicked leaders, not the French people in their entirety, who pursued these aims. . . . We are, and shall be, compelled to fight for our life-space and the centre of mastery on the Rhine with the whole race of barbarous Gauls . . . the Gauls having consumed, and wasted, their Roman and Teutonic substance in revolutions . . . now fall upon their thriving neighbour with all the vindictiveness of subjected inferior races, with all the blood-lust of re-barbarized Celts." (Let Irish readers wreak their anger on Wolters!) These French, ashamed of owing their victory to a string of allies, compensating for their essential downfall by a whipped-up cruelty, ventured upon "making the Rhine their slave", and driving a wedge into the body of Germany from its Rhenish flank . . . for here was soil fertile for "Catholicism, Liberalism, Democracy, and Socialism, the inner factors of un-Germandom. . . ."
The attempt has failed, and, for the time being, the alien "isms" haunting the stormy German soul are silenced; but we must appreciate the exposure of connections and relationships. Since about 1920, public opinion in England has clung to the belief that German opposition to France was the attitude of a nation, normally bent on self-preservation, towards a pestering and bullying neighbour. There was perhaps a time when such an element also entered into the picture. But we should be grateful to these mouthpieces of neo-German mentality for revealing that the anti-French bias is indissolubly linked up with a no less hateful hostility towards all that is Western and humanitarian, all who believe in progress and a moral conception of society, within the precincts of "Germandom" itself. France might easily be tolerated and patronized as a mediocre neighbour nation, preferably a fascist satrapy, a producer of good wines, nice food, and fine centres of fashionable entertainment; France must be counteracted and combated as long and as far as she is an outpost of humanity, an exponent of civilization, a depository of the Christian and Liberal soul of the West.

General Seeckt, the one-time Commander-in-Chief of the "republican" Reichswehr, writes in his book which bears the significant title "Germany between West and East" that Germany, owing to its geographical position, is obliged to pursue a policy different in kind from French, English, Italian, American, or Russian policies. "In view of the soil we live on we are forced to entertain a German policy." (It is not clear from this whether, for instance, Italy may safely devote herself to American, or England to Russian interests.) The present centre of power in the German sphere (1938) is intolerably weak. It is the financial inferiority of the Reich that has kept Austria from Anschluss. "We see here another example of the old law which governs German destinies in the making: the weakness of the centre power entailing a defection of the members. Thus did we lose in succession Burgundy, Lorraine, Alsace, the Netherlands, and Switzerland: and thus shall we lose Austria, too, unless the Reich is strong enough to hold it... the attraction of the West is increasing daily." No effective help can be hoped from England; notwithstanding its antipathies to France, England is likely to find a pro-French policy less risky than a pro-German one. France, in her turn, will never abandon her attempts to
advance her eastern frontiers; she would not finally desist even at the Rhine. Germany has but three choices: subjection, struggle, or a genuine understanding. Subjection is intolerable; understanding a mere utopia; therefore permanent struggle is the only remaining course. France will never support a lasting peace, unless it be a "peace of French imperialism" (Macht­friede): it will be out for political conquest even in the midst of a "formal state of peace"; in a "sated" condition it may acquiesce to temporary truce in the sense of a "breathing space", but without ever abandoning the plan of future expansion. An inwardly shaken and decadent France is all the more likely to plot war. "Any belief in the possibility of a durable understanding between France and Germany, and a policy based on such an expectation must be utterly disowned. France is compelled to adopt an anti-German attitude: her policy, prescribed by history and geography, can only be broken by the exhaustion of her vital energy." (A projection of one's own state of mind into the psychology of one's intended foe!)

The ignoble and insincere, though by no means entirely simulated, feature of persecution mania (Bismarck's "nightmare of coalitions"!) is deeply graven in the face of German nationalism. Its relation to geographical "centrality", to religious alieness from the Latin, Slav, and rationalist West, as well as to the inner cleavages of Germanic Europe, need hardly be emphasized. A genuine overflow of force, and a tradition of overt or latent aggression, play their part in it as do certain elements of weakness, formlessness, and lack of clarity. "For the most part, the nations hate one another; all of them certainly hate us", writes Blüher. "The other nations compel us by force to be Germans." (We know that in the summer of 1914, the Central Empires were "compelled by force" to declare war upon Serbia, Russia, France and Belgium.) Sombart complains: "The German frontiers are the worst imaginable. Germany has not a 'natural' frontier for her territory. This fact weighs all the more (!) because she is surrounded exclusively (!) by foes, and therefore always in danger of an onslaught". (Before he espoused the case of monarchist and clerical fascism, Karl Kraus—the ingenious Viennese satirist, now dead—gave this "Central" attitude the name of "persecuting innocence.".) In regard to Hitler himself, Wickham Steed points out in him the trait of
"persecution mania . . . from which he had long been suffering as a member of the German race. This mania began in the overheated Austrian racial atmosphere of his boyhood and youth. . . . For years his mind has been governed by the fixed idea that Jews, Socialists, and believers in parliamentary democracy, were engaged in nefarious persecution of the German race, and that, in seeking to put an end to this persecution, with the needful violence and brutality, he would be doing the Work of the Lord".

4. FIGHTING ROME AND THE WEST

"Your book has sold tremendously well in those circles" (viz., among German Catholics). "Thank God! . . . And now I wish God's blessing and the comfort of Our Saviour for my ally and fellow-in-arms in the war for Teutonism, against Rome, Jerusalem, etc. The consciousness of fighting for an absolutely good divine cause is a safeguard of victory! You wield your pen; I, my tongue; I point to my sword, and in spite of all attacks and naggings I say dennoch! ("quand-même").

Your truly thankful friend,

WILLIAM I. R.

(From a letter to Houston Stewart Chamberlain, New Year, 1912; quoted by G. Moenius).

"Omnes qui in orbe sunt, cives romani efficiuntur."
(All inhabitants of the empire are made Roman citizens.)

THE EMPEROR CARACALLA, A.D. 212
(quoted by G. Moenius).

"Rome has created the First universal order of the West, not by arms and commerce, but by language, law, customs, art of living—as a fundamental order and logic of speech, thought, and co-operation."

F. W. FOERSTER (quoted by G. Moenius).
"In this country tardily and laboriously Christianized, a latent enmity against Rome has survived, an outburst of which characterizes every new epoch of German history. . . . Germany's joining the Graeco-Roman world of culture would by itself bring about a pacification of Europe."

Georg Moenius.

". . . To free Germany . . . to destroy Occidental society in that country and to turn their back on Western culture . . . fundamentally they (the Tat Circle) hated that lucid Mediterranean civilization without which they might still be living in the forests of their Germanic-Slavic ancestors. Nationalism became with them a particularist substitute for religion. Their entire attitude strengthened the suspicion that Germany—Prussia, at least—was hardly part of the Western world at all."

E. A. Mowrer.

"France is the power of anti-Christian (!) mission in Europe. . . . Unlike the Teutons, the Gauls (Celts) have fully adopted the culture of victorious Rome. . . . France always carries the same mission, be it under the symbol of the Cross, or of the Rights of Man. . . . Germany is always essentially The Other Side. Even to-day, at bottom, she lives in a state of prorogated truce with official Christianity, nor can it ever be known if the pagan cult-fires are truly and properly extinct."

H. Blüher (1932).

"Rome" and "the West", in so far as they mean definable and palpable things, do not mean the same thing. To enumerate only a few items, there is an obvious and highly significant tension between the Roman emphasis on order and the Western emphasis on liberty, between the universalism of Roman "Empire" and Western "economic society"; between Roman Catholicism and Anglo-Saxon Calvinism; between the Roman idea of organized state-power and the atmosphere of the French Revolution; between the Mediterranean and the Atlantic as centres of civilization. However, the Roman and the Western world are united in a basic attitude which can aptly be described as Christian, individualist (in the metaphysical sense), rational and juridical, and correspondingly,
equalitarian (at least, from the racial and anthropological point of view). They are united in their unconditional adherence to the pursuits of civilization, domestication and equipoise; the ideal (however vaguely formulated) of men, guided by Consciousness, moving towards the goal of Happiness. They are united historically, the West being a continuation and a freshly inspired efflorescence of ancient Roman society. Finally, and this is what concerns us here, they are united by the implacable hatred which the Nazi and Teutonist mind nurses against them both. The historical roots of that hatred are to be found (1) in the incomplete adoption of Roman culture by the Teutonic tribes, arrogating themselves a position of masters rather than disciples of the Empire as well as of the Church; (2) in the evolution of medieval and modern civilization towards an emancipation from German military overlordship or preponderance; and the recreation of a universal and standardized world—"Roman" as it were, and embodying the moral and material leadership of the Christian West—by the family of Western nations. The spiritual stimuli of that hatred can only be understood in the light of ultimate problems of a religious, metaphysical, and anthropological order, which have been exposed throughout the preceding chapters.

However, are we not guilty of injustice towards the real captains of Nazidom, such as Hitler and Rosenberg, who command the actual policy of the Third Reich? Are they not proved Anglophils, ready even to be friends with wayward narrow-minded France, not to mention Fascist (if not Papal) Rome? Are not the fierce threats of Nazi Germany hurled invariably at the "East": Muscovite barbarism inflamed by Bolshevist fury and raving hatred of God?

We must not judge things at their momentary face value. Let us guard against drawing our orientation from our counterpart's casual tactics, or even from his more direct and material designs of conquest. That Nazi Germany plans an eastward rather than a westward territorial expansion—for the next step, at least—is very possible. She certainly seems to have decided on subjugating the "East" before wrecking the West; she may be assumed to have done so mainly for two reasons. Berlin is wisely intent on dividing its enemies. It rates the strength of the Anglo-French West higher than that of the Slavic East; on the
other hand, expansion to the East and South-East offers a much larger, and more preservable, territorial and economic reward. Hence, as to a decision to advance in the East, with a complacent or ineffectually reluctant West in the background, the assets seem to outweigh the liabilities. The second reason is that Berlin has incomparably more hope of engineering an ideological deception of the capitalist West, with its pacifist sentimentalism and its anti-proletarian instincts, than to allay the astute rulers of Russia, untrammelled by inhibitions prevailing in the West, into a common action against the Liberal world—whose downfall would immediately throw the Soviet Union upon the mercy of triumphant Central European Fascism. Thus the postponement of aggressive measures against Western neighbours, the play with a “European” front to parry the menace of the Red Tartars, is merely a link in the general plan of campaign, expressing neither the original substance of Naziism nor a change in that substance. The real European adversary is and remains the West, with everything that clings to this name; whereas Russia after all is more or less a huge appendix of Europe, if, by all means, an unpleasant menace and a coveted prey as well. Russian Bolshevism is no more a proper rival to Nazi Germany than Abyssinia was to Italy. Criticism of Western tenets of faith and codes of morals, not of Bolshevist ideas and methods (or the reviviscient ghost of “Pan-Slavism”), is the core around which Nazi mentality has developed. Bolshevism must be reduced and stamped out; Slav and semi-Slav Eastern Europe must be brought under German domination and exploitation, its natural and indeed redeeming destiny. But it is the world of Western democracy which must be cast down from its heights; which must be refuted both theoretically and in practice; which must be forced into an inferior position; which must be robbed of its strongholds—visible, or concealed—within the Germanic bounds themselves. An anti-Russian agreement between Nazi Germany and the West would in many ways be comparable to the problematical entente with Poland, which does not by any means imply a German renunciation of Eastern projects. Were Nazi Germany to march upon Moscow (and Prague, or Warsaw, or Kiev, or Bucharest) with the toleration, or even a partial assistance, of the West, she would, in essence, still wage the War against the West. Were she to carry the restoration of Russian
altars to the Church on the points of her bayonets, she would, in essence, still lead Teutonic Paganism on to victory over the Christian God of justice, mercy and humanity, over the universalism of Rome.

Hans Bäcker, the undisputed classic of Prussian Anti-Romanism and Anti-Westernism, has already been referred to in our section on the "Prussian drive." We now give some further quotations from his book, which in our eyes deserve the keenest attention. Who could resist the fascination which emanates from the following grand résumé?

"Whereas in the West everybody, be he a humanist, a Christian, a Liberal bourgeois, an Italian, a Frenchman, an Englishman, is ultimately a Roman citizen in the Empire of one great essential democracy—it is entirely different with us. Here everybody, both as regards his origins and his basic nature, is first and foremost—not his own private self, but—a serving member of one great vital structure embodying his existence, his life, and his action. He forms a point of intersection (Durchgangsstelle, a place of crossing or traversement) for the movements of those powers—elementary and superior, historical and supra-earthly—which according to their own will consume his self and his essence. The very centre of his existence and life lies in his active subservience, and metaphysical allegiance, to supraterrrestrial and supra-temporal, eternal powers."

We see that the War against the West is a religious war. Religion and politics, essence and aim, are here inextricably mixed. By "religion" we must understand something really binding; "creed" points to "action", and "action" is suffused with "creed"; "power" stands for "powers" in the highest meaning of the term; worship and combat become identical. Whether anti-Western Germandom will embark on another World War cannot be foretold with certainty; but surely the very display of its essence portends a War between Worlds.

Further details from Bäcker will amplify the picture without need of further comment. (1) Concerning Northern (Nordic) character: "Action, real action" (Tun) is its distinctive sign, particularly discernible in the moral attitude revealed by the Reformation. This "ethos" addresses primarily the individual, not the organized or uniform mass; but by individual is again meant a bearer of Volk substance, and an agent in the service of
Volk realization, not a personality with its autonomous selfhood. Man carries in him a direct approach, not transmitted by “objective” laws or institutions or “truths”, to reality and godhead; yet man, with all his sovereign subjectivity, is incorporated outright in a concrete, particular, social Whole.  

(2) Concerning the West: Bourgeoisie, citizenship, national democracy (which has displaced the medieval Empire and nobility), Liberalism, self-government, revolutionary progress, etc., are its distinguishing features. “Autonomous and liberal Bürger, autonomous and liberal Nation: such is the meaning conveyed to us by the West. . . . And we in the German sphere, as far as we conform to that ‘West’, are necessarily national-liberal. . . . Inversely, in the course of the anti-Liberal German Upheaval, we turn against the West both mentally and politically.” The more superficial among us, who have but incompletely thrown off the Western spell, are wont to inveigh against Western character in unjust terms which, however, miss the crucial point. It is not true—so Bäcker remarks with considerable generosity and penetration—that Western values are mere trumpery, sham goods, hypocrisy, “cant”, sheer technical Zivilisation ruled entirely by “matter”, etc. Nay, the ideas of liberalism, progress, public welfare, democracy, etc., are something different in the historical growth of Mediterranean-Western culture than they are in our climate: there, a genuine vital reality, alien to ours; here, the ghostly monuments of self-alienation, marks of spreading weakness and emptiness. Some of our writers have found out that the antagonism is rooted in religious experience, in basic theological attitudes: but again they went astray in contrasting the “Christian Empire” of Germandom to the “secular power” of France. The Imperium Teutonicum of thinkers like Stapel is still shaped on the Roman pattern, an inert and unreal anachronism. Our Northern and German mental “Shape” must stand with the Roman-Western compound “Shape” in a classic relationship of antagonism. Indeed, Anglo-French civilization, the Western Bürgerwelt with its statutes and fictions, is in no way a contemptible product of decomposition: rather must it be esteemed as a legitimate offspring of hellenistic urbanity and Roman order, re-coined to suit living national genius. (The recognition of Marshal Foch by the Academy showed in an
impressive manner that “in the army the soul of France is alive”!

(8) Concerning the Roman-Western complex: In the very guise of the West, the indestructible archetype of Civis Romanus confronts us; beneath all its camouflages we must sense it as a “Power alien and hostile to us”. Roman Christianity and Liberal utilitarianism are merely varieties of the selfsame anti-German spirit, chiefly represented in the triple form of the Roman Church (in the field of religion), France (state and culture), and England (society and economy). Certainly France, in comparison with original Roman substance, has less stamina, hence her perpetual clamouring for “security”.

Peace with France is essentially chimerical, because the French idea of paix necessarily comprises German submission. “No agreement is possible with the control-claim and disciplinary office of Pax Romana.” The European War against Germany has found a provisional conclusion only; it has produced the first results of the efforts to establish a Roman Empire of Europe arising over a subdued Germany. The South and the West converge in the pattern of a Caesarian-Democratic Empire.

(4) Concerning the relationship between Germany and the Roman world: “Until it has destroyed forever the vital core of our Northern world, Prussia and Germandom, the Roman world will not rest assured, it will not overcome the panic fear of barbarian invasion which has disquieted it ever since the Teutonic ‘Dark Ages’. . . . We, in our turn, shall never come into our own, never fulfil our historical mission, as long as that Roman world stands.” The Great War was the “overture of the final issue drawn between the two worlds ‘Rome’ and the North incarnated in ‘Prussia’-Germany”. The November revolution and the victory of Liberal and Socialist Bürgertum in collapsed and disgraced Germany, was a provisional interruption. That Bürger, as a foreign agent, is present in all kinds of liberalism, artistic humanism, Roman conceptions of law and order, the Roman Church and quasi-Catholic clerical “Protestantism” on German soil. Our defence is concentrated on the strongholds of “Nature and Race”. At present, “the German soul (das Deutsche) has been called up for decisive action, to an ultimate bursting of its bonds (Durchbruch). How will it succeed?”

(5) Concerning the “Occidental” amalgam of Rome-West with Germandom. The Abendland, an historical creation of Charle-
magne, contains the fruitful tension, frail and problematic, however, between “Teutonism” and “Romanitas”. We Germans have been “the Imperial People (Reichsvolk) of the West; the Italians, the French, the English have constituted particular nations in a state of defection from the Reich”. Spain and the Hapsburgs have provided a mere substitute. “We have been the proper bearers, the professed masters of Reich and Abendland”; but our true self has never actually merged into the West! Both Church and Empire have practised on us an un-Teutonizing, denaturing influence; whereas in the Roman sphere everything entered a process of re-Romanization, we Germans were being “seduced by Abendland into Romanity and evanescence”. With the end of the eighteenth century (the battle of Valmy) began the final break-up of Abendland, its complete supersession by the Roman-Western world. At the same time Germandom, too, is breaking away from the “Occidental” compromise. Our permanent undercurrent of unalloyed anti-Western selfness, writes Bäcker, has been represented by names and movements like Luther, Prussia, “German Idealism”, Hölderlin, Nietzsche, Bismarck, the Great War. On the other hand, the list of our Western (abendländisch, “mixed”) geniuses contains the names of Burckhardt (the great Swiss historian), C. F. Meyer (the Swiss poet), Bruckner (the Austrian musician), Däubler (a great poet born in Trieste), and Stefan George (in whom the Roman component prevails). The “tension” has now become sterile and meaningless; the process of final separation has set in. The “West” (Abendland) has gone to pieces: The Roman-Western world and the German-Northern world face each other in the panoply of their mutual alienation.

Let us pause a moment to add some observations of my distinguished friend Georg Moenius, the pro-Western Bavarian priest who has edited Henri Massis’s “Defence of the West” in German. “Anti-Roman rebellion has crept in and flourished in various shapes throughout German history.” It is a general repudiation of rational and moral principles as well as of religious authority and institutions which is at the back of political animosity towards France, Italy, Poland, Rome. The condensed symbol of values such as civilization, urban culture, state measure, administration, cultural tradition, reason, constructiveness, and humanity (Massis), has never escaped the hatred of
“Teutonic” Germany beyond the *Limes* (the old Roman frontier-line). Luther’s movement itself was mainly an ungrateful rising of Germandom against Rome, a reversion to *völkisch* instincts and atavisms. Its goal was not “progress” but the dismemberment of Christendom. The spirit of Luther, who called reason a harlot and nicknamed Aristotle *Narristoteles* (“Narr” means a fool or a madman), has lingered on in the maze of German “idealistic” philosophy. Many great German minds have complained of the barbarous and anarchical constituents of our character; on the whole, Teutonism has predominated in Germandom. The leaders of German Catholicism themselves have a heavy burden of guilt: their abject tactics of imitation and assimilation, their anxiety to display their “national reliability”, have contributed not a little to the final downfall of European Germandom. “Rome”, too, that powerful accumulator of foreign (Hellenic, Judaean, etc.) cultural and political impulses, must not suggest a notion of “Latinity” *versus* “Germandom” as though one nation or style were fighting the other: what it really means is “*Universitas*” at war with “Pan-Teutonism”, a Will founded in faith, reason and culture set against a Will surging from blood and race. Roman order naturally admits of leniency and variety; nothing can be further removed from it than Prussian drill stemming the tide of eruptive anarchy. (Compliance with a universal, mental and political, order of mankind *versus* the Tribal Absolute!) Reverence is due to Rome, not as a capital of Latin countries or even of Europe, but as a capital of the world. As regards the position of Eastern Europe, the author rightly takes counsel from F. W. Foerster, the great German “European” who, long before Naziism was turned loose in his country, had become an exile in Paris: German nationalism, says Foerster, has never honestly meant friendship with the Slavs; the “Russophil orientation” of certain more extreme militarist and “National-Bolshevist” circles is merely calculated to use Russia as a catspaw, or a source of subsidiary energies, against the West. An “understanding” between anti-universalist Germany and the Slav East is as futile as is an analogous truce with the West. Certainly Germany should seek friendship with the Slavonic world, but it should be formed in the matrix of an alliance with France, and founded on an abolition of the Prussian lead in Germany itself.
As was seen on former occasions, Rome is a regular bugbear for Houston Stewart Chamberlain. By "Rome" we are to understand the Roman Church—the lawful heir however to the ancient Roman Empire, particularly in its capacity as preserver and exploiter of damnable supra-racial universalism. Chamberlain is obsessed with fear of a Catholic re-conquest of the world (or Germany), which he thinks is bound to succeed unless a "German-Christian religion", cleansed from all foreign impurities, a "powerful creative revival of idealism", etc., takes the place of current atheism, dogmatic Romanized Protestantism, and the ranting of ethical societies. For the world, and even the Teutons, will prefer "Egyptian-Syrian mysteries" and the restoration of "inquisition courts" to barren nationalism. Roman hierocracy pursues the aim of a united Civitas Dei (State of God) with no national frontiers within its scope; universalism involves dogmatic intolerance and, at the same time, an absence of discrimination between various types and characters. (Certainly: "Rome" and the West ultimately mean equal freedom for men in the face of a universal law, whereas the worship of Teutonic Superman means freedom from enslavement for the privileged, who are only committed to the "law of their own essence"). If the State fails to assert its authority over the Church, the Church is sure to rise above the State. . . . The Jesuits are the bacilli of radical anti-nationalism, nay, indifference to one's country to the advantage of Rome. . . . On the other hand, Luther was a "political champion of German patriotism", who set up the idea of German nationhood against the system of the Roman Empire. The Reformation was a political feat, which has recalled the Teutons to themselves. Withal, Rome must not be supposed to encompass "Catholicism" in its entirety; there are many unorthodox minds and currents in the Catholic sphere, the chief targets for Jesuit arrows. "Rome" proper is not so much the fabric of Catholic beliefs as it is Popery: the world-wide empire of an irreligious political ruler, a worldly system of political power abstract and absolute, with cleverly fostered religious fervour as its effectual tool. The Roman Empire at its final stage survives in it spiritually, with its nationless body transformed. "A political power of this kind must plot unceasingly the weakening—and, at long last, annihilation—of all single states" (!). In the first place, it
is anti-German (of course! what else could we expect?) : it has been well said by Treitschke that the Catholic Church was always eager to protect the language of the less cultivated peoples.

Again, the West is a homestead of mediocrity, shallowness, vulgarity, etc. (This, it is true, was written in 1914.) The Western languages are deficient in vitality: "la médiocrité est de rigueur". Thus Erfolg (from "folgen", to follow) is rendered in French by succès; now "suc" and "cès" carry no meaning whatever for a Frenchman of to-day (?). Also it is "impossible to think deeply and subtly in English". Chamberlain was of English birth, whereas I, who am unable to share his opinion, am a foreigner to England; therefore I must not argue with him. Perhaps the English-speaking peoples will consider exchanging their idiom for one in which they could try to "think deeply and subtly". Indeed, a suggestion to this effect was politely made by the redeemed Englishman who had succeeded in overcoming his native barbarity. He claimed that, in view of the moral decay of England and the ruinous influence of English as a universal language upon the culture of the world, the political hegemony of Germany over the world should be completed by erecting German into a universal language. Only admit German on an equal footing with English in Canada, Australia, and the United States: you will see it "permeate life victoriously" (as those who spoke it did in Belgium).

Fundamental identity between "Rome" and the "West" is a staple theme of Prussian literary warmongers; French Christianity, writes Blüher, is a branch of Latinity, of Romanism; French nationalism flies the flag of Gesta Dei per Francos; there has never been a genuine Protestant upheaval in French history. France (as the bearer of a mission proper to her) is "our" confirmed enemy; and so is Rome. "Keep away from the spirit that hails from the Basque country" (Ignatius of Loyola), "and from the Latin plains... The Grail has again come within your (the Germans') reach; should you fail to seize it, it will pass on to Asia"... no mixing with Jews... "You hold the only post which is not lost as yet." The Roman Church, Blüher grants with spiteful courtesy, is a grand institution because it is perfectly pagan; "we must only combat it on national grounds, nor is that worth while except from a German standpoint".
Blüher, too, appreciates Luther as a political hero of the nation; he, too, sees in Rome an absolutely worldly system of power, only, being more sophisticated than is Chamberlain, he rather admires it on that score.

If Rome provides the original stuff of non-Teutonic Europe, the West embodies its present-day reality. It is to the Western "shape of culture" that Rome belongs to-day; and the parallel pursuits of Mussolini and the Pope are mainly "anti-Teutonic" (writes Professor Marr. As a symbolic puppet of Roman-Western designs he points out "the unhappy Herr Dollfuss", whose "obnoxious and humiliating policy" has been conducted under the "common tutelage of Italy and France".

In fact, the fusion between Roman imperial order and a society of "Western" type can be traced back to antiquity; the Mediterranean culture of Hellenism, largely mercantile in character, was already a great experiment in running society on a base of large-scale and rational civilization as opposed to tribal community. With Hellenism—the hated "racial chaos" of Houston Stewart Chamberlain—the prevalence of "manufactured conditions, forms created by arbitrary reason", became apparent (Schemann, quoting the historian Droysen). Forthwith "Hellenes" no longer meant those of Greek blood but rather the participants in Hellenistic culture (from Isokrates, *ibid*). Here, reflected in Schemann's resentment, we see the deep affinity between advanced society under the Roman Empire and the Western conception of nationality. The inner dialectics of European mankind, we read in Schemann, are determined by the dualism and antagonism between its "Northern" and its "Mediterranean" half. The latter is represented actively at once by "Rome" and by "Judaism". We are aware that to the Central European reactionary mind "Judaism" generally stands for "Western" democracy, progress, and internationalism. The Jews, as the bearers and agents of Western society with the sentiments and aspirations attached to it, provoke "earth-bound"—*bodenständig*—hatred. Moreover, the Roman Church itself is "Semitized" through and through. "Teuton-edom must now fight for its life against both Rome and Judaism. The struggle with Rome is handed down to the Teutons by their forefathers; the struggle with Judah, by antique civilization as a whole." What is meant here (half-consciously, at least) is not so
much "Jewish influence" as the specifically "Western" character of non-German Western Europe. If only the French and particularly the English and other outstanding Teutons, knew their true interests and their very souls, they would retract their misdirected adventure, break up their society of national democracies, and re-affiliate themselves to the Central and Master Race destined to build and control their part of the world.

Hielscher discriminates more keenly between the West and Rome. In his mythology of Powers, Rome is but one among the many, whereas upon the West is conferred the rank of a diabolic Counterpart of the Reich. The West is to the Reich what the Merchant is to the Warrior; what business, economy, profit are to fate, duty, and comradeship; what the Ego is to the We. Pre-war Germany, particularly in its upper classes, had become itself part and parcel of the West: that is the reason why the War was lost, and the German political body decapitated in the upheaval of 1918. The Western mind is characterized by the axiom that Matter and its rational organization are everything—and this is meant, not as a mere doctrine, but as an intrinsic psychology, a primary choice—and that such nations as refuse to conform to this attitude must be excluded from power. Everything further concerns the distribution of the booty. In the Western phraseology, God means Cotton, Country means Stock-Exchange, etc. The name "West" is due to the historical sphere where that mentality has risen to prevalence; however, the fall of many noble forces alive in the Western Raum (such as the Huguenots, Napoleon, etc.) came to pass in the struggle against that evolution. With the trial of Warren Hastings, England fell a prey to the West; so, with Napoleon’s end, did France; America has from the outset been a mainland of the West. During the very rise of the West, its inner contradiction—"the cleavage within Western man himself", or between the worship of property and the inevitable existence of disinherited masses—became apparent. . . . On the other hand, "Rome" symbolizes the idea of a legal order, extending even to a regulation of such injustices as make themselves felt in social existence. Again, the "Reich", "eternal community", "immutable eternity in God stirred up by profound transformations", the "oneness of Inwardness and Power", of "will-to-war" and "will-to-growth", etc., begins with Hermann who defeated the
Romans at Teutoburg, and who was counteracted by Marbod, the first home agent of pacifism, submission, un-Germanhood.

Far be it from us to debase Hielscher’s vision to mere delirious nonsense. On the contrary, it should enrich our understanding of the controversy. Certainly Western philosophy is not inspired by the idea of “Matter”: what it stands for is the free soul, personality, the community of equals endowed with reason, and the control of earthly conditions by their reasonable selves conscious of their mutual community. Material progress is only a token, a test, a pledge, and a means, for the pursuit of that ideal. But there is truth in Hielscher’s remark that Western society is hardly capable of existence when interlocked with anti-Western bodies. Obviously, too, the “Roman” formula of equitable order is the complement of Western rationality and progress. It is the Pantheist frenzy of anarchy and anti-individual tyranny, glorified under the name of “Reich”, which resists being reduced to the common denominator of the Western creed of civilization.

As its absolute antipode, the West is attached to the Reich by specific and mysterious ties. It performs a “rotation” around the Reich, and will ultimately dissolve into the latter. The West, embodying infinite Matter, corresponds to the Reich, that is to God in his infinitude. Tension between owners and would-be-owners (proletarians) is the driving force of Western evolution, as well as of its ultimate subversion. Louis XIV is followed by the French Revolution, which same historical step will be reiterated in later conditions. The propertyless masses are driven to actions contrary to their instincts and unjustifiable from a Western point of view: the very dynamics of the religion of self-interest will bring about its dethronement. (cf. Moeller-Bruck’s blandishments of the proletariat, and the hailing of the loss of the Great War, together with the Versailles treaty, as a liberating event for Germandom.) Western hatred against pre-war Germany was inflamed, apart from motives of economic jealousy, by a suspicion of its being but imperfectly and superficially Westernized: “the West’s unavowed fear of incalculable and uncanny Germanic man”. Among other great spiritu-political Powers, “Rome” is of peculiar interest. Its creed is legal justice, applied even to man’s relationship with God: redemption by Jesus is fashioned by the Roman mind.
into a computable act of "deserving". The Papal Church, not Mussolini, is the real embodiment of Rome; the activity of Pacelli as a nuncio in Berlin has marked its new ascendency. But the fate of Rome is sealed too. . . . "The Reich of Luther will decide about Rome." (The "Reich", at least as heralded by Hielscher, is certainly endowed with an enviable appetite.) Rome has its private grudges against the West; she counts on using fallen Germany as her own weapon, and therefore objects to its condition as a colony of the West. She attempted to derive benefit from Germany's national rally after the first Weimar years: Kaas and Brüning fought Rome's battles against the West, while the Reich looked on in silence. (To-day "Rome", upon the assumptions of Hielscher, may well ask herself whether she has acted wisely in flirting with the foes of Western Liberalism.) Until the Reich secures itself against the South, it cannot venture upon its conclusive struggle with the West. "The first World War, which opens the issue between the Reich and the West", was preceded by an alliance with Austria, the firmest stronghold of Rome in the sphere of the Reich. The fall of the Hapsburgs, those faithful lieutenants of Rome, paves the way for a new ascent of Austria, now freed from the tangle of a motley of nations, and for her irrevocable return into the bosom of the Reich. "Peace in the South will once more precede war in the West"—thus the prophetic trumpetings of Hielscher in 1931.

Here is a random survey of utterances on "Rome":

"There can be no peace, only a tooth-and-nail struggle, between genuine National Socialism and the Romish Church" (Arthur Dinter). It is an urgent necessity that all Germans should be anti-clerical, said Schönerer, the old hero of Pan-Germanism. "Away from Rome!" The "darkness of the Roman church of priestcraft is incompatible with the pellucid Teuton mind". Bergmann pleads petulantly that the Germans should "shatter the mental bondage to Roman Christianity", a task which must certainly come before liberation from the "bondage of interest". "Germano-holiness" must take the place of "Romano-holiness" (we need not repeat Deutschkirche, Deuschgott, etc.): it must never be forgotten that "Romish Christian mentality could not flourish except in a downtrodden Teutonia". Rosenberg contends that the demand for implicit obedience imposed on Catholics by the Pope entails complete
renunciation of one's honour. Political Catholicism is not an abuse but a consistent application of Roman Christianity; it is the latter which in itself constitutes an abuse of true religion. Rome as such is "an experiment of the first magnitude in the annihilation of nations". The very use of Latin as a Church language gives proof of the unnatural character of Roman Catholicism. Genuine popular feeling frowns on Latin, demanding the use of our "holy German mother-tongue". In his recent polemic against the Church, Rosenberg goes to the hyperbolic length of declaring the Third Reich to be the opposite rather than the re-establishment of the First (the Germano-Roman) Reich. The monumental statement of Bäumler may conclude this review: "The greatness of Germany is inseparable from her being an anti-Roman power".

So much for "Rome"; now to the "West". As regards the general features of Western society, some valuable hints are contained in the sober and moderate book by Governor Heinrich Schnee on "Nationalism and Imperialism" written in 1928. (Schnee was a leading figure of pre-war colonial Germany, and his seventy-first birthday was celebrated recently in the Third Empire.) Without any show of hostility, Schnee—a conservative nationalist rather than a Nazi—traces the trend towards self-government and social equality in English and French history. The insular character of England, as well as her precocious attainment of national organization, favoured the growth of a Liberal leaven in society. The Charta of 1215, giving the gentry specified rights in the face of royalty, proved in the aftermath to be the germ of the evolution of more universal popular rights. Owing to the system of primogeniture, the English nobility avoided the course of rigid segregation and inbreeding; it did not shut out the lower social orders. Thus the inelastic class system prevailing on the Continent was kept from gaining a footing on English soil. Also, the Black Death (1348) caused a protracted shortage of labour, thereby accelerating the replacement of serfs by free wage-earners. To sum up, England has known a "centuries-old coexistence of free people on a basis of equal rights"; common man has acquired an attitude towards his social superiors which is equally free from truckling servility and resentful defiance; Puritanism has fostered respect for a life conforming with principles and statutes; even the "shopkeeper
mentality" (so often decried in Germany) has its virtues in the way of commonsense and mental discipline. To be sure, France entered later into the sphere of self-government: the privileged (noble and clerical) and the unprivileged (taxable: *les taillables*) classes had long been held rigorously apart. Yet the very bases of society were less affected by inequality: the peasants, for the most part, were freeholders, although their property was inordinately small. Making allowance for territories later annexed in the East, there was no rural serfdom as in Germany. As to racial policy, the French conception of "frères de couleur", of "a hundred million Frenchmen", far outstrips English democracy. On the other hand, in Italy the traditions of self-government have to a large extent been warped by a century-long endurance of foreign domination. (See also Menczer's fine analysis of "Westernism" quoted in our Introduction.)

The anti-Western rhetoric of Professor Scheler (on the occasion of the War) were directed especially against England and the ideal of an Anglo-German Teutonic community; from the French point of view, he wrote, the War was devoid of meaning. Scheler's passionate hatred of the Puritan "moralism" and "cant", inherent in the English political mind, was by no means confined to the duration of the War. He appreciated, however, the English philosophical school of Utilitarianism, but merely for its quixotic self-exposure, as the *enfant terrible* of British bourgeois respectability. His malicious construction of an "English Table of Categories"—"comfort" taking the place of culture; "society", of community; "propriety" (correctness), of ethics, etc.—provides an amusing instance of spiritual villainy on the part of an ingenious philosopher. The reverse of English liberty, he said, was English narrow-mindedness (*Borniertheit*): conscience and intellect being instinctively and uniformly subservient to self-interest. Englishmen always behave with juridical caution, as though they were perpetually exposed to the public eye. . . . (A criticism more remarkable than it is annihilating, I should think.) It was irrevocable, writes Scheler, that the destinies of Britain and Germany should collide. "The issue between them cannot be decided save by a radical war. Should the present war fail to bring them to a final issue, the task will fall to another war, or to a whole series of such wars".
Instead of endorsing the outcry "Away from Rome," Scheler cried "Away from England!" Indeed, German victory and expansion would serve the "interests of a more deeply conceived Catholicism". The War means alike the beginning of a renascence, and an end of Europe: naturally, a German renascence, and the end of Anglo-American leadership with its lukewarm standards of civilization. But to France—which was less tainted with "Puritanism" and, anyway, appeared to be the weaker half of the West—Scheler generously concedes the possibility of error: France was not so bad at heart, only a "traitor to the West and her own ideals of culture". (We see how the secondary aspects of German nationalism can be modified according both to individual temper and the momentary situation.) In Scheler’s review of the situation, the West formed no organic unit as did the Central Powers, whose "community of life, culture and love" was countered, on the other side, by a mere "alliance of hatred and ulterior purpose". (Similarly, it is considered "un-organic" to-day that the Slavs, the neighbours of Germany, should be Francophil rather than Germanophil. Why, France could never annex them as a province!) As to the supreme object of war, Scheler propounds formulas which have since acquired a fresh topical interest: Secession of Germany from world capitalism, making economic competition with England superfluous; and a Continental Union of Europe, aligned in solidarity against the East, under German military leadership.

Concrete plans and tactics may differ: essentially, the Masters of the "Central Nation" are out to dismember the West, to break its soul; and to conquer the East, assuming towards it the part of a more contiguous, imperious, and irresistible, "West" entitled to "civilize", to "pacify" and to exploit in its own way those peoples who are predestined to bondage.

Professor Eibl, the Catholic nationalist who is all for both having his cake and eating it—he insists on interpreting German vitalistic imperialism in terms of universal justice and lawfulness has some striking views to offer concerning the issue between German and Western political thought. Current Western ideology maintains that there is such a thing as an objective right, whereas according to German doctrine the "right" is nothing but a manifestation of power which is in no
need of further justification. How did German theory fall into such disrepute?—he queries with a dolorous sigh. He discovers three main reasons for that deplorable fact. (1) Because of the darker view taken of human nature by the Reformation, German theory has often exhibited a somewhat gloomy realism in regard to the state also. (2) German Romanticism has refused assent to the democratic and revolutionary worship of reason. (3) "Occasional" pronouncements of Bismarck, the historical theory of Treitschke, and Nietzsche's theory of power, may certainly be susceptible of unfavourable interpretation. With professorial severity Eibl remarks that the misconstruction, even though explicable, is not therefore to be forgiven. The shallow mind of the West ought to have looked more deeply into the matter. Had it done so, its labour would have been rewarded by some startling discoveries: for example, that the idea of the state as an instrument of divine wrath was a natural counterpart to the dangerous Western emancipation of human nature, assumed to be uncorrupted; that in German eyes Western rationalism was rightly discredited by the Terror and the Napoleonic wars; that Hegel's glorification of state-power was better applicable to French than to German power policy; that Fichte did not preach German "imperialism", only a belief in the Germans being the Original People (Urvolk) of the Western Nation as a whole, and so on. Even the undeniable genius of Eibl, we must own, could hardly convince us that Frederick the Great's political immoralism was rooted in the disillusioning experiences of Jacobin terror and Napoleonic aggression. Again, it was very short-sighted (so Eibl writes) to take exception to Hegel's theory that Absolute Moral Reason, at a given moment, incarnates itself in a concrete State, conferring upon it a claim to supremacy. For "nothing prevents us from supposing" that some day Absolute Moral Reason might chance to become incarnate in a legal organism including several nations and states. Nothing, indeed, prevents us from supposing so; only, strange to say, the possibility of such a supposition never occurred to Hegel; and the critics of Hegel can hardly be blamed for having judged Hegel on the authority of Hegel rather than of Eibl, of whose existence they may have had no prescience at all. Nor does Eibl seem to be more fortunate in the rehabilitation of Treitschke. We hear that that eminent, if not universally
beloved, Prussian state philosopher never intended to glorify Might or to sneer at Right; he did no more than point out the hard fact that in most cases brute Power triumphs over pure Right. “Unfortunately”, Eibl adds, “he did so with a sort of malicious pleasure”. (“Leider mit einer Art Schadenfreude.”) Were I—in Christian Austria, for instance, where I wrote these lines—to exonerate a friend who is a confessed atheist from the charge of irreligion, I should say, with an obeisance to Eibl: “This man is a firm believer in personal godhead. He has repeatedly professed his faith in writing literally: ‘I am a theist’. Unfortunately, he is addicted to the habit of writing ‘a’ and ‘theist’ in one word. Surely this may explain, but not justify, your misconstructions”. We are then informed that Bismarck was intensely religious, and deeply conscious of his responsibility to God; that Nietzsche was hypersensitive and compassionate rather than cynical; and that the “general desertion of humanistic ideals in Europe” (in the closing period of the past century) produced more offensive manifestations in Germany than it did elsewhere, because the Germans were overwhelmed by the seductive experience of great and rather easily won victories. Finally, Eibl accuses Western rationalistic morals of being warped by an unsolved conflict between legal positivism—belief in the sanctity of legal promises with no regard to their material morality—and the idealistic striving for moral justice and perfection. Much of this is true, but hardly to the point. Were I to maintain, which I do not, that everything is all right in “Western” (English-American-French) ethics, politics and economy, “Western” readers could only reward my innocence with hearty derision. However, the controversy between the mind aspiring to a concrete and working moral order of society, and the religion of tribal, racial and vitalistic self-worship, is not affected by a demonstration of the inner tensions, failings, and even vices, in the former camp. Incidentally, it is to be regretted that Professor Eibl forbears to extend his laborious apologetics—so skilfully applied to Romanticism, Hegel, and Bismarck—to modern National Socialist literature as well. An Eiblilian edition of, say, Rosenberg, Bäumler, Hielscher, Freyer, Spengler, Hitler, Carl Schmitt, Spann, Stapel, Blüher, not to forget Haiser, might easily double the delight experienced in perusing the originals themselves.
In his book on “Autarkie”, Fried stigmatizes “revolutionary democracy, money-power, great cities, and centralism” as “French, Western, Occidental”. This mentality cherishes a “misinterpreted freedom for freedom’s sake... cold calculation, lack of mercy... unrestrained advancement of self, all "selves" being supposed to harmonize”. “Reaction against it is German, or more exactly, Prussian”. (Meaning, “service” and the surrender of self to Volk spirit and interests. The antithesis, compared with the brilliancy of Bäcker and several others of our standard sources, is rather crude.)

Spengler, anxious to stress the “natural” chances of German attainment to universal supremacy—an issue of which is due for decision in the near future—paints a depressing picture of the West (1988). Englishmen and Americans are blind to the idea of State and Fatherland; they are accustomed to refer to it as “this country”. (Who could fathom the depths of Prussian contempt for such a nomenclature? Are not even British officers sybaritic shopkeepers who prefer “mufti” to “the king’s uniform”? Perhaps it may spoil the picture a little to observe that Americans often address their country as “the States” too.) English and American society suffers from drab uniformity; it repines under the dictatorship of social homogeneity (extending even to male headgear, with too little preference for steel-helmets). The United States shows disquieting analogies with the Soviet Union, that hellish grandchild—as we know from the author—of Christian Scholastics. What, (beyond “U.S.A.” resembling “U.S.S.R.”), are the analogies? It is common knowledge that technological progress is held in great esteem in both republics; but the eagle eye of Spengler detects a more astounding correspondence, hidden beneath the surface of an apparent dissimilarity. Whereas in Russia the Communist Party is all-powerful, in America it has but scant existence, and practically no influence. Yet in a sociological sense, it has its full equivalent in the underworld of gangsters! England, originally at least a country of “Vikings”, is now tired out: it has lost too much valuable blood. The pre-Teutonic stock, usually called “Celts”, is in the upward movement; and these inferior strata carry in them a French mode of feeling and living. Genuine capitalist imperialism yields to rentier ideals. With great concern Spengler puts the query: “Will the English...
fight?" (The problem is not an unimportant one; but I think at bottom it would rather cheer the enquirer to know that they will not.) Spengler counts on the likelihood of "fratricidal hatred" between England and the United States; we can but wish that all his prophesies may be as true as this. Needless to say, his portraiture of France reflects even more sinister hues. Paris is already on the high road to becoming an historical curiosity like Vienna. (Will the liberators of Vienna, 1918, hasten to redeem Paris too?) The French do not see beyond their immediate neighbourhood; they can but hate such of their neighbours as have attained superior power. Does any true Frenchman think of French colonies, or, since 1918, even of Alsace-Lorraine? France indulges in a mischievous, barren Chauvinism: a "bully grown senile", loaded with arms, with a host of armed servants at his command, and yet in deadly terror of the army of others. This is certainly a caricature of the clumsiest sort; however, it may be well to retain the essence of the French "paradox", so puzzling to the Prussian mind: the attitude of a fundamentally pacific and high-minded nation which is yet unwilling to renounce political significance in the world, or to fall an easy prey to a stronger, more military and expansive—and, admittedly, less well-off—neighbour.

The authors whom we have chosen to conclude this parade are markedly anti-Western to the point of a so-called "Eastern orientation". (Naturally, the basic purpose is always the same: to prevent the West from imparting liberty to the "East"; to prevent the "East" from organizing itself on Western models; to substitute for humanitarian democracy the rule of the Master Man on an international scale.) Erich Müller, flirting with "National Bolshevism", describes the ignominy of the Weimar Republic thus: "The new State, divested of monarchical and military institutions, was out and out a State of the bourgeoisie; both directly and with regard to its inner structure, it was a tributary of the West". Whereas in the pre-war Reich, in spite of all its rottenness, kingship and the army were still "relics of a genuine edifice of mastery". The West, in its turn, is ruled by the type of man suffused with the ideas of the French Revolution: "the spirit of autonomous, impious, town-bred man, who at his very best believes in economy, and for whom economy means destiny... bourgeois, urban, Western man... in whose
world Germandom and Russiandom have remained foreign bodies". Dostoievsky and Nietzsche mark the turning of the tide, the new movement of anti-Western upheaval. When the battle of Tannenberg destroyed the Westernized surface of pre-war Russia, hopes of Russo-German co-operation seemed not ill-founded. Bolshevism promised to prove a "self-annihilation of Western civilization by its own weapons", naturally under the wholesome supervision of Prussian "Heroic nihilism", the "Germany of the Black Flag". It seems as though things were taking a rather different turn.

From Müller, it is but a short step to Moeller (van den Bruck). Undoubtedly the perspective in which he saw things immediately after Versailles was soon obsolete; it contributed mightily, however, to the formation of the Nazi state of mind. For Moeller-Bruck it was indisputable that Germany, for reasons of foreign politics, and owing to economic collapse and the rising influence of the proletariat, had no choice but to cast in her lot with Russia in stern opposition to the West. We have nothing to expect from the West—he wrote—but must, the sooner the better, form an alliance with Russia on condition that she accepts "German peculiarity". With remarkable consistency, he even drew (1928) a sharp line of division between Italian Fascism and the course which he urged his country to follow. "Italian Fascism is anti-revolutionary". It provides for Italy a school of discipline, through which the Germans have long passed under the beneficent severity of Prussia. "Inversely, German Nationalism is the movement of a people undergoing a state of revolution." We need not add that he meant what he used to call a "Conservative Revolution", in reality a bolder, more "dynamic" and more desperate kind of fascism. Moeller's position is strongly backed by Dyrssen, the very title of whose book is "The message of the East". He distrusts Mussolini, who—in his opinion—has never thought of a complete departure from the methods of "reasonableness", "citizenship", "bourgeois society". Rome has always been ambitious for world supremacy on a basis of "civilization". The Fascist State remains entrenched in capitalist imperialism; "Giovinezza", offering a fresh supply of blood, does no more than skim the surface of the bürgerlich world. The "East" alone knows the "inwardness and transcendency of faith". And "Russia is the
only real Power in the East to-day (1938) which stands unequivocally against Rome". Russia, like Germany, is driven to Autarkie as a means of wresting herself from the claws of capitalistic world economy; by all ultimate standards she is deeply akin to Germany. . . . Bolshevism itself means a "liquidation" of the Westernizing error of Peter the Great, just as Germany to-day is engaged in redeeming the Westernizing error of Charlemagne. A common front against the West would be supported socially by the revolutionary condition of the German people: the petty savers and rentiers swindled, the middle classes pulverized, the great rural owners ruined (?), the peasants wandering from their tenements (?) . . . There is, in contrast to the Western individualism of rigid private property, an ancestral kinship between the Russian Mir and the Teutonic Allmend. . . . (Forms of peasant land-ownership in common.) With us, Western veneer has always been a foreign import, it never coalesced with our real nature . . . now we are becoming alive once more to the advantages of an "'uncivilized' condition of liberty (?)" . . . the message of the East . . . a National Socialism . . . "the original pattern of Prussiandom". Niekisch's ideas, which are in the same vein—the "synthesis between Moscow and Potsdam"—have been mentioned in the section on the "Prussian drive".

General Seeckt completely shares the view of Niekisch that watchful self-protection against Communism is in no way contradictory to an entente with Russia. The more rigorously we repress Communism within our own borders, the freer we are to use Russia as a battering-ram against our national adversaries. (This, of course, is the real point. The alleged "revolutional situation" emphasized by Moeller-Bruck and Dyrssen has in fact been interpreted, and used, as a counter-revolutionary situation having certain undeniable analogies with the revolutionary process in Russia as opposed to the "sated" and "balanced" Liberal West.) "In analogy to General Schlieffen's cry: 'Reinforce the right wing!' we beseech the rulers of Germany: Keep our rear guarded!" Taken all in all, "Eastern" orientation amounts to a strategical preference which, should it be carried out, might naturally be reinforced with certain ideological weapons; and the same holds true for "Western" orientation seasoned by the anti-bolshevik obsession.
When France was still much superior in power, Germany little short of total disarmament, and Russia a subversive factor of great potential strength, aggressive German nationalism deemed it best to gamble on the Russian menace. Now both Germany and Russia are again first-rate military powers, Russia has become a conservative force in regard to foreign matters, and the West—afraid of Germany, and at the same time, distrusting Bolshevism—is still considered a very hard nut to crack; given such circumstances, there is something to be said in favour of finishing Russia first in order to be better prepared for closing the account with the West. We have not quoted the spokesmen of "Eastern orientation" with a view to prove that there is at present an imminent danger of Germany linking up with Soviet Russia against Great Britain and France: we merely intended thereby to round off the description of the many-sided, strong and inflexibly anti-Western substance of German Nationalism.

5. THE "MASTER RACE"

"From its centre, which is the consciousness of honour, Nordic soul is again entering into activity. . . . A new era of German mystique has opened: the myth of blood and the myth of the free soul are awakened to a new conscious life."

A. Rosenberg.

"A Nordic Europe and a German Central Europe—is our motto."

A. Rosenberg.

"The Teutons or the Night—is and remains our motto."

L. Schemann.

"The piety of a peasant nobility of Nordic race, living in an equipoise of body and soul, uprightly facing God in measured self-assertion. . . . God and man are not incommensurable
entities: men can have something divine in their nature, and display it in their deeds. ... Indogermanic piety means a devout penetration of all things pertinent to the native soil, as well as to human life, under the guidance of a high-minded response to divinity ... hence an easy deflection towards polytheism and pantheism. ... Mystique means a feeling of being housed in the world. ..."

H. F. K. Günther.

"We Germans bear several races within us. But every race does not carry in it the law of Germandom. This is a privilege of the Nordic race."

L. F. Clauss.

(From a lecture held in Berlin, 1986.)

It may surprise us that the Germans—as far as they are nationalists of the now prevailing colour—should deem their own race a nobler or more valuable breed than are other people, a lawful claimant for mastery by virtue of its indwelling qualities. Indeed, some of the dissenting spectators feel inclined to dismiss that idea as rank nonsense. For my part, I am in favour of a more circumspect and unbiased criticism. Without having any personal sympathy with the racial pretensions of an oddly self-enamoured Germandom, I find a triple reason for awarding them more significance than most opponents of Naziism are minded to grant. (1) An actual “symbiosis” between ruling Germanic elements and subjected non-German populations has proved to be a recurrent factor in history. It cannot be denied that even in some countries where the Germans have not been the dominant nationality, they have largely contributed to the formation of the political ruling set—identical with, or closely wedded to, the social aristocracy. At the same time, they have certainly exhibited first-rate gifts in the field of culture and civilization. Given a combination of all these facts, the inference—even though it be a rash or erroneous one—that the Germans are imbued with a specific racial virtue and superiority may not appear entirely preposterous. Supposing the Whites rank racially “above” the Negroes (with whom they can nevertheless intermarry), why should similar discriminations within their own circle be necessarily absurd? Is it impossible that there are no
"racial reasons" why the English should rule over Indians, the French rule over Arabs, the Dutch rule over Malayans?—and if this is the case, why should the Germans not equally be fitted to rule over Slavs? Undoubtedly there are weighty counter-arguments to this; but it is not unintelligible that it should have been conceived. (2) It is significant that eminent non-German authors have endorsed, if not originally forwarded, the German racial claim. There is scant need to mention once again Count Gobineau, Lapouge, and Houston Stewart Chamberlain. (Paul de Lagarde has no place in this catalogue; he was an unalloyed German, his real name being Bötticher.) Disraeli, if by no means a Teutonomaniac, inclined to the view that race (in the wider sense of national character) is determined by blood, not by language or religion. G. Le Bon, in many ways a disciple of Gobineau, contends that "man is always in the first place a representative of his race"; "chaque race porte dans sa constitution mentale la loi de ses destinées". Guizot was strongly prejudiced in favour of Teutonism: "Les Germains nous ont donné l'esprit de liberté . . . le droit et le bien de chaque individu . . . ." Contrary to the Roman principle of uniformity and state-worship, the Teutons introduced the principle of "faithfulness between individual and individual", the greater latitude of feudal organization. "L'individualité des peuples est proclamé comme celle des hommes . . . ." The admiration of Carlyle for Germanism was unqualified; the French Revolution he has called a "mad Gaelic effervescence". And there is the remarkable assertion from Stubbs ("Constitutional History of England", 1875-): "The German element is the paternal element in our system, natural and political". The American sociologists Madison Grant and L. Stoddard have at any rate borrowed certain basic principles of German racialism: the playing off of racial value against democratic promiscuousness, and the danger of the "under-dog" (quoted from Schemann). On the other hand, Francophil German writers, such as Heinrich Mann, for instance, never dream of the spectre of a French racial superiority, nor, thank heaven, do the French themselves. (3) The third reason, though in fact simple enough, is not so easy to state. What I am about to say should not be mistaken either for trivial irony or for an acceptance of Nazi pretensions. Namely, it might be suggested that there be such a thing as a
German racial superiority because the Germans themselves are widely addicted to the idea and "they ought to know". But megalomania, it will be argued, is no proof of real grandeur. Certainly not; and yet this blunt application of psychopathological categories is not entirely to the point. Supposing a man of undeniably great qualities and accomplishments (widely acknowledged and in many fields) were to contend that he entertained a special intimacy with the divine will: his claim might puzzle us, it might anger us, it might arouse incredulity; but the assumption that there was "something in it", or that he had some weighty reason for preferring this claim to other outlets for an overfed self-esteem, would not appear wholly unreasonable. In other words, the Germans, in so far as they pretend to possess a noble racial type in considerable degree, do so perhaps because it is true; again, in so far as they pretend to be ethnically endowed with a peculiar magic of power, perhaps to a certain degree they are right. The conclusions to be drawn from such knowledge might, of course, vary greatly according to one's fundamental outlook. It is not self-evident that racial values, even if they exist, are decisive values: it is far from being self-evident that mankind should willingly invest the magicians of power with the greatest possible amount of power. The essential thing is always the one upon which spiritual emphasis is laid. Nazi Germany is first and foremost the nation of racial superiority as a theme, a programme, a title-deed, not of racial superiority as a fact. And, should the claim have some legitimate foundation in facts, this is a circumstance liable to render it more serious and sustained, and therefore all the more odious and pregnant with menace: just as a sorcerer who is really endowed with certain magic powers may justly be considered more dangerous than a self-deceiving lunatic or a mere crook. To conclude this train of thought, I should suggest paying more attention to the moral falsity and essential aggressiveness inherent in the creed of racial mastery than to its alleged absurdity from a scientific point of view. To be a victim of one's own second-rate faculties and dubious virtues makes one's case more tragic, but certainly not more harmless, than to be the dupe of one's purely delusive ambitions.

The nebulous inexactitude and shiftiness of racial terms and definitions is already familiar to us. It is designed to serve the
idea of a self-centred Tribal Universe which is yet believed to concentrate in it the splendour of the surrounding, the vaster universe as well. The Race Teutonic (Germanisch) has the function of linking up the German nation with what is insinuated to be "best" in other nations, to make German nationalism a mystical law binding for the non-German world. Superiority is not claimed on behalf of a German (deutsch) Race, for such a claim could have no addressee outside the bounds of Germandom itself; the mystical substratum of human nobility cannot be identical with a definite country as such. The racial creed means a step beyond mere hard-and-fast nationalism, or else it means nothing. Hence its sponsors operate with the idea of an “Aryan” race (as opposed to Semites and Negroes), a “Teutonic” race (as opposed to Jews, Celts, Slavs, and generally, mongrels), or a “Nordic” race (as distinct from Latins, Mediterraneans, Slavs, Jews, from the “Alpine”—“Ostic”—and “Dinaric” stock as well). At the same time, the German nation—and in due consequence the German Fascist State, the Nazi Party, the Leader who incarnates the German national will—are the chosen exponent, the appointed executive agent, the organized centre of the Master Race; or inversely, the Master Race is the glorious halo around the Neo-Prussian State, the active core of a mankind embodying God’s majesty and the forces of Nature. The underlying sociological formula, pitted against the conceptions of self-government, rational co-operation, obligation by a universal moral and legal order, government by those most trusted by all, may be condensed in the words: The rule of natural and born Rulers, whose very essence is inseparable from an incarnation of Power.

The Teutons—if we are to believe Houston Stewart Chamberlain—have been, if not the “unique”, at least the “incomparable” factor in universal history. Our entire culture and civilization of to-day is the product of one type of man: to wit, the Teutonic race. As for an illustration of this bold statement, the author explains that the Dark Ages which followed on the wreck of the Roman Empire by no means owed their darkness to the invading Teutons, but simply to the inner dissolution of the Roman world, which was amply deserving of death: rather did the Teutons prevent that darkness from becoming absolute and everlasting. Celts and Slavs, particularly in their “North
European" branches, and as far as they have "preserved" cultural gifts and moral prowess, must also be counted to the Teutons. The significance of every nation as a "live force" is proportional to its share of "genuine Teutonic blood". What could be more obvious, seeing that "the thrones of Europe are occupied without exception by Teutons"?

A line from L. F. Clauss, the leading racial psycho-typologist, will at once open our eyes to the political perspectives of the racial circuit of thought. Having described the "Westic" or "Welsch" (Mediterranean) soul as an "inner field of tension", prone to hatred, craving for explosive emotions, etc., he infers: "For us Germans, every attempt to come to an 'understanding' with France is pointless—as long as France is still animated by the Mediterranean mind. Not before it ceases to be so, will it cease to feel its frontiers threatened... to yearn for gloire and triomphe, and the sight of the bleeding enemy... the problem whether its frontiers are in fact threatened is immaterial". Well, how can the welsch soul of France be discarded, and the change made visible and credible?

A somewhat unorthodox representation of Germanic racial theory provided by K. Hildebrandt, who adheres to it under the auspices of Platonic and Stefan Georgian fascism, may once more remind us of its political and sociological backgrounds, as well as of its "atmospheric" rather than strictly doctrinal value: It is our impending task, writes Hildebrandt, to forge the racial variety of our people into a "German national race", which will still be anthropologically a compound, but morally and aesthetically a homogeneous brand. What is "sought for" (!) is a harmonious image (Bild: figure, picture, design, frame) of German "style", indeed of German man. "The way to accomplish this task cannot be set down methodically: it will be the work of a few ingenious men, who create out of their instinct, not in conformity with the tenets of racial hygiene. This is what suits Nordic blood: to elevate the Leader incarnate as an image of the supreme value, and abide in faithfulness to him... not merely glorying in our inherited substance, but purifying and recasting it into a living Idea of the nation... to witness the re-birth of this Image, and of the people's belief in the Image..." As things look from this vantage-point, the original blood as such is worth little without its "shaping" by
fascist dictatorship; however the dilemma is adroitly overcome by touching on the pivotal fact that “our” blood by its very nature calls for that dictatorship. Teutonic “creativity of culture” crystallizes out in Hitler’s rule.

The opposite pole of this semi-Roman fascism becomes discernible in Bäcker’s geographical Nordicism. Here “Nordic race” is actually superseded by “Northern man”; and the “South” almost supeersedes the claim of the “West” to be chief adversary, or rather, the West is visualized as a mere part of the South. “In the South we are either inane or a bourgeois average. In the North we are conscious of being essentially unique and at our highest, bearers of service (’workers’). . . . The South must realize that its appeals are wasted on us, enwrapped in our Northern existence. The North is on the way to finding itself and its own language, its course and its system of action.” The Nordic racial idol is a mere blind-alley: “Races are alterable, space (Raum) has constancy”. Bäcker’s essay culminates in the fanciful vision—which, however, he does not wish to be taken for a “programme”—of the North flooding and re-creating the South “climatically and racially . . . as happened in prehistoric times”.

We now add some further information on the old Teutons. Historical accuracy, of course, matters less than the light in which the new Germans see them. Anyhow, it may be fairly supposed that the picture, if charged with arbitrary assumptions, is far from being entirely fictitious. For Naziism is a harsh creed with robust foundations in history, not a dulcet ideology or an ephemeral mood of self-glorification.

In his grand and delightful essay on Friedrich Nietzsche, Professor Bäumler advances the view that that much-contested philosopher’s conception of the State was a Teutonic (germanisch) rather than a German (deutsch) one. Nietzsche’s bitter criticism of German conditions and developments, often dressed in a Francophil, “European” or even pro-“Roman” guise, originated in his passionate reversion to the “Teutonic” substructure of German nature. “Now the sphere of Germandom does not cover the sphere of Teutonism. There are other peoples participant in Teutonic essence. At the same time, whenever German life reaches an historical apogee, the Teutonic element comes out with particular strength. The epoch of the Saxon, the Fran-
conian and the Swabian emperors, Luther's Reformation, and the duet of Bismarck and Nietzsche in the nineteenth century, represents supreme peaks of this kind." The epitome of Teutonic life and ideals is to be found in "liberty", that is, the liberty of aristocratic warriors, united by a contempt for settled, domesticated and peaceful modes of living. Liberty means "the prevalence of the virile instincts of war and victory over instincts of another kind, for instance, the urge for 'happiness'...freeman means warrior" (Nietzsche). Teutonism is akin to the Greek Polis—an active community of nobles out for self-assertion by strife and contest—rather than to the Roman "State", a large-scale organization of stable order. That is why Nietzsche dreamed of a "European" world of aristocratic camps of will-to-power, and despised national democracy as well as the idea of a "Christian Empire". His love of the Renaissance, commonly given artistic reasons, is in truth directed to the "agonistical" type of man who ruled the Italian city-states of that age, practising the "Greek ethics and metaphysics of strife", and who were probably of "Teutonic blood". The ancient Teutons knew no supra-personal "fatherland"; much less an abstract "state"; they did not fight "for their country", so Bäumler explains, adducing the testimony of Andreas Heusler, that eminent scholar in Teutonic research. "To carry the field in a serious situation, to assert one's warrior honour in courage, self-control and contempt of death, this alone is the vital point" (Heusler). The warrior ethics displayed in the Iceland Sagas furnish us with a realistic illustration of what Nietzsche understood by master morality, in contraposition to slave morality, which is the one proper to peaceful toilers. Nietzsche himself refers to the Iceland Sagas in this sense. We quote Bäumler: "Ancient Nordic has the word Mikilmenni, meaning a man of great stature, a master-man (Herrenmensch). He is high-minded and high-handed; great in will-to-power as well as in lavishing gifts and succouring his friends. His counterpart is Litilmenni (Lützelmann), whose soul is of scanty dimensions, fearing everybody and grudging expense." The proposition of Heusler might equally well be a passage in Nietzsche's 'Genealogy of Morals'. The following sentence could have been taken from 'Antichrist': 'To find a Teutonic term for the new virtue of humility, it was necessary to employ such words as
designated the low people, the bondsmen; in fact, no discrimina-
tion was made between humility and the mentality of a slave'.
Finally, what Heusler says as a general characterization of
Teutons reads like a motto for Nietzsche's struggle against the
morals of mercy and pacifist humanitarianism: 'In the place of
a universal idea of duties towards man, the great dichotomy of
Friend and Foe prevailed!" We have but to add that it reads
like a most appropriate motto for Carl Schmitt's philosophy of
law, and for the tribal ethics of Naziism in its entirety as well.

But Bäumler's account of Nietzsche's Teutonism runs further,
tempting us to avail ourselves of its rich fruits. Nietzsche's cam-
paign against slave morality is aimed in the same breath at
Christianity. Here the implication of Teutonism is a twofold
one: besides a direct renewal of its heathen substance, its
religious tradition also facilitates the understanding of the
actual condition of Europe's mind. For Nietzsche's point of de-
parture is the announcement that "God is dead"; he does not
set upon Christianity like a libre-penseur rationalist who rails
at its "superstitions" but at the same time keeps within its
scope; he contemplates its corpse like a rising young god of
another faith. Now the myth of the "Twilight of the Gods."
comes from the North; indeed, as a young man Nietzsche wrote:
"I believe in the primal Teutonic wisdom that all gods must
die". Many years later, he again wrote as if in retrospect to his
work: "I have treated the implantation of a deeply anti-
German myth—Christianity—into the German heart as the
German disaster proper". On the other hand, he saw in France
the Christian and priestly character par excellence, maintaining
itself unscathed even in the guise of anti-clerical free-thinking
and secular morality. "All gods must die", said Nietzsche,
whereas the libre esprit said: "If God did not exist he ought to
be invented". Widely removed from Latin rationalism and
atheism, it is rather the Siegfried of the Nibelungs' Song who
defies Christianity in the person of Nietzsche. "Nordic pagan-
ism is the measureless dark background from which the bold
aggressor of Christian Europe emerged. It was in the Latin races
that he saw Christianity firmly rooted." For the Latins, desertion
from Christianity means the jettisoning of their innate spirit;
for the Germans, it rather means a reversion to "their own
spirit (Geist) or, perhaps, anti-spirit (Ungeist)", the fertile and
as yet unexhausted "barbaric" depths of the Teuton soul. Nietzsche turned an irate face upon the Germans, because he was disappointed in them: "It has been incumbent on the Germans to become the first un-Christian nation of Europe. They are those in whom the destruction of 'Nordic barbarity' has been carried least far; they are the only really bellicose people in Europe; they have given birth to the greatest enemy of the Church; they have provided the background in which the figure of Siegfried could be conceived: how can it be that they are still Christians?" Bäumler then continues to quote Nietzsche's own words: "Remember that the names of peoples as a rule come from abusive denominations. . . . *Die Deutschen* originally means the Pagans: thus did the Goths, after their conversion, apostrophize the great mass of their unbaptized kinsmen. . . . It might still happen that the Germans, becoming the first deserters from Christianity in Europe, remake their old nickname into a name of honour. . . . Thus would they perfect the work of Luther, who has taught them to be un-Roman and to say, 'Here stand I! I cannot do otherwise!'" In Christianity, Nietzsche sensed the last buttress of Romanism as a definite outlook on life, alien and repugnant to Teutonic heroism. "What on earth is Church? It is a kind of State, and the most hypocritical at that." The principle of order and moderation, of lucidity and balance embodied in what Nietzsche technically terms "the State", implies an intolerable check to will-power, a barrier thrown across the path of expansive forces: "Man must not unfold himself any further! The measure is set!" Nietzsche's scorn of Protestantism, and his occasional praise of Catholicism, easily fit into the picture. He saw in Protestantism a sign of the inadequacy of the German mind to fulfil its mission; the Reformation effected a partial revival, rather than an integral collapse, of Christianity; it committed an unpardonable blunder by calling a halt to that process of re-paganization in which Southern Christendom and the Catholic Church were engaged. On the other hand, Latin and Catholic Christianity has all the advantages of a genuine and autochthonous style attuned to the underlying popular mind. Even modern Liberal democracy means a maintenance of the "priestly" attitude in changed conditions, and a fully fledged materialization of the Christian message of equality, of the
Roman message of lawful order. Rousseau, who had to bear the brunt of Nietzsche’s hatred, is a “past master in the art of unhorsing the adversary by moral defamation”, of “moral resentment”: “The Private Person grown into the stature of a Priest, blessing and cursing, praising and damning in the name of reason, virtue, humaneness, worldly charity”. Nietzsche with foaming lips called him “the historical expression of a synthesis between the Idealist and the Canaille”, as well as the incarnation of Christian “slave morality”. Resuming his dialectical appreciation of Latinism at the expense of the Reformation, Nietzsche—with truly prophetic vision—attached more hope to the evolution of Western democracy than he did to the Bismarckian experiment of a “Christian Empire”. To be sure, the Hohenzollern Reich contained an iron nucleus of Prussian-dom, enmeshed, however, in a tepid compromise with German National Liberalism, and thereby condemned to stagnation and impotence. The Western Democratic State, in its turn, offered, by its very climax called Socialism, a prospect of self-destruction, combining as it did theoretical state omnipotence with the inner anarchy of equalitarian individualism. . . . When the ruin of that State is completed, the way will be clear for a new Pagan culture. . . . “The State of Democracy is a successor to the State of Authority supported by religion. Not until the democratic State, too, belongs to the past, shall we have left the Middle Ages behind us; then, and no sooner, will Christianity have ceased to be a decisive factor.”

Nietzsche’s frequent eulogies of France, whose “cultural superiority” over the German “barbarians” he cannot emphasize too loudly, is equally suffused with a dialectical meaning, an ironical accent, a pedagogical tendency. “This, in fact, is Nietzsche’s message to the Germans: Given the standards of culture ruling in Europe, you will never come into your own; here the French will always surpass you. You are destined to something else!” Nietzsche, continues Bäumler, dreamed of the splendours of classic Greek culture, so much superior to whatever fruits the Roman Empire has borne; but he was not an aesthete. He knew brightness of art and thought to be the sister of a much fiercer and more indomitable political will-to-power than was the Roman desire for imperial organization. “Cruelty pervades the core of culture; generation, life and murder are one; the gorgeous
beauty of culture is upheld by the gory hands of the conqueror. *What a barbarous, amoral, truly Nietzschean image!*"

What a barbarous, amoral, truly Bäumlerian ecstasy!

After this somewhat lengthy—but, I trust, not fruitless—diversion, let us turn our attention once more to the old Teutons under the guidance of so competent a pilot as Professor Hans Günther. Indeed, his work on the “Origin and racial history of the Teutons” contains what might safely be called a précis of National Socialist philosophy as such—projected into ancient Teutonic sociology.

Günther writes that the Teutons formed a peasantry of warriors, a master people (Herrenvolk) requiring serfs (Knechte) for their economic subsistence. They were a fine set, full of noble qualities, not the meanest of which was physical beauty. Their fundamental attitude towards the universe can be described as “terrestrial piety”: a religious earnestness and respect in dealing with the order of Nature and the values of Life. They were governed by idea of racial discrimination and eugenic selection; they had a high opinion of woman but made allowances for aristocratic male polygamy; they thought highly of social stability (Bodenständigkeit) and despised the foreigner, the ubiquitarian (the elements not belonging to “Ourselves”). It must be noted that the most genuine and noble among the ancient Greeks—the Spartans—were also Teutons. Racial self-esteem and protection was a religious preoccupation with Teutonic society, nay, the centre of its religion. In spite of its assumption of certain Teutonic traits, Christianity, that cosmopolitan religion of humanity and equality, essentially ran counter to the world of Teutonism and in fact wrought havoc on its structure.

They were as a rule farmers, not as some prefer to think, herdsmen. The turmoil of their bellicose wanderings was mainly the work of their young generations swarming out in search of new land for cultivation. These periods of migration alternated with long pauses of rest. Most Teutonic tribes consisted of warriors who also worked with their own hands as peasants; the Franconians, having an exceptionally large number of Gaul slaves at their disposal, were the first to develop a pure caste of warrior lords.

The Teutons were generally tall; they had bright eyes, a
peculiarly sharp glance, and blonde hair. Black hair prevailed in the strata deprived of liberty. In the English language, the word "fair" indicates, up to the present day, blondness, beauty, and honesty. (Günther, it must be granted, is privy to the niceties of the English idiom. But is he quite sure that the cancelling of individual rights, the oppression of non-Nazi parties, the persecution of Jews, the breach of international agreements, and the treatment of Austria, adequately correspond to the English idea of "blondness"? Nomenclature is certainly interesting; but the thing itself may claim some consideration as well.) The Teutons had an early knowledge of hair cosmetics and the use of soap; besides their fair hair they were also outstanding for the fairness of their skin. Their division into the properly Nordic Asen (the tall, slender type) and the Vaelic Riesen (giants: almost as tall, but of stocky build), is already familiar to us; naturally, the dwarfs (Zwerge) interspersed with Teutonic peoples must be accounted for as "Ostic". The Romans themselves were lavish with epithets like "beautiful" and "noble" for the Teutons; the latter soon rose both to inferior and higher (all but the highest) offices in the Imperial army, whereas civil servants continued to be recruited from "Romans" proper, mostly the progeny of slaves. The Teutons displayed great "pride in their own racial character"; they used to call one another "you Roman" as a term of abuse (cf. what we said about deutsch and undeutsch is the early part of this chapter). This master race was busy "breeding its clans higher" with a religious zeal; the standard pattern of the "full man", the "perfect noble" (Edeling) had to be accomplished through selection by means of carefully planned matings, an object of chivalrous competition between the single clans and families. For the young noble it was a point of honour to woo "girls from a proved and reputable stock", and vice versa. Men were generally thought to fall into one of the two categories, Mikilmenn and Litilmenn (see above), very nearly covering the duality of nobles and serfs, and even extending to the physical qualities co-ordinated to either of them. For physical beauty, including tallness, a fine stature, etc., was quite simply considered the outward manifestation of an integrally noble character. This ethic expressed the vital attitude common to all free people; it is also more or less parallel with the Greek kalokagathia and the
Brahmin Mahatma, with megalopsychia or magnitudo animi ("high-mindedness", or in medieval German, a hochgemüte character), or humanitas (naturally, in the pagan sense of the Renaissance or Helbing’s "Third Humanism").

 Günther then proceeds to furnish us with even more exciting details. As in Lycurgian Sparta, the exposing of less valued children, he writes, was widely practised. It was, for instance, the custom to leave the children of a deceased poor freedman to their own devices, and to re-admit into life only the one that survived longest. (Undeniably, a cogent test of vital capacity.) "Misshapen and un-free orphans" were usually encouraged to escape from the burden of life. The same bounty was occasionally awarded even to invalid adults. Günther assures us that such behaviour on the part of the Teutons, however it may shock our present-day feelings (it does not seem to shock his overmuch!), was not due to a cruel temperament but prescribed by their type of religious piety. They regarded themselves as in duty bound to protect their racial exquisiteness, thereby honouring godhead; inversely, the Christian Church set up abstention from killing and the protection of the weak as desiderata of piety. As far as I can judge the matter, I am in full agreement with Professor Günther. Only, since I (united with very many people both above and beneath my mental level) happen to be on the side of the Christian version of "piety", and am more inclined to make allowances for man’s natural viciousness than for systematic devilry, I could forgive the Teutons any act of temperamental cruelty but refuse all forgiveness for their (and, particularly, their followers') "type of piety". Far from accepting all (psychologically) genuine religious feeling as an excuse, I am of the firm opinion that an evil religion is the only thing really worth being combated. Maybe the Teutons of Günther were indeed tall and handsome fellows. I certainly do not object to tall and handsome men, still less to women. Yet as to people who revere tallness and good looks as divine, and entitled to sacrifices of all kinds, I can only declare calmly that I object to breathing the same air as they.

But we are not yet through the fascinating ordeal inflicted upon us by Günther. He has many more things to tell us. Like Rosenberg and other modern thinkers, the ancient Teutons meant the punishment of an evildoer to be, not deterrent or
retaliation, but the "elimination" from the social body of a subject that has "departed from type". For, if we are to believe their recent discoverers, they knew no "abstract morality", only the living "We". With their outlook of "peasant aristocrats" they delighted in the idea of honest property; it was deemed natural that the ablest among them should beget a greater number of children, whereas the "freaks, dwarfs, and un-free" were excluded from the right of heirship. They were firmly convinced that all essential qualities were handed down by blood; for the dualistic philosophy of body and soul, of flesh and spirit disinvested is an Oriental conception utterly un-Teutonic. Biology and morals are one; bloodless idealism and economic materialism are likewise damnable. A sterile husband would often appoint an "assistant"; such a custom must be appraised as breeding discipline (Zucht) rather than licence (Unzucht). On the other hand, a man was allowed to divorce his sterile wife, a concession more or less approved by Luther. In view of the dangers specially entailed by her conduct, an adulterous wife was liable to capital punishment. High store was set by the "preservation of barriers between the noble landholders and the un-free lacking personal property": the division of classes amounted to a "racial cleavage". Whereas Teutonic opinion was advanced enough not to despise a "bastard", an illegitimate child as such, it clung to a rigorous observation of class endogamy, of equal birth (Ebenbürtigkeit) as a condition of licit marriage. In this respect, too, the untoward intervention of the Church—which disqualified extra-marital union but worked for the abolition of restrictions on marriage—contributed mightily to the subversion of Teutonic racial order. With the Teutons, it was the interests of race and "estate" (Stand) that weighed heavily in the balance; with the Church, it was the formal paraphernalia of wedlock. ... The Teutons admitted no connubium between high and low ones; a noble girl entertaining relations with an un-free man incurred the risk of the death penalty. Nor was intermarriage with foreigners permitted. In sum, the Teutons held in awe the obstacle of incompatibility (dissimilitudo); they dreaded racial contamination (confusio generis). (In fact, they anticipated Nürnberg legislation in a more comprehensive fashion!) Both canon and Roman law ignore the concept of "equal birth": they are suffused with
moralistic individualism and are sadly indifferent to species
(nicht sippentümlich) . . . The Church authorized marriage with
Latinins; she also promoted the habit of travelling (by encourag­
ing pilgrimage), thus assailing bodenständig values . . . (Spengler
is right: Christian theology is the grandmother of Bolshevism !)
Later on, the laws of “equal birth”, preserved in certain
aristocratic strata of Europe, degenerated into mere trappings
of class prejudice lacking any racial content . . .

The “genteel peasant”, or noble “yeoman”, felt himself to
be radically above minor people; to his equals alone did he
grant equality. This “German freedom” within the range of
“homoioi” (such as were of like blood and standing) is the
antipode of the ideas of 1789; the indiscriminate, ubiquitarian
liberty and equality applied to “the mass of urban mob and
moneylenders”. (Meaning: the artisans and proletarians, topped
by no upper classes other than wealthy tradespeople.) But where
did those nasty doctrines of mongrel equality originally come
from? Again and again, we discover that the main guilt lies with
Christianity! It was Christianity that preached a universal
equality of souls; the brotherhood of all peoples; a community
of faith in which all racial and class distinctions were to vanish;
that presented humanity as a unique actor on the scene of
history’s great drama; Paradise as the real home of us all (a
typically monkish perversion). St. Paul suggested that all men
were of one blood (ex uno sanguine); and the Church did away
with the cult of ancestors, putting in its place a mental affiliation
to the ancestry of the Jews. Naturally, seeing that she had raised
the Jewish God to the rank of a World God. The Oriental
mania of redemption, the contempt of physical desires, etc., also had
their share in severing religious feeling from the biological order
or nature. To make bad worse, the Church frequently chose her
instruments from the servile ranks, thus effecting a large-scale
emancipation of inferior classes and reducing class distinctions to
comparative insignificance. We think it unlikely that Günther ex-
aggerates in any way the democratic functions or organized Chris-
tianity in its early stage. One can but wish it would resolutely
take the hint from its Nazi enemy to-day, instead of backing up
class privileges and fascist outrage in so many parts of the world!

The quest of supra-mundane happiness and virtue (Jenseits-
denken), the rejection of “this world”, the preference for
celibacy, etc., were apt to lead men into an unsound pampering of weakly, degenerate, unheroic life. . . . None but the qualities of Litilmen (Heusler—cf. Bäumler) could draw an unexpected profit from the Christian contempt of pride and of the desire for power. The Christian resentment against the mighty, and in particular against the oppressor, or any rejoicing in the fall of an overweening power, is utterly un-Teutonic. In the Teutonic Saga, only the weak-kneed traitor and the mean upstart have odious features.

We supply a passage from Fülöp-Miller's account of the new naturalism of fate and race, and its religious sources: "Haimdall, the Nordic-Teutonic God of heaven, has from the outset created men along the lines of a division into estate (Stände): as serfs, freemen, and noble Earls; hence the Teutons believe in a divine origin of inequality, and in the Maker himself (as the custodian of class (ständisch) order ").

The mental world whose outlines are indicated in the above survey hardly requires comment. Perhaps it is not too much to say that, impressed by its uncanny colour, a Russian Bolshevik might almost feel tempted to sympathize with Roman Catholicism, a British Tory to discover the attractions of Russian Bolshevism, or even an English Left intellectual to acknowledge some acceptable characteristics in French Democracy. But one material remark may not be wholly futile. What arrests our imagination most in that strange fabric of Teutonic ideology is the prevailing note of, as it were, a Daemonic Philistinism. Theirs is a world of migratory landowners, ecstatic disciplinarians, respectable demigods, and bullies choking with self-respect. Their cruelty lacks the Latin directness; their piety, the Eastern trait of melancholy contemplation; their complete lack of humour, their crude hierarchy of all values—religious, social, economic, biological—displays a union of suffocating narrowness with inane totality. Man is absolutely locked up, and exhaustively organized, in the Tribe; but the Tribe rolls over the earth and devours the sky. In the very Hero of the myth, the traits of a well-to-do stalwart family father (with wisely extended rights to augment his progeny) become discernible; behind the settled "warrior yeoman", again, emerges the figure of the howling Wolf, drifting aimlessly through his irksome and yet glorious home, the Heath.
Schemann, with a slightly different emphasis, less forceful and more universal in outlook, provides us with Teutonistic information rather analogous to Günther's. (We can but advise the English reader who is specially interested in the matter to study Schemann's most valuable references, given in Volume III, to the preparatory racial speculations of French authors like Lamarck, Buffon, Gobineau, Lapouge, Le Bon, Topinard, even Voltaire and Comte, and especially of great Germans like Goethe, Fichte, Drews, Nietzsche—who conceived his Superman as a reaction against the coming of the "Netherman"; Dühring—who held that "education for a nobler humanity and morality primarily depends on the breeding of a superior type"; Jahn, Lagarde—in spite of his assumed French name "our deutschester Deutschdenker"—and others.) Schemann, too, sees the exclusive raciality of Teutons through the perspective of equalitarian decadence embodied in the Stoical philosophy of individualism and universalism as well as in the social reality of the Roman Empire. The fine Romans of yore were probably of Teutonic lineage: "a dim feeling of racial kinship between Italic and Teutonic peoples" prevailed a long time (?). The later Roman world, governed on a colonial pattern and determined by an irreparable leakage of genuine Roman blood, displayed the features of a "multi-national muddle: colluvies...civitas ex nationum conventu constituta...epitome of all the known orbis terrarum". Unlike such morbid Stoics as Cicero and, worse still, Seneca, the aristocratic Tacitus was a thinker after Schemann's heart: he admired both the Teutons' physical beauty and prowess, and their "sense of freedom". (The latter, however, comes rather close to anarchy: Tacitus speaks of cuncta ex libidine agere.) The Romans, and even the Arabs were impressed by their mental and moral superiority; it was the Teutons who forced the issue in battles like Pharsalus and Catalaunum; "it was not their fault if Constantinople, which they had defended so tenaciously, fell at last".

Without prejudice to his fundamental fidelity to German nationalism—Deutschdenker!—Schemann is at pains to adhere more closely to Gobineau than did Houston Stewart Chamberlain; he maintains a stricter identification of Teutonism with a "universal" racial aristocracy transcending the limits of all nationalism. "Race" is confluent with a general outlook of
aristocracy and conservatism, as against equalitarian internationalism, democracy, pacifism, and progress; and Teutons take upon themselves the rank of the "Race" as such. Thus the new rise of Latin nations after the decline of the Roman Empire is booked to the credit of the Teutonic ruling sets in each. However, the original, central, Germanic Teutons must be regarded as a more homogeneous and condensed stock of nobility: with them, aristocracy and peasantry are "anthropologically one estate"; the nobles are merely the pre-eminent group among the landowners; nobility is determined by race, the "kernel" of which is peasantry. The ruling stock of a sound society must be composed of the Teutonic patricians of the cities, and the big peasant owners (Otto Ammon). . . . Teutons are always and everywhere aristocrats, since they are "royally minded" (Lagarde).

We are aware how inextricably Teutonism, which on the one hand never allows a real separation from Germanism, is, on the other, linked up with the general ideas of intrinsic nobility and racial fitness for mastery. In the midst of all these quotations from Günther, Schemann, Rosenberg, and other Teuto-Nazi worthies, we may interpose a brief formula of our own. The Germans are natural rulers over the peoples, as the soldier nobility are natural rulers over the people. Some of us may object to both claims; but neither their psychological connection, nor a certain degree of substantiation in actual history can well be disproven. Speaking in terms of international relationships, I hold the view that we cannot effectively combat the German pretensions by dismissing them as folly or mere lust for conquest; we can only combat them reasonably, with a hope of durable success, by professing a radically different conception of society and of government, which may have its own drawbacks but is ultimately better attuned to the needs of human nature and what is really noble therein.

In the Middle Ages—here Schemann agrees with Gobineau, Woltmann and Chamberlain—it was Teutonic influence which predominated. The Catholic navigators who carried the faith into remote corners of the earth were all "Romanized Teutons"; whereas those who remained at home were busy purifying it, and their efforts culminated in Luther. The Picardian Calvin was no less of Teutonic blood. All genuinely solid and noble accomplish-
ments on Italian soil were the work of Teutons: the fruit of Lombard seed equivalent to the Gothic sangre azul which created the glory of Spain. Woltmann has ferreted out the fact that all highly gifted Popes as well as the prime movers of the French Revolution were Teutons. He has also unravelled the mystery of Spain’s decay and paralysis: the reader has guessed rightly; it was due to the gradual extinction of the Teutonic ruling set.

Suppose a Martian visitor who knew about the human race were to inspect London and found it in a rather desolated state: most buildings damaged or utterly neglected, the streets covered with reeking heaps of rubbish, businesses and factories without exception standing still, the whole place teeming with stray dogs, cats and horses, infested by vermin of all kinds, and practically no human being in sight. Why should he, when searching for the causes, bother about geographical or economic subtleties, or incriminate social crises or an overdose of war, too much atheism or too much clericalism, devious principles of traffic organization, horse-breeding, or disinfection? He would soon discover that the reason why homes for stray dogs no longer worked faultlessly had very little connection with the inner disorders of canine society. The trouble was simply that man, the creator and ruler of domestic civilization, had died out. Now what else is the Teuton but man proper amidst a race of animal beings which have assumed a coarse imitation of man’s outward shape?

Clearly, the French nobility consisted likewise of Teutons. In the high Middle Ages, France was a “Teutonic vanguard” (germanische Vormacht). Her Teutonic master set received the death-blow in the plebeian Revolution; however, long before that eruptive event, it had been insidiously diminished and ousted from the strongholds of its power. The suppression of the Huguenots marked the first great step in the destruction of Teutonic France. . . . As for England, things look hardly any better to-day. Only cast a glance at her present House of Lords, at this doubtful aristocracy freely interspersed with Jews, and you will gather sufficient information. Here, too, the Teutonic—Norman—masters have more or less melted away in the crucible of vital struggle. But Schemann, as we know, is (or was) a pessimist: he even scrutinizes Germany with the weary, disillusioned eyes of a racial blasé who is not going to fall a prey to deception. When Lagarde complained that German history largely
amounted to a process of de-Germanization (Entdeutschung), he meant it in a spiritual sense only; in fact, he might well have attached to it a somewhat less figurative—namely, a racial—meaning. Although Teutons are good at reproducing themselves (more so than the Latins, anyway), they suffer vitally from their incapacity to overcome their innate spirit of dissen­sion: it is this dismal fate hanging over them to which they have given form in their myth of the Twilight of the Gods. However, it is by no means vanity which makes Schemann point to the frequency of foreign testimonies to Germanic racial greatness. It differs undoubtedly from the praise by foreigners of the French for their lucidity or their charm, the English for their common sense or their tenacity, the Italians for their deep relation to Art, the Russians for their chaste infatuation with spiritual things, the Spaniards for their picturesque, dignified nobility, or the Hungarians for their proverbial conviviality. The Germans, in their turn, are reputed to be efficient, martial, poetical, philosophical, musical, and reliable (all that being true; the last item perhaps least): but the very list of these virtues indicates a superior and more mystical essence of value which is inexpressible in plain terms. The Germans, the least charming of all men—this does not refer to typical Austrian, nor perhaps certain Rhenish, elements—are apparently invested with a particular charm or rather charms, a particular spell, denied to others. It may have nothing to do with witchcraft; it has probably something to do with their being a great and inadequately defined nation which has its excrescences or dependencies, as it were, in the higher quarters of other nations.

The Teutons, affirms Schemann, appear to be the classical representatives of the Nordic race in general: “whenever specimens from other families of this race can be said to approximate its ideal type, one is well-nigh tempted to describe them as Teutons.” Yes; all human beings must be convinced that the best and holiest part of themselves is deposited somewhere in the Teutoburg Forest, and administered from Berlin! There has always been a consciousness of Teutonic unity, Schemann assures us, nor does it contradict the fact of Teutonic variety; the Teutons were—and have really remained—a youthful society containing unlimited possibilities. Goths, Franconians and Saxons are personified, each in turn, by Theoderic, Charlemagne,
and Alfred the Great. . . . But even the Teutons are not perfect; however superior they are to other people, they, too, have their own shortcomings. Thus their "chief characteristic of valour" is accompanied by an "undercurrent of cunning". This estimate, given by a connoisseur, may assist the reader to understand the policies, both domestic and foreign, of Hitler. But, to keep within Schemann's range, the worst treachery on the part of Teutonic—or anyhow semi-Teutonic—people lies at England's door. Instead of admitting Germany to a parallel status, inaugurating with her a "joint administration of Teutonic Anliegen (interests, affairs, values)" all over the earth, she infringed heavily against the unwritten laws of Teutonism by combining with Tom, Dick and Harry in a predatory assault on Germany (what a vivid rendering of the historical chain of events!) and conniving even at her subsequent mutilation and spoliation. The English of to-day may, if they like, read this as an appeal couched in terms of an accusation. Yet do they—even the stoutest pro-Germans among them, for the sake of fair play or for any other reason—really feel strongly attracted by the prospect of a "joint administration of Teutonic Anliegen"? At any rate, Schemann does not withhold his approval of Houston Stewart Chamberlain's demand for an "emancipation from the English pressure on our essence".

According to Haiser, it is imperative for the Master Man to attain world-power. The "final struggle" is upon us. Internecine war between Nordic peoples would be a deadly sin. The Nordic race is still in need of a "Caesar" (written in 1926, when Mussolini had already won his spurs; does Hitler come up to standard?) Meanwhile, alas! "slave races are busy usurping your thrones". Nationalistic quarrels are waste of energy; the great issue is between the master "Race of the Right" and the mongrel "Race of the Left". The Teutonic master man is to the "herd man" of other races what gold is to iron: they complement one another. The Teuton's office is to rule as a Nordic upper race over racially inferior peoples. Without this pleasant and fruitful "symbiosis", subsidiary forms of a noisome character are sure to intervene. The part played by Jews must be seen in this light, and accordingly fought from the point of view of biological, not of Christian morals. "It is merely for want of the Nordic slaveholders that the Oriental slavcholder was able to
steal his way into our social texture." It is an old Catholic opinion that wherever belief in the true God is refused its place is taken by a belief in some idol. In Germano-theology, the idol—the Teutonic Master—so perfectly usurps the place of God that even this law of religious psychology is rediscovered in relation to him. The Right Slaveholder being unhorsed, the Wrong, or Left, One is bound to emerge: but a Slaveholder there must be.

Passing to Rosenberg, we are approaching the "Presence". In his lecture on the "Crisis and Reconstruction of Europe", the official brain-hero of Nazidom expounded racialism in a style bordering on pacifism. The German idea of Race is in no way designed to stir up hostility amongst the races: rather is it imbued with respect for their distinctness. "Foreign peoples in their racial peculiarity have a claim to our appreciation." Contrary to the "lawless and destructive liberty" embodied in the ideas of 1789 and in Liberal world economy, "personality" on a racial basis appears to be blossoming out of "organic laws, founded in Blood, Soil and tradition, of a growth within the bounds of shape (gestaltet), and therefore limited". It only remains to add that whereas the "lawless and destructive liberty" of Liberalism provides for "limitation" by equality of rights and the consciousness of mutual obligations and considerations, in the "Blubo" system the drawing of limits is rather arbitrarily confided to the "immanent shape" of the vital unit engaged in "growth". We may well believe that the Third Reich feels less of an immediate urge to "co-ordinate" Indo-China and Alaska than the partisans of "1789" as such feel to pervade all mankind with their suggestions of reason and justice; mathematics and technology, too, are more "imperialistic" than was Gengis Khan. But Rosenberg offers no hint as to whether German "growth" will or will not stop, say, at the shores of the Black Sea. Shape knows—not we! Nor does Rosenberg say anything to allay our suspicion that "racial peculiarities", however respectable in their manifoldness, may quite conceivably include a natural pre-destination to subservience in one case, to domination in another. After all, a man need not "despise" his dog, not think of effacing his "racial peculiarity", in order to keep him in the station of a dog and himself in that of a man; but he must either naturally rule the dog as a master rules the slave, or be unnaturally tyrannized by
him. In any case, we must bear in mind that the lecture was held in 1934, when the tenure of a high public office in the limelight of international interest was already exercising a polishing influence on the style of Rosenberg’s enunciations. The Myth, this Holiest of Nazi Writs second to nothing but Mein Kampf, was written some years before the conquest of the State: and it certainly has a vastly different tone.

To-day, in the hour of danger—we read in Rosenberg’s “Myth”—it is a task of the utmost urgency to realize the Nordic “community of fate”. We must give ourselves up entirely to the new Myth of the Blood: the Blood that encloses the divine essence of man. Domestic politics are a projection of blood conflicts. Thus Counter-Reformation in Austria meant the extermination of Teuton blood in that Alpine portion of the Germanies; thus the sympathies evinced by “Weimarian” Germans for France, and even for Russia, indicate the instinctive “friendship of bastards for bastards”; thus the Bolshevik revolution was nothing but an upheaval of “Mongoloids” against the shackles of “Nordic forms of culture”. We are now called upon by history to make once more the “racial stream of Teutondom” the bearer of reason and will: “to supply the Will, at present uncertain and evasive, with a great motive in keeping with its original source”. (Notice the morbid subjectivism, so inimitably German: this empty craving for “contents”, this longing to “find ourselves”). To supplant the old socialism by a nationalist one, the old nationalism by a racial one, is necessary but quite insufficient: above all, religion, culture, Weltanschauung must be Teutonized in conscious antagonism to the old confessional Christianity. Education must be placed integrally in the service of Teutonism (germanistisches Ideal). Whoever declines to assimilate this ideal is guilty of “naked treason to Volk”, on a par with high treason in war. “Teutonic values of character are the standard measure to which everything else is bound to conform.” Fully in keeping with fascist totalitarian thought, Rosenberg adds to this: “Should a cultural tendency fail to develop into an urge for power, it had better not engage in the fight at all.” Following up the thread of these ideas, Rosenberg duly arrives at a Pan-Teutonic European programme, in organized opposition to the “destructive and mongrel” conception of Pan-Europa—which could only be born
in the brain of such a typical hybrid as the Austro-Japanese Count Coudenhove. An alliance between all Nordic empires: Germany, the Scandinavian states including Finland, England, and if possible the United States, will by itself—without necessitating war, which is otherwise inevitable—doom bastardized France to effacement. But Rosenberg was never an utterly heartless fellow: even in 1930, his hatred of France was less implacable than might be supposed. Instead of wallowing immoderately in the joyful prospect of a near future when France will have become an antiquated geographical term, he provides, in his inscrutable mercy, that unsavoury people with good advice. France has only to confine herself to modest retirement; to realize her position as a third-rate nation of "Alpino-Westic race"; to banish Negroes and Jews from her military and public life; to withhold assistance from her Eastern allies (for, obviously, "honour" is binding for Nordic people only;)

"and to content herself with frontiers adequate to the size of her population". For the moment a more exact explanation of this ominous condition is omitted. Should France fall in with these amicable suggestions, she will have nothing more to fear from the side of Germany. After all, she has got to understand that a country of Alpino-Westic race must naturally defer to the Nordic cream of mankind! A Nordic Europe, and a German Central Europe is our watchword. Is it necessary to demonstrate at length that, in the logic of this formula, "Nordic Europe" outside the range of "German Central Europe" means an affiliated department under German central rule differing little in form to autonomous minor states of "German Central Europe" itself? At any rate, it sounds comforting to hear that "from a Nordic and German standpoint" British control of India deserves support. This, however, only holds good on the condition that racial interbreeding be carefully avoided. No Dominion status must be granted to India! Generally, as was already reported in the previous chapter, foreign nationalisms and "national awakenings" must not be endorsed indiscriminately, on purely theoretical grounds: no sympathy is due to them unless they can be co-ordinated with German plans of action, and are favourable to "Nordic and above all, German" interests.

To sum up, what we must strive after is an "organic symbiosis
of systems of states established on racial lines”, to prevent a chaotic “confusion of shapes”, and to safeguard the political hegemony of the Whites over the earth. (Probably today the Japanese count as Whites; in any case more so than the Russians.) The complicated phraseology embracing “organic symbiosis”, “systems of states”, “racial lines”, and “prevention of chaos”, is of course meant to suggest the idea of hierarchic divisions within the sphere of Whites, the sphere of “Nordics”, the sphere of “Teutons”: the British forces maintaining order in foreign parts are recognized and confirmed as “organic” underlings of the Prussian Superman. After all, the English should not forget that their imperial policies have only been made possible by the “racial purity of their national core” which they owe to the Saxons and Normans. Itemizing the ideals of a “racial systems of states”, Rosenberg dreams of a “Germano-Scandinavian league” allied to England, which shall keep India; in Eastern Europe, space shall be secured for a hundred million Germans, the formation of a “Russo-Mongolian” military power be prevented, and an “anti-Tartar” Ukrainian State erected; there shall be a Mediterranean group under Italian lead; in the East, a yellow system presided over by Japan, but subject to Anglo-Germano-American safeguarding of White interests. Rosenberg, always mindful of the community of “White” people, is not averse to an understanding with U.S.A.: but here, too, he makes conditions. American financial claims on England and Germany must be withdrawn: decidedly, the English cannot complain of niggardly treatment. Further, it must be an “America purged of Blacks and Yellows and Jews, with a systematic Nordic-European breeding imposed upon it”. Well, should the Third Reich come to a bad end, we need not worry about Rosenberg’s future: unless it be for his slightly Jewish name, the post of an Imperial Wizard to the Ku Klux Klan will hardly be denied him.

In conclusion, let us interpolate a most appropriate, if severe and gloomy, Austrian judgment. In 1982, Murner wrote: “The ‘Norde’, who, for all we know, may be endowed with a purer and nobler blood, places this heritage at the service of a mentality that taints his blood with poison; and his ‘racial inferior’, who has learned to rouse in himself the powers of the spirit, will triumph over him mentally and morally... granted the
supposition that the German is chosen to rule over other, "inferior" peoples, he can never be ready for a loyal and peaceful cooperation with them: he must look upon them as tools of his own selection, and deal with them accordingly. In this perspective, treaties assume the character of scraps of paper, torn up as soon as the time becomes ripe for it.

Let us now borrow the finishing touch from Adolf Hitler's own *Kampf*. From it we have already learnt that the creation of a state is normally the work of an "Aryan" tribe conquering, dominating and exploiting the "inferior" population of non-Aryan race inhabiting a certain territory. To this lesson of the past, Hitler adds as a precept for the future: "What we have to fight for is this: to secure the maintenance and the increase of our race and our *Volk*, the nourishment of its children, the purity of its blood, the liberty and independence of our country, so that our *Volk* may become able to carry out the mission confided to it, too (*auch ihm*), by the Maker of the Universe." The little word *auch* conveys a certain impression of modesty: it implies that other peoples (and races?), too, have a mission proper to them. However, the missions are likely to be of vastly unequal range and dignity; and it is more or less the "mission" of the Aryan to provide a "universal" setting for the "Nordic" race, which again materializes in the "Teuton", who in his concrete and palpable form, for present purposes, is none other than the German of the Nazi Empire. Towards the close of his canonical work, Hitler writes: "A State which, in the age of racial decadence, devotes itself to the care of its best racial elements, is bound to emerge some day as the Master of the earth."
6. NATION OR EMPIRE

"To bring about the Empire is the mission of mankind. . . . The gloriously surging, fierce power, roused by God, not the quibblings of moralists, widens our hearts. The Emperors Charles, Otho and Frederick stand out against the ranting of Geneva. They are joined by that other Otho, of the Saxon forest. . . . One nation in Europe must assert its authority over the others; one nation must set up an Imperial Right and establish a European 'Nomos'. Nationalism, an offspring of the French Revolution, must be overborne by a new Imperialism. Only the German nation can be the agent of that new Imperialism. . . . There is one thing we strictly demand: the 'Imperium'. Wherever 'Imperium' is not granted to us, it must be taken by force. For we are not 'equal' to others—we are 'Germans'."

W. Stapel.

"In the beginning was Action: i.e., not arbitrary action, but an action that has sprung from the axiomatic essence of German man, from his Logos, from his Idea, and was executed by the Leader of the German people. . . . From the wedlock of Logos and Life, of Idea and Existence, arises the New Realm, the 'Teutonic Empire of Germanic nation', which is destined to open up a new Aeon."

"In the original idea and reality of Reich, the substance—determined by birth and fate—of the Teutono-Germanic people forms an indissoluble union, an eternal alliance, with the Divine essence manifesting itself in Cosmic law. This is Reich. So may the question, 'Was ist deutsch?', be answered."

Professor H. Heyse.

"National Socialism is not a chance phenomenon, nor an invention of single men, and by no means a radical innovation: it has long been developing in essential Germanism and its evolution. It belongs in the river-bed of German history and is rooted in its past."

Bishop A. Hudal (1936).
The Germans are fond of their beautiful word *Reich*, which has indeed a noble and mystical ring, the more impressive because of its shortness and the number of connotations vaguely to be discerned in it. *Reich* has more of a transcendent touch than has "empire" : *Reich Gottes* is what we call the "kingdom of God" ; *reich* means "rich" ; *reichen*, "to reach", "to stretch", "to suffice", "to tender" ; *Bereich*, and often *Reich* itself, is equivalent to "range", "sphere", "orbit". In a word, *Reich* has a suggestion of power as a religious entity, of the metaphysics of hierarchy, which the simple translation "empire" cannot convey. In addition, we have an imperial tradition, not yet by any means extinct, on Central European soil. The memory of the medieval German Empire, cast in a Roman mould, still lingers there ; fundamentally anti-Western ideas as to supranational power invested with religious dignity, yet embodied in the German nation alone, still thrive there, and far outreach the precincts of Nazidom. Most certainly, we must not overlook the fact that the Nazi mind, if only because of its anti-Roman bias and its abandonment of dynastic loyalties, harbours a tendency to break off, as well as to take up, that line of imperial tradition. As we have mentioned before, Rosenberg pretends the Third Reich to be an antipode rather than a re-edition of the First Reich : its national hero being not Charlemagne but Widukind while he was at loggerheads with Charles. His surrender disqualifies him : "With his baptism, Widukind disappeared from the history of his Volk". Nevertheless, Nazi consciousness clings to the idea of *Reich* as a vital part of its constitution : significantly enough, the most frantic exaltation of that idea has issued from the pen of so stern a hater of Rome as is Hielscher. It might, however, be asked with good reason : is not the unification and centralization of Germany by the Nazi fascist régime directly opposed to the very idea of *Reich*? Has not Naziism in truth accomplished the task originally incumbent on the inert rulers of the Weimar Republic, namely, to sweep away the cumbersome remnants of the pre-war Empire, the crusts of dynastic federalism? Is not Germany becoming at last an ordinary national state, with nothing left to recall that main feature of the Reich, a supreme Crown above vassal crowns?

There is some truth in this view ; and among the many possibilities of the future there is the one that Naziism will prove to
have been the brutal assistant at the birth of Germany as a normalized republic with its assigned place in the family of European nations. Still, it is idle to construct an "ultimately" harmonious solution for present complications and tribulations; in any case, the paths of history are tortuous, and the long-range implications of an historical enterprise have sometimes little in common with the original motives and intentions of its agents. It is true that the Nazis want a German nation; it is not true that they want it "normal"—it is not true that they do not want a German Empire. Briefly, what they have in mind is an exquisitely and uniquely Imperial Nation with the German Nation as the core, the hierarchic centre of an Empire, or rather, of the Empire to come. We shall witness much variety of opinion as to the precise meaning of that "Reich": an Austrian clerico-romantic Nationalist like Eibl, a Prussian Satanist salved with a drop of "Christian" chrism like Stapel, a spiteful aesthete like Moeller, a heathen power-maniac like Hielscher, an abstract priest of Caesarism like Spengler, the immature yet cunning mind of a convinced nationalist politician like Hitler, will naturally differ on various points. Yet essential faithfulness to Reich ideology is a constant phenomenon: (1) The emphasis laid on Race prevents the German nation from being represented as one among many co-ordinated nations; apart from its concrete organization, by virtue of its blood, the German is an Imperial Nation. (2) The emphasis laid on Volkstum (nationhood) is calculated to confirm the habit of thinking that the political complex of Germandom essentially stretches beyond the range of Germany as a compact national unit—embracing foreign nationalities as well. (3) Central Europe, with boundaries elastic towards the East, is considered to be a German patrimony. (4) In contradistinction to either colonial conquests or free alliances, nationalist Germany yearns for an "organic" affiliation of vassal nations, in the sense of the German "Raum" becoming directly enriched and aggrandized. Compared with Spanish, Dutch, English or French explorers, exploiters, missionaries, merchant adventurers, empire-builders, slave-traders, workers for emancipation or civilization, etc., in all their objectionable or admirable varieties, German imperialism is somehow more in the nature of a live being intent on extending, more or less indefinitely, the confines of its body. Strictly speaking, there
is no intrinsic reason why German rule over a non-German country should be considered immoral as long as British and French supremacies in Asia and Africa pass as justifiable. Certain differences, however, impress themselves upon our mind. As has rightly been pointed out in the case of Italy versus Abyssinia, colonial expansion has to-day a different value to the one it had a hundred years ago or earlier. The maintenance of British overlordship in India, for instance, however bitterly criticized by many Indians and not a few Englishmen, is not in the least comparable to an imaginary case of England setting out to-day to subjugate an independent Indian nation. Certainly "later comers" labour under a disadvantage which may be considered an injustice; but from that they can deduce no right to weigh down the scales in their favour by dint of a far more violent and culpable practice of unjust aggression. If, in an excess of fair-mindedness, hypersensitive English readers were to deny this statement, I should politely suggest that they start a campaign to cede Canada to Germany, to hand Australia over to Japan, and to invite Italy to annex the Mohammedan provinces of India. Moreover, non-German Eastern Europe can in no way be compared to a welter of "backward" coloured populaces in urgent need of "White"—or rather, Blond—colonization or Prussian organization. In fact, I am not sure that Czechoslovak sovereignty would not mean a great chance of progress for present-day Germany, or that an Austrian governor would not be a blessing in disguise to Munich. In any case, the majority of East European nations, in so far as they prefer French money and protection, Western ideas, or their own fashions, to the "organic" envelopment by Germany, will have their good reasons (not excepting their experiences from 1916 to 1919) for doing so. Finally, the auspices under which Germany is about to "colonize" cannot be regarded as analogous to the evolution of the Western colonial empires. Here the trend at least reveals an element of emancipation, of encouraging and admitting new sections of mankind to the exercise of self-government and free co-operation. But the Third Reich has wiped out everything reminiscent, however faintly, of liberty and progress; fascism is its "organic" principle, serfdom its promise for future members. At the very best, Nazi conquest in Eastern Europe could be compared to the Spanish conquest of the Netherlands, pursued
and frustrated some four hundred years ago. However, this is a matter of taste; we must now turn to a closer survey of Reich ideologies.

To begin with, we submit a general profession of spiritual imperialism—with a gentle accompaniment of other than spiritual undertones—by Joseph Goebbels, Minister for Propaganda. In his booklet on Fascism (1934), a very useful reading for people who believe in an essential disparity between Fascism and Naziism, the smooth-tongued orator earnestly suggests an International of Nationalists. Whereas the wires of democracy are pulled by lawyers who, dreading definite issues and honest hatred, never reach conclusive settlements; whereas humanitarianism inflicts inhumanity upon the strong; whereas old parliamentary cynics may easily be tempted to provoke war: fascism, "in spite of its stern anti-pacifism, is likely to ensure peace;" nationalists of different nations have no difficulty in understanding each other, seeing that their philosophical points of departure are the same, and that they mutually respect the national honour of others. Thus in those years when it was still very unpopular to acknowledge the unfulfilled rights of Germany, Mussolini, prompted by love of peace (!), was the first to do so. Here we had a first glimpse at the forthcoming gesture of German neo-imperialism: a guarantee of peace offered in exchange for mental submission—naturally associated with the emergence of Germany, the major pioneer of the new "International", as the hegemonic power of Europe. Another pamphlet by Goebbels, "The racial problem and world propaganda" (also 1934), contains the ponderous words: "What once held good in relation to the parties, will to-day hold good in relation to the world: We must never lose control of our nerves; sobriety, clarity, firmness and constancy are the virtues which will help the German idea, coined in our mint, to victory in the world as well. Nothing is impossible. What seems to be impossible must be made possible by the force of our spirit. Germany will not fall a victim to the racial problem; on the contrary: in its solution lies the future of our people: Here, as in many other fields, we shall march in the van of the world, indicating the way for others. The revolution upon which we have embarked is of epoch-making importance. Perhaps its apex will be the fulfilment of the poet's prophecy: "Denn es wird am deutschen Wesen einst die ganze Welt
A brief political introduction is supplied by Sombart: the future conceals many divergent possibilities. Germany may become a "Russian province"; she may be "dissected" and placed under the control of the "victorious Western powers"; she may be co-opted into a Pan-European alliance by France and Italy; she may become the head of a Central European Empire; or else, the present frontiers may survive for an indefinite time. It will neither surprise nor annoy us that Sombart prefers the last but one variant. Here, as on some other occasion, he excels by his moderation. He distrusts a racial foundation for the empire; repudiating all political union among members of different nations, he at the same time rails against a "blond International." The idea of Reich does not entail the mastery of a nation over another, nor any belief in a chosen people: it only presupposes a "spiritually relevant (sinnvoll) hierarchy of nations". The distinction is nice. It is to be hoped that the nations appointed to the nether degrees of the "hierarchy" will offer no objection.

As regards the "meaning" underlying that sinnvoll hierarchy, some remarkable suggestions are made by Möller-Bruck. The German claim is supported by the two qualities of central position and youth—or rather "youngness": "We are a special nation among the nations ... a great nation by ourselves, and yet also bearing a zone of foreign country within us." Certainly we must be a thorn in the flesh of the stodgy doorkeepers of balance, for balance is nothing but a preponderance of the old powers, and a young nation (junges Volk) means "a weight more". Now the idea of a young Volk finds its purest incarnation in Prussiandom, and the current hatred of Prussiandom may easily be understood in this light. (It would otherwise remain inexplicable.) Whereas old nations are distinguishable by their display of a "uniform level of talents", their clinging to possessions and the right of inheritance, their pursuit of satiety in pleasure, young nations show signs of alertness, ambition, initiative, a spirit of expansion and sacrifice: they are "nations of believers in themselves", made of "more valuable, efficient, important men" (?), bent on the triumph of "quality over quantity". Here the characterization, so far as it has any
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foundation in reality, obviously goes astray. The issue of the Great War, which meant the defeat of a young nation at the hands of old ones, was—according to Moeller—a blind-alley, a temporary blunder of history, a diminution of greatness in the world. "A German imperialism could have made our world very powerful, also in regard to 'Form'." The theology and eschatology of Reich glows in the words: "There is only One Reich, as there is only One Church." And, further: "The idea of eternal peace is, of course, identical with the idea of a Third Reich. But its realization must necessarily be fought for, and the Reich must be asserted."

We shall see presently that Chancellor Hitler, when writing Mein Kampf, followed similar trends of thought. At the present moment, other considerations may occupy the forefront of his policy; but the sanctity of that unique document suffers no restriction other than a slight disproportion between the fervid cult it enjoys in Germany and the more discreet treatment applied to it in foreign relations. To superficial eyes, Hitler's declaration for "völkisch nationalism" as opposed to "dynastic patriotism" might seem to amount to a preference for "nation" versus "empire"; in fact, it only underlines the imperial claim based on a strict refusal to be content with the political frontiers of Bismarckian "Little Germany". Such was Hitler's eagerness to propound his Anschluss profession of faith that the demand for union with Austria actually forms the opening theme of his book: it begins (page 1) with the declaration that such a course, no matter if it be economically demanded or not, is stringently prescribed by ethnical identity. "Like blood belongs together in a common empire." However, the territorial scope of these projects for reunion extend very much farther. The acquisition of colonies must not be contemplated "before the frontiers of the Reich enclose all Germans even to the last man" and it becomes impossible to procure sufficient food for them. One aspect of Reich, which may be described as federal hierarchy within the imperial nation itself, meets with no appreciation on Hitler's part. He relies on the intrinsic value of national substance, and scorns the architecture of diversity. (Which is rather natural in a born politician covetous of dictatorial opportunities—as contrasted to, say, a reactionary aesthete and lover of historical perspectives.) Had the Germans attained the same degree of
homogeneity as did other peoples, the German Empire, owing to their advantage in quality, would to-day be "the mistress of the globe". We should then enjoy the blessing of the "Peace guaranteed, not by the palm-branches of whimpering pacifists and the profuseness of their tears, but by the victorious sword of a Master Nation, taking the world into the service of a higher culture". Compared with this vision, which makes our mouths water, the following formula for a programme is considerably less forceful: "The German Empire as a State shall enclose all Germans, and pursue the task, not only of gathering and preserving the best racial elements among this Volk" (in the author's indigestible prolixity of phrase, die wertvollsten Bestände an rassischen Urelementen), "but even to raise them to a prominent position". In fact, Hitler's "ambivalent" appreciation of pacifism came into existence long before his assumption of chancellorship. He detests it, but he commends himself as the right man to gratify its wishes. Like a feminine sentimentalist who cannot renounce anything which occasionally tickles his palate, he gets caught in crude contradictions: pacifism is bad, but militarism, which is good, will bring about the fulfilment of pacifist aims; pacifism is vile, but the Germans, who are very noble, are particularly susceptible to it. Why? Apparently because this calamity justifies a strong propaganda for nationalism, and because a surreptitious admiration for peace-loving "idealistic" generosity links beneath Hitler's nationalist fury. Thus we hear that, whoever is really anxious for the victory of pacifism, should do all he can to help the Germans to conquer the world, seeing that otherwise the Germans might die out, and the last one to take pacifism seriously would perish with them. For the Germans "more than others have become the dupes of that nonsense opposed to nature and reason". (But then, why not prefer the triumph of the French, Russians, Poles and Czechs, since they are obviously less tainted with that nefarious poison, and in Hitler's own teaching the triumph of "the strong" is desirable? However, perhaps the rules of the game were invalidated for a time by the illegitimate presence of a preternatural agent: the Jews.) "In fact", continues Hitler, "the pacifist and humanitarian idea may become quite tolerable when once the Supreme kind of Man will have conquered and subjected the world integrally enough to be the exclusive master of the earth".
I forbear from all speculation as to the closer identity of that “supreme kind of man”, leaving the reader to his own devices. “In a word: struggle first, and then, perhaps, pacifism.” Unfortunately, we too think that the application of this maxim may well become inevitable.

On the neo-conservative wing of imperialists, Edgar Jung—whose murder by Hitler’s gang was really undeserved—is outstanding. We need not repeat here what has been quoted from him, in the third section of this chapter, dealing with the “German era of history” to come, and kindred subjects. Jung, a particular enemy of national democracy on the French model, is uncommonly well fitted to draw up an Imperial programme. First of all, Grossdeutschland must be established by the reception of Austria. Then we shall have to set about providing German populations outside our State frontiers with “space for life, and a safeguarded self-management of their Volk affairs amidst their host-nations”. Europe must undergo a “reconstruction, beginning with its Central, near Eastern and near Southern spheres, progressing therefrom towards its margins, so as to form a European confederation of states”. What that confederation will be like may be guesses plainly from the terms of its genesis. One of the most important milestones will be the “freeing of Upper Silesia” (from Polish pressure), facilitated by the happy fact of “the encirclement of Czechoslovakia by Greater Germany” (Europe’s main reason for regretting the end of Austrian independence). Jung, in his turn, has some further designs with the little Danubian sister. Vienna shall be elevated to a “sally-port (Ausfallsforte: embrasure, or channel of communication) for German cultural and economic expansion towards the South-East. Then, newly flooded with German blood, it will get rid of its foreign admixture of population”. (My charming city, must thou needs become a bigger Halle an der Saale? This indeed seems to be thy fate!) On the whole, Jung has a sound preference for larger national units rather than for a superabundance of obstructive barriers, skilfully drawing therefrom the proper consequences. “The sources of friction between single peoples and their states should be reduced as much as possible. Thus the policies of the German people, too, cannot stop at the frontiers of the future Greater Germany . . . they will also extend to Germandom abroad.” But what if we
have more taste for Pan-Slavism? It might also diminish the "sources of friction". One might also ask whether it is really the existence of too many technical "barriers", shutting off too minute states against one another, which creates the most dangerous "sources of friction".

The opposite pole is rather feebly represented by G. Gründel. To the best of my knowledge—which is, I realize, far from exhaustive—he is the only neo-nationalist author who seems flatly to reject the ideology, or terminology, of "Reich". (However, in view of their general outlook, on this point, some shrewd "advanced" Nazi thinkers like C. Schmitt, Bäumler, and Freyer, might not inappropriately be classed with him.) In the "Manifesto of the German Revolution" contained in his book on the "mission of the young generation", Gründel sees fit to hail "the first universal idea of a great nation which is not an imperial idea". But why not, since Gründel himself calls it "universal", and in the same breath speaks of Germany as "the world's new centre of gravity", as well as of a German "duty to power"? The famous phrase of the German cure for mankind (am deutschen Wesen...Welt genesen), he says, can only acquire relevancy through a real German position of power. (Wherein does this idea fall short of "imperial" character?) Finally, the author explains his dislike of the term "Reich" by warning his fellow countrymen against "building on insecure ground" and trusting anybody but themselves. We only "mean" the "German nation"; "but this we want integrally". Also the new idea of nation conveys a new sense of intensity, inwardness, community. On the whole I should say that Gründel is not at all a real enemy of Reich: he merely over stresses the national side of the "Imperial Nation" and the thematic importance of the post-Weimarian German nation for itself. What he really has in mind is not that there should not be any German Empire—merely (a) that it should have a "high-toned" government securely vested in German hands, (b) that it should not primarily be founded on a supra-national (Christian, European, dynastic, perhaps racial) idea, but centred in the original and self-subsisting power, cohesion and supereminence of the German nation as such. In some sense, Gründel follows most logically the tribal line of logic. Plunge yourselves into yourselves, make your "We" a god, and all other things will be given unto you.
We are already acquainted with Hielscher's standard conception of "Reich"—the very title of his grand, if slightly insane, work. We have heard more than enough of "Power fused with Inwardness", the oneness of Fate and Will, Reich as the meaning and entelechy of mankind, the ultimate fusion of all other "powers" with Reich, Prussia as the paramount figure in the "Imperial sphere", etc. I may add, for the sake of completeness, that Reich embodies eternal community; immutable eternity in God, apparent in profound historical transformations; self-consciousness of the Soul, mirrored in the fiery glance of the eyes—gratitude, jubilation, ecstasy, pride, will, and certainty. Reich is a matter of growth, not appropriation: action and conquest presuppose inner concentration. "Will to struggle means will to growth. He who wills to grow must first dig up the ore from which to forge his swords." Historically speaking, Reich began with "Ermin (Arminius the Cheruskian), the first great slayer of the Romans". The Emperor Henry VI, the hero of the Sicilian expeditions, is his first great successor, another scourge of Rome; the ruthless revenge he takes on conspirators, the blinding of prisoners, etc., is lustily recounted by Hielscher, not as a tribute to the customs of the age, but as an extraordinary personal merit. For it conveyed a wholesome warning to such obstreperous factors outside the Reich as might have it in mind to try their strength with its people: "The foreign world came to see that Teutonic ferocity had not diminished. Here, too, Henry restored to its old splendour Ermin's reputation of being a good enemy of his enemies. It is well to possess this reputation. Inversely, Charles the Butcher made it a point of honour to be on good terms with his Volk's enemies". (Unlike Catholic Nazis and a few of their Protestant colleagues, the fashionable Nazi set take delight in condemning Charlemagne as "the Butcher", that is, of the recalcitrant pagan Saxons.) Furthermore, the Reich as a cosmic Centre absorbs, from time to time, foreign essence, and subsumes foreign energies to itself. As Teutonic mythology shows, there is also a feminine side to Reich, associated with peace, grace, gracious mildness (Huld): the virtues of the men of Reich are the virtues of War, which keeps the world in motion; but they are also the virtues of Peace, which, like a decorous flower, grows in this world of War.

Stapel—we recall the motto for this section—is more catholic
in his tastes: he opens his Imperial arms to Charlemagne as he does to his more sternly Teutonic, and often heretic, successors. Indeed, beneath his conception of Reich lies that of a religious, nay, a Christian Utopia; the Reich is essentially placed under the crown of a "Christian Emperor", as he chooses to call it. His "Christian Statesman, a theology of nationalism", puts forth "the Dream of Reich: it is in the hour of the deepest excitement, the hour of popular distress, that the Goal emerges". Undoubtedly, the Romans preceded the Germans in building an empire: they, especially in comparison with the "moralistic" Jews, were a truly "imperialist" people. Oddly enough, this is meant to suggest that they were less, not more, tyrannical in their designs. They left everybody else's morals and gods untouched, contenting themselves with the exercise of "protectorate", "leadership", "political supremacy". But on further elucidation, the picture assumes a somewhat different complexion. "Only political affairs are submitted to the decision of the Imperial nation. Thereby, naturally (freilich), by the very spreading of its language and its supremacy of legal codification, opinions prevalent among the Imperial people come to be specially revered." The Imperial nation is essentially a leading one... its ways acquire a peculiar respect, but they also become the target for a peculiar hatred. Taken all in all, the imperial idea is more tolerant than is any idea of a universal morality. (In a word, the forcible imposition of faith and moral standards "as a natural consequence" is less injurious to liberty than is any influence gained by spiritual persuasion. The same old story: power must not subserve truth and right; it is truth and right.) "The Germans are by nature an Imperial nation." Like the Romans (?), they draw the hatred of all moralists upon them. "Although they carry order and peace in their knapsacks, they are continually accused of being ruffians." To be sure: this is no longer a novelty. Save for a few insignificant scraps, inferior mankind forms one huge conspiracy against snow-white Berlin; to suffer crucifixion is the usual fate of genuine virtue. Such is the blackness of the human heart that, as I have been told by many, during the War considerable portions even of the German and Magyar population and soldiery of the Hapsburg Empire allied to Germany indulged in seditious grumblings at the German military methods of securing order and peace, not
excepting the problem of quota in the distribution of requisitioned materials.

"Reich", says Stapel, is by definition unique: for it means that "mankind in its entirety, notwithstanding its manifoldness, shall be united under a single leadership". Accordingly, it constitutes a term of theology. Reich and Church form two concentric circles founded on politics and dogmatics. They are inseparably fixed to each other by their tendency "to spin round the earth" and their synchronism as regards "Kairos" (the period of maturity and accomplishment). Under Charlemagne, the Roman Empire was transferred to the Teutons; under Otho the Great, more specifically entrusted to the Germans. The supreme fulfilment of terrestrial Reich heralds eschatological events: "Reich is a preamble to the apparition of Christ".

Indeed, the principle of Reich, the exercise of universal mastery, more or less exhausts the treasury of religious sanctities. God cannot be represented except as the "Lord of the Kingdom of Heaven" (in a word, the supreme command in the Prussian military scale). His mastery is reflected in the double glory of the Church and, in co-ordination to it, the Reich; whereas the "humanity" of pan-democratic individualism, autonomy, mutual understanding, etc., symbolized by the Tower of Babel, is opposed to the constructive principle of Herrschaft and irrevocably doomed to failure. We are already familiar with this trenchant distinction: mankind may be ruled by a central tyranny, but men must not think in terms of, or act with regard to, mankind. It may not be idle to remark that Stapel's scheme of Church and Reich "co-ordinated" presents a sham duality, vastly different from the Catholic duality of spiritual and temporal authority: in fact, his nondescript Lutheran Church is merely an empty shadow of his German Reich, a religious luxury indulged in by the latter. Neither a Pope and a genuine ecclesiastic hierarchy, nor a free religious congregation are conceivable for him: the Kaiser is the direct earthly recipient of heavenly sanctity as well as of heavenly power: "The last and supreme Statesman will appear as the Christian Emperor of the One Christian Reich: the dream of history. Like the indomitable lion he will rise up powerfully at God's behest. Splendid in his force, high-minded and proud, terrible to rebels, gracious to his followers, a warrior beyond resistance, a father to his people,
humble in the face of God, he will achieve terrestrial history, and lay the Crown at the feet of the Cross on Golgotha " . . . This last move may not meet with the approval of Rosenberg or other more orthodox Nazis; happily the author avoids setting a time-limit, and certainly accords an indefinite lease of life to his Imperium Teutonicum, glorious enough even before being "completely fulfilled". That earthly Empire of Germanum, as we know it from previous quotations, rests on the fundamental fact of national inequality, which invariably tells in favour of the Germans. Other nations are in no way "equal" to them, "merely because they are also nations". Another significant passage will be helpful in illustrating this simple but basic truth, and gives a valuable hint as to its practical application. Stapel will have nothing to do with a "protection of national minorities", even though claimed on behalf of German interests in Eastern Europe. No "equality of rights", he exclaims, none of those "spineless corollaries of the rights of man"! "We have no reason for enthusiasm because our 'minorities', grudgingly tolerated, may for a while continue a languishing existence. What does it matter whether we Germans are a 'minority' or a 'majority'? What is the use of this statistical gibberish? Minority or majority, we are Germans, and being Germans we are the holders of primacy (die Ersten). Were only two Germans to live in all Poland, still, just for being Germans they would be more than all the millions of Poles." (This was written in 1932; since 1934, another term of comparison would probably have been chosen in the place of Poland; but even that detail in the text may at any time regain its validity.)

Germania, the mother of nations, is divinely ordained to rule them. "What other people has wrestled like this, with all gods and daemons, and the all-powerful Creator himself? Unlike Western Pharisees pretending to know 'God's will' or to be "collaborators of God'" (Stapel's antipathy is directed against the idea of God's will in connection with moral endeavour, and against the democratic blasphemy of collaboration with him), "we do not know what God wills, because we do not possess Him. Yet we must go our way into the dark, and dream of a glory beyond all glories." And this supreme glory, most intimately derived from God even though they disclaim "knowledge of His will" is outright the glory of German overlordship on earth. The
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author then narrates a war episode culminating in the gleeful comment: "The enemy, in his turn, knew who was—and was to remain—his born master". Stapel then censures the State for providing unemployed youth with "alms" instead of "arms": a charge which has since lost its relevancy. Not so, however, the accompanying ejaculation: "Look at a marching troop of German youths and realize what God has made them for! They are warriors by nature, and their calling is to rule!"

A rather interesting outline of the historical position of contemporary Reich ideologies is given by Schramm (1932). The German pretension to Reich refers essentially to a restoration of more or less medieval conceptions. Something akin to that has been attempted by Fascism and the Corporative State it called into life; but Italian fascist restoration keeps within national and pragmatical limits, it does not comprise either a final liquidation of Left internationalism on a supra-national plane, or an inner reversion to Christian experience and the real spirit of the Middle Ages. However, it embodies "anti-European restoration" directed against "European bourgeois with France as its forearm". The worldly, anti-Christian restorationism of Baron Evola ("Imperialismo pagano", 1928), recalling the Ghibelline aspects of the medieval Empire, does not suffice for the needs of our religion of Reich. What we thirst for is a new world epoch centred in a German Empire of complex construction, the trustee of a universal mission beyond all "isms", far removed from the "diabolical" ways of Red Russia, but also distinct from the overstressed organizational forms of the Italian Fascist State. Nothing short of a new German Christendom will appease our romantic longing. In the nineteenth century, the bourgeois era, we Germans were out of tune with ourselves... in all bürgerlich civilization, we could never be anything but more or less successful imitators.... The German romantic mind never ceased to protest against bourgeois materialism, worldliness, comfort, formalism and "patriotism"—a patriotism for which, even though it were a German one, the real and appropriate "fatherland" was always France. And the dreams cherished by that German romantic mind strove to attain reality: Wahrträume.... Thus Novalis (Hardenberg) dreamed of a new Christendom with Germany as its Reichsnation.... Homogeneous world civilization and the
corresponding right of self-determination for all nations, a "meaningless heap of units instead of organic articulation", are now at a discount. Reich will be a supra-national structure wielded by real master nations, or more explicitly: a "unity of the Christian Occident (Abendland) under the leadership of the German nation". It cannot be imagined without an indwelling faith. Germany is commissioned to champion the "world revolution" for a complete restoration of mastery, corporative sub-division of society, and "Christian hierarchy"—the "rule of the best".

In particular, Schramm envisions the German army as a "bridge" to universal restoration. During the War, the philosopher Scheler defined its supreme aim as a "Continental Union of Europe, aligned in solidarity against the East under German military leadership". In fact, the Second Reich can claim to have constituted a pale but significant forecast of the Third.

Arrived at this point, we should never forgive ourselves if we omitted to quote some choice passages from Richard Kralik's writings on the War. The stolid mind, barren of all artistic refinement, of that clerical and monarchist poet laureatus, that insipid idol of backward circles in Vienna, was yet possessed of some significance: few Nazis have formulated the counter-revolutionary claims of Central-European imperialism with more vigorous bluntness. His war-time vociferations were by no means primarily due to a temporary war psychosis (as was the case, for instance, with that otherwise noble poet Ernst Lissauer, whose fine Hassgesang gegen England was to delight a number of English readers). There is no doubt that Kralik despised the allied nations profoundly, not because he was all for giving way indiscriminately to emotions of warlike hostility, but because he was genuinely convinced of their meanness as well as of the noisomeness of the principles for which they stood. The allied governments, that of Belgium being expressly mentioned, were "criminal"; Italy (1916) was "no state at all", only a mask for criminal sects, an unnatural state formation. Kralik wished her to be restored to papal sovereignty—needless to say, under Imperial protection. On the other hand, the two allied Empires represented divine Imperium, the given centre for a world "organically" ordered on federalist lines. "The German Reich and Austria-Hungary are the two political and cultural organizations of a higher order, towering far above other states:
national states, commercial states, colonial states, rapine states, phrase states, slavery states, trust states, swindle states.” Muscovite (Tartaro-Mongol) counter-culture . . . Gallic phrase-making . . . British commercialism and utilitarianism. . . . However, Kralik struggled to keep up an appearance of moderation. Thus, though warmly endorsing a certain scribbler’s warning against any clemency or mildness towards England:

Schonung ist Selbstmord, Milde ist Wahn—
Auge um Auge jetzt, Zahn um Zahn,

he sententiously added that “such firmness does not necessarily imply hatred. . . . I am not going to join in songs of hatred against hostile nations of culture”. Presently he seems to have taken affright at his own excess of fairness, and continues thus: “certainly I do not minimize the guilt of England. . . . An unnamed author of ballads (!) rightly proposes:

Pfui Teufel! war sonst als Fluch bekannt;
Jetzt soll es heissen: Pfui England!”

(Meaning, that in a popular oath the devil’s name should be replaced by England’s.) At a time when there were yet few people under William’s and Francis Joseph’s sceptres who expected to cross swords with the U.S.A. in the near future, Kralik had already discovered that the Germans were “the only respectable element in America”. Events were soon to prove the falseness of his prophecy, “We have nothing either to hope or to fear from the U.S.A.” The formula of Kjellén, interpreting the Great War as an issue between the obsolescent ideas of 1789 (liberty, equality, fraternity—the rights of man) and the sound, reliable principles of Germandom (order, discipline, justice, devotion—the duties of man) could not fail to meet with the highest satisfaction on Kralik’s part. He suggested a World Alliance (Weltbund) headed by the Central Powers—a position “naturally inherent in their very centrality”—the next steps towards its creation being indicated by the site of the Bagdad railway-line. The war had already been lost for the Entente when the German ships Goeben and Breslau were taken over by the Turkish fleet. The Central European Union had to be widened
out towards the East, even to the remotest shores of Asia and Africa. Rapidly enough, these high-flown projects came to reveal themselves as unreal ravings devoid of all consequence. But another prediction of Kralik (that the hall-mark of post-war culture would be “less rationalism” and “more nationalism”) has indeed come true after a brief swing of the pendulum towards the opposite side; and in the very year of his death (1984) he may well have felt rehabilitated to an unexpected extent. It must have been a rather queer experience for him to stand by his Austrian and clerical position, threatened by the impact of a re-born and intensified German imperialism.

Consulting Professor Eibl—Kralik’s more brilliant pupil—we gain the knowledge that according to the German custom of thinking, Reich is the “highest term in sociology”. (Not, apparently, mankind or society!) The idea of Reich shows two main groups of characteristics: (1) An articulated (gliedhaft: corporative, hierarchie) construction, complexity, universality; (2) the attributes of dignity, majesty, suffusion with spiritual values. Reich is essentially meant as Imperium sacrum: a merely factual power, stripped of spiritual relevancy, lacks real majesty. Not in vain does German philosophy speak of the “empire of values”. Historically, the idea of a German Reich cannot be torn apart from that of a Divine Reich (Kingdom of God: Civitas Dei). The old (First) German Reich was part and parcel of a Divine Reich on earth (?). The new (Second) Reich, in its turn, was scarcely more than a federal State. In reference to it, Eibl writes the sober words which we can only confirm: “The louder the Germans sang about the world having to be cured by German essence (Wesen... genesen), the less they knew in what the cure should actually consist”. Moreover, says Eibl, the German Reich ideology, originally aiming at a “Reich supra-national, but entrusted to one nation”, has exercised a demoralizing influence on Magyars, Czechs and Poles, who, under the cloak of “empires” of their own, were busy erecting their mechanical national states with oppressed or restricted minorities.

However, interesting as the First and Second Reich may be, it is the Third on which our preoccupations are focused. Eibl views the Nazi movement with a mixture of philosophical reserve and unrestrained sympathy; agreeing only in part with
its ideology, he fully prescribes to its foreign designs. In his opinion, the claim for a new German Reich is tantamount to a new plan for the reconstruction of Europe on the basis of a working legal order: the recognition of nationality transcending state boundaries (*Volkstum*), co-operation, and disarmament. But at the same time it is infinitely more than that. By the very distress of post-Versailles Germandom, "the soul is prompted to a new penetration into the empire of eternal values". The idea of German Reich, as it is at present materializing, inspires the "strongest of all national movements", without, however, being understood in all its depths and perspectives by the protagonists of that movement. It is a religious, an apocalyptic idea... which applies to the cultural problems of the time ahead of us as well as to political situations. Its magic index "Third" hints that the new Reich is also a formula of solution for a series of spiritual and moral dilemmas. As regards politics, it is above all destined to solve the tension between close national unity and supra-national imperialism, and between Prussian and Austrian imperial conceptions. In the mental and social sphere, the great central images of the First Reich: the "German nobleman", the "German knight", the "Christian fighter" are reappearing in our political ideas. The figures for which we yearn are "German champions of the Kingdom of God". The German noble "must" impress us with "calm dignity, composure, and heroic serenity". (This level, no doubt, will be fully attained only by the second Nazi generation.) The disgrace of Versailles has turned against its own perpetrators: it has mobilized the German mind into self-identification with general European problems. The Germans must undertake the organization of the Occident (*Abendland*) for its own sake; the German Reich will become the recognized focus of Occidental civilization. It will reveal a threefold stratification: around the nucleus of a closely knit national state including Austria, a looser texture of *Volk* community embracing all German populations of the earth, and lastly, a halo of non-German mankind yet adhering to the Reich by even more "spiritualized" ties: Reich as "the idea of a new legal order for all peoples". It all sounds so convincing that one is hardly tempted to wonder why the Prusso-German core including Austria happens to be a necessary premise for such a reasonable order of international relationships. But Eibl
is firm and explicit on this point: “The solid structure of the
Third Reich will be the powerful centre, not of Germandom
only but of all national groups (Volksgruppen), both German and
non-German”. In all sincerity it must be owned that the neat­ness of this vision leaves nothing to be desired. To enhance its
colour, Eibl also adds that the spiritual and political currents
(Fernwirkung) which have hitherto emanated from France and
England will duly adopt the Germanic Reich as their new centre
of irradiation. The next steps towards integration will naturally
be directed to the Near East. For instance, the three and a half
million Germans living amongst eight million Slavs, in Czechoslovakia, cannot be qualified as a “minority”; a “minority”
bordering on a foreign state formed by the bulk of its kinsmen
means a misdrawn frontier; to all intents and purposes, if the
Czechoslovak Republic is to remain intact, it must be re­
modelled on the pattern of Switzerland. How would the world
like a Germany with eighty million Germans and thirty million
minorities? (This is rather poor reasoning: besides the propor­
tions, the absolute numbers also matter very much indeed.
Perhaps even Eibl would restrain his excitement if eight Slavs
“oppressed” three and a half Germans, although Stapel might
teach him that half a German is more than any number of
non-German millions. As for the Swiss ideal, Czechoslovak
reality is probably less far removed from it than would in fact
suit Eibl: for the Swiss cantonal organization runs less than
anything on völkisch lines of division. Moreover, Switzerland,
ensconced in its mountains so hard to approach, has a French
and an Italian colossus on its frontiers besides the German one,
whereas the Czechs form a tiny—though keenly characterized
and highly active—Slav islet in the German flood.) Further,
Austria (cf. Jung) means Germany’s “gateway for advance”
towards the South and East.

Further, Eibl points out that the historical theories of all the
great Occidental nations have their common origin in the
Christian conception of a “Divine Empire”. But one of them is
in some way privileged. “The Germans will have to understand
(werden einschen) that the same task which they ought to have
accomplished as victors is to-day incumbent on them as losers:
to set the Central European sphere in order.” (They do not
seem to refuse to understand it, though perhaps they would
prefer to emerge as victors altogether. Unfortunately, there might be other people smitten with a mental obduracy which prevents them from that "insight." The German primacy can be traced back to the Dark Ages: the "Migration of Peoples" constitutes a "deed of nobility for Teutonism . . . for the division of Europe effected by the wandering Teutons has more or less remained in force until our day". Both the historical truth of this argument and the historical logic implied in it are open to doubt. However, time and again, Eibl (like most convinced Catholics) has lucid moments: thus he declines to grant the Teutons a monopoly of human perfection, or to make "the value of a religious or ethical doctrine dependent on its being attuned to the special character of a race or a nation". He is rather lukewarm about Luther, and cherishes the dream of Prussians acting as the outposts of "Rome" (to speak with Hielscher) facing "the great enemy in the East: the Gengis Khan of Moscow". Few authentic Nazis will share Eibl's sentimental cult of the pre-Lutheran beginnings of Prussiandom, his tender feelings for "Marienburg"; but the "Eastern sphere (Ostzirkum) being our central object" (Rosenberg) is axiomatic for all.

Fried, whose imperialistic programme was outlined in earlier passages of this chapter, describes the extension of the German economic domain southwards and eastwards as a necessary complement of state-planned economic policy. France and England, the creditor nations, are interested in the maintenance of market economy, legal order entailing the recognition of debts, gold standard, etc., and above all, Liberal world economy in general; on the other hand, the new economic principle of "social" and "national" service, and the State superseding "heavy interest-drawers" in the control of production, corresponds to Central-Eastern integration under German presidency. (Which is but another circumlocution for the fundamental thesis that Germany is entitled to world-power because Power is its main object and preoccupation: that Society must recede, and efface itself, before the will of the Empire.) The break-up of national democracies East and South-East of Germany, and their desertion from the French line, writes Hermann Ullmann, will imply no "co-ordination" (Gleichschaltung) of these neighbour peoples: for National Socialism does not continue in the steps of
old Pan-Germanism, and Hitler has clearly condemned "Germanization". However, the neighbour nations will have to undergo a "reversion to national reality" analogous to, and induced by, the German Durchbruch. They will also have to oust from power "Chauvinistic rulers who are tools in the hands of emigrants from Germany". Further, German "Volk groups" in these neighbour countries must again perform, "as they did in the last millenium", the office of "living factors of that connection" (with the German mother country); their vocation is not fulfilled by the status of "minorities". We see that a rude thing like Gleichschaltung is quite out of the question, just as a refined person would never "drink beer", "wine" or "spirits", only "absorb fermented liquor". German economic imperialism in the East (deutsche Grossraumwirtschaft) is announced in rather similar tones by Karl Krueger. We have "no imperialistic and Pan-German ambitions", but the "peace and welfare of Europe", as well as advantageous dealings with Russia, are only possible on condition of a "strong Germany". We affect no political incorporation of our agrarian neighbours, only a "co-operative union of interests". The first or inmost zone of German designs for economic union embraces the three non-Slav countries, Austria, Hungary, and Rumania; the second zone, the Baltic states; the third, Bulgaria, Turkey, the North-West of Poland (written in 1982); the fourth, Yugoslavia, Poland, the Scandinavian states and Finland. Krueger expects England to acquiesce in the renascence of German Central-Eastern power from anti-Russian considerations. He deplores the obstinacy of Austria in opposing the Anschluss, seeing that nobody in Germany has a mind to attack Catholic positions in Austria (1982). The "chivalrous" nationalism of Hungary, and her "just political ambitions", must be encouraged as a means of bringing pressure to bear on Czechoslovakia: sooner or later, Prague will be forced to "agree" with economic Greater Germany. On the other hand, Hungary has no claim to unlimited assistance: she will have to grant economic concessions—namely, in favour of the German designs—in return for her territorial gains, and to submit to a final agreement with her neighbours, in particular with Rumania. (In brief: Hungary, and also Rumania, are likely to become German vassals entitled to a more gracious treatment than those restive and incorrigibly
Western-minded Czechs; but above all, they like everyone must not "forget their place" as vassals.) To a certain extent, Yugoslavia may be played off against Italy, to force the latter to give up her veto on Anschluss or Austro-German tariff union. As for Poland, politically she will be a negligible quantity after having surrendered her German territories (written in 1932); the project of a Polish Grosswirtschaftsraum would instantly rally all Central Europe to plot her destruction; nor has she any right to hamper German economic expansion towards Russia and the Black Sea. Concerning the concrete details of such an expansion, Krueger hints that it will be necessary to secure "certain privileges" for German immigrants to the Ukraine, Caucasus, and Western Asia. He assigns great importance to German cultural propaganda on a large scale, consciously directed to counteract the influence of the Alliance Française. In any event, he impresses upon the German mind that no well-being at home is possible without the pursuit of foreign political activities, without acquiring the "mastery over a greater Raum". Nor can the task be achieved except by defeating the two main international principles hitherto (1932) predominating Europe: the Third International linked to Russia, and the League of Nations, the "embodiment of French and English will-to-power".

"Anti-imperialism" is also preached by Wirsing in his Zwischeneuropa. "Europe in between", this term is meant to designate that highly interesting patch of territories which fills the space between Germany and Soviet Russia. On closer scrutiny, "anti-imperialism" and "federalism" present themselves especially as equivalents for an anti-Western evolution, a fundamental departure from both Western predominance and Western methods, including the German imitation of them as attempted, in part, by the Second Reich. "Anti-capitalism", too, is only an aspect of secession from the Western world. Germany must bring "a new social and therewith, a new supra-national order" beyond state centralism on the national democratic pattern: "space integration" beyond mere "state integration". A key to Wirsing’s conception is provided by his peremptory statement: "Very definitely the federalist idea must be kept apart from the obscure and befogging experiments of internationalists, Pan-Europeans, and fantasists of
reconciliation”. In fact, Zwischeneuropa federalism means that Germany must be allowed to form a system of “federations” with a series of divided weaker partners, dictating terms to each of them at will, and secure from interference from any third factor.

To the neo-German mind, the thought of expansion is not an interchangeable aim confined to a specified object; it is the very axiom of life, the unchanging form of inner attitude. “For a nation which is increasingly prolific” (!), says Professor Kriek, “an appropriate (!) gain of space, and a firm direction of foreign policy pointing towards it, must be the goal of all its efforts. . . . To gain this, however, the nation must first have stood the test of efficiency in its hitherto available space by integrating and educating itself to a power which is bound to burst its frontiers”. (The word “bound” is the one to notice here.)

Spengler, whose recent death has—according to reports—evoked rather cool comments in the German press (controlled as it is by the iron hand of Goebbels), lays down that we have entered “the era of world wars”. Under such circumstances, an impoverished nation, lacking leaders and arms, could not regard even its bare existence as secure. Lest we should cease to be, let us rather conquer the world—such is the logic he applies, translated into plainer language. Certainly his aphorism “Abstention from world politics is no safeguard against their consequences” can by no means be dismissed as pure fallacy. But reckless cynicism gets the upper hand in the phrase following upon it: “The gambling for world hegemony has only just begun. It will be conducted to the end between strong men. Should not Germans, too, chance to be among them?”

From Mowrer’s book, valuable on all points that touch our subject, we may again borrow some “scraps of evidence”. An extract from a lecture of Professor Srbik, the grossdeutsch Austrian historian: “One people! Then one State! and only then, when the immediate national task has been accomplished, the super-national task of a new Central European unification under German leadership”. Young enthusiasts, more or less of Hielscher’s mental lineage, express their thoughts in terms such as the following: The benefits of Germanism must be extended to other peoples. The mission of most people stops with forming a nation; Germany’s task is to realize “the” Empire. “To shape
and secure the spaces between Flanders, Burgundy, Transylvania, Dorpat . . . to fit into the political and economic power zone of Germany those Eastern and Southern parts of Europe whose peoples are not adapted to becoming nations. It is the task of the Empire to transfer the rule to the bearers of a Germanism that is bound to no nation, no people and no race. . . . Only the German people is called to rule the earth” (F. W. Heinz). The coming war will have the character of an insurrection “Its preparation must be invisible and it must be started without formalities”. (Hans Schwarz van Berk. Written long before 1985.) “Admitted . . . silly and hysterical . . .”—Mowrer remarks—“but that such ‘new nationalism’ should be the admitted ideal of literate human beings . . . is no laughing matter”. Besides, Mowrer supposes an interconnection between the Germans clinging to imperial pretensions and their chronic national insufficiency. “The formlessness of the Germans offered no effective fulcrum for the application of their strength . . . Germans, half hypnotized by the obsolescent idea of the Holy Roman Empire, remained inchoate and helpless. . . . Their final crystallization revealed them as a greater Prussia. But Prussia was itself essentially a glorified Military Order. To build a modern nation requires first of all a modern citizen!”

Thus does Reich appear to emerge from the dim foundations of geographical predestination and theology gone astray, of tragic inferiority in citizenship and a fearful superiority in the display of highly organized power.
7. THE ROAD TO HEGEMONY

“Invictis victi victuri.” (To the unconquered, from the conquered who will yet be conquerors.)
(Inscription on the Memorial for the Fallen at Munich University.)

“France is and remains the implacable mortal enemy of the German people.”

A. HITLER.

“Today, speaking of fresh soil in Europe, we can only think of Russia and her marginal states.”

A. HITLER.

“Will-to-power is at the same time the way to German Freedom, which, in spite of all talk of German self-sovereignty soon to be restored, will long remain a far-off goal. . . . To develop will-to-power silently and with iron consistency, is our chief task. . . . Some day the hour will come for us to take our resolution for the great venture. . . . Purity of soul and keenness of sword go together. . . . Genuine war is an instrument of order.”

E. JUNG.

“We do not want, however, to convey a roseate picture of war. Nor do we incline to be desirous of war. But we are convinced that war will come; and that through it alone the path towards liberty can be taken.”

E. BANSE.

The question, so hotly canvassed to-day in England and other well-intentioned countries, whether Hitler and his staff “actually do, or do not, want war”, seems to be unanswerable, or rather, to allow for different answers according to its different interpretations. It is quite possible, if not probable, that the Chancellor (together with his most influential assistants) does not hanker for war in the sense that, for instance, many a young German officer anxious to display his courage and gain promotion might do so. Very conceivably, the dictators of Nazi Germany may
well keep in mind that war against other great powers would at all events be a terrible game in which many fine youths of their own nation, of their own blood and caste, would be bound to fall; that, short of a comparatively rapid victory which it is difficult to foresee, it might bring about their downfall, followed by revolutionary reaction; that by patient political manoeuvres, seconded by the mere menace of German military power and by fascist ascendancy in the world, the chances of a future war could be so decisively improved as to make it worth while abstaining from it for a very long time. No particularly weighty reason prevents us from believing that Hitler does not want war to-day in the sense that Bismarck did before 1866 and 1870, or as Mussolini did in 1935. This, however, is not the crucial issue. It has no bearing on the fact that Nazi Germany, by her mental constitution and her line of action, is pursuing a course which makes European war appear a probability amounting almost to certainty: the only alternative being an unending series of bloodless conquests which seem to be as unlikely as they would be undesirable. For the prevention of war certainly should not be, and most certainly is not, the only problem of mankind. Out of a love of peace ready to go to extreme leniency, Great Britain has tolerated the Italian rape of Abyssinia; but it is more than doubtful whether she would acquiesce to the infliction of a similar fate, say, upon Egypt or any of her own colonies.

One might raise the objection that the mere possibility of a future war arising out of tension between Germany and other nations is no proof whatever of warlike, or even aggressive, designs on the part of Germany. There have been wars characterized by a comparative absence of actual "will to war"; some may even place the Great War in that category. But, apart from a war engineered with direct intent and full deliberation, and a war crisis tragically arising between fundamentally peace-loving antagonists whose vital interests come into inevitable conflict, there remains yet another possible situation. The triple fact of Nazi Germany’s armaments, her foreign political designs, and her national and racial ideologies, all enjoying the unreserved protection of a ruthless totalitarian dictatorship, may not mean an unconditional and unalterable determination to wage war; but it certainly means direction towards war in a sense highly different from the mere chance of
war between distinct sovereign nations with divergent interests. The way things present themselves to us is that the rulers of Nazi Germany, believing more or less seriously in their ideology of the Master Race, are determined to pursue gigantic designs of imperialistic expansion; that they, although quite willing to accept the realization of those designs without use of arms, have scant illusions as to the likelihood of such a favour of destiny; and that they hold it to be their supreme duty to prepare the country, both technically and psychologically, to the best of their ability, for a final military achievement of their aims. They may not want war in a strict and literal sense of the word; which is a matter of minor importance. They do want war inasmuch as they cherish aims other than national self-defence or even a single definite object of expansion, which they know in all probability to be unrealizable without resort to war. They—and to our mind, this seems to count even more—do want war in so far as they are integrally organizing, educating, converting as it were, their people (and in particular, the young ones) to the sole and central purpose of war mentality and war efficiency. The creation by Naziism of a dominant atmosphere of war is in no wise a mere by-product of its activities, but, even though not necessarily answering its immediate purposes, certainly a genuine materialization of its very spirit and consciousness.

Ungracious critics of the Nazi régime are in the habit of prophesying that the rulers of the Third Reich will some day be compelled to begin a foreign war as an outlet for "growing inner difficulties" and "incurable economic distress". Of that I am less sure. Dictatorships of the Nazi calibre, commanding a strong body of well-trained and enthusiastic adherents animated by a profound and definite creed, have most efficient and direct methods of dealing with "inner difficulties", which are often "growing" more in the imagination of expectant adversaries than in reality. Such a dictatorship is also capable of forcing its subject people to endure economic calamities and deprivations which would upset any democratic cabinet and even overthrow many a democratic régime as well as more feeble dictatorships. Still, there is a particle of truth in that slightly propagandist reasoning. Fascist dictatorship is bound sooner or later to attempt spectacular foreign expansion, because an achievement of this order is inseparable from its meaning, its unwritten law of
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constitution. It needs imperialistic enterprise, not to “placate popular discontent”, but to execute the Will that drives on, and holds together, its closest supporters. Or, to put it differently, to provide men with that meaning of life which it has taken upon itself to bring them. A fascist government may easily impose on its people an act of discipline and reserve, of temporary sacrifice, which a more liberal and less strictly nationalist régime could never dream of daring: the true with Poland, perhaps Mussolini’s initial agreement with Pashitch (also his present flirtation with Yugoslavia), may serve as examples. But this inner discipline, composure and concentration must lead somewhere. The fascist leader must live in constant dread, not of oppositional insurrection—it would be far too late already to ward off this menace—but of the first signs of inner relaxation in the elite grouped around him. Fascism must make war to save its soul: to stave off the revelation of its inner barrenness, the vacuum of despair at its core. However, the qualified and superior fascism of German Nazidom has its own laws. Banalities such as regulating production and public services, reclamation of swamps, even the acquisition of a new African colony, can hold no decisive place in its scale of aims. The front of the Third Reich—the Reich of the Superman—is of world-wide dimensions. If Mussolini may satisfy himself with “creating an Empire”, nothing short of creating the Empire of the World is a task appropriate to Hitler’s radius of activity. The religion of the Tribe Absolute is necessarily at loggerheads with any residue of free mankind outside its orbit; and National Socialism is an anthropological as well as a political creed. Further, Nazi economy may contribute towards precipitating war, not because it is bad or blundering economy, but because it is war economy. The economic organization of the Third Reich points towards Kriegswirtschaft as a logical culmination; in all main points it is determined by the previsible requirements of war conditions. (Exposed among others, by Alfred Schwoner, a well-known expert on German economic problems, in “Der Oesterreichische Volkswirt”, April, 1936.) To maintain a big army, together with corresponding armaments, is still to a large extent compatible with the preservation of peace; to imbue the whole life of a nation with the scale of values, the mode of life, the attitude of war, amounts to such a concentration on war-preparedness as
would make an indefinite maintenance of peace appear, as it were, irrational.

Naturally, we shall see that warlike designs and preparations are by no means the only ones to enter the Nazi system of foreign political schemes; war itself is merely an item, a climax maybe, in the complex process of "organic" growth. The general "atmosphere" (to repeat a vague but indispensable phrase), the trend of expansion suffused with vitality and faith, the fanatical nationalism of a highly exclusive racial and imperial kind, the intention—deeply engraved on the neo-German mind—of re-opening their "case against the world" brought to a temporary close by the issue of the "first" World War: all that weighs heavier in the scale than any concrete and definite project of aggrandizement by force of arms. Let us assume, for the sake of comparison, that France had to-day an increasing rate of population, accompanied by a revival of martial and expansive spirit. If, under such circumstances, France were known to be preparing for the reconquest of that part of Canada which has remained French in a comparatively high degree, her designs being obviously confined to this object, the British Empire would not, in any probability, think of granting any concession in favour of the French claim; but at any rate it might do so. The idea of securing peace by an arrangement that would set French ambitions at rest might enter into Britain's consideration; perhaps the contest could even be settled by a more or less limited and episodic campaign. But how would it affect British opinion if France applied herself to revoking the treaties of 1815, or to re-opening the colonial rivalries of the eighteenth century? From framing perspectives, however, we must return to our survey of ideological contents.

Although many more Englishmen are likely to read Wickham Steed's "Meaning of Hitlerism" than the present book, it can do no harm to reproduce some of Steed's precise and vigorous formulations: "War of liberation... in reality, the war for German ascendency—lies in the background of Hitler's thoughts and forms the steady purpose behind the facade of powerful asseverations of which he is prodigal". Preparations for war, of all conceivable kinds, are making rapid headway (written before 1935)... "The 'totalitarian', absolute State cannot be moral, because it is responsible to itself alone..."
Fascist and Hitlerite ideas of the total and absolute State are utterly irreconcilable with free and liberal civilization which, in my view, is the only civilization worthy of the name". Hitler is "sincere in saying that Germany does not want a war yet. He would undoubtedly prefer an interval of two or three years before fighting". Quoting Feder’s draft of the National Socialist Party programme: “We claim all the Germans in Czechoslovakia, Alsace-Lorraine, Poland and the League Colony of Austria. . . This demand, however, expressly excludes any tendency towards imperialism (!); it is a simple and natural demand which any strong nationality puts forward as its natural requirement". Again, from a speech of Sauckel (the sub-dictator of Thuringia): “There must be no discussion of things that bear upon the life and the existence of the people; and everybody who dares to doubt the rightness of the National Socialist outlook must be branded as a traitor". Again, some famous words of Hitler, in reference to parents refractory to Nazi ideologies: “We shall take their children from them and train them to be what the German people needs”. (War jurisdiction and war-education anticipated in peace-time!) Succinctly Professor Hoover states the case: “The normal life of the German nation is to be that of constant preparation for conflicts which are bound to arise in the fulfillment of German destiny. It is necessary to realize that the Nazis live in a totally different mental world from that of the statesmen of countries which are still under the liberal, capitalistic, parliamentary system. They believe that the mission of Germany is to save European civilization by Nordifying it. They see Germany standing as the bulwark of Europe against the spread of Asiatic influences. Her task involves the acquisition of new territory in Europe to support an increasing Nordic population”. Finally, Wickham Steed presents to his readers the renowned and entertaining Professor Banse—an author on Wehrgeographie already familiar to us—depicting the terrors of future war for the whole population: “A people can pass through these trials and win the war if every individual member of it is deeply convinced that his life belongs not to him but to the State and to the State alone”. (A “refrain, inseparable from all advocacy of the Totalitarian State”, the English publicist adds.) Banse’s strategical sketches as to the planned invasion of Great Britain and Ireland from the Dutch and
Belgian coasts, as well as his lyrical comment: “We confess that it is charming to imagine and to portray the downfall of this proud and secure people”, have appeared in a considerable part of the English press. Presumably, however, the competent authorities would vastly prefer an isolation of France and her humiliation with British assistance as the next step. For Hitler, writes Steed, France is the “permanent enemy” of the German nation: “No less clear is it that England is to be wooed, or otherwise persuaded, for the express purpose of facilitating the overthrow of France”.

However, Banse is able to offer us further prospects, fascinating if rather grim. As a general axiom of German war policy, looked upon from an economic angle, he writes: “A modern war can hardly be sustained without leaning on either of the three economic giant empires, Great Britain, U.S.A., Soviet Russia.” The warning may not lack all foundation, and an anti-war alignment of the above-mentioned composition (naturally including France and a number of smaller nations) would indeed seem likely to discourage the pupils and superiors of Herr Banse from “war of liberation”. Should, however, war break out after all, it would show him hand in glove with those who maintain that a swift and thorough annihilation of the adversary is the better part of humaneness. After having described poison-gas warfare in bright and seducing terms, Banse turns to the even more luscious category of “biological” weapons, the use of which—writing two years before Hitler’s official announcement of rearmament—he would fain have secured as a German prerogative. (At any rate, it must be owned that a preference for biological warfare would not go ill with the emphasis on biology displayed in racial thought and vitalistic beliefs.) “Matters for consideration are (In Betracht kommt): the contamination of drinking and other water by typhoid germs, as well as the dissemination of typhoid fever by fleas and of pests by rats artificially inoculated. Aeroplanes, in particular, might obtain highly favourable results by descending in the enemy hinterland and disembarking the bearers of germs. . . . One thing is beyond doubt: biological war is the proper weapon for disarmed peoples robbed of their means of defence. They cannot be reproached for resorting some day (dermaleinst—a term of future) to the use of such arms against brutal violence (!), and destroying the nation
of their oppressors (ihren Bedrückerstaat) by purely scientific methods. For no other reason, albeit with sanctimonious airs, did the League of Nations lay a ban on biological means of fighting! Yet if the existence (!) of a State and a people is at stake, then every means to ward off and even (darüber hinaus) to defeat a superior (!) adversary must appear justified." Well, well . . . one thing is beyond doubt: that the logic of Banse, cruel as it is, is far from being flawless. What if the "superior" adversary, especially on reading Banse's indiscretions here or elsewhere, also happens to apply the contrivances of "pure science"? Or again, is it quite certain that the General Staff of the Third Reich, if in a coming war it find itself by any chance "superior" to the enemy in "normal" military respects, will, in conformance with the Bansean code of fairness, refrain from alliances with pest and typhoid microbes? That in the neo-German vocabulary "existence" is a euphemism for "expansion", has by now become a mere truism for us. However, if Banse has effective plans in store for the time of open war, he is by no means at a loss as regards its preparatory period of latency. *Wehrpsychologie*, an important branch of universal war-science, has the task of grinding the enemy's spirit to powder, and of winning the neutral's during outward "peace". The following passage is one of the classic pieces of neo-German nationalist literature, duly including also the element of inferiority complex linked with an insincere admiration for the enemy's ruthless efficiency: "Permanent agencies must be entertained abroad to draw a close net of unobtrusive propaganda over hostile and neutral countries, availing themselves of all means that seem to suit their purposes: press and broadcasting; cinema and espionage; charitable institutions and activities. Every means is legitimate, where it is a question of thoroughly demoralizing the enemy's, and strengthening one's own, mind in the period preceding the struggle. The *English* seem to be past-masters in this new combative art. At any rate, in the World War under Jewish and semi-Indian tutorship ('Northcliffe' and Kipling) they bravely stood the test as such, thereby inflicting heavy damages upon us; whereas we were too clumsy, too stolidly honest and too unworldly to institute a real campaign of lies". But, on the Central Empires' side, was not truth bright enough? What a distressing sight is virtue trying to drift away
from itself! Since the new Germany has an invincible dislike for Jews, it would be advisable, perhaps, to secure some semi-Indian tutors for the inevitable "campaign of lies". They might still teach the Nazis undreamt-of finesses.

If a man like Banse may, if necessary, be disavowed by the high authorities of Nazidom, it is quite a different matter with a coryphaeus like Rosenberg. In accord with the typical neonationalist mentality which grew up in Germany after the armistice, Rosenberg holds that out of the "deepest humiliation" of Germanism its "highest elevation" could, and should, be worked out. (cf. Jung, Chamberlain, Moeller, Eibl.) The significance of the War lies in its character as a sociological process, as an historical line of demarcation rather than in the decision between two combatants in which it has resulted. With it, the era of "expansion" and of "financial world-power" has come to an end; we witness the beginnings of an "era of inner gathering (concentration), which will produce a racially and organically determined system of states". Practically speaking, however, Rosenberg does not prove such an inconvertible enemy of all "expansion"; what he means is rather that random conquests and excursions of non-German peoples are no longer suited to the spirit of the age, whereas it is high time that the Germans should begin the occupation of their "natural space of life". (Surely that can no more be called "expansion" than a baby elephant can be accused of "immoderate greed for space" because, obeying the indwelling law of organic shape, it develops into a full-sized elephant!) German "space of life" suffers unnatural restrictions; in the East, particularly, Poles and Czechs are its mortal enemies. The German people cannot flourish until the buttresses of French power in Europe are razed to the ground. Instead of a timid concentration on "inner settlements", we must in the first place lend assistance to all enemies of the French system of alliances. (Then why talk about a new era of non-expansion and inner reconstruction?) World pacification, adds Rosenberg to dissipate all possible misunderstandings, must begin, not by disarmament, but by a sweeping extermination of "honourless democracy", the "un-racial State of the nineteenth century", and "world economy controlled by financial interests". Well, we entertain no doubt that—once the "spiritual" undoing and "historically overdue" decomposition
of the West, linked to an "organic penetration and re-arrangement" of the East, is achieved—Rosenberg will be the sincere and grateful champion of world peace. Unfortunately some wayward factors might happen to disturb the smoothness of the transition. However that may be, Rosenberg announces that Germany will know how to secure, in Europe, a space of life adapted to its future population of a hundred and fifty million. To make the prospect more palatable for other inhabitants of that part of the world, he holds out the bait that such a political development will enable the Germans to regain their inner freedom of creation (now hampered by material duress) and make them again productive of metaphysics. Let us hope that this compensation will even satisfy the minds of those Eastern infra-men who might otherwise resent what Rosenberg declares in relation to them: "In this great vital issue of honour, freedom and bread for a nation so creative as the German, no considerations can be taken for Poles, Czechs, etc., who are as impotent as they are valueless and overbearing. They must be driven back to the East, so that the soil may become free to be tilled by the horny hands of Teutonic peasants". To-day, Rosenberg would probably substitute "Russians" for "Poles", but the essential trend undergoes no change: it is merely the choice of the preferred vassal, the favourite slave as it were, that may vary according to degrees of docility in the "inferiors", and to other circumstances. In 1928 (writes Heiden in his biography on Hitler), Rosenberg still thought it natural that Poland should bear the chief burden of German expansion; he reckoned on "friendship" with an independent Ukraine and a nationalist Russia in spe, the Poles seeming to him "incapable anyway" of maintaining a state of their own. Now, in view of a consolidated Soviet Russia approaching the West, a flirtation with "incapable" Poland commends itself as the wisest course for the moment.

How does an inspired poet of the Third Reich envisage the oncoming years and decades of his country's life? Gottfried Benn* writes, with tremulous rapture: "A century bursting with destruction is already pounding on our gates: the thunder will fuse with the ocean, the fire with the earth, thus inexorably will the last breeds (Endgeschlechter) of the White Race fall upon each other". "To see the New Man in a dreamy light is a criminal mistake... he must know how to fight..." that he will learn in
the midst of arrows, surrounded by the spiritually inimical.”

“Peace in Europe will be no more; the onslughts on Germany (?) are yet to come: from the West and the East, from the part of Liberalism and Democracy.” To cope with that menace, the German nation must become in all its spirit, its creed and its inner constitution, “not militaristic but militant”. “This Volk, bent on achieving not happiness but its discipline, will become free.” It must be clearly realized that to find a common footing for agreement with a nation governed by such a mentality appears to be fraught with incomparably greater difficulties than may be the settlement of any concrete controversy, however acute or intricate. The conflict of interests and rights here involved is merely a function, a shadow, a token of conflicting religions, of clashing worlds, of disparate mankind.

Though one degree more sober and realistic, E. Jung pursues analogous trains of thought. The basic experience of the World War—the War against the World, as it were—remains the leitmotif. The German soldier in the World War, says Jung, “was in a special position: he was a German, and over there stood the world”. He grew accustomed to live in the “harmony of life and death... death being natural, and life a gift”. The final result of the war is still undetermined. The German people in the twentieth century are the heralds and pioneers of a new ideal for mankind—the ideal of “organic” social order, of the “natural” rule of aristocratic minorities. All the motives (none of which is unknown to us by now) of war heroism, ethnical centrality, superiority in intrinsic “value”, Herrschaft due to the people of the greatest sacrifice, Herrschaft due to those who are first in understanding its natural necessity—converge here: “The formation and leadership of this new society falls to that minority creative of history, who for life and death unite their own existence with that of the community”. And above all, “we must convert the defeat of this War into a spiritual victory”. To be sure, “spiritual” victory does not mean a brilliant self-assertion in academic discussions! It means an integral victory of one world over the other, of Teutonism over the West: in no way less, and even more, than would mean, say, a German military victory over France. Far from deploiring the World War because of its unfavourable ending, we must in the main judge it positively, seeing that without its effects, the new “Era of the
Germans" would have scarcely been possible. Now it is an "ethical commandment"—a bequest of the War underlying that new Era of the Germans—that the German nation shall be well armed and prepared: "ready to obtain German freedom and the new order of Europe, if necessary, even at the price of its blood". For, although wanton enterprises of war are also possible, "genuine war is a weapon of order". For the Germans, foreign policy is a direct requisite of their "existence", their "inner formation", and their "relationship with God". A "policy of treaties" instead of Machtpolitik (policy of power) is a "confused concept", for it is only the "power of states" which gives weight to the "engagements of diplomatists". (Yes; only power can be used for different purposes, and occasionally even, which will never be intelligible to Prussians and Fascists, for the purpose of protecting lawful rights and mutual welfare.) "Foreign policy can never be conducted in a democratic, only in an aristocratic fashion; by men in whom Germans place their trust. . . . And since, at bottom, German foreign policy must be inspired by designs of Machtpolitik, availing itself of pacifist forms for tactical reasons only (in view of Germany's deficiency in arms), its supreme object cannot be anything other than to enhance and re-build German power." For, as we know (cf. our chapter heading), "some day the hour will strike" . . .

What we should do is "not to rely on the reasoning ability of our enemies"—longing to strike "good bargains" with them, yearning for the "maximum profit", and rejoicing in "correct theories"—but "to foster love and passion for our own country, to incite grim hatred against the enemy, to develop will-to-power and resolution to carry the day . . . to forge new weapons day and night, and to train our youth day and night for the impending struggle". (Thus Friedrich Wolters, 1927.)

At this point it would be useful to make a general review of opinions regarding the War and post-War situation as a point of departure for German foreign policy.

During the War (1916), Houston Stewart Chamberlain published a pamphlet on the "war aims of Germany". It can surprise no one to learn that in it he urged a peace of German ascendancy rather than of impartial justice; however, the philosophical details and backgrounds of his contemplations make them well worth reading from the point of view of our
enquiry. Chamberlain borrows his motto from Marshal Hindenburg: "The war, let it be hoped, will last until everybody has conformed to our will". Then comes the puzzling definition that "for Germany, the object of the war is peace". Yet the enemy's folly and duplicity make it needful that "Germany should impose peace, namely, her peace". Conditions must be enforced that will grace the European world with a "worthy peace satisfactory to all worthy and aspiring parties". This sounds a little vague, but the author immediately proceeds to put his meaning more squarely. "Should the display of armed force be thwarted by the dead weight of humanitarian phrases, should diplomatic sophistry prevail, then nothing has been gained." That peace can only be founded on German victory follows from the very nature of peace:—an absolutely up-to-date thought, Naziism of the first water as early as 1916! The proof is linguistic and incontrovertible. The Latin pax (French paix, English peace) means something in the manner of a juridical treaty; on the other hand, the German Friede means a "lasting realm of love and mildness". "Why, the enemies of Germany do not even possess the concept of Peace!" (Ridiculous as the form in which it is expressed may be, the thought itself is not without a meaning. It is the old issue again: Herrschaft versus Society; feudal loyalties versus reason and contract.) Were the French not "mad", and willing to degrade themselves to bondsmen of England and Russia, there would be no necessity for conflict with them; but seeing that they are mad, "Germany must for all time be secured against their fits of rage". (Which, presumably, break out at a nod from their Anglo-Russian masters, leading to events such as those of the summer of 1914.) As for England, we must on no account be satisfied by merely defeating and coercing her. Certainly "England's arrogance must be broken and humiliated: England must acknowledge inferiority to Germany", which by divine ordinance is entitled to the position of führer der Weltstaat. But care must also be taken of England's tangled internal affairs. "Now the Teutonic element, still large in England, is oppressed, led astray, silenced; if the German ideal emerges victorious, there, too, a transformation is sure to follow."

Unfortunately for England, the condition was not to be fulfilled this time; but we may seriously hope that the delay does not mean final frustration. For, as Chamberlain wrote some ten
years later (see Rosenberg’s book on him, 1927), “the defeat of Germany was only victory postponed”. World conditions were not yet ripe . . . we must watch over our sanctum in the closer circle of the Fatherland . . . for it is Germany alone which still preserves a living sanctity susceptible of evolution. . . . In a collection of Chamberlain’s essays published in 1925, we also read that the Germans, being free from the vice of greed, take a lofty view of war: for them, the meaning of war lies in “safeguarding equity”. (It must, I suppose, be borne in mind, that “equity” is neither equality nor “formal” justice of the Roman, French or Jewish type, but something like “the mastery of those created for mastery”.) Given such a lofty conception of war, there can be no place for pacifism. “Pacifists are no Germans.” With Hitler in command of affairs, this has indeed become an official axiom of the Reich government. The rest of mankind, however, is rather interested in the converse of this generalization, which gives them a feeling of uneasiness: “Germans are not pacifists.”

We recall one more terse and bitter pronouncement from the time of the Great War, made by Lenz—the inventor of the telling term “Gentilism”—in 1917, proudly reprinted in 1938: “As for that baleful civilization of the West. . . . I wish Occidental civilization, with all its trumpery and paraphernalia, were swept away by the war, so as to clear the field for the German culture to come!”

Moeller-Bruck took special pains to persuade his Germans of the benefit of defeat, the opportunities offered by the very harshness of Versailles. In relation to the other side, we have the advantage of the incalculable; whereas they are tied to their own victory, we are in a position to raise long-range questions. It is we who are free to explode the “banality of vulgar greed”, to uplift the “daemonism of an eruptive self-awareness”. Had the Wilsonian promises been faithfully kept, it would have been possible to make the Germans the most peaceful of all nations: they might have renounced being a “world people” and acquiesced in being a respectable “people of work”. With a sigh of relief, the Prussian “daemonist” dismisses the nightmare that might have been. “But it is our mission to disturb the quiet of the world. It is our destiny to set up a scandal of spiritual (!) unrest in the eyes of the peoples of high living (!).” Some day “the masters and the powers of this earth will be called to account for
the distribution of territories: to answer the question how it is that the old and shrivelling (?) nations of Western Europe own the earth (?), whereas young and buoyant (!) peoples lack soil, sea, air and freedom (!) to live”. We recall that Moeller was the chief apostle of the policy to exploit the energies of proletarian socialism for the aspirations of an aggressive anti-Western nationalism. He launched the ingenious idea of “winning the revolution”, as well as of hatching victory out of defeat. He preached the conversion of “revolutionary suicide” into a “political re-birth”. More than anyone else, Moeller was instrumental in imprinting upon Germandom an indelible stamp of the world-war situation. “We are the nation of the World-War, after all”, the “One who fought Ten”; and the end of the War meant “the triumph of all peoples of the earth over the German nation”. Thus by the acceptance of that same alignment of war, together with a resolution to reverse the issue of the struggle, genuine German imperialism has come into existence: for the imperialism of pre-war Germany was merely a dull display of armed force without an idea of its own, without a kernel of spiritual pretension or belief in its vital necessity, helpless against the onrush of foreign ideas. The Germans did not want the war; they were internally unprepared for it; they lacked both unity and definite war aims; their mind was provided with no antidote to the poisonous slogan “Peace without victory”. A few pages later, though, the author maintains that “the War originated in problems of population”, the only concrete meaning of which is a German policy of expansion. The contradiction is easily solved: Moeller reproaches pre-war Germany for not having possessed a sufficiently keen consciousness of its indwelling and profoundly justified imperialism. The experience of the War and its catastrophic consequences have thrust the German mind back upon its metaphysical sources, and have given it a chance of recovering that consciousness. (cf. G. Günther: The army of 1914 was in actual fact a “political” army: it embodied the “existential struggle for the nation”.) Germany must continue to face the world; she must, in due course, resume her fight against the world; but she must do so under improved conditions; taking her stand on a higher level of ideological self-certainty, and opposing that hostile world by a different, anti-Western, anti-Liberal counter-world created by herself. The Germans must
understand at last that it is precisely their unfitness to answer Western standards which constitutes their point of vantage. The stern truth, "Liberalism is the death of nations", must at last be turned against the Western nations themselves. The "self-exposure" of the Liberal Type of man at Versailles will pave the way for his annihilation. Just as democratic factors in Germany have proved an "obsequious tool in the hands of our enemies", our anti-liberal upheaval will be a prelude to the destruction of the liberal world as a whole. Already (Das dritte Reich: 1922) we witness a "reshuffle of men and peoples alike: we see that everything which is in any way anti-liberal is gathering against the forces of Liberalism". In a word, Moeller exhorts his people to renew the World War with the old heroism, as well as with the old issue underlying it, but with a new and more positive attitude of consciousness and creativeness, and with better prospects of success: to turn the War against the World into a War for a New World, a German world of feudalism, militarism, fascism, tribalism, "Teutonism", to replace the old world of Western and Liberal civilization.

Springenschmid, apparently an Austrian Nazi, writes in 1934: "States are live beings; self-unfolding, growth, victory in continuous struggle with their neighbours are natural to them. Contrary to any 'eternal peace', incessant strife and struggle are inherent in the manifestation of their lives... at best (!), a mutual respect of each other's vital rights, or an equilibrium, are possible"... We live in a queer kind of world, if we are to believe the elaborations of German nationalists: pacifism is rotten nonsense, and yet the Germans are the higher and more sincere pacifists; Germany has weighty reasons for upturning peace, and yet the one who really does disturb it is France. For instance, Springenschmid cautions England that she is menaced heavily, and at the same time exclusively, by French aerial armaments. Then come philosophical definitions with a ring of familiarity in them. "Paix does not mean 'peace' (Friede)... it does not cover the German concept of peace (!), but merely (!) the maintenance of the machtpolitisch encirclement of Germany." (A society game which French perversity is unwilling to give up. They are deceitful fellows, these French: they perpetually carry la paix on the tip of their tongues, but at the bottom of their hearts they do not really mean German world
In conformity with Moeller-Bruck, Springenschmid points out that it was precisely the pressure exercised on Germany which gave rise to an upheaval against the spiritual atmosphere of the French revolution (the ideas of 1789), and a formation of new political principles in the Germanic "central body". Owing to the centrality and the open frontiers of Germanom, it is to-day difficult for the others to close their doors to the influences of the German revolution. (There is much truth in that: mentally and politically no small effort is needed to withstand its lurid attraction.)

To H. Nicolai's "Racial theory of law" (published in the National Socialist Party Library, 1932) we owe the significant revelation that international law (Völkerrecht) is necessarily a very poor affair (inhaltssarm), for the obvious reason that it links together different races and therefore different "feelings for law". There is one addition, however, to soften the edge of this harsh truth: the Germanistic or vital (deutschrechtlich, lebensgesetzlich) theory of laws applies, not to the Germans alone, but to all Teutonic peoples. Hence, absurd as all conception of a universal League may be, a League of Teutonic Nations is a matter well worth considering. We see that England may still reckon on treaties being kept by Germany; only she must cease to receive non-Teutonic exotics into her sphere of jurisdiction. Then, in the name of N.S.D.A.P., Nicolai declares that such measures of former governments as are obnoxious to the people (volksschädigend)—the Treaty of Versailles, the Dawes Plan, the Young Plan, the Concordats—will not be juridically binding for the authorities of the Third Reich. (Nor will any obligation, be it even undertaken by a Nazi government, continued to be "juridically binding" as soon as it happens to appear "obnoxious to the people": this, at least, is the consequence of lebensgesetzlich theory of law.)

Professor Eibl, the Catholic philosopher of a German universal Reich, works out his own version of deducing Germany's claim to hegemony from the fact of her defeat in the War. According to him, the Treaty of Versailles was morally invalid and injured Germany; therefore the requirements of objective right fall in line with German interests as such; therefore the Germans—whether or not they like it—must take it upon themselves to bring order to Europe. The struggle against the violation of rights
is at once a struggle for a new lawful order, forming "part of the struggle for the Kingdom of God". Why does Eibl deny validity to the Peace Treaties? Because they encroached upon the preliminary agreements (that might be a matter for discussion); because they were built (?) on the assumption of the Central Powers' unilateral war-guilt; and because they were "impossible to carry out". (To put it in plain English, because the Germans found their terms disagreeable.) Even if the Central Powers had started the War with deliberate malice, says Eibl, this would never have justified the enemy coalition in "punishing" them for it, for until the Kellogg Pact war had not fallen under prohibition. No, I should add, because at the beginning of the century all efforts aiming at bringing about a pact of that kind were defeated at the Hague by Kaiser Wilhelm's envoy (whose very name, Zorn von Bulach, was adapted to the purpose). But apart from that, does the learned and meticulous Professor of ethics really and earnestly think that, failing an express "prohibition" of war by codified international law, a group of nations attacked and laid waste by a powerful neighbour, but eventually overpowering him, should strictly content themselves with expelling his troops from their territory, forbearing to apply any retaliation? This would be that very kind of over-scrupulous "morality" which is so dear to the hearts of lebensgesetzlich immoralists, indeed, a guarantee and an inducement for their enterprises. Of course, the question has no sense, says Eibl, because the Central Powers are not in fact burdened with special war-guilt. That, brushing aside all suggestions of negotiation, they fell upon their neighbours, including the country whose neutrality was specially guaranteed by Prussia itself, is merely an unfortunate appearance. Reality is of a different order. Reality embraces the following facts: the murder of Sarajevo; the existence, before the War, of a Franco-Russian secret treaty; the mobilization of Russia, which obviously meant war; the subsequent proof that the Serbian Government did have a hand in the Archduke's murder; and the high probability that Belgium would not have remained neutral anyway. Nor would the Allies probably have respected Belgian neutrality, which is clearly indicated by their later intrusion on Greek soil! Poor Eibl: in his "moral" apology for an abject cause, he is obliged to resort to rather desperate weapons. He then notifies us that, the
assumption of exclusive war-guilt having been proved erroneous, a German claim to "reparation" will follow therefrom. In his righteous indignation, Eibl seems to think that the refutation of "exclusive" war responsibility is apt to render all results of German aggression and defeat null and void. He (writing in 1932) intends to forge it into a regular instrument for blackmail. "It would be best to delay the revocation of the guilt paragraph to the last, using it in the meantime as a lever to throw out one article after the other from the Treaty." We are morally free to treat the guilt paragraph as an object for barter: for it does not affect our (the Germans') honour but that of the adversary: ultimately, it is also a duty of ours to restore the enemy's honour. (A strange mixture of selfless sublimity and naïve cunning!) Besides, we may tactically agree to "revision"; as a matter of principle, however, the entire nation must insist on an abrogation of the Treaty. In its place, let us return to the preliminary agreement concluded (?) before the armistice, which is based on the Wilsonian theorem of national self-determination. That agreement is by no means obsolete: "if it is intelligently applied to the present situation, the main purposes of German policy can be deduced from it". Above all, the right of self-determination must be granted, not to nations only, but to every national fraction (Volksstum): it must be acknowledged that national minorities are under a double allegiance, committed to their race as well as to the state that holds them as citizens. This is of particular importance in the East and South-East of Europe. (Naturally: because in this fashion the Germans living in Czechoslovakia, Poland, the Baltic States, Hungary, etc., would come under German para-sovereignty, functioning—more or less imperceptibly—as intermediary agents of a central Reich. There can be little doubt that this is not what President Wilson had in mind when he set out to "make the world safe for democracy"). Our ideals, says Eibl, will be Volksstum's rights, co-operation and disarmament, in contraposition to "ghosts" such as the sanctity of treaties, reparations and security. To condense it into a brief formula: the "natural superiority" of Germans must be released from all shackles of international control and legality. As for the postulates of Wilson, Eibl's response to them is so lively and enthusiastic as to tempt us to suspect its sincerity. "It is precisely the Germans who, out of the very distress of the
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age, must stand for these principles . . . a happy concidence that the road to German freedom should lead through the victory of these ideas. "What a divine boon it is for the Germans that their peculiar needs and interests should thus providentially answer the general advantage of peoples! Eibl cannot contain his rapture on pondering over the "magnificence of this state of things". We, however, had better keep our heads. The Wilsonian ethics of international justice and liberty cannot but be salutary for every nation on earth; on the other hand, their miraculous unison with the peculiar aspirations living in (or inculcated on) "Germandom" is merely a magical concoction from the Herr Professor's alembic of philosophical sorcery. Having had the honour of a slight personal acquaintance with him, I vividly remember him fuming with disgust in speaking of the "Western Calvinist moralism applied to politics" contrasted with the superior German "affirmation of war as an inescapable tragedy inherent in thriving life". But there is no need even to dig up tender recollections. The very phrasing, "the road to German freedom leads through (führt durch) the victory of these ideas", betrays the transitory and tactical rôle assigned to "these ideas", whereas German "freedom" (to wit, freedom of hegemony) remains the final goal for our juridical, ethical and metaphysical manoeuvres. As long as post-war Germany still seemed to be the "under-dog" (Eibl wrote this book eight years ago), it was one of the possible courses for German imperialism to play off the "pure principle" of Wilsonism against its alleged breach—in fact, its imperfect realization—by the victorious West. Even to-day, it might be used to pave the way for German ascendancy over the countries of the "mid-European" belt between the Centre and the East which are endowed with German minorities. Many German and Austrian reactionaries, however, have protested against Eibl's manipulation of Wilsonian ideology. How does "self-determination" agree with an "organic order", how, indeed, with the Holy German Empire, or with the "Teutonic Era" interfered with by the "godless" ideas of the French Revolution, by "shallow" liberalism and civilianism? Herr Eibl, acting the part of a champion of "objective right" as a momentary channel for the drift of German expansion, cuts very much the same figure as fascist parties in non-fascist countries, incessantly complaining
of governmental or socialistic inroads on their "lawful rights under the constitution".

Adolf Hitler's conception of German foreign policy, outlined in *Mein Kampf*, is built up on four iron pillars: (1) The domestic life of the nation must be so arranged as to suit the requirements of total concentration on the display of power in foreign relationships, especially on a future war. (2) Concentration is also the secret of foreign policy in a direct sense; instead of causing half the world to gather against us, we must isolate and weaken our arch enemy, thereby acquiring a general freedom of action. (3) Germany must seek for territorial expansion in the East. (4) She must ruthlessly combat France but secure English and Italian friendship. That conception does not lack vigour, but undoubtedly it has certain aspects which invite criticism. Between (2) and (3), there is more than a shadow of contradiction: although bent on eliminating England from the line of presumptive enemies, Hitler fails to banish the spectre of double engagement in the East and the West, for he himself established a relationship between aggrandizement in the East and the annihilation of France. Then, his Anglo-Italian calculation suffers from his having overrated the logic of events immediately succeeding the war. Both England and Italy are supposed to dread French "hegemony" more than any other evil on earth, and expected to be operative in the creation of a huge German Empire just in order to rid themselves of the French "peril". Presumably, too, *Mein Kampf* was never intended to be widely read by foreigners. I can but state that this modesty is entirely unfounded, since the book offers excellent reading material for Western gentlemen of leisure.

Hitler is anxious not to repeat the blunders of the past. The alliance with the crumbling monarchy of the Hapsburgs was suicidal folly. (Nobody can be more pleased than I at the disappearance of that monarchy, and the liberation of its Slav peoples; but I should hesitate to call it so obviously "crumbling". On the whole, the Hapsburg armies bore themselves bravely; and, as likely as not, if the German annexationists had not had their way in 1917, that motley dynastic State would still exist.) A simultaneous enmity with England and Russia should have been avoided: if there was no other choice, Germany should have linked arms with Russia against England, but
preferably with England against Russia. To-day we are faced with the task of training our people for to-morrow's "military struggle of decision", to imbue them with the enthusiasm, discipline, fortitude and efficiency necessary for the "regaining of to-morrow's liberty". The foreign political problem of Germany is only expressible in terms of totality: what forces the issue is the combative value of the mother country, not any favourable settlements of territorial or other details. A temporary loss of large areas, whilst the rump of the nation forms a kernel of unrelenting resistance and will to struggle, is preferable to uniting the entire people "under the yoke of foreign bondage". For "liberation" will not be obtained by requests and petitions, it will be enforced "by the power wielded by that part of the fatherland which has preserved its sovereignty"; lost provinces will come back to the Reich "not by dint of flaming protests . . . but by the action of a powerful sword".

The inner political workshop, destined to manufacture that "powerful sword", must be coupled with foreign political art which secures undisturbed work at home and the acquisition of "friends-in-arms". Among them, England is selected to figure. This calculation is based on familiarity with English political tradition. England is interested in a European balance of power, and has a horror of any "undue rise of a continental Power in the world scale". Therefore she naturally looks askance at the French attempts at hegemony encouraged by the issue of the Great War. "Sooner or later, French policy must inevitably come into collision with British interests." Nor is England the only one to be discomfited by the pressure of French predominance: under the same head comes Fascist Italy. The more so because France is but a tool of "universal Judaism", receiving its mandates through the intermediary organ of freemasonry; whereas Fascist Italy, even though she refrains from overt Anti-Semitism, is conducting bitter warfare against freemasonry and the other pillars of Judah International, and indeed champions the cause of "Aryan mankind at bay". For the sake of an ally so worthy and valuable, we had better abandon all claims for the deliverance of South Tyrol. For we know full well that a reconquest of lost territories can never be put into effect either by "eloquence", by "the Lord God", or (least of all) by the League of Nations, only by "the force of
arms”, “the sharp sword”, and “internecine war”; now, with the South Tyrolean affair at stake, the national enthusiasm necessary to foment such a struggle could never be afforded. The two hundred thousand Germans in Italian Tyrol, are, after all, numerically negligible in comparison with the millions of Germans living East and South-East of the Reich. Generally speaking, it is not the surface but the depth of German national aggressiveness that must be stressed. It would be imprudent to pick a quarrel with everybody; it is mere “lip-heroism” to raise the hue and cry against all non-German countries that have wronged us in any respect. Instead, let us attract allies by “our visible will to wars of liberation”; gag the pacifist cracklers who interfere with our preparations for settling the account; “devote ourselves wholeheartedly to our object”; and “concentrate our moral and physical energies on a thrust to the heart of our wickedest enemy”.

I am by no means of the opinion that Hitler’s renunciation of South Tyrol was, or is, really final; having pierced the heart of “our wickedest enemy”, there is no reason why the less wicked ones should not in due course be subjected to proper treatment. If, which Heaven forbid, Hitler and his Transalpine Colleague were to succeed to a joint dominion over Europe, the next few years could scarcely be expected to prove uneventful. Still, this indifference in regard to South Tyrol is highly characteristic. For the fascist politician, oppression of his own kin is alleviated by being intensified. It becomes excusable when exercised by fascists; it hurts less when it is done more thoroughly. It is the ideology of “natural” Herrschaft: ruling should be reserved for full-blood tyrants, even as far as they happen to be of a foreign tribe; though, of course, “our” own tribe holds the privilege of breeding the really supreme specimens. Thus our nationalism may, with comparative ease, brook the crushing of our South Tyrolese brothers under the iron heel of Fascism, whereas the “gravamina” of the German population in Czechoslovakia or the very fact of Austrian independence are felt to be unbearable.

As for the attitude of England towards France and Germany, Hitler is driven to false assumptions (possibly encouraged, however, by certain ideas which were current in England and may still have advocates) by putting his own fiercely macht-political schemes into other people’s minds. It is not “self-
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evident" that the "strongest Power" on the Continent should "menace" British interests; the issue depends on the constitution, mental and social, of that "Power", as well as on the concrete relationships (of manifold nature) established between it and Great Britain. There is no reason why the English mind should not be aware of the obvious truth that contemporary France, be it even armed cap-a-pie and overwhelmingly superior to any other European nation (which was the case when Mein Kampf was written), has no designs whatever for expansion or subjugation, least of all such as could touch England where she is most vulnerable; whereas a "strong" Germany of to-morrow, having daunted her "wickedest enemy" in the West and grabbed a huge empire in the East, would not be a wholesome "offset for French hegemony" but an overbearing "world-power" bristling with far-reaching pretensions. It is scarcely necessary to stress the point further.10

In spite of his anti-French bias, then unrestrained and un concealed, Hitler makes a keen distinction between "East policy" (of expansion) on which he steadfastly insists, and "east orientation" which he deprecates with no less resolution. The "East" is not for him, as it is for the "National Bolshevists", a desirable partner in the struggle against Rome and the West as a whole, but merely an object of conquest, seemingly an easy prey if once deprived of French protection. At any cost, Germany must have more land, and considerably more land, in Eastern Europe. "A nation cannot have its liberty of existence secured except by a sufficiently large space on this earth . . . the disproportion (?) between the size of the population of Germany and its surface must be remedied . . . it is a question of our daily bread . . . we cannot wait for gifts." . . . Our minds must be governed by the aim, not of a mechanical restoration of the pre-War frontiers, but of the occupation of fresh soil in the East. Frontiers and their alteration have nothing to do with sanctity or fatality; they are subject to human will. In more concrete terms, we must repeat the great "Teutonic eastward march of six hundred years ago"—on the score of "Russia and her vassal neighbours". Hitler did not expect at that time either a consolidation of Soviet Russia or her supersession by a robust national government. He prefigures the end of "Jewish rule in Russia" as an "end of Russia as a State" as well. Given
such a pleasant vacuum, positively crying for a merciful power to redeem it from the horrors of naked anarchy, the historical enterprise of "Aryan state-foundation" will repeat itself. "Marginal colonies of pure race" will again invade the inert masses of "native helots", ordained by God to serve as a nether layer for the creative exploits of the Master Man. Part of the Slav rabble, as we know from Rosenberg, will be compelled to move further East, for it is proposed to seize new land also for German peasants, not merely for German Barons. "The German sword shall clear the field for the German plough." On the other hand, an alliance between Germany and Russia against the West would be sure to entail disastrous war; whereas an Anglo-Italian-German alliance would probably prevent war by virtue of a "complete isolation of France." (Is it not a pity, though, to leave the "sharp sword" untried?) In any event, we can rely on no solution other than the "entire annihilation of France"; which, to be sure, would again be pointless if unaccompanied by an appropriate eastward advance. All talk of "inner colonization", inasmuch as it is tainted with a pacifist note, must be suppressed: in a hundred years we must have two hundred and fifty million Germans, not, however, as a crowded proletariat, but a proud race of "peasants and workers" with plenty of elbow-room.

To-day as we see, the tactics of "concentration" are carried a step further: the "annihilation of France" is put aside for the moment, and France is offered the concession of being left alone on the condition that she, in her turn, leaves a free hand to Germany in Central and Eastern Europe. In the light of our portrayal of the Nazi-German mind, what would it mean for France to accept the generous offer? Instant "annihilation" as a moral factor; and the probability, approaching certainty, of material restriction and general degradation in a not very remote future. A West sinking into fatalistic torpor and provincial complacency, a West grovelling before the insurgent "dynamism" of its spiritual Antipode, a West deprived of the leadership of mankind, a West disinterested in the aspiring world of the "East", would not prevent but lose, with or without an actual passage of arms, the War against the West. Abandoning Russians and Czechs, Poles and Yugoslavs, Baltic and Balkan peoples to the appetite of Fascist Teutonism,
it would irrevocably betray its own Soul and seal its own Doom.

Franz Mariaux, who in 1982 published an elegant essay on the foreign policy of nationalist Germany (Nationale Aussenpolitik), is rather inclined to take up the pro-Russian alternative, which, even to-day, has probably not yet lost all ground in the Third Reich; he atones for the tarnish of his French name by putting forward the programme of a universal league against France. Nevertheless, his forceful insistence on an integral Machtpolitik indifferent to petty advantages and small bargains makes his work a valuable complementary study to Mein Kampf. Mariaux points out that a mere policy of spiteful sulking, of random demands and continual haggling in relation to the Western powers is scarcely more valuable than the policy of pliant obsequiousness. The illusion of selling ourselves at a high price is peculiarly ruinous because of its ability to lull all real and total nationalism, which must brush aside altogether the idea of adaptation and agreement. Relentless and inflexible revanche policy must be preserved in spotless chastity. Unconditional enmity with France! German leadership in Europe on a basis of anti-liberal federalism! An “alliance” with all minor powers in the East and South-East! Deliberate furtherance of chaos and pauperization in Europe revealing the absurdity of its Versailles statute! Adjustment of the inner order of Germany to the requirements of Machtpolitik! What we must aim at is not a reconstruction, but a confusion of to-day’s European society. The more topsy-turvy things are, the less will France, by dint of her military apparatus and her financial reserves alone, be able to keep her allies on her side politically and economically.

With the watchword of reconstruction, all other wishes of mere restoration must be dismissed. A mere effort to recuperate lost positions, to “have” this or that thing, means pseudo-nationalism, a Swiss type of stiff-necked avarice. We can gain nothing by agreement on a common level of interests. On no condition could France really regard with favour our economic prosperity, which would inevitably restore us to political significance; therefore let us drop all thought of an economic understanding with her. (Here again, the standard pattern: we were ill-treated in Versailles—thank God for that!) But, if against all conjectures the re-establishment of economic well-being
were to succeed, it would be *so much the worse*! Who, then, would cast in his lot with us to destroy the Versailles order in Europe, since it would have proved beneficial for all? In truth, however, the economic world crisis proves that the so-called "realists" were soft-headed illusionists. Certainly, *time and again we may pursue an ostensible policy of "reconciliation"; but it must never be anything but a temporary makeshift enabling us to follow all the more vigorously our main lines of revenge.* Such is the political method bequeathed to us by Baron Stein of the Napoleonic age. (With Hitler, the advice does not seem to have fallen on barren ground, since his accession to power.) The "revision" of Versailles begins with the revision of Weimar, the seizure of the power by a new generation. (And so it did.) "We must erect Germany into a State of Power ... a factor of prime and decisive influence ... it being due to her spiritual and corporeal prowess ... real revision can only be enforced by revanche, which must be carried out when a favourable opportunity presents itself." The Sudeten (Czechoslovakian) Germans must be fully aware of Germany behind them, as well as of the future necessity of "extorting their freedom by means entirely different from ballot-papers and coalitions." What is more, "wherever a front is forming for revolution, it must be known that Germany will leave nobody in the lurch". In the time before 1914, compromise and balance were the regulators of life; it was not a golden age, but fairly liveable anyhow. The War and the Treaties have utterly wiped out that mode of living. "They have destroyed all justification for compromise." France and her allies established an inflated, unnatural system of pre- dominance. Economic collapse, starting in 1930, has given Germany the chance of "revolution". With bold serenity we must face the approaching catastrophe. Fears of isolation are out of place: Germany, being the core of Europe, is historically immune against the possibility of isolation. (A self-reassurance in answer to the torturing "nightmare of coalitions"!) "The process of destruction is the great ally, for a while the only admissible one, which will tend to raise Germany from impotence to power." It is our historical duty to be revolutionaries, the pioneers of a new order. Never again must we slip back into the policy of "begging for alms". "The atmosphere of dismay around us is just what we need. . . . The disastrous consequences
of Versailles must not be softened but illuminated in all their repulsiveness.” Germany and Russia have their place on one side: both have broken away from the “ideology of the French Revolution, national democratic sovereignty, national hatred” (!), etc., progressing towards “federal constitution, and cooperation on the ground of national (völkisch) and corporative (ständisch) autonomy”. We are “neighbours of Russia on the scale of world history”; but—here suddenly Mariaux chooses the better part of valour!—there is no reason why we should “copy Russian clichés”; we can be quite happy if we dispense with “world-wide vagueness” and, particularly, “Marxist nebulae”. (Yes, because “we” are out for universal counter-revolution; and, as it is, its prospects of an alliance with the Russian Revolution have measurably lost in feasibility. On the other hand, I am firmly convinced that, in spite of its comparative economic conservatism, German counter-revolution assaults Western civilization far more drastically than does, or even did, Russian revolution.)

Mariaux observes reflectively that German claims, so far as they spring from mere national self-interest, are futile: they only derive their justification from the fact of “a general principle of order, suitable for the Continent, which attains accomplishment by the fulfilment of the special German claim to revision”. This is indeed the familiar and touching German professorial thoroughness. “We” must rule the world as an act of self-immolation, or better still, in conformity with an “organic” necessity of Mind and Matter. The reader will notice an analogy with Eibl’s mystical union between the line of German protestations and the realm of objective right. We also find in Mariaux the Eiblian stratagem of using the “unjustified war-guilt paragraph” to upset the entire construction of Versailles. Further, we are told that the disarmament of Germany was a danger to Europe. It “encouraged the Chauvinistic and aggressive spirit in Poland, and fostered an overweening insolence in all anti-German districts on the Continent, down to the very smallest”; it was a “stimulus for the over-excited and unrestrained French instinct for power”; it contributed to the “artificial exclusion of German economic influence” (?). On one point, it may be admitted, Mariaux’s argument is hard to gainsay: I mean the contention that sixty million cannot be
disarmed and supervised, for an indefinite time, against their will. “He who would insist on a one-sided disarmament of Germany, would be obliged to destroy it together with its population. But then he himself would be a candidate for destruction.” English opinion, as against the French, will almost unanimously endorse these words; it might, however, be added, not unjustly, that as early as 1919 the old Prussian military powers had again firm ground beneath their feet, and Republican Germany never did much to persuade the French of the fictitiousness of their anxieties. Now what Mariaux is driving at is by no means “honest” disarmament and genuine truce; for him, as for all sharers in his faith, wrongs perpetrated on Germany are not evils to be removed, but welcome excuses for their own attitude. Germany, writes Mariaux, must be restored to military activity; disarmament has no practicable meaning except the formation of larger territorial units, “new Wholes”, the members of which would “mutually disarm” within their own circle, and agree upon standards of armaments between the higher units themselves. Then why interpose these “new Wholes” at all? Simply to create Greater Germany, the Empire proper, naturally following in the tracks of “economic integration”. Let the peoples of Zwischeneuropa, now to a large part allies of France, become confederates, tributaries and dependencies of Germany, and then even codifications of army standards may acquire “meaning” and “feasibility”. Like Hitler, Mariaux reckons on Italy as being party to the game, and entreats England to become susceptible to the so obvious truth that she is gravely damaged by France playing havoc with European order, whereas her own position depends directly on the existence of German power. This, if I may say so, certainly contains a distorted modicum of truth: for the alleged “French hegemony” means a real status of balance (with France as its outstanding moral sponsor and military guarantor, perhaps), and such a status, even if strengthened by a collective organization like the League, is by its nature a somewhat delicate organism liable to distressing confusion; on the other hand, a hegemonic military Empire, with a firm rein on all affairs falling within its orbit, may offer a more or less stable protection to any member of its own system which is above all anxious for peace. Only... but let us leave it at that; after all it is largely a matter of taste.
To sum up: Revision is only discussible as Total Revision, extending to all planes of man-to-man relationships. (Mariaux.) In the nineteenth century everybody followed the French school, soaking himself with the ideologies of "individualism", "national democracy", "mechanical equality", "decision by majority"; but now all that is thrown out of gear, evoking incessant frictions and unavoidable conflagrations. Everywhere the need is felt for larger economic complexes capable of self-subsistence, state control, a more flexible order, federal and corporative. Therefore German imperial leadership will answer a universal need; and the birth of the new Man is closely bound up with a general alignment of forces against France. No rigid charter can be drawn up for the new order... neither will it spring from a victorious stroke of arms, nor be decreed by a conference... it will "grow apace into maturity". Instead of giving for it a cut-and-dried definition of programme, Mariaux refers to it as a family possession of Germandom, vaguely reminiscent of the proletariat's mission, according to Marx, to work out Socialism. "The right of the German people is a right to Empire." (Not, as we know from Stapel, a right to equal status.) Nay, the very incalculability of the German factor to-day, the uncertainty about German intentions, is itself an instrument of disruption, a dynamic agent of the new order! (At any rate, it is a strong weapon of which Germany certainly takes full advantage. How far such weapons will really facilitate the making of a new "federal" order in Europe, devoid of the "will of majorities" and yet satisfactory to most, and achieve this even without war, is another question to ask. Besides, Mariaux only says that the new order will not be dictated—pure and simple—by victorious war, in which he is without doubt perfectly sincere; but he by no means declares that victorious force of arms will not be an important link in the chain of developments.) It will always be ineffective to try peaceful suasion with France: every German trump discarded will only stiffen her to an even greater obstinacy. Our agenda lie elsewhere. The isolation of either Germany or France will determine the political order of the Continent. "Every rebel to France is a presumptive associate of Germany." Italy is already at hand (1932); Belgium tends to neutrality between France and Germany; Russian Bolshevism will always see in France the chief arsenal of Western Capitalism.
We see that the construction of the anti-French League is carried out with amazing simplicity; of course we should scarcely be at a loss if called upon to rally a similar league against, say, Spain, or Japan, or Brazil. But I am forgetting England, which, too, has her appointed place in the great anti-French gathering. Realizing how much German power is a condition of her own welfare, "England must change her course and mobilize new forces against France". (I am only quoting Mariaux, without personally endorsing his appeal.) The neutrals, for their part, must be made to see that they are bound to pay a heavy price for their abstention. What of the allies of France? These are but wavering, vanishing régimes. All decisions calculated to free the world from the mire of Versailles will have to be taken in spite of France; therefore the peoples must turn against France so as to be prepared for them. All "democratic-absolutist" régimes are allies of France against their own peoples; whereas the peoples are preordained allies of Germany, "the providential Leader of rebellion". Germany and France are enemies for life and death; and Germany must never relax her hold as a firm core around which all energies directed against France should be concentrated.

This passionate piece of international propaganda calls for comment on one point. It does not, like, for instance, a French offer of alliance, appeal to reason or commonsense value judgements or even self-interest outright. It does not strictly promise peace; it does not simply promise prosperity; it does not promise a righting of wrongs; it does not promise a higher type of social order in tangible terms. (Or is there any idea of emancipation and moral improvement conveyed by the concept of a "federalist-imperialist upheaval against democratic absolutism"?) It does not promise definite bribes in money or territory either. What this propaganda really appeals to is the sense of fear and uneasiness, and still more, the sense of fatality. It works with hypnosis rather than temptations. The German nationalist does not fix an aim for his free and conscious activity, inviting others to join him in his pursuit by intelligible arguments; he rejoices in being caught in the tide of an historical process—"growth", as it were—with himself as its main figure, and he warns others to fall in line with that evolution rather than stem its tide. What a contrast to the French atmosphere of reason and liberty,
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law and security, contract and covenant! Indeed, foreign politics cannot be envisaged in complete aloofness from metaphysical tensions. As regards the practical side of the matter, historical fatality occasionally fails to live up to the auguries of its smug confidents. Viewed from a perspective of four years, Mariaux seems to have trusted too blindly, for instance, both the anti-French attitude of Italy and the blessings of economic collapse. Nor has Soviet Russia revealed a behaviour according to formula: perhaps she has slowly come to realize that there are even worse things under the sun than traditional "Western Capitalism" and its "chief arsenal". Even the reciprocal knowledge that there are worse things than "Eastern Bolshevism", too, is beginning to penetrate Western society.

In fact, neither Hitler nor Stalin seem to have given much credit to Wirsing's asseverations ("Die Tat", 1938) of a "polar attraction" between Germany and Soviet Russia. Germany, he writes, imperatively needs Russian co-operation; inversely, friendship with Germany is a postulate of U.S.S.R.'s raison d'État. Since then, things have taken a very different turn; but we must keep well in view that the spiritual substance of Nazi Germany, as indicated by a political undercurrent of "Eastern orientation", is even more keenly and originally anti-Western than it is anti-Bolshevist. The truth is that the so-called "National Bolsheviks", from Moeller-Bruck onwards, are as far from being Bolsheviks as Hitler is from being a sympathizer with France or a believer in English constitutional usages. If the Third Reich ever goes to war, it will fight equally Socialism and free economic citizenship west of the Rhine, and the foundations of Christian and Liberal society east of the Vistula. A significant postulate of Wirsing's has since been fulfilled: "Not before the co-ordination (Gleichschaltung) of Austria is carried through, will the German revolution be territorially completed".

Czech-Jochberg, the popular Nazi publicist, wrote in his book, "We and France" (1982): "Never will the Rhineland be safe from danger! Has France definitely renounced the Rhine frontier? She still looks upon the Rhine as her "natural frontier". By "security", France means conquest (!). War can only be averted by a Franco-German alliance, the preconditions for which are very hard to create. Frenchmen (like Jules Ferry) who contemplated such a policy, always meant a
Franco-German alliance with a French emphasis. (However, Czech hesitates to say squarely that he does not mean a German emphasis.) First of all, France must part company with Poland; for Germany will never accept the finality of Polish rule over "soil of German culture". "An 'Eastern Locarno' is impossible for Germany." (Since then, little has been left of the original Locarno either.) We can only agree to an equal status, not to a possession by France of "51 per cent. of the shares". An agreement on a fifty-fifty basis, it must be remarked, presents superhuman difficulties. How can the "alliance" be adjusted to the fact that Germany is a far more populous country? Czech-Jochberg is anxious to keep out any third partner who, from reasons of sentiment or for the sake of balance, might add weight to France in the compound. He sees the necessity for France of an alliance with Germany hastened by the "waning of the English star"; the vacuum left by England has to be filled by Germany (?)

It is a quaint experience to-day, when Poland and the Third Reich are as thick as thieves, to read J. von Leers's pamphlet on Germany's relation to Poland, printed by the official National Socialist Party publishers in 1982. I must confess that I have never read a German challenge of equal vehemence flung in the teeth of the Czechs (which certainly does not mean that none exists). At any rate, this Germano-Polish intrigue is an artificial affair bridging a profound chasm of bitter hatred and unsolved vital controversies. I do not know whether it means a fantastic project of joint conquest which is really contemplated, or merely a postponement of open hostility for reasons that happen to suit both sides, but I am not a little inclined to assume that even the first alternative would ultimately find its way into the latter. Be that as it may, words like Leers's—which in those days were nothing exceptional—cannot have lost all symptomatic purport even a few years afterwards. "What is lost must not be lost for ever!" exclaims Leers. All thought of making terms with Poland is arrant nonsense. "For every inch of robbed soil, Poland will fight tooth and nail. . . . With the re-establishment of Poland, their most dangerous enemy in all history has arisen for the German people. . . . A Polish-German coalition against Soviet Russia can only be urged by fools. Let us have our labour problems arranged in the sense of a volkhaft German Socialism,
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and the reddest Soviet Russia will be no danger at all to us in comparison with the Polish danger. Once Russia has no longer political allies inside Germany, she may very well be the proper ally for us against Poland." That we cannot accept the loss of the Corridor, West Prussia and North Posen—their population being in part German, in part "unlawfully Policized"—is axiomatic for all of us. But there are "Philistines who talk as though it were conceivable in the course of time to recover all that by amicable methods. . . . We, however, know that in the East the decision—the decision as to our people's country, space and future—will be forced by blood and iron alone . . . either we shall stand firm on the Vistula, or some day soldierly, hard, fanatical Poland will stand on the Oder". Having adduced divers ethnographical, historical and other arguments for the German claim, von Leers concludes with a veto on the suggestion that Germany should buy back the Corridor in exchange for letting Poland have Lithuania and the Memel territory. A settlement of this kind is odious, because as a result Germany would be shut off from the East. (To-day, Leers is commissioned to superintend the "political schooling of students").

As things really are, neither Poland nor Russia, neither Czechoslovakia nor Lithuania is the actual enemy of nationalist Germany in the East. It is simply the Slav and para-Slav world of independent nations as such, and particularly in view of their religious, cultural, social and economic allegiances to the Western paragon of our civilization. Everything further is a question of priorities and tactical considerations.

Speaking of Poland, Hielscher once again demands attention. Prussian tyranny over the Poles arouses his unrestrained enthusiasm; he prizes Bismarck's masterful sternness with regard to them as a victory won over "Rome". The removal of Bismarck and, ultimately, the German declaration of Polish "independence" in 1916, were suicidal actions—or rather, murderous injuries inflicted upon the Reich by William II, who was not a man of Reich but of the West, a "foreigner". However, Bismarck's cession of power meant in reality his greatest triumph, his self-immolation in the cause of the Reich: for its consequences led up directly to the World War, thereby initiating the downfall of the West. "Germany and Poland cannot exist at the same time; Poland needs the East Elbian space to
breathe freely; and Germany needs the Polish space both as a connecting channel for her surplus population, and for the sake of Prussian order." Besides, we should wrong Hielscher in assuming that his scope is confined to Europe alone. His "Reich" is indeed a religion: a pantheistic Kingdom of "Power united to Inwardness", which is of this earth taken as a whole. In the final event, Reich will absorb everything, or at least everything that is still the bearer of any value and force outside the limits of the Reich; even the last genuine "Christians" and "Israelites" will at last "stream into" the Reich, the only sphere where a Jewish problem really exists and can really be solved, and where Christian decision can be made final; for a "World always and everywhere suffused with God stands in no need of redemption". Moreover, the author also takes interest in the destinies of Islam. The magnificent creed of Mohammedan fatalism will ultimately be discredited by the creative forces of the soul, and find its Aufhebung (preservation, suspension) in the Reich Divine and Active. Zaghlul Pasha and Ibn Saud are semi-unconscious workers for the great awakening and transformation directed towards the Reich (Verwandlung zum Reich hin): their rise corresponds with the World War conducted by the men of Reich, and provisionally won by the West. Here, too, unwittingly and against its will, the West, by stirring up forces and mobilizing countries, prepares for the advent of Reich. To-day, this reading may impress us all as the soliloquy of a talented Prussian with a deplorably unhinged mind. To-morrow, when German imperial power extends to the shores of the Aegean and the Black Sea, Hielscher may easily be rediscovered as the inspired and prescient herald of great events.

Here is an abstract from General Ludendorff's "Total War" (1915): Total war is the future form of warfare. War is a nation's supreme display of power and, therewith, the supreme accomplishment of its meaning, to which its policies must be completely subservient. A war will always be decided on the military front. The soul of war is, and remains, attack; any prevalence of fortress and trench warfare is a sign of degeneration. Infantry, superbly equipped and trained, is still the main arm; the air fleet alone cannot force the issue. Railways still surpass motorroads in importance. Declarations of war must be looked upon as obsolete: as was shown in the summer of 1914, they are
liable to bring moral and political disadvantages to a nation compelled to practise aggression as a means of self-defence. In the Total War, "popular warfare", waged by armed and uniformed detachments in the back of the enemy, will constitute a weapon strictly indispensable. (Taken from "Neues Wiener Tagblatt", December 9th, 1935.)

I propose to conclude with two references supplied by current history.

In its issue of March 29th, 1934, "Reichspost", the Viennese clerical fascist organ (mildly anti-Nazi and certainly pro-German), published a report of confirmed authenticity on "National Socialist leaders' declarations pro foro interno". According to these secret instructions, which sound plausible enough, the incorporation of Austria is regarded as a matter of indubitable urgency, but by no means as a purpose in itself. It is merely an important station of the more general and comprehensive "drive towards the East". The next step will be the conquest of Czechoslovakia. Hungary as well as Bulgaria must be territorially satisfied and closely co-ordinated to Germany's course. Bessarabia, with its fertile soil, must be made a German colony for settlers. (Naturally, the securing of Romanian oil-wells would not be forgotten in the hurry.) No sooner will the erection of an Empire of 120 millions be achieved than the road will become free for an advance on the Atlantic and for settling the account with France. (Certainly tactical details are subject to daily change. But the standing orders remain: division of the presumptive objects of German expansion, and targets for attack, between one another; dealing with them, as far as possible, one by one; bettering the chances of war by pushing "peaceful" steps and acquisitions to the utmost limit; and to all intents and purposes achieving a lucrative forward move in the "Mid-European zone" before embarking on actual war in the West.)

In the Viennese weekly paper, "Der christliche Ständestaat" (February 9th, 1936) an apt juxtaposition of two literal quotations was given. The first is a passage from Chancellor Hitler's recent New Year's speech (January 1st, 1936) which runs thus: "Desirous of living at peace with other peoples of the earth, and of co-operating with them, in every domain of life, in mutual understanding for the benefit and progress of mankind, the
German nation is anxious to see a similar desire for confident collaboration and mutual consideration prevailing with all other peoples as well”. The second quotation is borrowed from Militärwissenschaftliche Revue (Review of Military Science), official organ of the German Ministry of War (Berlin, January 17th, 1986): “War is the culmination of human pursuits. War is the natural and closing phase of an evolution in the history of mankind. War is the father of all things; at the same time it prepares the end of a period in the history of a nation, and again becomes the father of a new evolution”.

FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER IX

1 Gunther tries to show that the Nordic spirit is the exact opposite of the normal nineteenth century type. It is opposed to the destructive intellectualism and the racially “tainted” genius of that century. The really noble spirit is not created by education but by breeding.

Spethmann also argues for nobility based on the body. The masses of men only exist as a means for the great individual to achieve his aims. This is a nobility which has learnt to practise cruelty and despotism with a good conscience.

Ernst Jünger unwittingly reveals in a startling fashion the hollow result of Fascist ecstasy and hyper-activism. What cultural purposes are to benefit by the supremely elaborate technique of Nazi social control? He confesses that “We find ourselves in a last phase of nihilism, characterized by the fact that while the creation of new systems and rules has already been carried far, the corresponding values have not yet become visible”. He goes on to complain that all present day institutions, ideas and persons seem, as it were, to be merely substitutes for reality, anticipation of that which is not yet.

What then is to be done in the face of this cruel disillusionment? “In such a situation” says Jünger, “pain is the only standard that yields secure orientation” and war offers us the two equally possible alternatives of annihilation or some unknown future.

1 In his third-rate but not uninstructive book on German ethics (So lebst du deutsch!), F. Schulze urges his fellow-nationals not to speak of “religion”, only of Glaube (faith). “We will avail ourselves of our own language; it alone is worthy to express correctly our innermost essence”.

2 See on the Führer principle in old Prussia, Grunsky (p. 65); on the Prussian features in Spartan militarism, education and class-rule, W. Jaeger (pp. 119 et seq.)

3 It need hardly be said that Fascist Italy, as regards her predominant features, is not supposed here to represent the “Roman world”, but rather a kind of Prussianized Rome.

4 See ample details on “Master morality” and divine powers, “Beyond good and evil”, in Heusler’s Germanentum—cf. F. Schulze: “Teutonism is based on aristocracy (selection, heroism), whereas Christianity preaches democracy (promiscuity, the folly of masses). Nominal nobility does not correspond to this Teutonic principle of aristocracy”.

5 A soldierly, heroic education can only grow out of the affinitive powers of Nordic faith, on the basis of a Nordic vision of the essence and aim of man” (F. Berger, quoted by F. Schulze). O. Gräf, a pioneer of pre-War Youth Movement (he died in 1915 at the age of nineteen) qualified the German Youth Movement (Wanderweg) as an “unconscious quest of the pure German juvenile soul after the lost Aryo-Teutonic Germanic divinity” (quoted by F. Schulze).
In his study on the "Nordic idea of Fate", Gunnarsson writes that a man of "rebellious disposition" (der Widerspenstige) was considered a religious offender. Such a type was called "Nidding, the evil-minded, dissatisfied, jealous one, who raises higher and different claims on life than those pre-formed in himself or in life".

As G. Gründel writes: "With National Socialist revolution something has happened and is still going on in Germany which, in the course of time, will determine the features of all the West (für das ganze Abendland verbindlich sein), as was the case, centuries ago, with the English and the French revolutions".

I meant that Stapel imagines God as the very highest rank in the Prussian scale of military commands—the next superior to the Kaiser, or Hindenburg, or the Führer (although the latter is rather an incarnated Son of God, more intimately one with Him).

Benn, in his earlier days a mediocre poet of the revolutionary school, happens to be a Jew. Therefore his toadying to the dominant party has secured him no reward.

England, writes G. Gründel in 1937, must adopt the fascist system of "social aristocracy" in order to be able to consolidate her Empire and White rule over coloured peoples. She must also be glad of the fact that "over-armed" France has again a rival in Germany and has therefore become less capable of forming designs on British possessions. After all, adds Gründel, since the insular character of England has practically disappeared owing to modern technology, there is no longer any reason why the "English form of Teutonism" should develop in a different way than its "Prussian form".

Recent developments in the Mediterranean seem to speak in favour of this view.

Spethmann declares that the present-day German soul, imbued with the Nietzschean spirit of indomitable mastery, abides by its absolute faith in the holiness of war and its iron determination to wage it; to proclaim "peace" for a while is a tactical necessity for the responsible leaders of the nation, recognised by the latter in soldierly discipline.
CONCLUSION

NAZI GERMANY AND THE WESTERN WORLD

1. THE FAILURE OF THE WEST

With the sweeping victory of counter-revolution in Germany, which has assumed a peculiarly violent and anti-Liberal form in Nazi Racial Fascism, with the triumphant revival of German pressure for expansion founded on an integral philosophy of the Giant Tribe, the cause of the West has suffered a severe setback, and indeed appears to be confronted with perils graver than ever before.

Most of us are keenly aware that this is itself, to a large extent, due to insufficiencies and blunders on the Western side (in the broadest sense of the term), and that therefore we are sadly justified in speaking of such a thing as a "failure of the West"—though, I trust, by no means a complete failure.

The false moves made by "Western" factors are of a manifold nature and the work of many agents. The unsolved and urgent problems of Western economic and political organization itself, the vicious aspects of Western post-war policy towards Germany, the absence, partial or complete, of co-ordination between Western nations proper as well as between them and the Slavic East, and finally, the incompetence and flaccidity displayed by the German Democrats and Socialists of the Republican interlude, all this falls within the range of what we have labelled "the failure of the West".

A detailed research on this subject would require a more expert pen than mine, and would anyhow be out of place here. Hence, apart from a general consideration to the effect that the "winnowers of God" will never deliver "perfect" corn and mischief is "bound to come", we will content ourselves with three brief remarks.
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(a) Its dubious and sluggish way of grappling with the "social problem" is not the one and only essential drawback to Western democracy. Another is its incomplete, if not positively faulty, theoretical elaboration. In countries like England, America or France, the philosophical and sociological presuppositions of political liberty are very largely taken for granted; the system works more or less, because conditions are comparatively favourable. With a country like Germany it is different. Crucial problems of democracy—the limits of liberty, the existence of élites sworn to other people's freedom, the necessity of self-discipline, the effects of economic restrictions on the possibility of understanding and compromise, the tension between liberty and efficiency, the relationship between democracy and national self-consciousness—had developed an increasing urgency in the Central European field, now rid of the pre-republican oligarchies. They required a spiritual handling to which the dogmatic traditions of Western democracy were not simply and fruitfully applicable, whereas the intellectual traditions of Germany were in part unequal to the task, in part they were of a positively warping effect. To put it in a nutshell, democratic theory had been too much concerned with the "postulates" and the "architecture" of democracy, and too little with the consolidation of power in the hands of a group destined to serve and administer democracy. Thus, in the practical sphere, did it come to be forgotten that democracy was not a function of majority but majority of democracy, that the granting of liberty "to people whose principle is the denial of liberty to others" (R. Dell) is at best a generous luxury but in crucial cases a self-destructive folly based on sham logic, that the formal democratic classification of Communists with Nazis was as pointless as the Communist classification of Democrats with Fascists, etc.

(b) Further, it is an error, now common in Western opinion, to say that Western statesmen in the aftermath of the war blundered merely in an over-harsh treatment of Germany. That treatment was certainly harsh and unjust in some ways, and above all, it implied too little discrimination between militarist and Weimar Germany; but it was also too lenient in other ways, and particularly, it lacked consequence, unity and strength of will. The destruction of Hohenzollern Germany was not pushed far enough; its crimes were too mechanically visited on the
Republic; consideration was denied to a prostrate Germany with chances of real assimilation to the West, and half-hearted but progressive "concessions" were granted, one after the other, to a Germany recovering along parallel lines its forces and its allegiance to the evil and rejuvenated ruling factors of the past. This process, impressively depicted by Robert Dell, is seldom spoken of by the various groups of pro-German Western "Pacifists". Withal, if the nationalist perspective of "foreign political problems of power" have been blind to the problem of Germany's inner transformation and the task of bracing the Weimar Republic against the surging daemons of counter-revolution, the "Left" perspective of schematic pacifism and class-war sociology are equally one-sided and obnoxiously unreal in their application of indiscriminating categories of "capitalist society", "militarism" (the French having "succeeded" to the German one!), "international equality", etc. Even today, I see the chief peril in the famous "have-nots" theory—its smug simplicity and cheap generosity—with bleak conceit and Sunday-school prigishness lurking behind it. As if demonic evil were really a "product" of unjust "curtailment" and, better still, could be spirited away by a stingy tip, or even by a lordly donation! As if a drug-addict could be cured just by offering him some good Burgundy (without even, at the same time, locking up all stores of morphia within his reach)! As far as I know, Norman Angell has added to his merits by blowing the "have-nots" theory to smithereens. (cf. also Wickham Steed's recent book, Vital Peace.)

Besides, let us confess that the "failure of the West" has been painfully exaggerated, principally, by well-meaning pro-Germans subscribing to the comforting view that it was "no use anyway" to try and curb the appetites of nationalist Germany. What good has come of victory in the War, and the destitution of the ruling powers of Central Europe? Apparently, only the return of those powers in a hardened and more malignant shape, and greater peril of a more terrific war. I invite the reader to consider whether the argument is actually conclusive in the intended sense. But I also largely deny the premise. In any case the defeat of the Central Empires, though it might have been exploited a good deal better, has been a great step forward. In some respects, the situation is worse now than it was before
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the cataclysm of 1918, in other respects it has greatly improved. A considerable number of free nations have been restored; the Hapsburg Monarchy with its absurd and oppressive dynastic principle and its servile loyalty to Pan-German designs has disappeared, and a great part of its former populations are still allied to France; Prussia has met with resistance in the West; Russia, as it becomes clearer every day, is more organically attached to Western mankind now than it was under the Tsarist régime. On the other hand, we have suffered grievous disillusions; and Fascism and Naziism cry to heaven. But these losses can merely induce us to gird ourselves for further struggle and endurance—never to give up the game. Free humanity is on the march, even though the hostile powers have appeared in novel and more concentrated forms, and certainly show incomparably more vigour than could have been foreseen some twenty years ago.

Lack of space prevents me from inserting more than a formal reference to the enlightening expositions of Mowrer on the causes of the failure of Weimar (pp. 1-26, 70-107, 324 ff.) and of Wickham Steed on the mental and material requirements of a working democracy (Hitler: Whence and Whither, pp. 152, 187 ff.; Meaning of Hitlerism, pp. 187-206). But let us take in thoroughly these wise words of Steed: "We should have a care lest we, too, by harbouring perverse and degenerate conceptions of democracy, betray its sound principles and smooth the path of the enslaver... Self-government cannot exist unless there is government in the real sense of the word." And, if failure must be, let it rather be a failure of Germany, even "the Other Germany" than of the West proper. "After the Great War," writes Mowrer, "Germany had an opportunity to achieve historical leadership through self-renewal—and missed the chance... She might have, instead of the hybrid compromise between a copy of Western parliamentarism and former Prussian autocracy, evolved a new kind of democracy, more efficiency and genuine expression of popular will at the same time." But the Republic failed.

Will the main body of the West live up to the task of stopping the rot and compensating for that failure?
2. THE FIELDS OF RESISTANCE

"Cruel in the shadow, crafty in the sun,
Far beyond his borders shall his teachings run.
Sloven, sullen, savage, secret, uncontrolled—
Laying on a new land evil of the old;
Long-forgotten bondage, dwarfing heart and brain—
All our fathers died to loose he shall bind again."

"Give no heed to bondsmen masking war with peace.
Suffer not the old King here or overseas.
They that beg us barter—wait his yielding mood—
Pledge the years we hold in trust—pawn our
brother’s blood—
Howso’ great their clamour, whatsoe’er their claim,
Suffer not the old King under any name!"

(R. KIPLING, "The Old Issue.")

I propose to formulate the conclusions to which our inquiries appear to have led us in the following Ten Theses—as a supplement to those given in the Introduction.

(a) FACTS

1. The West is faced with the choice, either of relinquishing its leading and exemplary position in the world and submitting to Nazi primacy on pan-Fascist and pan-Teutonic lines, or of accepting the challenge and preparing to fight out the struggle, spiritual, social and political, according to its various aspects and requirements.

2. Making allowances for "agreements" in a technical sense which may or may not secure some definite temporary advantages, the central idea of an "understanding" with Nazi Germany is fundamentally futile and pointless, because the inmost—profound and operative—creed of Nazi Germany precludes the very ideas of understanding, equal dignity, legal order, and a common rational medium of humanity. The
greatest danger for the West is to lull itself into a sense of security by gestures of complacency, renunciation or friendship, which at best can never mean more than a technical truce.

3. No "concession" however large could succeed in weakening, or eventually removing the Nazi menace, because such concessions are dependent on a general plan which, though it may recommend itself to the Western mind, embodies an express denial of what is axiomatic for the Nazi mind: the religious self-sovereignty of One particular organism of Life and Power. On this mental premise, concessions only act as signs of weakness and disintegration, and are calculated to whet new appetites. Relying on a policy of concessions means blinding our eyes to reality. In normal cases, they can work wonders; in this case, only increasing complications—or eventually, disaster.

4. The issue of the struggle depends largely and primarily on the West’s own insight and resolution. Not only are the material resources of the earth, in their vast majority, at the disposal of the West, but Western society is also fully entitled and equipped to act on behalf of Mankind and Reason; indeed, of those ultimate values which can never fully lose their appeal to every God-created human soul. The Western cause does not mean a nation set against another nation, not even a party fighting another party: it means the world of civilization organized in moral self-awareness versus the rebels to mankind.

5. The conflict between the West and Nazi Germany is inseparably connected with the inner problem of Western society. A mere turning of her own weapon of Machtpolitik against Germany is no less a blind alley than is the method of concessions.

(b) PERSPECTIVES

6. Resistance can only be planned sensibly and effectively by action in many fields at once. There is no such thing as a single remedy: there is no such thing as a nostrum, philosophical or political, which would work alone, swiftly and infallibly. No action except an integral one: spiritual and political; ideological, moral, scientific, social, economic, diplomatic, and if need be, military; inward and outward at the same time—will be of a size to meet the emergency. Intellectual criticism and self-reassertion will only attain to spiritual stature if backed
by a determination to hold our ground in every sense. Armaments and protective treaties will be condemned to political vacuity unless there be a spiritual substance to direct and guarantee their application.

7. An armed conflict must not be looked upon as either a fatal necessity or an unbearable horror. No war, particularly in a complex situation like this, is simply and strictly “inevitable”; a “preventive war” would not produce an integral refutation of Nazism and would leave the deepest moral energies of Western nations unused. On the other hand, the mere maintenance of “peace”, at any cost and with any implications, is both morally and practically unfit to occupy the place of the supreme principle of politics. The only possible course is to provide for such an incontestable and crushing superiority—moral and juridical, material and strategic—as will either deter irresponsible anti-European powers from taking arms to pursue their schemes, or else will ensure that those desperate adventurers who still prefer to take the sword shall “perish by the sword”.

8. If the watchword of iron defensive applies to the theme of peace and war, or safeguarded collective security, it fails to hold good in the sphere of spiritual decision. In the relationships of individuals, calm and peacefulness can be a sign of unshaken strength; on the plane of ideas, in the welter of historical powers, life is equivalent to progress and mere self-protection amounts to self-surrender. Do not let us talk of preserving Democracy as a family heirloom, or a pardonable weakness; of Fascism being a normal and acceptable form of government on a par with Democracy; of Naziism being “justified” as a legitimate self-expression of the German soul. Democracy must indeed renew itself; this means an abandonment of certain illusions; but this also means a new advance, a new offensive against the buttresses of unfreedom.

9. The cause of the West urgently requires the establishment of unity. In an important respect, this will doubtless be carried into effect on the basis of the League of Nations; but, politically, the vital unity of the West must far outgrow the present limit of League provisions, whereas spiritually it must precede all formal covenant and juridical stipulation. The unity we need is not a tactical convention of random allies but the conscious and disciplined manifestation of a common substance threatened by a
conscious and resolute adversary. Such a unity must not mean opposing Naziism by a similarly rigid and uniform “Western” system with opposite aims—which does not exist and would not be Western at all. It means an elastic unity embracing a variety of interests and standpoints, designed to emphasize the basic identity in the face of a danger identical for all. That unity will embrace the Slavic East, Soviet Russia and various other countries and powers which are not primarily “Western” as well. Great as the material weight of their adhesion may be, it is yet surpassed by its moral importance. The Eastern allies testify that the West is merely a prefiguring sketch of united Mankind, a centre of crystallization for universal citizenship.

10. A tactical alliance with such fascist States as may oppose the expansion of Nazi Germany may not necessarily be a mistake, but it must be kept strictly apart from the original and constitutive “unity”. It may be a helpful addition, but if we have to depend on it we are half lost already. Unity can only be supplemented, not created, by a casual “parallelism of interests”. Nor would it be safe for us to rest our hopes on the “mutual dislike of the two dictators”. We may play on this and similar circumstances—not build on them. How could the West ever fight Nazi Germany except in the name of Liberty? There is no point in selling our souls for a bribe, be it even at the expense of Germany. Unity is imperative; recruits are welcome. However, before being united, we must be there.

* * * * *

“The proposal”, writes Robert Dell, “to give the Third Reich ‘fair play’ to practise international brigandage is a symptom of suicidal mania. What we have to do—all the countries that still value liberty and civilization and respect human rights—is to combine against it”. Fascist countries are natural allies of one another; it was a bad blunder of the West to entrust Mussolini with the defence of Austrian independence. The great problem of the present is “not that of averting imminent war, but that of organizing Europe in one sense rather than another”. (“Who shall plan the planners?” Different planners imply structurally different plans: this is the meaning of the “West”—and the “War against the West”). “We can destroy Hitlerism only by force of some sort, for it appeals to force and understands nothing but force. The only way to
stop the ‘healthy war-like joy’ of Nazi Germany in its ‘own strength’ is to show that Western civilization is still stronger’.

Wickham Steed urges “firm, open-eyed and well-prepared fidelity to the principles of liberal civilization on the part of the countries that still hold them dear, coupled with a settled resolve that war, the most illiberal, intolerant and irrational form of human enterprise, shall not be undertaken with impunity even by the strongest and most warlike of peoples”. Nor can League members observe neutrality towards a country guilty of the offence of war-making. “Otherwise their unwillingness to renounce neutrality must invalidate their former renunciation of war”.

What President Edward Beneš of Czechoslovakia (then Foreign Minister) wrote in 1933 may conveniently be added. “Apart from technical fitness, modern warfare requires moral qualities: a strong will, strong nerves, untiring endurance, quiet and self-control, and the consciousness of serving a good and just cause. . . . It is our endeavour to tie our State and our nation firmly to the civilization of Western Europe, as well as to connect our interests with the interests of Western Europe: not of Central and Eastern Europe alone. Western Europe must have a vital interest in our existence and our undisturbed evolution. In this sense do we also build up our military co-operation, always subject to our duties resulting from our membership of the League.”

Finally, I would clarify two further points.

The question will be raised perhaps whether a “total” policy of concessions would not be calculated to block all possibility of war, and even gradually to assuage the ferocious and embittered aggressiveness of Nazi Fascism. On the whole, I feel disposed to answer that question in the affirmative; only I should add the proviso that such a course, apart from being an utterly dishonourable moral suicide, would soon prove impracticable, and thus actually make for war with lessened chances of victory rather than for peace (however vile). Certainly, let us give Nazi Germany everything she may chance to desire: Eastern Europe and the Balkans, naturally Austria and Czechoslovakia, the Dutch and perhaps some Northern dependencies of “Teutonism”, a slice of Eastern France, not to mention the Germans under Swiss rule, and a fair helping of overseas colonies which, I am
confident, need not even be excessive; and, in logical conformity with that, a full moral acknowledgement of her domestic policy, best substantiated by an all-round string of fascist governments, partly on the German model, but in the first place, at the beck and call of Berlin... and we can hope, not groundlessly, that Nazi Germany will keep and even impose "peace". Nay, this enormous rise and expansion, especially at such a quick pace, would deeply alter the neo-German mentality, making its megalomania more open and more serene, freed to some degree from the persecution complex. It would entail the formation of new ruling classes of German social and military aristocracy and "colonial" officialdom; in course of time, these new oligarchies would probably come to resent the narrow totalitarianism of the Nazi Fascist state originally born of the throes of national and economic depression. Yet the more we ponder this "mental experiment", the more we are impressed by its complete unreality. The rule of the German "Master Man", at the height of his power, would be no less overweening and unbearable for being no longer typically fascist; it would recognize no final limits, and in time discover new claims—for instance, to "Aryan" India, or to North America with its German "racial elite". There would inevitably be constant, or at least intermittent, insurrectional warfare in various regions. However, we need not look so far ahead; it is as a much closer point that this plan of temporary pacifism would abut on an indomitable barrier of adverse facts. There would be no one to carry out the experiment: Russia might not give in without resistance, even if French help were to be withheld; it would be hard for England to prevail upon France to take such a course; and I doubt whether there could ever be an England to undertake the task. The plan would decidedly involve too much. It does not really square with human psychology: it requires a maximum of moral idealism and resolution subservient to a maximum of immorality. On the other hand, the method of reluctant petty concessions, though of doubtful morality and undoubted danger, is all too deeply rooted in human psychology.

Then there is the widespread antipathy to a policy of "encirclement" and the analogous fear of "splitting Europe into two camps". All that, however, is based on a misconception of the real issue. We cannot renounce the integration of mankind.
because some would prefer it to be a playground for their adventures in “mastery”, just as we cannot give up the use of our reason because Bedlamites feel hampered by it. The Franco-Russian Pact only “encircles” Germany because she has refused to join it: she has preferred “encirclement” to really binding mutual obligations, because what she is anxious about is not her own security but the insecurity of others. It will always “irritate” those who nurse dark designs if those around them, who cannot help being “around” them, arrange for their own protection. The same applies to the nightmare of “two inimical camps”. We should never dream of disbanding the police force just to prevent its “forming two camps” with the gangsters. We consciously reject the “Friend and Foe” theory of Herr Professor Carl Schmitt; we absolutely insist on what is most odious to him: the substitution of a moral “enmity” by the use of legal categories and the moral condemnation of barbarians who defy humanity, the substitution of “war” by “execution”; we are engaged in building a rational and democratic society in which there are no tribes at loggerheads—only the executive of civilized mankind on one side, and offenders against the law of mankind on the other side. Even if several offenders be leagued with one another, and command a respectable force: there can be no question of symmetrical “camps”. This aspect of the situation was already present, in an embryonic form, in the Great War. But what matters most practically is that, as soon as we really have succeeded in forming our “camp” the “camp” of mankind, there will be no other “camp” at all. And, are we really to desist from organizing peace, just because some may start meanwhile a “preventive” war in order to forestall the terrible danger of assured peace? I think that we ought then to be determined to break their obstructive will, even at the price of opposing a malignant “camp” with our own “camp” of human solidarity and goodwill.
3. **THE SOUL OF THE WEST**

“And she seemed broken, and they thought her dead:
The Overmen, so brave against the weak.
Has your last word of sophistry been said,
O cult of slaves? Then it is hers to speak.”

(CECIL CHESTERTON, “France.”)

When I was a boy, imprisoned within the murky gloom of the Imperial confederation against the West, my heart enshrined a wild hope for the victory of the “Entente”, and my lips pronounced its lovely name as a word of prayer. Not for a moment would I suppose that this was a conflict between “one” nation and “another”, between “one” group of nations and “another”, or between one group of business-men and another. I was dimly aware that “Entente” meant “Understanding”: mankind united under the sign of Reason and Liberty, under the leadership of the nations that bore the indelible stamps of the Magna Charta and the first sovereign Parliament in Europe, of the Enlightenment and the Great Revolution, of the Declaration of Independence and the traditions of Jefferson and Lincoln. I was also dimly aware of the daemonic creed of power unconfined and uncontrolled, and of delight taken in servility and unreason, on the hostile side. Little did I know then, however, how much clearer the issue would be drawn some day, long after a “victory” followed by confusion, disenchantment and a recovery of the ostensibly crushed “daemons”, and how much higher “the grapes of wrath” would yet be “stored”.

One thing is essential above all: the reawakening of the soul of the West. Unity and concord, yes; but not a casual and soulless consortium of peoples which, just at a certain moment, are prompted to fear the Third Reich; it must be a unity based on an intensified and extended “Understanding”: the old Entente, risen from the dead and purified, in the form of a League of Nations full of vitality, resolution and directive intelligence, reliable for its faithful members and capable of imposing its will on defaulters and aggressors.

As it is, fascist poison has deeply invaded the tissues of
Western civilization. But it is only for us to reduce that stronghold to a forlorn hope. Is there any reason, for those who cling to liberty and humanity, to despair of their cause? None whatsoever. True, there is now a slump in spiritual and social progress; but the powers ultimately sworn to it, ultimately at variance with the daemons of darkness and fatality who are mocking right, practically control the earth, a combination made up of the British Empire, France and her East European Allies, Soviet Russia and (particularly, in non-European relationships) the United States, readily and gladly supported by many important smaller nations, could be resisted by no one. Not a single really serious, let alone insurmountable, obstacle impedes that combination. Its value for everybody would be nothing less than vital. Naturally, this consideration alone does not suffice: for the mere computation of interests mostly provides a sluggish motive power, especially when it fails to accord with the urge of the most direct and visible, though in the long run secondary, local interests. This is why it must be said again and again: the Soul of the West is everything. There must be a spark to kindle the fire; there must be a living and active core around which to align mankind: the West aware of the menace of its Foe, and all that is Western and akin to Western essence, outside the West.

What have we to offer the German nation, besides its redemption from the tyranny of a pernicious fury? What will compensate it for the loss of historical opportunities granted to it in the years after 1918? We cannot say. Certainly, in whatever form the demise of the Third Reich takes place, it will be far from easy for Germany to live down the ravages it will have wrought till then; and many of us who have lived in close contact with the great spiritual values of a Christian, humanistic and progressive Germandom, may regret that. But in the first place, we must think of ourselves, of the West and those who follow it. In one point, let it be observed, the National Socialist regime may be supposed to have smoothed the path for a future German democracy; by reducing the remnant of individual dynastic states to complete insignificance, it has helped Germany towards becoming a nation in some ways like other nations; thus, against its own will, it may also have brought Germany nearer to the normal status of a national democracy stripped
of “cosmic” imperial dreams and pan-German or Pan-Teuton unlimitedness. The tension, hitherto unsolved, between Nazi Germany and the would-be restorers of the Hapsburg Empire may similarly work out in an anti-Imperial—and ultimately, pro-Western—sense.

Be that as it may, our own lives must be devoted to re-experiencing, restating and renewing Western Democracy. Politically, we must seek for Unity suffused by a common Soul; and mentally, begin again with the beginnings. With deep wisdom, Mowrer counters the Nazi plea for novelty and excitement: “No mystery can be more fundamentally stimulating, no political creed more breath-taking than the assertion, ‘All men are born free and equal.’ For to realize this in its immanence is a major problem of mankind.” Amidst all horrors of the present—and after all horrors, I fear, have been heaped up in this volume—let us take comfort to ourselves from the radiant Credo of T. G. Masaryk:

**Democracy is Still in Its Infancy.**

**The End**
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